CourtListener 10670079•In re J.H. CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/11/25 In re J.H. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re J.H., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D084759
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J245737)
v.
J.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Browder Willis and Robert J. Trentacosta, Judges. Reversed in part and
remanded.
Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Paige Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
In this juvenile court proceeding, the trial court sustained a petition
brought under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that J.H.
committed vandalism resulting in damage of $400 or more (Pen. Code, § 594,
subds. (a), (b)(1)) (count 1) and resisted a peace officer (id., § 148, subd. (a)(1))
(count 2). The trial court adjudged J.H. to be a ward, placed him on
probation, and ordered him to pay $6,151.69 in restitution to the victim of the
vandalism.
J.H. contends that (1) insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
finding on the vandalism count; (2) he did not receive constitutionally
adequate notice of the People’s intent to proceed on an aiding and abetting
theory for the vandalism count because that theory was raised for the first
time during closing argument; (3) the minute order from the disposition
hearing improperly imposes a condition of probation that the trial court did
not order at the disposition hearing; and (4) remand is required because the
trial court failed to indicate whether the vandalism offense was a
misdemeanor or a felony. The People concede that the last two contentions
have merit but dispute the others.
We conclude that insufficient evidence supports the true finding on the
vandalism count, and we therefore reverse that true finding. Further,
because the trial court’s order that J.H. pay restitution to the victim of the
vandalism is based on the trial court’s finding that J.H. committed
vandalism, we vacate the restitution order. Finally, we conclude that the
probation condition identified by J.H. must be stricken from the disposition
order because the trial court did not orally pronounce it. We need not, and do
not, reach the other issues raised by J.H.
I.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around noon on January 14, 2024, R.B. was driving his Chevrolet
Silverado truck in a commercial district in El Cajon. He came upon at least
25 “kids” on bicycles. The bicyclists were riding in all lanes of the street,
“going in and out of traffic” and “holding up traffic.” As R.B. prepared to
make a right turn onto another street, the bicyclists “were all over the place,”
with some on the right side of his truck, and some on the left side. One of the
bicyclists later testified that R.B.’s truck almost hit some of the bicyclists who
were in the right-hand lane.
At that point, while R.B. was looking in his left mirror and preparing to
make the right turn, he saw an iced tea can hit the driver’s side back corner
of his truck’s cab. The can exploded and fell into the truck bed. According to
R.B., the can damaged his truck by denting the back corner of the cab. R.B.
did not see anyone throw the can, but he inferred the can was thrown by a
youth with a specific type of bicycle and wearing distinctive clothing. Using
the hands of a clock to identify the youth’s position, R.B. stated that the
youth was located “between 6:00 and 7:00.” According to R.B., he concluded
that the youth located in that position was the person who threw the can
because he did not see anyone else near his truck at the time.
J.H. participated in the group bicycle ride that R.B. witnessed. R.B.’s
description of the youth he believed to have thrown the iced tea can was
consistent with J.H.’s clothing and bicycle on that day. Further, R.B. later
identified J.H. as the person to whom he was referring, both at the scene and
again in court.
After the iced tea can hit the truck, R.B. completed his right turn and
then immediately made a left turn into a parking lot. As R.B.’s truck entered
the driveway entrance to the parking lot, R.B. heard what he assumed was a
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loud kick to the right-hand side of his truck’s tailgate. Upon hearing the
“thump,” R.B. looked and saw J.H., and no one else, in a position to have
caused the thump, although he did not “visually see” J.H. “pick up his leg and
kick the tailgate.” R.B. explained, “I couldn’t see him because he was behind
the corner of my truck.” However, because of where J.H. was located, R.B.
was “one hundred percent positive” that J.H. was the person who struck the
truck, presumably by kicking it. Once again referring to the positions on a
clock, R.B. testified that J.H. “passed on the right-hand corner of my truck,
probably at the 5:00 o’clock side.”
After pulling into the parking lot, R.B. parked in front of a Starbucks
where there were at least 15 to 20 bicyclists. R.B. got out of his truck, started
taking photos, and according to one witness, yelled at the bicyclists. While
R.B. was standing near the back of his truck, a bicyclist other than J.H.
kicked the right-hand side of the truck’s tailgate and hit its passenger-side
mirror. R.B. saw those incidents take place in front of him as they occurred.
