People v. Wimberly CA3

CourtListener 10663230Calctapp29.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/29/25 P. v. Wimberly CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101179, C101196

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 02F09968,
00F03503)
v.

LARRY WIMBERLY,

Defendant and Appellant.

In these consolidated matters, defendant Larry Wimberly appeals from the trial
court’s orders denying his motion to vacate a conviction (Pen. Code, § 1473.7)1 in one
case, and denying his request to recall a sentence and resentence him (§ 1172.1) in
another. We affirm both orders. We also agree with the parties that the abstract of
judgment in one case should be corrected.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
BACKGROUND
In 1990, Wimberly was convicted of second degree rape in Oklahoma after
pleading no contest to the charge. Ten years later in California, in case No. 00F03503,
Wimberly pled no contest to a charge of failing to register as an out-of-state sex offender
(former § 290, subd. (g)(2))2 and was sentenced to prison. We will hereinafter refer to
this 2000 California judgment as case 1. In 2003, after a California jury found Wimberly
guilty of two counts of rape and one count of kidnapping to commit rape, the trial court
ruled his 1990 Oklahoma rape offense was a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and
qualified as a rape under California law (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), which triggered the
“habitual sexual offender” sentencing scheme (§ 667.71).3
The trial court made this ruling because even though the use of force or fear is an
element of section 261, subdivision (a)(2) and is not an element of second degree rape in
Oklahoma, Wimberly’s “actual conduct”—as illuminated by the record of conviction
(including the 1990 preliminary hearing transcript, which the trial court admitted into
evidence at the 2003 hearing)—met all the elements of rape in California. The trial court
cited People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153 for the proposition that it could “examine the
entire record” to determine whether Wimberly’s “conduct met the requirements of the

2 This registration requirement is now located in section 290.005.

3 Section 667.71, subdivision (a) provides that “a habitual sexual offender is a person
who has been previously convicted of one or more of the offenses specified in
subdivision (c) and who is convicted in the present proceeding of one of those offenses.”
Subdivision (b) provides that a habitual sexual offender must be punished by
imprisonment for a term of 25 years to life for each sexual offense specified in
subdivision (c). Subdivision (c)(13) provides that an offense committed in another
jurisdiction that includes “all of the elements” of a California offense specified in
subdivision (c)—including rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2))—triggers the habitual sexual
offender sentencing regime. (§ 667.71, subds. (a), (b), (c).)

2
California penal statute.”4 After finding the habitual sexual offender sentencing scheme
applicable, in case No. 02F09968, the trial court sentenced Wimberly to prison for 150
years to life plus five years for the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement. We will
hereinafter refer to this 2003 California judgment as case 2.
In 2024, Wimberly claimed his 1990 Oklahoma conviction was improperly used in
both case 1 and case 2. Regarding case 1, he argued in a motion to vacate his conviction
(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(2)) that “after viewing the [s]entencing [t]ranscripts” from his
Oklahoma case, he discovered that “there is no order requiring [him] to register as a sex
offender in Oklahoma,” which meant he never had to register as an out-of-state sex
offender in California, the offense he was convicted of in case 1. Regarding case 2, he
argued in a request for recall of sentence and resentencing (§ 1172.1) that the Oklahoma
conviction was improperly used to increase his sentence. The trial court denied the
motion to vacate in case 1 and dismissed the request for recall in case 2.
The trial court denied the motion to vacate in case 1 on two grounds. First, it
concluded that the motion was not based on “ ‘newly discovered’ evidence” within the
meaning of section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(2), because Wimberly had known since at
least 2001 that he was not required to register as a sex offender in Oklahoma, as
evidenced by a letter he sent to the court asserting the absence of that requirement.
Second, the court found that the lack of a registration requirement in Oklahoma was not
dispositive, because under California law at the time of the conviction in case 1, a person

4 See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pages 1204-1205 (reaffirming that,
notwithstanding language in Penal Code provisions that limit the effect of prior
convictions from other jurisdictions to offenses that “ ‘include[ ] all of the elements of’ ”
an analog offense in California, the “ ‘trier of fact may consider the entire record of the
proceedings leading to imposition of judgment on the prior conviction to determine
whether the offense of which the defendant was previously convicted involved conduct
which satisfies all of the elements of the comparable California serious felony offense’ ”
(italics added)).

