People v. Rodriguez CA2/5

CourtListener 10661089Calctapp26.08.2025

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Filed 8/26/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B336607

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA156827)
v.

DAVID RODRIGUEZ and
ANDREW MICHAEL
SHINAIA,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph R. Porras, Judge. Affirmed with
modification.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, David Rodriguez.

Julie Caleca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant, Andrew Michael Shinaia.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Defendant David Rodriguez (Rodriguez) drove defendant
Andrew Michael Shinaia (Shinaia) into rival gang territory
seeking to avenge the recent killing of Shinaia’s brother.
Rodriguez pulled up alongside a car, and Shinaia issued a gang
challenge and then opened fire on the car; the driver was killed,
and the passenger survived. A jury convicted Shinaia of first-
degree murder of the driver and attempted murder of the
passenger, and convicted Rodriguez of second-degree murder of
the driver. Defendants attack their convictions on a variety of
grounds, none of which has merit. Shinaia attacks his sentence,
asserting that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of
seven years to life for premeditated attempted murder rather
than a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. This
argument has merit. Accordingly, we affirm defendants’
convictions, and order Shinaia’s sentence to be modified.

2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. Territorial rivalry between Florencia 13 and
Morton Town Stoners gangs, and defendants’ gang
membership
Florencia 13 is a well-established Hispanic gang in Los
Angeles County founded in the 1950s. Florencia 13’s territory
borders the territory of a different Hispanic gang, the Morton
Town Stoners, along Nadeau Street. Florencia 13 and the
Morton Town Stoners are rivals.
Shinaia and Rodriguez are members of the “85th Street”
clique of the Florencia 13 gang. Both of them have several gang-
related tattoos; Rodriguez had “MK”—short for “Morton Killer”—
tattooed above his left eye.
B. Shinaia’s brother is gunned down along the
Morton Town Stones border
Shinaia had a twin brother named Hector. Hector also
belonged to the 85th Street clique and went by the moniker
“Little Largo.” On November 23, 2020, Hector was gunned down
while in a car driving on Nadeau Street. After Hector’s death,
Shinaia got “RIP Hector” tattooed on his left temple, and
Rodriguez got “Little Largo RIP” tattooed above his right eye.
C. Defendants “hit up” people inside Morton Town
gang territory and shoot at a car
A little after 4 p.m. on the afternoon of August 5, 2021,
Rodriguez and Shinaia recorded a video on the phone Rodriguez
and his girlfriend used that depicted Shinaia holding what
appeared to be two semiautomatic pistols.
Approximately one hour later, Rodriguez drove a sedan into
Morton Town gang territory with his girlfriend as the front

3
passenger and Shinaia in the back seat. As they drove, they were
“nozzing”—that is, inhaling nitrous oxide gas.
Rodriguez drove up alongside a man parking his car, and
Shinaia asked if he “gang-bang[ed].” When the man said he did
not, Rodriguez drove away.
Moments later, Rodriguez pulled up alongside a white
Lexus stopped at a stop sign. Juan Ochoa was its driver; Tony
Vela, the front seat passenger. From the back seat, Shinaia
asked the men in the Lexus where they were from, which is a
classic gang challenge. Although Ochoa and Vela responded that
they were not gang members, Shinaia did not believe them and
proclaimed, “There’s the enemy.” Shinaia then yelled “Florence”
and fired three shots at the Lexus. Rodrigeuz then sped away.
One of the bullets struck Ochoa in the head, killing him.
The bullet recovered from the scene bore “the exact same head
stamp” as a bullet depicted in a video Rodriguez recorded four
days prior on his cell phone.
Less than two hours after the shooting, Shinaia and
Rodriguez returned to the area. They recorded a video depicting
the very intersection where the shooting occurred, and played a
song in the background cued to the lyrics, “You all know who shot
your man. Yeah, we definitely did it.”
Cell phone tower evidence placed this shared cell phone in
the area before, during, and after the shooting.
D. Shinaia’s admission and jailhouse calls
On September 25, 2021, a law enforcement officer who had
known Shinaia for years and knew that his brother Hector had
been shot expressed his condolences to Shinaia while
transporting him. Shinaia “effect[ively]” responded, “It’s been
taken care of.”

