People v. Nero CA2/3

CourtListener 10667862Calctapp08.09.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/8/25 P. v. Nero CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B337211

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA310575)
v.

BENNIE TRIMALE NERO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Affirmed.
Gloria C. Cohen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

In 2007, a jury found Bennie Trimale Nero guilty of second
degree murder and found true that he personally used a knife in
committing the offense. Nero had testified at trial that he
stabbed the victim, but he contended he acted in self-defense or
in defense of his sister, Lisa Brown. Brown was a codefendant in
the case. In 2022, Nero petitioned for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied the petition at the
prima facie stage after concluding Nero was the actual killer. We
conclude Nero is not eligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter
of law. The record of conviction conclusively establishes he was
not convicted on an imputed malice theory. We affirm the trial
court’s denial of his petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Crime
Based on our review of the trial transcripts, we find the
background stated in the opinion affirming Nero’s conviction to
be an accurate summary of the evidence at trial.2 (See People v.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We refer to the law as section 1172.6 for the remainder of this
opinion.
2 On May 12, 2025, we granted the People’s request for
judicial notice of the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts from Nero’s
trial. Nero argues in his reply that we cannot rely on trial
transcripts at the prima facie stage, but concedes that it may be
appropriate to rely on the clerk’s transcript, trial court minutes,

2
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis) [appellate opinion
generally part of record of conviction as applied to § 1172.6
proceedings].) We therefore quote its description of the trial
evidence, which is in the published portion of the opinion. (People
v. Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504 (Nero).) We provide these
facts only “for background purposes and to provide context for the
parties’ arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974,
978, fn. 2, disapproved on another ground in People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569 (Patton).)
“A. The prosecution’s case-in-chief.
“On September 27, 2006, Milton Yates was found stabbed
to death in a parking lot fronting a laundromat and a market.
Videos from the laundromat’s and market’s surveillance cameras
showed Yates riding a bicycle in the parking lot. [Fn. omitted.]
Nero and Brown came out of the market. Brown got into a car,
but Nero remained outside, urinating. Yates rode his bicycle
around the car, and Nero walked to him. Brown got out of the
car and, after watching the two men, walked to them. Yates and
Nero fought. At one point, Nero grabbed the back of his pants
and bent near the back of his car. Nero stabbed Yates with a
knife four times. Autopsy results showed that Yates ingested
cocaine and ethyl alcohol within hours of his death.
“Detective Sunny Romero examined Yates’s bicycle, but he
did not find it possessed any evidentiary value. A photograph of

jury instructions, verdict form, appellate opinion, closing
arguments, and information. (See People v. Beaudreaux (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1232–1233 [record of conviction consisted
of clerk’s transcript, trial court minutes, jury instructions,
verdicts from underlying proceedings, and prior appellate
opinion].)

3
the bicycle, however, shows a black object bound to the bicycle’s
frame where a water bottle would normally be attached.
“B. The defense case.
“Nero testified. [Fn. omitted.] Brown is his older sister and
has been his legal guardian since their mother passed away when
he was 13. Around 2003 or 2004, Nero was convicted of grand
theft and of driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent. As a
result, he went to prison, where he developed a fear of knives. In
2004, he was shot and hospitalized for two to three weeks.
“On the afternoon of September 26, 2006, Nero ran into
Yates. Nero had never seen Yates in the neighborhood, but Nero
asked him for a quarter to buy a cigarette. Later that night, Nero
and Brown went to the liquor store to buy beer. Nero went inside
the store, and when he came out, he urinated, and Brown got into
their car. Yates approached Brown, who is a lesbian, and called
her a ‘bull dyke’ and ‘bitch.’ Yates made other comments and
hand gestures by moving his hands back and forth. He went to
the driver’s side of the car and threatened Nero. He challenged
Nero to a fight, saying ‘ “bring it on.” ’ Nero approached Yates,
and Yates hit him. Yates did not appear to be sober.
“ ‘Green Eyes’ pulled up in a car. Nero asked Green Eyes
what he would do if someone disrespected his sister. Green Eyes
said it depended on the situation. Green Eyes left, and Yates
and Nero resumed fighting. When Nero knelt by the back of his
car, he was merely pretending to get a weapon. And when he
grabbed the back of his pants, he was merely pulling them up
because they were baggy. Yates got a weapon from his bicycle
and stabbed Nero’s arm, creating a scar that was visible at trial.
Struggling over the weapon, the two men fell. Yates dropped the
knife. [Fn. omitted.] Nero picked it up and stabbed Yates, but