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was required to register as a sex offender in California if either of the following applied:
(1) the person was required to register in another state for an offense a court in that state
found was committed as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual
gratification, or (2) the out-of-state offense, if committed in California, would require
registration as a sex offender under California law. The court reasoned that the second
scenario applied, because Wimberly would have been required to register had he
committed his 1990 rape offense in California.
The trial court ostensibly dismissed the recall request in case 2 after determining
that Wimberly was not entitled to seek relief under section 1172.1. However, after ruling
that the petition was “dismissed without action,” the court went on to explain that, even
assuming Wimberly had the right to file such petition, it would nonetheless deny the
request. The court noted that it had reviewed the probation report—which included a
factual summary of the offense as well as Wimberly’s prior history—as well as
Wimberly’s pleading and supporting exhibits. Based on that review, the court declined to
recall the sentence. Wimberly appeals both rulings.
DISCUSSION
I
Case 1
Wimberly argues in his opening brief that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to vacate, asserting he was factually innocent of failing to register as a sex
offender because his prior Oklahoma offense was not a qualifying registerable offense.
The People respond that the trial court did not err, as the evidence Wimberly relied on
was not “newly discovered” within the meaning of section 1473.7. In his reply brief,
Wimberly addresses the trial court’s newly discovered evidence ruling for the first time
and articulates a new theory on appeal. We decline to consider this argument, as it is
doubly forfeited—first, because it was not raised in the opening brief, and second,
because it presents a new theory not asserted in the trial court.

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A. “Newly Discovered Evidence” Under Section 1473.7
Relevant here, section 1473.7 provides: “(a) A person who is no longer in
criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence for any of the
following reasons: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Newly discovered evidence of actual innocence exists
that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence as a matter of law or in the interests
of justice.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(2), italics added.)
The phrase “newly discovered evidence” in the statute means “testimony, writings
and similar things described in Evidence Code section 140 (which defines ‘evidence’),
discovered after trial or judgment, and that with reasonable diligence could not have been
discovered earlier.” (People v. Perez (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 994, 999, italics omitted;
see § 1473.7, subd. (c) [a motion pursuant to § 1473.7, subd. (a)(2) “shall be filed without
undue delay from the date the moving party discovered, or could have discovered with
the exercise of due diligence, the evidence that provides a basis for relief under this
section”].)
B. Analysis
Wimberly argues that the trial court’s newly discovered evidence ruling employed
flawed reasoning when it denied his motion to vacate on the ground that he had known
since at least 2001 that he was not required to register as a sex offender in Oklahoma, as
evidenced by a letter he sent to the court at that time. He contends that his mere
“awareness . . . of the legal grounds for his claim” does not constitute “evidence” within
the meaning of section 1473.7. According to Wimberly, the relevant newly discovered
evidence is an August 2003 report from the Sacramento District Attorney’s Office, which
he asserts provides key evidentiary support for his claim of actual innocence and did not
exist at the time he sent the 2001 letter.