4
A few days later, on September 27, 2021, a deputy sheriff
visited Shinaia in jail and, as a ruse, told him she was
investigating a hit-and-run accident because Rodriguez had
collided the sedan used in the shooting with another vehicle a few
hours after the shooting, and then abandoned it. Shinaia made
several in-custody calls soon thereafter. In two of those calls,
Shinaia stated, “They got me.” On one call, he stated that he
“should have known that [Rodriguez] is a snitch.” In several
instances, Shinaia indicated that he “did it” for “the hood”: On
one call, he said, “At the end of the day, you know who I did it
for—I don’t give a fuck . . . . On the hood. I don’t car[e]”; on
another, he said, “I had it coming . . . it’s regular . . . on the hood”;
and on yet another, he said, “I told [Hector], dick, if we—we
choose this life, dick, no matter what, . . . , we’re going to have to
learn the hard way, fool, on the hood . . . . And I think that we
came out solid . . . . Look, how people say how we did it for the
hood, . . . , we did it for the hood . . . . Look, my brother passed
away for the hood, . . . and I’m over here.” When a woman on the
other end of the line in response to the final comment stated,
“But, you didn’t do it for the hood, you did it for your brother[,]”
Shinaia responded, “Yeah . . . it’s stupid as fuck.”
II. Procedural Background
In the operative first amended information, the People
charged Shinaia and Rodriguez with (1) the murder of Ochoa
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a));1 (2) the attempted murder of Vela
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)); and (3) conspiracy to commit murder (§§

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

5
182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a)).2 As to all three counts, the
People alleged that Shinaia personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)). As part of a later, unrelated incident, defendants were
also charged with robbery (§ 211). Defendants pled no contest to
the robbery count prior to trial.
The matter proceeded to trial. Defendants did not testify
or present any evidence.
The jury convicted Shinaia of the first degree murder of
Ochoa and the attempted murder of Vela, and found true the
personal use of a firearm allegation. The jury convicted
Rodriguez of the second degree murder of Ochoa, but acquitted
him of the attempted murder of Vela. The jury acquitted both
defendants of conspiracy to commit murder.
The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to prison for 18 years
to life, comprised of a mid-term sentence of three years for the
robbery, plus a consecutive term of 15 years to life for the
murder. The trial court sentenced Shinaia to prison for 43 years
to life, comprised of a mid-term sentence of three years for the
robbery, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for first degree
murder, plus a consecutive mid-term sentence of four years for
the firearm enhancement, plus a consecutive term of seven years
to life for attempted murder, plus a consecutive mid-term
sentence of four years for the firearm enhancement.
Defendants filed timely notices of appeal.

2 The People further alleged multiple aggravating factors
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.421, but later
elected not to proceed with them.

6
DISCUSSION
I. Instructional Error
Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred in not
instructing the jury on the lesser-related offense of being an
accessory after the fact (§ 32) to Ochoa’s murder.3 We review
claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18
Cal.4th 558, 569-570.)
A. Pertinent facts
During a discussion on jury instructions, counsel for
Rodriguez stated, “I did want to add a lesser PC 32. I think it’s
appropriate.” The trial court believed it was “a separate charge”
and not “an actual lesser” but agreed to look at the law. The
court subsequently returned to the “issue” of whether “PC . . . 32”
was “a potentially . . . lesser included” offense, and reported that
it “could not find anything that showed that Penal Code section
32 was a lesser of either murder, attempted murder or
conspiracy.” The court asked if either counsel for Rodriguez or
the People had “found anything that would include [§ 32] as a
lesser”; both responded that they had not. The court declined to
instruct on accessory after the fact.
B. Pertinent law
“A trial court has a duty to instruct on general principles of
law that are ‘closely and openly connected to the facts before the
court and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the

3 Section 32 states: “Every person who, after a felony has
been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such
felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape
from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge
that said principal has committed such felony or has been
charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an accessory to
such felony.”