R.B. believed that the kick he witnessed made contact in a location that was
“pretty close” to the thump that R.B. heard while he was entering the
parking lot driveway, presumably caused by a kick from J.H. When asked
whether he could identify which specific parts of his truck were struck by the
first kick and the second kick, R.B. stated, “In the same area. I can’t tell you
which one hit which point.”
The bicyclists then left the parking lot, going in different directions,
and R.B. drove after the group that included J.H. At one point, as the
bicyclists drove through the city streets, the group went into and out of
another parking lot, and R.B. followed them as they did so. At that location,
some of the bicyclists threw large dirt clods and rocks at R.B.’s truck. R.B.
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was certain that J.H. did not throw rocks and dirt clods, as J.H. was already
bicycling down the street at the time, ahead of R.B.’s truck.
Eventually, as R.B. was following the bicyclists, the police arrived.
After some delay, J.H. stopped for a police officer, but as the officer got out of
his vehicle, J.H. rode off and then refused to stop when repeatedly ordered to
do so. Finally, an officer was able to stop J.H. by taking him to the ground.
R.B.’s truck sustained damage during the incident. In addition to the
dent in the back left corner of the cab where the iced tea can hit it, the truck’s
tailgate had a single dent on the right-hand side. R.B. received an estimate
from an auto body repair shop in the amount of $6,151.69 to fix the damage
to the tailgate and the corner of the cab.
A wardship petition was filed in juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 alleging that J.H. committed vandalism which
caused damage of at least $400 (Pen. Code, § 594 subds. (a), (b)(1)) (count 1)
and resisted a peace officer (id., § 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2).
At the jurisdictional hearing, the evidence included photographs of the
dent on the truck’s tailgate. During R.B.’s testimony, he noted that in one of
the photographs of the tailgate, there appeared to be two shoeprints in the
area of the dent. One shoeprint was on the bottom right area of the dent, and
the other shoeprint was on the top left area of the dent. During cross
examination, defense counsel asked, “Only one of those kicks left a dent and a
footprint on your tailgate; correct?” R.B. replied, “No. Two footprints.”
When defense counsel followed up by asking, “And which of these footprints
caused the majority of the damage or all of the damage to your tailgate?,”
R.B. answered “[b]oth footprints did it.”
An investigator for the public defender’s office testified that she had
enhanced the relevant photograph to be able to better see the shoe tread that
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appeared in the shoeprints. Based on that enhanced photograph, which was
received into evidence and which we have viewed, the investigator
determined that what R.B. assumed were two different shoeprints from two
different people were actually a single shoeprint from the same shoe. The
investigator suspected that the appearance of two different shoeprints on the
dent was created because the person’s foot “tilted” or “rotated” to the left at
the end of the kick. Using the shoe tread markings, the investigator
determined that the shoeprint was from a DC Metric brand shoe. The tread
appearing to the bottom right of the dent was from the heel area of the DC
Metric sole, and the tread appearing to the upper left of the dent was from
the toe area of the DC Metric sole. Based on our review of the photograph of
the DC Metric shoe that the investigator used for her comparison, along with
the photographs of the shoeprint markings that were entered into evidence,
we have confirmed that the investigator’s conclusion about the shoeprint
markings is well founded.
The undisputed evidence was that, during the incident, J.H. was
wearing Nike Air Force shoes, with well-worn soles. The tread on the sole of
those shoes is completely dissimilar to the tread on the DC Metric soles and
does not match any of the shoeprints on the dent in the truck’s tailgate.
During closing, the People argued that in light of the evidence about
the shoeprints, “if the Court doesn’t believe that the tread left on that truck
belonged to [J.H.],” it was still the case that “[J.H.] kicked the truck the first
time. [J.H.] maybe didn’t leave tread on the truck, but he did leave a dent.”
The People also argued that J.H. “aided and abetted the entire vandalism,”
regardless of the specific damage caused by his direct acts.
After a break, but before the trial court delivered its findings, defense
counsel objected to the People “amending their case to allege aiding and
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abetting” “at this point in the case.” The trial court stated it would “note
[the] objection for the record,” but dismissed the objection on the ground that
aiding and abetting was “just a theory.”