5
This appellate claim is doubly forfeited, because it is a new theory on appeal that
was not raised in the opening brief. (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 98 [finding
argument “doubly forfeited” by appellant’s failure to object in trial court or raise issue in
opening appellate brief]; People v. Collins (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 627, 634, fn. 4 [“The
failure to raise this argument in his opening brief forfeits defendant’s ability to make the
argument in reply because the Attorney General has no opportunity to respond”]; People
v. Borland (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 [“It is well established that a party may not
change his theory of the case for the first time on appeal”].) Although Wimberly
addressed the trial court’s determination that he would have been required to register as a
sex offender in California had he committed the Oklahoma rape here, he did not present
any argument in his opening brief challenging the court’s separate finding that the
evidence he relied on was not “newly discovered.”
Further, and as explained above, Wimberly’s theory in his motion was that, after
viewing the sentencing transcripts from his Oklahoma case, he discovered he had never
been ordered to register as a sex offender in that state. Although the August 2003 report
from the Sacramento District Attorney’s Office was included as a supporting exhibit to
his motion to vacate, Wimberly cited it merely for context—specifically, to suggest a
conspiracy among law enforcement officers to compel him to register. He did not rely on
the report as evidence of actual innocence. (See In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231,
1240 [actual innocence claims based on newly discovered evidence “do not attack the
procedural fairness of the trial”; rather, they “seek a reexamination of the very question”
of the defendant’s guilt].) Accordingly, Wimberly’s claim in case 1 is forfeited.5

5 If we were to reach Wimberly’s original theory for relief under section 1473.7, we
would reject it. Wimberly offered no explanation in his motion as to why the sentencing
transcript from his 1990 Oklahoma conviction would have been unavailable to him at the
time he entered his no contest plea in 2000 for failing to register as a sex offender.
(People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123 [a trial court’s ruling may be affirmed on

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II
Case 2
Wimberly contends that his sentence under the habitual sexual offender sentencing
scheme was “unauthorized” because his Oklahoma offense did not qualify as a prior
conviction for purposes of the statute. The People respond that the trial court properly
applied the law in effect at the time of sentencing in 2003, and that any subsequent
changes to the law were procedural rather than substantive; thus, the 2003 determination
that Wimberly was a habitual sexual offender remains valid. We reject Wimberly’s
contention, as it is based on the incorrect premise that his 2003 sentence was
“unauthorized.” Before addressing the merits of Wimberly’s claim, however, we first
consider whether the trial court’s order denying his recall request is appealable. We
conclude that it is, because the court considered and ruled on the merits of Wimberly’s
request.
A. Section 1172.1
Effective January 1, 2024, section 1172.1, subdivision (a), as amended, authorizes
the trial court to recall and resentence a defendant on its own motion at any time if the
sentencing laws applicable at the time of original sentencing are changed by new
statutory authority or case law. (Stats. 2023, ch. 795, § 1.5.) Specifically, section
1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) now provides: “When a defendant, upon conviction for a
felony offense, has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . , the court may, on its own motion, within 120 days of
the date of commitment or at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of
original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law . . . ,
recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in

any correct ground]; cf. In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 1016 [evidence of alleged
innocence was not “newly discovered” where it was reasonably available through a
thorough pretrial investigation].)

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the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, whether or not the
defendant is still in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the
initial sentence.”
Under the amended statute, a defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking
resentencing relief, and the court has no obligation to respond to a defendant’s request for
such relief. (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).)
B. Appealability
Before turning to the merits of the trial court’s section 1172.1 ruling, we first
consider its appealability. The right to appeal is purely statutory. (People v. Loper
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.) “[A] party may not appeal a trial court’s judgment, order
or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.” (Ibid.) Absent an
appealable order, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal. (People v.
Montellano (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 148, 153.) The question before us is whether
Wimberly’s appeal in case 2 is permissible under section 1237, subdivision (b), which
authorizes a criminal defendant to appeal “[f]rom any order made after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of the party.”
A trial court’s order denying relief that it has no jurisdiction to grant does not
affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237,
subdivision (b). (People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1085; see also People v.
Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1208.) An appeal from such an order must be
dismissed. (People v. Mendez (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 32, 34 [applying Turrin and
dismissing appeal].) “Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of
jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has
commenced.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344.)