7
case.’” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 554, quoting People
v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047.) As part of that duty, a
trial court must instruct a jury on any crimes that are necessarily
included within a charged crime (so-called “lesser-included”
offenses) if there is substantial evidence that the defendant
committed the lesser-included offense but not the charged crime.
(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196.) However, the duty
to instruct does not extend to lesser-related crimes unless the
prosecutor consents to the jury being instructed on that
offense. (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 136-137
(Birks); People v. Hicks (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203, 211; People v.
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1230.) Even if the prosecutor
consents, a trial court still retains discretion whether to instruct
on a lesser-related offense. (People v. Hall (2011) 200
Cal.App.4th 778, 783; see Birks, at p. 131.) This distinction
between lesser-included and lesser-related offenses is grounded
in the separation of powers: When the People charge a crime,
that charging decision necessarily encompasses all lesser-
included crimes to the charged crime; because lesser-
related crimes are outside this charging decision, granting
defendants the right to have the jury instructed on lesser-
related crimes over the prosecutor’s objection risks impinging on
prosecutorial discretion entrusted to the executive branch.
(Birks, at pp. 134-135; Hicks, at p. 211.)
Because the offense of being an accessory after the fact is a
lesser-related offense to murder, not a lesser-included offense
(People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 486), the trial
court did not err in declining to instruct on this offense because
(1) Rodriguez never asked for a lesser-related instruction (as he
only asked for this instruction as a lesser-included offense); (2)

8
the People did not consent to this instruction; and (3) the trial
court was not obligated to give this instruction even if the
prosecutor had consented.
Rodriguez responds with what boils down to four
arguments.
First, he argues that the People “never expressly objected”
to his request for a lesser-related instruction. We reject this
argument. Because Rodriguez never asked for the jury to be
instructed on the crime of being an accessory after the fact as a
lesser-related instruction, the People cannot be faulted for failing
to object to a request that was never made. And even if we were
to construe Rodriguez’s ambiguous request for a “lesser”
instruction as encompassing a request that the instruction was
“lesser-related” as well as “lesser-included” (as Rodriguez urges
the trial court should have done), the People informed the court
that they had found no authority for such an instruction. A
prosecutor’s statement to the effect of, “You don’t have authority
for that instruction” is not equivalent to consent.
Second, Rodriguez claims the trial court “failed to recognize
[Penal Code section 32] was a lesser-related offense” and that it
failed to engage in a “lesser-related analysis.” Given the default
presumption that we must presume from a silent record that the
trial court is aware of the applicable law and given the parties’
agreement that there was no basis for the instruction, we cannot
presume error where the record does not establish on its face that
the trial court misunderstood the law. (People v. Gutierrez (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527.)
Third, Rodriguez essentially asks us to ignore Birks
because (1) the prosecutor introduced evidence at trial in support
of the conspiracy charge that could be used to support an

9
accessory after the fact conviction (and hence amounts to an
implicit consent to the lesser-related instruction), (2) the jury was
otherwise left with an “all or nothing choice,” and (3) the
application of Birks’ rule requiring prosecutorial consent to a
lesser-related instruction requires a more “nuanced” analysis as
to whether the policy underlying Birks is implicated in a
particular case. We decline to construe a prosecutor’s decision to
elicit evidence relevant to a charged offense as implicit consent to
the giving of a lesser-related instruction. Doing so would create
an unauthorized exception to Birks, and we are in no position to
overrule our Supreme Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455-456.) The jury was not faced
with an all-or-nothing choice; the jury had the option of
convicting Rodriguez of second degree murder as opposed to first
degree murder, and did in fact choose that option. And
Rodriguez’s request that Birks’s rule can be ignored based on
case-specific policy balancing is a request to overrule Birks; as
noted above, we cannot do that.
Fourth and lastly, Rodriguez cites sections 1127 and 1093,
subdivision (f), both of which deal with a trial court’s general
duty to instruct on that law; they are accordingly irrelevant.4
II. Evidentiary Errors
Defendants raise two challenges to the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings. We review such rulings for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 413.)

4 We do not address Rodriguez’s argument that counsel was
ineffective for failing to ask for a lesser related instruction
because we have assumed for purposes of our analysis that
Rodriguez made such a request, and still find no error.