The trial court made a true finding on both counts in the wardship
petition. With respect to the vandalism count, the trial court found
insufficient evidence that J.H. threw the iced tea can and dented the truck
cab, but sufficient evidence that J.H. kicked the tailgate. Specifically, the
trial court stated, “While [R.B.] did not identify you as the person who threw
that initial object, he was . . . a hundred percent certain that you were at that
five or six o’clock position at the time of the thunk. And he never wavered
from that description.” With respect to the shoeprint evidence, the trial court
stated, “I certainly find myself interested in this whole idea of what was
happening with this footprint,” and it noted that “the public defender
investigator did a great job of researching.” However, ultimately, relying on
R.B.’s identification of J.H. as the first person who kicked the tailgate, the
trial court explained that although the testimony about the shoeprint,
“certainly made me look at your evidence really closely, it didn’t rise to the
level of reasonable doubt to negate the testimony of [R.B.]. . . . He was
certain that you were there at the time of the thunk. . . . And he was
adamant. And I don’t find anything that credibly created doubt as to the
quality of his testimony or his identification.”
Immediately after the trial court made true findings on both counts,
defense counsel asked the trial court to clarify, for the purpose of a future
restitution order, whether J.H. was responsible for the damage caused to the
truck’s cab (as opposed to the tailgate). The trial court initially stated that
its tentative ruling was “to exclude that part of the damage and to limit the
part of the damage to [the] tailgate.” However, after hearing argument from
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the People on their theory that J.H. aided and abetted all of the vandalism to
R.B.’s truck, the trial court concluded that J.H. was “liable for all of it” as
“the instigator of the entirety of the vandalism.”
At a subsequent restitution hearing, the trial court ordered J.H. to pay
$6,151.69 in restitution, which was based on the full amount of the repair
estimate obtained by R.B. At the jurisdictional hearing, the trial court
adjudged J.H. to be a ward and placed him on probation.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. J.H.’s Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence
J.H. first argues that insufficient evidence supports the true finding on
the vandalism count.
1. Standard of Review
“Our review of [J.H.’s] substantial evidence claim is governed by the
same standard applicable to adult criminal cases. [Citation.] ‘In reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ . . . ‘ “[O]ur role on appeal is a limited one.”
[Citation.] Under the substantial evidence rule, we must presume in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] Thus, if the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the
reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled
with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment.’ ” (In re
V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026, citations omitted.) We “may consider only
those inferences that are reasonably supported by the record. ‘ “[A]
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reasonable inference . . . ‘may not be based on suspicion alone, or on
imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess
work.’ ” ’. . . . It ‘must logically flow from other facts established in the
action,’ and it cannot be ‘based entirely on the suspicions of the officers
involved in the case and the conjecture of the prosecution.’ ” (People v. Ware
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167–168 (Ware), citations omitted.)
2. Insufficient Evidence Supports a True Finding on the Vandalism
Count Under the Theory That J.H. Directly Caused Damage to
R.B.’s Truck
The crime of vandalism is set forth in Penal Code section 594,
subdivision (a). “Every person who maliciously commits any of the following
acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases
other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism: [¶] (1) Defaces
with graffiti or other inscribed material. [¶] (2) Damages. [¶] (3) Destroys.”
(Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a).) If, as the trial court found here, “the amount of
defacement, damage, or destruction is four hundred dollars ($400) or more,”
the offense is punishable either as a felony or a misdemeanor. (Id., § 594,
subd. (b)(1).)
J.H. argues that, for two separate reasons, insufficient evidence
supports a finding that he was a direct perpetrator of vandalism: (1) no
substantial evidence supports a finding that he acted with malice in kicking
the truck; and (2) no substantial evidence supports a finding that he caused
damage in any amount to the truck. We need not decide whether the
evidence supports a finding of malice because, as set forth below, insufficient
evidence supports a finding J.H. caused any damage to R.B.’s truck, even
crediting R.B.’s testimony (as did the trial court) that (1) J.H. was the cause
of the “thump” to the tailgate, and (2) both visible shoeprints contributed to
the dent.
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As we have explained, the trial court found that the evidence did not
support a finding that J.H. threw the iced tea can. That specific finding of
fact in favor of J.H. is not challenged in J.H.’s appeal. Accordingly, to
determine whether the record contains substantial evidence that J.H. caused
any damage to the truck, we focus on whether the evidence supports a finding
that J.H. caused damage by kicking the truck’s tailgate.