8
Here, the execution of Wimberly’s sentence commenced in 2003. Absent an
exception to the general common law rule, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence
him in 2024 when he filed his resentencing petition.
Section 1172.1 provides such an exception to the general rule that a trial court
loses jurisdiction to resentence a defendant once execution of the sentence has begun.
(People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 637; People v. E.M., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1082; see also Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 448, fn. 3 [interpreting
former § 1170, subd. (d), which included similar language and was the precursor to
§ 1172.1].) When the trial court denied Wimberly’s recall request in 2024, section
1172.1 had recently been amended, effective January 1, 2024, to authorize the court, on
its own motion, to recall and resentence a defendant within 120 days of commitment or at
any time if the sentencing laws applicable at the original sentencing have since changed
due to new statutory authority or case law. (Stats. 2023, ch. 795, § 1.5.) Although these
amendments expanded the trial court’s authority to resentence Wimberly, we must still
determine whether the trial court’s order denying his self-initiated request for
resentencing relief constituted an order affecting his substantial rights. We now turn to
that question.
Invoking People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, the People argue that
because section 1172.1 does not authorize defendant-initiated requests for resentencing—
and because the trial court is under no obligation to respond to such requests—the court’s
denial could not have affected Wimberly’s substantial rights. As in this case, the
defendant in Hodge filed a pro. per. request for resentencing under section 1172.1. The
trial court issued an order stating it “ ‘respectfully decline[d] to exercise its discretion to
recall [the defendant’s] sentence.’ ” (Hodge, at p. 991.)

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In concluding the order was not appealable, the Hodge court reasoned that trial
courts are free to disregard such requests under section 1172.1, subdivision (c), and thus:
“It follows that a defendant who chooses to file [such a] request for resentencing has no
right to a ruling. The defendants may have a liberty interest at stake in any decision as to
whether they should remain incarcerated. But a defendant has no right to demand that the
trial court actually make such a decision. If the defendant has no right to a decision, the
trial court’s choice not to make one does not deprive the defendant of any right, much
less a substantial one.” (People v. Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.)
We agree with Wimberly that the present case is distinguishable from Hodge. In
Hodge, the trial court simply issued an order declining to exercise its discretion under
section 1172.1 without addressing the merits of the request. Here, by contrast, the trial
court expressly considered the merits of Wimberly’s petition, stating that it had reviewed
the probation report, the section 1172.1 petition, and the accompanying exhibits, and was
denying the request based on that review.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the order is appealable. While
Wimberly had no statutory right to file a resentencing petition under section 1172.1, and
the trial court was not required to respond, the court’s decision to engage with the merits
transformed the order into one that affected Wimberly’s substantial rights. Had the trial
court simply declined to respond, there would be no order to appeal. But once the court
evaluated and denied the request on the merits—rather than merely declining to act as in
Hodge—its ruling became a reviewable postjudgment order.6 (Cf. People v. Superior

6 The parties do not discuss People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, a recent decision
by a different panel of this court that was published nearly one month before the People
filed their respondent’s brief. In Roy, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s request for
resentencing and expressly “ ‘decline[d] to make its own motion for recall and
resentencing,’ ” without engaging with the merits of the request. (Id. at p. 995.) The
court held that the order did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights and therefore was
not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b). (Id. at p. 1001.) Here, by contrast,

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Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375
[“A defendant has no right to make a motion, and the trial court has no obligation to
make a ruling, under section 1385. But he or she does have the right to ‘invite the court
to exercise its power’ ” to dismiss a prior strike, and may raise a trial court’s erroneous
failure to do so on appeal]; People v. Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1162 [the defendant
could appeal the trial court’s denial of the Department of Correction and Rehabilitation’s
request for compassionate release even though the defendant did not have standing
himself to petition for release].) We thus turn to whether the court erred in denying his
section 1172.1 request.
C. Analysis
Wimberly contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his recall
request because, upon considering the merits, the court “became aware, or should have
become aware,” that his 2003 sentence was “unauthorized” and therefore subject to
correction at any time, and therefore had to be corrected when it was before the trial
court.7 This contention is unpersuasive, as it rests on the false premise that the 2003
sentence was “unauthorized” in the way that Wimberly seeks to use the term.
“The unauthorized sentence doctrine is designed to provide relief from forfeiture
for ‘obvious legal errors at sentencing that are correctable without referring to factual
findings in the record or remanding for further findings.’ [Citation.] It applies when the
trial court has imposed a sentence that ‘could not lawfully be imposed under any
circumstance in the particular case.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962,
italics added.) An unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time by a court with