10
A. Admission of gang evidence
1. Pertinent facts
Prior to trial, Rodriguez filed a motion in limine to
completely exclude or strictly limit evidence of his and Shinaia’s
involvement in criminal street gangs, arguing it was
“inflammatory and not relevant” because “[n]o gang enhancement
or gang charge” was alleged against defendants. The People
responded that gang evidence was relevant to prove
defendants’ motive and intent for the shootings. The trial court
denied the motion in part, reasoning that it would “allow a
limited amount of motive testimony” because the shootings had a
“joint motive” of avenging Hector’s death as well as avenging the
death of a fellow Florencia 13 gang member.
At trial, several law enforcement officers testified to having
gang enforcement duties or explained gang-related slang and
terminology and a gang expert testified on gang terminology, the
meaning of defendants’ tattoos, and the significance of videos and
photographs found on Rodriguez’s cell phone. Following this
testimony, the trial court indicated it was aware of defendants’
continuing objection to the gang expert’s testimony, and found
that everything the expert testified to was within the court’s
ruling.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury
that it could “consider evidence of gang activity only for the
limited purpose of deciding whether . . . [t]he defendants had a
motive to commit the crimes charged”—but “not . . . for any other
purpose,” including to find that either defendant was a person of
“bad character” or who had a “disposition to commit crime.”

11
2. Pertinent law
Even when a gang enhancement is not charged in a
particular case, “gang evidence . . . may still be relevant and
admissible to prove other facts related to a [charged] crime,”
including motive and specific intent. (People v. Tran (2022) 13
Cal.5th 1169, 1208; People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040,
1049.) However, because “gang membership evidence does create
a risk the jury will impermissibly infer a defendant has a
criminal disposition and is therefore guilty of the offense
charged” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 859), trial
courts must be cognizant of that risk when assessing, under
Evidence Code section 352, whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice.
3. Analysis
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
gang-related evidence in this case. That evidence was limited to
the shooting of Hector in disputed gang territory, defendants’
membership in the gang, the history and motivation of the
Florencia 13 gang and its rivalry with Morton Town Stoners,
defendants’ tattoos reflecting affiliation with that gang alongside
tattoos commemorating Hector’s death, defendants’ conduct in
issuing gang challenges before the shooting as well as shouting
“Florence” during the shooting, Shinaia’s post-shooting jailhouse
calls indicating that his acts were for “the hood,” and gang expert
testimony explaining the pertinent terms and practices of gang
culture. Although, as defendants assert on appeal, they could
have gunned down Ochoa solely in retribution for Hector’s death,
the gang evidence provided a second motive for the shootings—to
exact revenge on those they believed to be members of the rival

12
gang that killed Hector in order to assert their gang’s dominance
and earn respect. The gang evidence therefore provided a second
motive for the shootings—and thus further reason for defendants
to act with the specific intent to kill. That evidence was
accordingly quite probative to the contested element of intent.
Nor was this substantial probative value substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In this context,
unfair prejudice means more than that the evidence at issue is
“damaging” to a defendant; it means that the evidence is unfairly
or unduly inflammatory because it “evoke[s] an emotional bias.”
(People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638; People v. Branch
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 286; People v. Olguin (1994) 31
Cal.App.4th 1355, 1369.) In light of the graphic nature of the
crime itself (shooting the non-aggressive Ochoa in the head), the
introduction of evidence regarding the background and motives of
the Florencia gang was not unduly inflammatory or emotional.
On appeal, defendants point to eight specific items of gang
testimony that the trial court erred in admitting. We conclude
there was not prejudicial error.
First, defendants assert that the court should not have
allowed Detective Gutierrez to testify, in her prefatory remarks
explaining how she seized the cell phone containing several
videos and images, that she was “on loan to [the] gang impact
team” and “investigating an individual named David Rodriguez”
on the day before the shooting. No one objected to this prefatory
comment about her assignment or her investigation and this is
not “gang evidence,” so this argument has been forfeited. (Evid.
Code, § 353; People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 369, 366-367.) It
also lacks merit, as Detective Gutierrez’s remarks were relevant
to explain why she was following and “pinging” Rodriguez’s