On that question, the photographic evidence and the testimony from
the defense investigator regarding the shoeprint markings on the truck’s
tailgate are dispositive. We have examined the relevant photographs, all of
which show one dent to the tailgate. As the witnesses noted, the photographs
show shoeprint markings directly above and below the dent. As established
by the testimony of the defense investigator, as well as from the photographs
presented during her testimony, the shoeprint markings are both from a DC
Metric brand shoe. It is undisputed that J.H. was not wearing DC Metric
shoes during the incident, and the tread on the sole of J.H.’s shoes was
completely dissimilar to the tread on the DC Metric soles. Therefore, there is
no substantial evidence that a kick from J.H.’s shoe caused the dent on the
tailgate. In fact, the evidence is contradictory to any such inference.
During his testimony, R.B. disagreed with defense counsel’s suggestion
that only one of the kicks caused the dent. However, R.B. was very clear that
he reached that conclusion based on the fact that he saw two different
shoeprints on the dent. Normally, “the testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support a conviction.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535,
585.) However, that rule does not apply when the testimony “describes facts
or events that are physically impossible or inherently improbable.” (Ibid.)
R.B.’s assumption that one of the shoeprints on the dent was from J.H.’s kick
is undermined by the evidence showing that neither of the shoeprint
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markings were from J.H.’s shoes. As such, even though we have no basis to
question the trial court’s decision to credit R.B.’s testimony that (1) J.H.
caused a thump to his truck’s tailgate by kicking it; and (2) both of the
shoeprints on the tailgate contributed to the dent, without a reason to
conclude that J.H.’s kick caused one of the shoeprints, there is no logical
basis for R.B.’s assumption that the dent was caused by both J.H.’s kick and
the later kick that he witnessed while standing nearby.
In short, because (1) there is a single dent on the tailgate; (2) the
uncontradicted evidence shows that neither of the two shoeprints on the dent
came from J.H.’s shoe; and (3) R.B.’s assumption that the dent was caused by
two different kicks is inconsistent with the physical evidence, the
circumstances do not reasonably justify an inference that J.H. damaged the
truck when he made contact with it. As we “may consider only those
inferences that are reasonably supported by the record” (Ware, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 167), we conclude that insufficient evidence supports a
finding that J.H. “deface[d],” “damage[d]” or “destroy[ed]” R.B.’s truck as
required to establish the commission of vandalism in violation of Penal Code
section 594, subdivision (a).
b. Insufficient Evidence Supports a Finding That J.H. Aided
and Abetted Vandalism Committed By Others
As an alternate ground for supporting a finding that J.H. vandalized
R.B.’s truck, the People argue that J.H. aided and abetted other perpetrators,
who actually inflicted damage. Specifically, according to the People, J.H.
aided and abetted either the person who kicked the truck in R.B.’s presence
while it was parked at Starbucks, or the group of people who threw rocks and
dirt clods at the truck while R.B. was following the bicyclists through the city
streets. The People’s theory is that J.H. was an aider and abettor because, as
the trial court stated in deciding to hold J.H. financially responsible for all of
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the damage to the truck, J.H. was “the instigator of the entirety of the
vandalism.”
“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime . . . whether they
directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its
commission . . . are principals in any crime so committed.” (Pen. Code, § 31.)
“Thus, a person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if
someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts.” (People v. McCoy
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in
three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime
committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—
knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist
in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—
conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the
crime.” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) The actus reus
requirement must involve “some affirmative action.’ ” (People v. Partee (2020)
8 Cal.5th 860, 868, italics omitted.) The actus reus requirement is satisfied
where the aider and abettor “by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d
547, 561; see also People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 81, [“[t]he person
who advises and encourages the commission of the crime while present at its
perpetration surely falls within the definition of a principal,” italics added].)
Based on these principles, CALCRIM No. 401 sets forth the following
elements for a finding of guilt based on a theory of aiding and abetting:
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding
and abetting that crime, the People must prove that:
“1. The perpetrator committed the crime;
“2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit
the crime;
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“3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant
intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;
“AND
“4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime.
“Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the
perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends
to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” (CALCRIM
No. 401.)
Here, J.H. does not dispute that the first element is present. Someone
(or multiple people) did, in fact, vandalize R.B.’s truck by denting the tailgate
and throwing objects at it. As we will explain, however, the evidence is
insufficient to support a finding in favor of the People on the second, third
and fourth elements set forth in CALCRIM No. 401.
