People v. Sneed CA2/7

CourtListener 10667860Calctapp08.09.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/8/25 P. v. Sneed CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B336299

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA314300)
v.

DONNIE SNEED,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kristen J. Inberg and Taylor
Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
INTRODUCTION

In 2011 a jury found Donnie Sneed guilty of failing to
register as a sex offender after he was released from prison in
2006. The trial court found Sneed had two prior serious or
violent felony convictions and had served a prior prison term.
The court sentenced Sneed to a prison term of 25 years to life
under the three strikes law, plus one year for the prior prison
term enhancement.
In 2023 the superior court held a resentencing hearing
under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 The court struck the prior
prison term enhancement and resentenced Sneed to a prison
term of 25 years to life. Sneed argues the superior court abused
its discretion in denying his request under People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to strike his prior
serious or violent felony convictions and in denying his request to
dismiss those convictions under section 1385, subdivision (c). We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. A Jury Convicts Sneed of Failing To Register as a
Sex Offender, and the Trial Court Sentences Him
Before he was released from prison on parole in 2006,
Sneed met with a correctional counselor. During that meeting
Sneed signed a document stating he had to register as a sex
offender. When Sneed was released, he was ordered to live at a
specific motel, but he never checked in. Sneed moved to

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Louisiana for a job. In 2010 he returned to California and turned
himself in. Sneed told his parole agent he had registered with
the Los Angeles Police Department in 2006, but there was no
record of Sneed registering with any law enforcement agency.
(People v. Sneed (Apr. 15, 2013, B233710) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2011 a jury convicted Sneed of failing to register as a sex
offender. (§ 290, former subd. (a)(1)(A).) The trial court found
Sneed had two prior serious or violent felony convictions, within
the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and had served a prior prison term,
within the meaning of section 667.5, former subdivision (b). The
court sentenced Sneed as a third strike offender to a term of
25 years to life, plus one year for the prior prison term
enhancement. We affirmed. (People v. Sneed, supra, B233710.)

B. The Superior Court Resentences Sneed Under
Section 1172.75
In 2021 the Legislature declared legally invalid prior prison
term enhancements imposed under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), before January 1, 2020, except those arising from
convictions for sexually violent offenses. The Legislature enacted
section 1172.75, which provides a procedure for resentencing
inmates serving prison terms that include the now-invalid
enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
In 2023 the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
notified the superior court that Sneed was serving a prison term
that included a no-longer-valid enhancement under section 667.5,
former subdivision (b). Sneed asked the court to strike the
invalid enhancement and one of his prior serious or violent felony
convictions and to resentence him to a determinate term. Sneed

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argued that, if he were sentenced today for failing to register as a
sex offender, the People would not seek an indeterminate term
under the three strikes law. He also argued that, because of his
age (64) and diminished physical condition (he uses a walker), he
was unlikely to be a danger to the community and that he
suffered from mental illness that should be treated in a non-
custodial setting. Finally, Sneed argued he had taken advantage
of educational opportunities in prison and had not been
disciplined for five years.
The prosecutor argued Sneed’s criminal record, along with
his “poor performance on parole and lackluster rehabilitation
while in prison,” placed him within the spirit of the three strikes
law. The prosecutor stated that, if the superior court resentenced
Sneed to a determinate sentence, he would be immediately
released, even though he posed an “unreasonable risk to public
safety” and the parole board found him unsuitable for parole in
2022. The prosecutor also argued there was no guarantee Sneed
would receive the mental health treatment he needed if he were
released without supervision.
The superior court struck the prior prison term
enhancement but denied Sneed’s motion under Romero. The
court agreed with the People that Sneed was “within the spirit of
[the] three strikes law.” The court stated that Sneed’s prior
serious or violent felonies included “a stabbing with a homemade
ice pick,” “forcible rape,” and “oral copulation” and that Sneed
also had a prior conviction for domestic violence (§ 273.5). The
court also found that Sneed had “poor performance on parole”
and that his prison record was “not spotless.” The court
resentenced Sneed to a prison term of 25 years to life. Sneed
timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.75
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), states: “Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” (See People v. Rhodius (2025)
17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054; People v. Grajeda (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
829, 835-836.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (b), requires the
Department to identify individuals serving terms that include
no-longer-valid enhancements. After the superior court verifies a
judgment includes an invalid enhancement, the court must
“recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (c).) Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), provides the court
must “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and
apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” ““‘By its plain terms,
section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the
trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.’”” (People v.
Dixon (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 236, 243.) “The court may consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced
the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)

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We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions in a
section 1172.75 resentencing proceeding for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 366, review
granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628; People v. Garcia (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855-856.) However, where the appeal from
a resentencing order “raises questions of law, our review is
de novo.” (Mathis, at p. 366; see People v. Braden (2023)
14 Cal.5th 791, 804 [“‘The interpretation of a statute presents a
question of law that this court reviews de novo.’”].)