13
phone prior to the shooting, and were in no way prejudicial
because she never mentioned what she was investigating.
Second, defendants contend that the court erred in allowing
Officer Palacios to testify that Palacios had previously told
Shinaia that Shinaia was going to “spend life in jail” if he
continued with “gang-related activity.” This testimony was
elicited by Shinaia, so he cannot object to it now. (See People v.
Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1138-1139 [defense
counsel’s cross-examination questions on a topic invited any
error, barring his appellate challenge].) This was also not “gang
evidence” insomuch as it was “life advice.” In any event, this
testimony was duplicative of Shinaia’s own words on one of the
jailhouse calls, where he indicated that the “cops” told him he
was “going the wrong path” and was “either going to be dead or
do life in jail.”
Third, defendants posit that the trial court erred in
admitting video and still-photo downloads from Rodriguez’s cell
phone that depict Rodriguez putting up and posing near gang
graffiti associated with his gang clique and his gang moniker;
that depict both defendants discussing “Morton Killers” or
otherwise using offensive, derogatory, racist language; and that
depict the hand stamping of the bullets matching the bullets used
in the charged crime or Shinaia displaying what appear to be
guns just an hour before the shootings. This evidence is relevant
to show identity and motive, and to establish defendants’
involvement in the gang, which formed the basis for the gang
expert’s opinions. Further, evidence of “putting spray paint on
walls” and “doing [gang] hand signs” was not inflammatory when
compared to the charged crimes.

14
Fourth, defendants argue that the court erred in allowing
the gang expert to testify that Rodriguez had a tattoo of “MK” for
Morton Killer because, as it turns out, neither Ochoa nor Vela
were members of the Morton Town Stoner gang. But this
evidence was probative to show Rodriguez viewed himself as a
killer of those rival gang members and hence was more likely to
be aware of Shinaia’s intent when they drove into that rival gang
territory while armed and started hitting up people they
encountered. The fact that Shinaia’s instinct that Ochoa and
Vela were “the enemy” ended up being incorrect, and that the
victims were not gang members, does not bring into question
defendants’ intent or motive in spoiling for an encounter.
Fifth, defendants contend that the court erred in allowing
the gang expert to testify that gang members seek “respect” and
“put in work” for the gang by committing crimes or by protecting
their gang’s territory because there was no evidence that
defendants ever acted “for respect, or to put in work” on behalf of
their gang. The record is to the contrary: The location they
cruised, defendants’ conduct in hitting up people they
encountered, and Shinaia’s proclamation that Ochoa and Vela
were “the enemy” before he shouted “Florence” and opened fire all
indicate that defendants were, in fact, seeking respect and
putting in work for their gang by committing crimes and
protecting its territory. Indeed, Shinaia on one jailhouse call said
that “we did it for the hood.” (Italics added.)
Sixth, defendants posit that the court erred in allowing the
gang expert to testify to the history, territory and characteristics
of Florencia 13. But this testimony was directly relevant to
defendants’ motive. Hector was killed near Nadeau Street, which
is an area contested by Florencia 13 and Morton Town Stoners.

15
This testimony thus proffered a reason why defendants went
looking for a rival gang member. The testimony also explained
why defendants would create a video claiming credit for the
killing just two hours after the shooting as a means of taking
credit for committing a killing in rival gang territory.
Seventh, defendants argue that the court erred in allowing
the gang expert to testify that he was familiar with Ochoa’s
brother, which defendants claim unfairly suggested that Ochoa
himself was associated with Morton Town Stoners and was killed
for that association. For starters, this testimony was elicited by
Shinaia, so he has no cause to complain on appeal. More to the
point, there was no error because the expert extensively testified
that he was not familiar with Ochoa himself; any gang affiliation
by familial link was entirely speculative and hence neither error
nor prejudicial.
Eighth and lastly, both defendants agree that the court
erred in allowing the gang expert to testifying about “snitching”
and how gangs often retaliate against individuals who help in the
prosecution of gang members. However, this testimony is
relevant to bolster the credibility of both Rodriguez’s girlfriend
and Vela, whose testimony vacillated and who potentially put
themselves at risk by testifying truthfully. Defendants assert
that it is not relevant as to Rodriguez because he was not a
witness in the case, but the expert’s testimony is relevant
because Shinaia said in one of the jailhouse calls that he believed
Rodriguez to be a “snitch” and wanted to make any proof of that
fact public—which shows both that Shinaia believed Rodriguez
had incriminating information to offer law enforcement (which
would be true if Rodriguez and Shinaia had planned to shoot
rivals in advance) and that Shinaia had a consciousness of guilt.