4
he did not intend to kill Yates. Nero dropped the knife.
“Throughout the altercation between Nero and Yates,
Brown was telling them to stop. She never told her brother to
fight Yates or encouraged him in any way, and she did not hand
him a knife. In his later statement to the police, Nero
maintained he acted in self-defense and that his sister told him
to stop.
“C. Rebuttal case.
“Detective Salaam Abdul examined Yates’s bicycle, which
was never booked into evidence but was instead released to the
victim’s son. At trial, he could not recall what the black item on
the bike was, but he believed it was ‘some balled up like plastic
that looked like it was crunched together.’ He did not find
anything on the bike having, in his opinion, evidentiary value.”
(Nero, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 507–509.)
Trial, Verdict, and Sentencing
The People charged Nero with first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) and alleged he had personally used a knife in the
commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The information
also charged Brown with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)).
In 2007, the People jointly tried Nero and Brown before a
jury. In closing argument, the prosecutor argued Nero stabbed
Yates and Brown aided and abetted Nero by handing him the
knife. The prosecutor relied on Nero’s testimony and the video
evidence. Nero’s counsel argued Nero stabbed Yates in self-
defense and because he was standing up for his sister. Nero’s
counsel told the jury, “He admits stabbing him. But stabbing,
just stabbing a person and killing him doesn’t add up to murder,
not in this country, not when there’s a defense of self-defense.”
Brown’s counsel explained aiding and abetting to the jury, and

5
argued Brown had not aided and abetted the murder. Brown’s
counsel highlighted Nero’s testimony and the video evidence that
he contended showed Brown attempting to stop Nero’s fight with
Yates.
The trial court instructed the jury on first and second
degree murder, second degree implied malice murder,
manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter, direct aider and
abettor liability, and the definitions of principals, among other
instructions. The jury was also instructed on the specific intent
required for first degree murder, second degree murder, and
voluntary manslaughter, and on provocation that reduces an
unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter. The court further
instructed the jury on express and implied malice. (CALJIC
Nos. 8.10 [defining murder as an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought], 8.11 [defining express and implied malice], 8.30
[defining second degree express malice murder without
deliberation and premeditation], 8.31 [defining second degree
implied malice murder].)
The jury also heard various self-defense instructions. Two
were generally worded, such that they could have pertained to
either Nero or Brown. (CALJIC Nos. 5.10 [resisting attempt to
commit felony], 5.12 [justifiable homicide in self-defense].)
However, several were specifically tailored to the defense’s theory
that Nero acted in self-defense of himself and Brown.
For example, the jury was instructed: “Homicide is
justifiable and not unlawful when committed by any person in
defense of himself or another. In this case, Miss Brown, the
defendant Nero’s sister, if he actually and reasonably believed
that the individual killed intended to commit a forcible and
atrocious crime . . . .” CALJIC No. 5.32, regarding use of force in

6
defense of another, stated, as given: “It is lawful for a person who,
as a reasonable person, has grounds for believing and does
believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon another, in
this case, defendant Brown, to protect that individual from
attack. [¶] In doing so, he may use all force and means which
that person believes to be reasonably necessary and which would
appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar
circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which
appears to be imminent.”
In addition, the jury was instructed only as to Nero: “It is
alleged in count 1 that in the commission of the felony charged,
the defendant Nero personally used a dangerous or deadly
weapon. [¶] If you find defendant Nero guilty of the crime thus
charged or a lesser included felony crime, you must determine
whether the defendant Nero personally used a deadly weapon in
the commission of that crime.”
The court did not instruct the jury on felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.
During deliberations, the jury asked the court: “If [B]rown
is an ‘aide&abet’ [sic] must she rec[ei]ve [the] same level of guilt
(or innocence) as Mr. Nero? Can she rec[ei]ve a higher or lesser
degree of murder, manslaughter, or innocence?” In response, the
trial court repeated CALJIC No. 3.00: “Each principal, regardless
of the extent or manner of participation, is equally guilty. [¶]
Principals include, one, those who directly and actively commit or
attempt to commit the act constituting the crime, two, those who
aid and abet in the commission or attempted commission of the
crime.”
The jury convicted Nero guilty of second degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), and found true the allegation that he personally