B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Sneed’s Request To Dismiss His Serious or
Violent Felony Conviction
Sneed argues the superior court abused its discretion in
denying his request to dismiss one of his prior serious or violent
felony convictions and to sentence him as a second strike offender
to a determinate term. The court did not abuse its discretion.
The trial court has discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (a), to dismiss in furtherance of justice “allegations or
findings that a defendant has previously been convicted of a
serious and/or violent felony that would otherwise count as a
‘strike’ under the ‘Three Strikes’ law.” (People v. Dain (2025)
18 Cal.5th 246, 252; see Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-
530.) “‘[W]hen facing a motion to dismiss a strike allegation, the
trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of
[the defendant’s] background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or
in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not

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previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.”’” (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 358; see
People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
“[T]he three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing
norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart
from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its
decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378; see People v. Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th
at p. 358; People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140.) “We
review a trial court’s ruling on a Romero motion under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard, which requires the
defendant to show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary.” (Avila, at p. 1140; see Carmony, at p. 375.) It “‘is not
enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about
whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.
[Citation.] Where the record is silent [citation], or ‘[w]here the
record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant
facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the
spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if
we might have ruled differently in the first instance’ [citation].
Because the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by which a
career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very
scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike
as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation
of which the law was meant to attack’ [citation], the
circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that
the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme
must be even more extraordinary.” (Carmony, at p. 378.)

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The circumstances are not extraordinary here. The nature
and circumstances of Sneed’s prior serious or violent felony
convictions place him squarely within the spirit of the three
strikes law. In 1988 Sneed was convicted of assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), for stabbing the victim in the
chest with a homemade ice pick. In 1989 Sneed was convicted of
forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) and forcible oral copulation
(former § 288a, subd. (c)(1)) after he invited his 19-year-old victim
to his home to do cocaine, ordered her at knifepoint to undress,
and forced her to engage in oral, anal, and vaginal sex.2
Sneed argues his serious or violent felony convictions in
1988 and 1989, while “serious,” were “too remote to put [him]
within the spirit” of the three strikes law. However, the
“remoteness of a prior conviction, ‘by itself, cannot be the basis
for dismissing a prior strike conviction.’” (People v. Dowdy (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 (Dowdy); see § 667, subd. (c)(3) [“[t]he
length of time between the prior serious or violent felony
conviction and the current felony conviction shall not affect the
imposition of sentence”]; People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
328, 342 [section 667, subdivision (c)(3), “suggests, at a minimum,
that remoteness alone cannot take a defendant outside the spirit
of the very law that expressly rejects remoteness as a basis for
avoiding the law”], disapproved on another ground in People v.
Dain, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 265, fn. 5.) Instead, “older strike
convictions do not deserve judicial forgiveness unless the
defendant has used them as a pivot point for reforming his ways.”
(People v. Mayfield (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107.)

2 Though the People alleged Sneed had three prior serious or
violent felony convictions, the record reflects the court found he
had two prior serious or violent felony convictions.

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Sneed did not pivot. After he was released from prison for
his sex crimes, Sneed was convicted in 1995 of domestic violence
(§ 273.5) and sentenced to a prison term of six years for beating
the mother of his children, causing “unconsciousness, lacerations,
and hearing loss.” In 2005 Sneed was convicted of possessing a
controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code § 11350, subd. (a)) and
sentenced to 32 months in prison. Thus, though 22 years elapsed
between Sneed’s prior serious or violent felonies and his 2011
conviction, they were not crime-free years. (See People v.
Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [13-year period between the
defendant’s prior serious or violent felony convictions and the
current felony was “not significant,” where the defendant “did not
refrain from criminal activity during that span of time, and he
did not add maturity to age”]; People v. Vasquez (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 374, 390 [“A prior strike conviction is not
considered ‘remote’ for the purposes of mitigation where the
defendant has not demonstrated a prolonged period of
rehabilitation (a crime free life) in the interim.”].)
Sneed also argues that he has been law-abiding since 2011,
when he was convicted of failing to register, and that he
committed his last violent felony (domestic violence) in 1994,
almost 30 years before the resentencing hearing. However, in
“‘analyzing whether a defendant’s prior criminal conduct was
“remote,” the court should consider whether the defendant “was
incarcerated a substantial part of the intervening time and thus
had little or no opportunity to commit” additional crimes.’”
(People v. Beasley (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 495, 501; see People v.
Vasquez, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 390.) Sneed has been in
prison since 2011, as well as part of the time between 1995 and
2011, which limited his opportunity to commit additional crimes.