Addressing the second and third elements, the People argue that the
evidence “support[s] a reasonable inference that [J.H.] knew and shared in
the perpetrators’ intent to vandalize the truck.” To support their argument,
the People describe J.H. as “the leader of the group.” However, that
description is misleading. Although a fellow participant in the group bicycle
ride testified that J.H. was “leading” the ride, that witness used the word
“leading” to describe J.H. as being out in front of the group, marking the
intended route of the bicycle ride. That witness did not describe J.H. as
someone who took the lead in encouraging a group activity of vandalism.
Next, the People point to J.H.’s “continued engagement with the group”
during the bicycle ride. It is true that J.H. was present in the Starbucks
parking lot with the entire group of bicyclists and that he then stayed with
the subgroup of bicyclists whom R.B. followed as they rode through the city
streets. But J.H.’s continued participation in the group bicycle ride, by itself,
does not suggest that J.H. knew that any of his fellow participants intended
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to damage R.B.’s truck, or that he intended to encourage that activity. Such
an inference is especially unwarranted because R.B. testified that while the
other bicyclists threw the rocks and dirt clods at his truck, J.H. had already
bicycled away from those perpetrators, ahead of R.B.’s truck, and took no part
in throwing the objects. Finally, the People rely on J.H.’s failure to stop for
law enforcement. A failure to yield could reasonably support an inference
that J.H. had a guilty conscience for his participation in the incident.
However, that fact, standing alone, does not provide substantial evidence
that J.H. anticipated and encouraged other people to damage R.B.’s truck.
Therefore, we find no substantial evidence to support a finding that J.H.
knew of, and shared in, the perpetrators’ intent to vandalize R.B.’s truck.
Regarding the fourth element, the People contend that J.H.’s actus reus
consisted of encouraging and instigating the vandalism committed by third
parties. Specifically, the People argue that J.H. “instigated the vandalism by
throwing a full iced tea can at the truck and then kicking the tailgate hard
enough to dent it.” They contend that J.H.’s “own actions, in twice making
contact with the truck, support an inference that he . . . encouraged the
others to vandalize [the truck] by taking the metaphorical first swing at it.”
The argument is not persuasive because it is based on a series of incorrect
factual premises. As we have explained, the trial court did not find sufficient
evidence to establish that J.H. was the person who threw the iced tea can.
Further, the record does not support a finding that J.H. kicked the truck’s
tailgate “hard enough to dent it.” On the contrary, as we have explained, the
shoeprint markings on the truck contradict such a finding. Finally, the
record contains no evidence that any other bicyclist was watching J.H. kick
the truck. Indeed, R.B. testified that J.H. was the only person on the right-
hand corner of his truck when he heard the thump. Without evidence that
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the members of the bicycle group who later vandalized R.B.’s truck had any
knowledge of J.H.’s earlier kick, the record does not support a finding that, by
kicking R.B’s truck, J.H. encouraged other members of the group to engage in
similar activity.
Therefore, we find no sufficient evidence in the record to support the
People’s contention that J.H. aided and abetted the vandalism to R.B.’s truck
by encouraging and instigating it.1
Because the evidence does not support a finding of vandalism under
either a direct-perpetrator theory or an aiding-and-abetting theory, we
reverse the judgment insofar as it adjudges J.H. to have committed
vandalism. Further, because the restitution order was premised solely on the
true finding on the vandalism count, the restitution order must be vacated.
B. The Condition of Probation Advising J.H. “To Not Associate With
Negative Peers” Must Be Stricken From the Disposition Minute Order
The minute order from the disposition hearing sets forth the conditions
of J.H.’s probation. Among other things, the minute order states that “[J.H.]
is advised to not associate with negative peers” (the negative peer condition).
(Capitalization omitted.)
J.H. challenges the negative peer condition on two grounds: (1) it is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and (2) the trial court did not order
it during the disposition hearing.
1 Having concluded that insufficient evidence supports a finding that
J.H. committed vandalism as an aider and abettor, we need not, and do not
address J.H.’s contention that he did not receive constitutionally adequate
notice that the People intended to proceed on an aiding and abetting theory
when the People identified that theory for the first time during closing
argument.
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The People agree that the negative peer condition was not ordered by
the trial court at the disposition hearing and should therefore be stricken.