7
used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission
of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The jury also found Brown
guilty of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Nero to
a term of 16 years to life. A different panel of this court affirmed
Nero’s conviction on direct appeal, but reversed the conviction as
to Brown.3
Resentencing Proceedings
In 2022, Nero filed a form petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. He checked boxes on the form indicating that he
was convicted of murder under a now invalid theory and he could
not be convicted presently due to changes to sections 188 and
189. The trial court appointed counsel. The People opposed the
petition, arguing Nero was ineligible for relief because he was the
actual killer. The People’s opposition attached the opinion from
Nero’s direct appeal.
The trial court denied the petition. The court found Nero
was ineligible for relief as a matter of law as the actual killer. In
reaching this conclusion, the trial court cited the opinion from
Nero’s direct appeal, which described Nero’s testimony admitting

3 The opinion in the direct appeal explained, “During
deliberations, the jury asked if they could find Brown, the aider
and abettor, guilty of a greater or a lesser homicide-related
offense than Nero, the direct perpetrator. They were told that
principals in a crime are equally guilty. The jury then found
Nero and Brown equally guilty of second degree murder. In the
published portion of this opinion, we hold that the instruction
was prejudicial error, and the judgment as to Brown must
therefore be reversed. In the unpublished portion of this opinion,
we affirm the judgment as to Nero.” (Nero, supra, 181
Cal.App.4th at p. 507.)

8
he was the actual killer, and the jury’s verdict finding he
personally used a knife in the commission of the offense.
Nero timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of murder and limited the scope of the felony murder rule.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) The bill amended section 188, requiring
that to be convicted of murder, “a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The bill also amended section 189,
subdivision (e) so that a person may now be convicted of felony
murder only if he or she (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the
actual killer but, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the
actual killer in committing first degree murder; or (3) “was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life.”
However, a principal in a murder, even as an aider and
abettor, may still be criminally liable if he or she personally
possesses malice aforethought, whether express or implied.
(People v. Silva (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639–640; People v.
Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595–596 [Sen. Bill No. 1437 did
not “alter the law regarding the criminal liability of direct aiders
and abettors of murder because such persons necessarily ‘know
and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator’ ”].)

9
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created “a procedural mechanism
for those previously convicted of murder under a theory amended
in [Senate Bill No. 1437] to petition for resentencing.” (People v.
Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 880 (Emanuel); see also Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) “The process begins with the filing
of a petition that declares, among other things, that ‘[t]he
petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because
of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’
the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3);
see id., subd. (b)(1)(A).)” (Emanuel, at p. 880.) Senate Bill
No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) subsequently extended
resentencing relief to any person convicted of murder based on
any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime . . . .”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
II. Prima Facie Stage and Standard of Review
At the prima facie stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) A court may not reject the petitioner’s
allegations “ ‘on credibility grounds’ ” or engage in “ ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ”
(Id. at pp. 971, 972.)
“If the trial court determines that the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief, it ‘shall issue an order to show cause.’
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 880.)
However, “ ‘If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial

10
court may dismiss the petition.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Antonelli
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724 (Antonelli).)
As our high court has “repeatedly said, ‘[t]he record of
conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry . . . , allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.’
[Citations.]” (Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 731.) “We
independently review the trial court’s determination that the
petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing for relief.”
(People v. Ramos (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 460, 465.)
III. Any Error In Denying Nero’s Petition Was Harmless
Because the Record of Conviction Conclusively
Establishes He Is Not Eligible for Relief as a Matter
of Law
Nero contends the trial court denied his petition based on
an “improper review of the record.”4 He further argues that the
jury instructions under CALJIC Nos. 3.01 and 8.31 were
ambiguous and permitted the jury to impute malice. We
conclude that any trial court error was harmless because the
record of conviction conclusively refutes the allegation in his
petition that he is eligible for resentencing.