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And though Sneed has not been convicted of any crimes while
incarcerated, in 2015 he was found guilty of a prison rule
violation for battery on a peace officer.
Sneed further argues his most recent felony (failing to
register) is “minor” and “not a statutorily serious or violent
offense.”3 He relies on People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991,
but the facts in Cluff were quite different. In Cluff the defendant
“consistently registered [as a sex offender] in the jurisdictions
where he resided,” but did not update his registration annually, a
requirement the Legislature added five years after the defendant
left prison. (Id. at p. 1001.) Describing the defendant’s violation
as “the most technical violation of the section 290 registration
requirement we have seen,” the court held the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the defendant’s Romero motion. (Cluff,
at p. 994.) Sneed, in contrast, never registered as a sex offender,
left the state, and when he was arrested after returning to
California, falsely claimed he had registered.
Sneed argues his “conviction may have been connected to
mental illness . . ., which is a mitigating factor.” He cites a 2015
prison report stating he “has a documented mental illness which
manifests in symptoms of paranoia, delusion, hearing voices,
mood instability and negative behaviors.” But Sneed does not
point to any evidence his failure to register in 2006 was

3 In 2012 the voters approved Proposition 36, which
amended section 667 to authorize a court to sentence a third
strike offender to a life sentence only when the new offense is a
serious or violent felony, with certain exceptions, including, as
applicable here, where the defendant had a prior serious or
violent felony conviction for a sexually violent offense. (See § 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I).)

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connected to mental illness. Sneed also argues he is “unlikely to
commit violent felonies due to his age and physical condition.”
But the superior court considered Sneed’s mental illness, age,
and physical condition, and stated granting Sneed’s Romero
motion “would result in release of an individual with mental
illness that may [commit] further serious and violent sex crimes
even [at] his present age.” In light of Sneed’s criminal history,
the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
Sneed was within the spirit of the three strikes law.

C. Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2)(B), Does Not Apply
to the Three Strikes Law
Sneed argues the superior court erred in not dismissing his
prior serious or violent felony convictions under section 1385,
subdivision (c). Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), provides “the
court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so.” Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), provides that, in
exercising its discretion under subdivision (c), the court must
consider and “afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove” any of nine listed mitigating factors (see
§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)-(I)), “unless the court finds that dismissal
of the enhancement would endanger public safety” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)). Sneed contends he offered evidence to prove three of
those mitigating factors: sentencing him as a third strike offender
resulted in a sentence of over 20 years (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)), his
offense was connected to mental illness (id., subd. (c)(2)(D)), and
his prior convictions were over five years old (id., subd. (c)(2)(H)).
As Sneed acknowledges, however, every court that has
considered the issue has held that, because “subdivision (c) of
section 1385 applies only to an ‘enhancement,’” and because the

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three strikes law is not an enhancement, section 1385,
subdivision (c), does not apply to the three strikes law. (People v.
Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243; see, e.g., Dowdy, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 9-10; People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th
60, 67; People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 776, fn. 2.) We
continue to agree with those courts.
“The term ‘enhancement’ has a well-established technical
meaning in California law. [Citation.] ‘A sentence enhancement
is “an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.”’
[Citations.] It is equally well established that the Three Strikes
law is not an enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing
scheme for the current offense. [Citations.] We presume the
Legislature was aware of, and acquiesced in, both this
established judicial definition of enhancement and the distinction
between an enhancement and an alternative sentencing scheme
such as the Three Strikes law.” (People v. Burke, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243; accord, People v. Olay, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 65-66; see Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 527 [the three strikes law “articulates an alternative
sentencing scheme for the current offense rather than an
enhancement”].)
Sneed argues “the Legislature’s uncodified preamble in
Assembly Bill 600 suggests that section 1385, subdivision (c)
should apply to strikes as well as enhancements.” Effective
January 1, 2024, Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.)
amended section 1172.1, which authorizes a court to recall and
resentence a defendant when, for example, the Secretary of the
Department recommends resentencing. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1);
see Dowdy, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 10.) Assembly Bill
No. 600 amended section 1172.1 to allow a court to resentence a

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defendant when “applicable sentencing laws at the time of
original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), as amended by
Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2.)
Sneed relies on the following language from the preamble
to Assembly Bill No. 600: “It is the . . . intent of the Legislature
that courts have full discretion in resentencing proceedings
pursuant to Section 1172.1 . . . to reconsider past decisions to
impose prior strikes. The list of factors considered in [Romero] is
not exhaustive. Courts should consider Section 1385,
postconviction factors, or any other evidence that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interests of justice.”
(Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 1, para. (b).) Sneed does not explain why
the preamble to Assembly Bill No. 600, which amended
section 1172.1 (a statute not at issue in this appeal), has any
bearing on the interpretation or application of section 1385,
subdivision (c). (See Dowdy, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 10
[“Because Assembly Bill 600 amended section 1172.1—but not
section 1172.75—the expression of legislative intent in Assembly
Bill 600 . . . has no relevance to this case.”].)

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.

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