and as explained above, the trial court did engage with the merits of Wimberly’s request.
Accordingly, Roy is distinguishable.
7 Wimberly’s claim that his sentence is unauthorized relates to the trial court’s
determination that his 1990 offense qualified as rape under California law, a
determination the trial court arrived at by reviewing the record of the 1990 conviction.

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jurisdiction. (People v. Cabrera (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 470, 477.) The unauthorized
sentence doctrine “is not merely a matter of labeling.” (Id. at p. 478.) An “erroneous
sentence” is not the same thing as an “unauthorized sentence.” (Ibid.) A sentence that
was proper when imposed may become “erroneous” in light of subsequent legislation and
case law. But a sentence that was authorized when imposed cannot later become
unauthorized, just as a sentence that was unauthorized when imposed cannot “ ‘ripen
into’ ” an authorized sentence. (Ibid.)
Here, it is undisputed that when the trial court ruled in 2003 that Wimberly’s 1990
Oklahoma rape qualified as rape under section 261, subdivision (a)(2), it was permitted to
examine the record of the 1990 offense.8 (See In re Milton (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 977,
986 [explaining that in People v. McGee, supra, 38 Cal.4th 682, a case where the trial
court “examined the record of two prior robbery convictions the defendant had received
in Nevada to determine if those convictions were serious felonies” under California law
by “review[ing] a preliminary hearing transcript and other court records in each of the
Nevada convictions,” our Supreme Court ruled the trial court’s inquiry was lawful].) In
this case, the trial court determined that the record of Wimberly’s 1990 guilty plea, which
included a preliminary hearing transcript admitted into evidence in 2003, reflected that
Wimberly’s “actual conduct” in 1990 constituted rape as defined in section 261,
subdivision (a)(2). That finding, in turn, triggered the application of the habitual sexual
offender sentencing scheme.

8 Wimberly asserts that People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682 provides relevant
guidance regarding how a trial court should determine whether a foreign prior conviction
qualifies under the habitual sexual offender law. The People contend that People v.
Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120 stands for the proposition that trial courts can no longer
conduct the type of inquiry the trial court conducted in 2003 to determine that
Wimberly’s 1990 offense qualified as rape under California law.

12
Thus, the 2003 sentence in case 2, which resulted from the trial court’s
determination that Wimberly was a habitual sexual offender, was not a sentence that
could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance. Therefore, it was not—and is
not—“unauthorized.” (People v. Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 962; People v.
Cabrera, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.) This is true even if—viewed in hindsight—
the sentence can reasonably be characterized as “erroneous.” (See In re Milton (2022)
13 Cal.5th 893, 900-903; id. at p. 915 [“Although the rule we announced in Gallardo
modified the permissible procedures for finding facts about a defendant’s prior
convictions, the factfinding procedures in place prior to Gallardo did not lack basic
integrity or fairness”].)
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wimberly’s
recall request. (See People v. McCallum (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 202, 211 [abuse of
discretion standard of review].)
III
Abstract of Judgment in Case 2
The parties agree that the abstract of judgment in case 2 must be corrected to
accurately reflect the sentencing changes made in 2022. Specifically, the parties agree
that the trial court should be directed to correct the abstract to show a current sentence of
100 years to life, plus a determinate term of five years for the section 667, subdivision (a)
enhancement. We agree with this assessment and will order the clerk of the trial court to
correct the abstract of judgment accordingly.

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DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. The clerk of the trial court is directed to correct the
abstract of judgment in case 2 (case No. 02F09968) so that it reflects a sentence of 100
years to life plus a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a), and to
deliver a copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

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