4 We do not address Nero’s arguments that the trial court
erred by relying on the summary of facts in the opinion on direct
appeal, and by allegedly misunderstanding that he acted with an
accomplice. Our de novo review indicates the record of conviction
conclusively establishes Nero is ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and any error was therefore
harmless. (Cf. People v. Mejorado (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 562,
572.) We may affirm the trial court order if it is correct on any
ground. (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807.)

11
A. The charges, closing arguments, jury
instructions, and verdicts show that the jury
did not impute malice to Nero as an aider and
abettor
The jury was never instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or the felony-murder doctrine. Thus, Nero
is eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 only if he was
convicted pursuant to a theory under which malice was imputed
to him based solely on his participation in a crime. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).) The record of conviction establishes that no such
theory was available to or presented to the jury.
At trial, the theory of all counsel—the prosecution and both
defense counsel—was that Nero was the direct perpetrator and, if
involved at all, Brown was an aider and abettor. No evidence
was offered to support a conclusion that anyone other than Nero
stabbed Yates and killed him. Nero testified that he stabbed
Yates. His theory, as argued by counsel, was that he committed
the killing in self-defense, or in defense of Brown. (People v.
Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 86 [actual killer is “the person
who ‘personally’ commits the homicidal act”].) The People
charged only Nero, not Brown, with using a knife, and the jury
found Nero personally used a knife in the commission of the
second degree murder. The prosecutor’s closing argument did not
state or suggest that anyone other than Nero was the perpetrator
who stabbed Yates.
While whether Nero’s killing of Yates was justified was
disputed at trial, that he committed the deadly stabbing was not.
Further, the charges, verdicts, closing arguments, and jury
instructions establish that the jury convicted Nero as the direct
perpetrator who stabbed Yates to death. Nero’s form

12
resentencing petition and his reply to the People’s opposition
asserted only conclusory allegations that he was entitled to relief
under section 1172.6. With respect to whether Nero was the
person who actually killed Yates, Nero’s petition identified no one
else as the direct perpetrator and there was no material fact
dispute on that point. As our high court has reasoned in the plea
context, “absent specific facts, no such [material fact] dispute
arises . . . from mere latent, speculative possibilities; that is, a
hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be conjured from
thin air or a legal conclusion.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 567.)
Because he was convicted as the direct perpetrator, Nero
has no basis to argue he was convicted under a theory in which
the jury imputed malice to him based solely on his participation
in a crime. As noted above, the jury was not instructed on felony
murder, or any other theory that would have permitted the jury
to find Nero guilty of murder while simultaneously concluding
that, although he stabbed Yates to death, he did not personally
harbor either express or implied malice.
B. Even if the jury somehow convicted Nero as an
aider and abettor, the record conclusively
establishes that it did not impute malice to him
While the jury was instructed on aiding and abetting
liability, the charges and closing arguments made clear that this
theory of guilt pertained to Brown only. However, even assuming
the jury somehow could have convicted Nero as an aider and
abettor instead of as the direct perpetrator, we disagree that it
could have found him guilty of murder by imputing malice to
him.

13
The version of CALJIC No. 3.01 given to the jury required
it to find the aider and abettor “by act or advice” aided, abetted,
promoted, encouraged, or instigated the commission of the crime
“with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator” and
“with the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime.” When the aiding and
abetting instruction given to a jury includes such language, the
jury may find a defendant guilty under this theory only if it finds
the aider and abettor shares the perpetrator’s specific intent.
(People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 (McCoy) [the aider
and abettor shares the specific intent of the perpetrator “ ‘when
the accomplice “knows the full extent of the perpetrator’s
criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with
the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission
of the crime” ’ ”].)5 Thus, Nero would have had to share Brown’s
murderous intent even if the jury convicted him, not her, as an
aider and abettor.
Nero contends that the combination of two jury
instructions, CALJIC No. 3.01 and CALJIC No. 8.31, created an
ambiguity which allowed the jury to impute malice. We disagree.
In addition to CALJIC No, 3.01, the trial court instructed
the jury with CALJIC No. 8.31, which, as given stated: “Murder

5 McCoy made “clear . . . that ‘when guilt does not depend on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, . . . the aider
and abettor must know and share the murderous intent of the
actual perpetrator.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Flores (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173, fn. 4; see Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 731 [“we agree with the Attorney General that ‘the
[section 1172.6] eligibility question will turn on an examination
of both the governing law at the time of trial and the record of
conviction, including the jury instructions’ ”].)