Specifically, during the disposition hearing, the trial court ordered certain
conditions of probation by referring to the numbered conditions that the
probation officer recommended in the social study that was submitted in
connection with the disposition hearing. The negative peer condition was not
identified in the social study, and the trial court did not state it was adding
that condition of probation during the disposition hearing.
“The record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the
clerk’s minute order.” (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.)
When there is a discrepancy between the minute order and the trial court’s
oral pronouncement, we may order that the minute order be modified “to
reflect the conditions orally imposed by the court.” (People v. Gabriel (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073; see also People v. Contreras (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 868, 881 [ordering that the minute order be corrected to
properly reflect the orally pronounced conditions of probation].) Here,
because the negative peer condition was not orally pronounced by the trial
court, we order that it be stricken from the minute order that sets forth the
conditions of J.H.’s probation.2
2 Because we resolve J.H.’s challenge to the negative peer condition on
the basis that the trial court did not orally pronounce it, we need not, and do
not, consider J.H.’s contention that the negative peer condition is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
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DISPOSITION
The true finding on the vandalism count (count 1) is reversed, and the
order of restitution in the amount of $6,151.69 is vacated. The matter is
remanded to the juvenile court for a new disposition hearing.
IRION, J.
I CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
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RUBIN, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent in part. Adhering to the substantial evidence
standard, there was sufficient evidence that J.H. directly perpetrated and
aided and abetted vandalism.
A. Vandalism — Direct Perpetration
In reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s factual findings, “ ‘ “we review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] We
determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] In so doing, a
reviewing court “presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ ” (People v.
Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1281.)
When making their decisions trial judges are not, as we are, limited to
a cold record. In addition to any physical evidence (here, photographs), they
hear the witnesses testify, observe their demeanor on the witness stand,
evaluate the character of the testimony, and at the end of the proceeding,
decide what occurred. (Evid. Code, § 780; CALCRIM No. 226.) Indeed, it is
well settled law that “[Courts of Appeal] must defer to the trial court’s factual
assessments” that are based on its assessment of live testimony because
“ ‘[w]e review a cold record and, unlike a trial court, have no opportunity to
observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses.’ ” (In re Luke M.
(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1427.) Observing how lay and expert witnesses
testify can make all the difference.
Here, the trial court heard testimony about the source of damage made
by minors to the back of R.B.’s truck. On one side of the case the truck’s
driver, R.B., said he saw J.H. kick his truck. The key part of the defense case
was a defense investigator who opined that based on photographs at which
she looked, there was a single dent belonging to a shoe not worn by J.H.
Further, she felt that what appeared as a second imprint was actually caused
by a single kicker’s foot (not J.H.) moving slightly.
In its role as fact finder, having heard the testimony, and observed the
witnesses on the stand, the trial court did not wholly accept the defense
investigator’s opinion regarding the single dent theory. Instead, the trial
court found only “that [the] heel print with the lettering” on the lower portion
of the dent was “clearly not” from J.H.’s shoe. The trial court went on to
observe that there were “many theories” as to whether or not both shoeprints
came from the same shoe or kick, stating “there’s questions as to what the
value of that information is.” Ultimately, the trial court found that the
defense investigator’s version of events “didn’t rise to the level of reasonable
doubt to negate the testimony of [R.B.].”
These are the kinds of decisions triers of fact are better positioned to
make than we. Evaluating the quality of the testimony using factors
unavailable to an appellate court (e.g., witness demeanor during testimony,
the quality of the testimony), the trial court simply credited R.B.’s testimony
over that of the defense investigator on the issue of separate kickers causing
separate shoeprints. We should not disturb that finding because “ ‘[i]n
reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court
2
should “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 646.)
As an example of why I would affirm, I turn to the photographs of the
dented tailgate. In the photographs one can see a DC Metric shoeprint on the
lower right side of the tailgate dent. But based on the quality of the
photographs, and consistent with R.B.’s testimony, the higher shoeprint to
the left is not clear enough to make a definitive determination regarding
tread. Additionally, attributing that higher shoeprint to J.H. corroborates
R.B.’s testimony. R.B. said that the second kick from the other bicyclist was
in the “[b]ottom right-hand corner . . . right above the bumper” and the first
kick from J.H. “was up higher.”