16
Even if the trial court had erred in admitting any of this
evidence, the jury was specifically instructed that it could
consider the gang evidence only for the limited purpose of motive
and the People reinforced that during closing argument. We
presume jurors followed this instruction in the absence of proof to
the contrary (People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 940), and
there is no such proof here. The People also emphasized that
instruction during closing argument, asserting the evidence
proved defendants were guilty “not because they’re gang
members” and telling the jury to “not use the gang evidence
improperly.” In any event, the prosecution’s case was strong, so
there is no reasonable probability that the gang evidence affected
the jury’s verdict. (People v. Davis (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 806,
813; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 923.)
B. Admission of rap lyrics
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred in
admitting the video that they filmed of the intersection where
Ochoa was shot a few hours after the shooting.
1. Pertinent facts
As noted above, law enforcement recovered from
Rodriguez’s phone a video of the crime scene taken less than two
hours after the shooting that contained audio that played a
snippet from a song with the following lyrics: “You all know who
shot your man. Yeah, we definitely did it.” The People indicated
its intent to introduce this video because, given the location
depicted and the cued-up lyrics, it was effectively an adoptive
admission (of the lyrics) as to “what ha[d] happened an hour and
a half before.” Shinaia sought to exclude the video as unduly
prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352, but never objected
under section 352.2. The trial court agreed that the audio

17
constituted an adoptive admission and ruled that the video and
audio were admissible but that the audio would not be
transcribed.
2. Analysis
Evidence Code section 352 grants trial courts the
“discretion” to exclude otherwise relevant evidence “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Evidence Code section 352.2 effectively creates an overlay to this
analysis for evidence that is “a form of creative expression” in two
pertinent ways. First, it dictates that the “probative value” of
any “form of creative expression” “is minimal” unless it was (1)
“created near in time to the charged crime or crimes,” (2) “bears a
sufficient level of similarity to the charged crime or crimes,” or
(3) “includes factual detail not otherwise publicly available.”
(Evid. Code, § 352.2, subd. (a).) Second, it explains that “undue
prejudice” “includes, but is not limited to,” (1) “the possibility that
the trier of fact will . . . treat the expression as evidence of the
defendant’s propensity for violence or general criminal
disposition,” and (2) “the possibility that the evidence will
explicitly or implicitly inject racial bias into the proceedings.”
(Ibid.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
video and audio. As a threshold matter, it is unclear whether we
may apply Evidence Code section 352.2’s overlay because
defendants never objected on that basis, and arguably forfeited
their right to insist upon its application. (Evid. Code, § 353.) But
the court did not abuse its discretion even if we apply that

18
overlay. The probative value of the video and audio is
substantial: The video is a recording of the scene of the shooting
in the middle of their rival gang’s territory, hours after it
occurred, created by the defendants and to which they cued up the
lyrics, “You all know who shot your man. Yeah, we definitely did
it.” This is powerful evidence tending to establish not only that
defendants did the charged crimes, but that they were proud
enough of it to document it for posterity. It need not be ascribed
“minimal” probative value under Evidence Code section 352.2
because it was “created near in time to the charged crime or
crimes” and “bears a sufficient level of similarity to the charged
crime or crimes” because it is a near-contemporaneous
documentation of those charged crimes. This probative value is
not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice
because the effective admission of guilt is limited to this crime
and thus carries little possibility of being construed as a general
propensity for violence or injecting any racial bias. In short, if
the audio to the video had been defendants saying, “We did it,”
there would be no issue at all. We do not view the admissibility
of the video any differently if they had sung “We did it” in two-
part harmony or, as happened here, they cued up someone else’s
song saying, “We did it.”
Defendants resist this conclusion with two arguments.
First, they assert that there is no evidence or suggestion that
they wrote the lyrics. But what makes the video relevant is what
the lyrics say and that defendants—by their conduct in using
those lyrics as background music for the documentation of the
crime scene—adopted those words as their own; who originally
wrote the lyrics is utterly irrelevant. Second, defendants cite
People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401. Although the Supreme