14
of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being
when, [¶] one, the killing resulted from an intentional act; [¶]
two, the natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human
life, and; [¶] three, the act was deliberately performed with the
knowledge of the danger to and with conscious disregard for life.
[¶] When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not
necessary to prove that the defendant intended that the act
would result in the death of a human being.”
Nero relies on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
(Langi) for his assertion of ambiguity. In Langi, the defendant
was one of four people to assault a victim during a robbery. (Id.
at pp. 975–976.) The victim died after falling during the assault
and hitting his head. (Id. at p. 975.) The court instructed the
jury on first degree felony murder and direct aiding and abetting,
and the jury ultimately convicted Langi of second degree murder.
(Id. at p. 977.) The trial court denied Langi’s petition for
resentencing at the prima facie stage. (Ibid.) However, the
Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the jury could have
convicted Langi as an aider and abettor, and CALJIC No. 3.01
did not adequately explain that to be convicted of aiding and
abetting second degree implied malice murder, Langi had to
“have acted with the mental state of implied malice.” (Langi, at
p. 983.) The Langi court noted that CALJIC No. 8.31 provided
that although the jury must find the killing resulted from an
intentional act, it was “ ‘not necessary to prove that the
defendant intended that the act would result in the death of a
human being.’ ” (Langi, at p. 981.) The Langi court thus
observed that while the perpetrator of the killing must have
deliberately performed the fatal act, his or her “purpose,” the
term used in CALJIC No. 3.01, “may have been only to strike or

15
to injure, or conceivably only to embarrass, the victim. Since the
perpetrator’s purpose need not have been to kill the victim, the
aider and abettor’s knowledge of that purpose similarly need not
have been knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill. If the
perpetrator need not have had ‘murderous intent,’ certainly the
aider and abettor need not have had such an intent.” (Langi, at
pp. 982–983.)6
Langi is materially different from this case. In Langi, the
defendant was charged with and found guilty of robbery and
battery, in addition to murder. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 976.) The only crime charged in this case was murder. The
jury was instructed that murder required either intent to kill or
implied malice (based on conscious disregard). The only possible
“unlawful purpose” at issue here was an unlawful killing, and
“one cannot knowingly and intentionally help another commit an
unlawful killing without acting with malice.” (McCoy, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 1123.)
Moreover, in our view, when considered in the context of
the rest of the instruction, CALJIC No. 3.01’s reference to
“purpose” can only mean the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent.
As noted above, CALJIC No. 3.01 instructs that a person aids and
abets the commission of a crime when, with knowledge of the
perpetrator’s “unlawful purpose,” and with “the intent or purpose
of committing or encouraging or facilitating” the commission of

6 Nero also cites People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689,
714, in which the court viewed the aiding-and-abetting
instruction, which was identical in relevant part to the aiding-
and-abetting instruction in Langi and given here, as inadequate
as applied to the crime of second degree murder because it did
not clarify that an accomplice must personally harbor the mental
state of implied malice. (Powell, at p. 714.)

16
the crime, by “act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the commission of the crime.” The instruction’s second
use of “purpose” is as a synonym for intent. We see no basis to
conclude that, in the first use of “purpose,” the word would have a
meaning other than as a synonym for intent. The unlawful
purpose the aider and abettor was required to share here was the
direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent, defined in this case as either
an intent to kill, or committing an act with the knowledge that it
was dangerous to human life and with conscious disregard of that
danger. Since no other crimes were charged, there was no
ambiguity and no opportunity for the jury to determine the
shared unlawful purpose was anything other than an intent to
kill or implied malice.
Thus, the record of conviction conclusively establishes that
Nero was not convicted based on a now invalid theory. He is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law.

17
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Nero’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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