In sum, I find the photographic evidence and defense investigator’s
opinion are not dispositive, nor can it be fairly claimed they make R.B.’s
testimony improbable. Rather, the defense investigator’s testimony merely
conflicted with R.B.’s account that J.H. damaged his tailgate, and the trial
court resolved that factual question by accepting R.B.’s testimony. We should
not reweigh that determination on appeal, and the causation element of the
vandalism count is adequately supported on a direct perpetrator theory.
B. Vandalism — Aiding and Abetting
“Among the factors which may be considered in determining aiding and
abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct
before and after the crime, including flight.” (In re Jessie L. (1982)
131 Cal.App.3d 202, 217.) Additionally, “the aider and abettor need not have
advance knowledge of the crime or the perpetrator’s intent. ‘Aiding and
abetting may be committed “on the spur of the moment,” that is, as
instantaneously as the criminal act itself.’ ” (People v. Frandsen (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1148.)
3
J.H. was present at the scene of the crime, and the preorganized group
ride included his companions. J.H. also played at least a partial leadership
role. One of the fellow riders testified that J.H. was in front of the group
most of the time “leading [the] whole group.” That group rode “[a]ll over the
place,” holding up traffic, grabbing cars, and yelling.
Even though the trial court did not find that J.H. threw the iced tea
can, R.B. testified that J.H. was about ten feet away and the only rider in the
area when the can exploded against the truck, indicating J.H. was aware of
the first act of vandalism. J.H. then kicked R.B.’s truck, which led to a
second kick in the same location from a rider in a red hoodie, the swarming
and hassling of R.B. and other drivers, and eventually the throwing of rocks
and dirt clods by the rider in the red hoodie and others.
Although J.H. was riding away when the others threw rocks and dirt
clods, J.H. previously rode with that group. Additionally, the entire incident
lasted about 20 minutes, and R.B. described J.H. and another rider as “the
worst outta them all.” Finally, J.H. fled, indicating consciousness of guilt.
(People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 458.)
Based on this evidence, the trial court could have reasonably concluded
that J.H. was aware that his fellow riders intended to vandalize, and that he
instigated and encouraged that vandalism. I therefore find sufficient
evidence that J.H. aided and abetted the vandalism.
1
4
C. Vandalism — Malice
Although not reached by the majority, I briefly address J.H.’s argument
regarding insufficient evidence of malice. Malice under Penal Code section
594 “ ‘may be “presumed” or “implied” from the intentional doing of the act
without justification or excuse or mitigating circumstances.’ ” (People v.
Kurtenbach (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1282.)
J.H. “does not necessarily deny that he touched the truck with his foot,”
instead claiming that the contact could have been accidental or in self-
defense. J.H. asserts it was a chaotic scene, and two witnesses testified that
R.B. almost hit the cyclists. However, those witnesses did not state that R.B.
almost hit J.H., nor did they witness J.H kicking the truck.
Further, R.B. described the cyclists as “swarming” his truck and
“hassling” and “harassing” other drivers. R.B. testified that he was “[o]ne
hundred percent positive” that J.H. kicked his truck, describing it as a “hard
kick” and “really loud.” J.H. also fled the scene, ignoring repeated demands
from police to stop, from which consciousness of guilt may be inferred.
(People v. Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 458.) Based on this evidence, the
trial court could have reasonably inferred that J.H intentionally acted
“ ‘without justification or excuse or mitigating circumstances.’ ” (People v.
1 I also disagree with J.H.’s claim that he did not have adequate notice of
the aiding and abetting theory. “Under California’s practice of short-form
pleading, an instrument charging a defendant as a principal is deemed to
charge him as an aider and abettor as well. [Citation.] This ‘notice as a
principal is sufficient to support a conviction as an aider and abettor . . . “ . . .
without the accusatory pleading reciting the aiding and abetting theory.” ’ ”
(People v. Quiroz (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 65, 70.) I see no federal violation
either because J.H. was aware from the start that he was alleged to act with
“a large group of juveniles,” and the People did not affirmatively mislead or
ambush. (Id. at p. 71)
5
Kurtenbach, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1282.) I therefore find sufficient
evidence of malice.
D. Conclusion
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part. I would affirm the
true finding on the vandalism count and remand the matter to the juvenile
court to declare whether that offense is a felony or misdemeanor. I concur
that the challenged probation condition must be stricken.
RUBIN, J.
6
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