19
Court in Hin relied on Evidence Code section 352.2 to conclude
that a trial court erred in admitting a creative expression, the
facts of Hin are inapt. In Hin, the defendant possessed a CD
with lyrics that were “graphic and violent, repeatedly describing
‘blast[ing],’ ‘killing,’ [and] ‘murder[ing]]’” gang rivals, and the
lyrics also included “inflammatory and irrelevant descriptions of
sexualized violence.” (Hin, at p. 480.) There was no “evidence to
show that Hin was involved in the creation or production of the
song or that it described any of the charged crimes.” (Id. at p.
479.) Here, by contrast, defendants created the video and cued
up the lyrics as a snappy way of saying they “did” the crime.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Rodriguez’s
Conviction for Murder
Rodriguez contends there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction for the second degree murder of Ochoa as
an aider and abettor with express malice. We review this claim
for substantial evidence. In so doing, we ask whether the
record—construed in the light most favorable to the verdict—
contains enough evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value for a reasonable trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57;
People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 242.)
Where, as here, the jury is instructed only as to murder
based on express malice, a defendant can be guilty of aiding and
abetting that express-malice murder only if (1) the direct
perpetrator committed the crime of murder; (2) the defendant
knew of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful purpose to commit
murder; (3) defendant, by his acts or advice, aided, promoted,
encouraged, or instigated the direct perpetrator’s commission of
the murder; and (4) defendant acted with the intent to commit,

20
encourage or facilitate the murder—that is, with the intent to
kill. (§§ 31, 188, subd. (a)(1); People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1111, 1118.)
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that
Rodriguez is guilty of Ochoa’s murder as a direct aider and
abettor. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
Shinaia committed the crime of murder: Two eyewitnesses saw
Shinaia open fire on Ochoa, and Shinaia repeatedly said that he
“did it” on the jailhouse tapes. Substantial evidence supports the
jury’s finding that Rodriguez knew of Shinaia’s unlawful purpose
to commit murder because they videotaped Shinaia with two
guns an hour before the shooting, Shinaia “hit up” the man
parking his car within earshot of Rodriguez, and Rodriguez
nevertheless pulled up alongside Ochoa’s car where he waited for
Shinaia to issue another gang challenge and open fire before
driving off. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
Rodriguez by his acts or advice aided Shinaia’s commission of the
murder because he was Shinaia’s wheelman. And substantial
evidence supports the jury’s finding that Rodriguez acted with
the intent to kill—he had a tattoo dedicated to Hector’s killing, he
was a member of the Florencia 13 gang, he knew Shinaia was
carrying a gun when they drove into Morton Town Stoners
territory, and Shinaia was worried about Rodriguez being a
“snitch” (which tends to show Rodriguez knew about a plan to kill
gang rivals from the outset). Contrary to what Rodriguez argues
in his reply brief, our conclusion in no way rests upon imputing
Shinaia’s intent to Rodriguez.
Rodriguez offers three arguments to the contrary.
First, Rodriguez asserts that he only had the intent to kill
rival gang members (as evidenced by the fact that Shinaia did not

21
shoot the man parking his car moments before), such that
Rodriguez lacked the intent to kill Ochoa, who was not a rival
gang member. This argument assumes that murder requires the
intent to kill a specific person; California law does not support
that assumption. (People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 139 [“for
murder, ‘the intent to kill need not be directed at a specific
person’”].) Because the implicit premise of Rodriguez’s assertion
is that he had the intent to kill gang rivals, and because an intent
to kill anyone is sufficient, Rodriguez’s assertion effectively
concedes the existence of this element.
Second, Rodriguez contends that he did not intend to help
Shinaia kill Ochoa because Rodriguez started to drive away from
Ochoa’s car once Ochoa denied being a gang member. We reject
this contention. Although one witness testified that Rodriguez
started to pull away once Ochoa denied gang membership, two
other witnesses testified that Shinaia opened fire before
Rodriguez drove away. It was for the jury to resolve this factual
dispute (e.g., People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181), and
there was ample basis for the jury to resolve it in favor of finding
that Rodriguez waited for Shinaia to blast his perceived enemies
before pulling away. Under substantial evidence review, we
accordingly defer to the jury’s resolution of this factual issue.
Third, Rodriguez argues that Shinaia’s concern—expressed
on the jailhouse calls—that Rodriguez might be a “snitch” means
that Rodriguez is innocent because only innocent people
cooperate with law enforcement. Not only is this argument
divorced from reality, but it also ignores the competing and far
more likely inference that Shinaia was worried about Rodriguez
cooperating because Rodriguez had been part of the plan to

22
murder gang rivals all along and hence could provide particularly
damning evidence against Shinaia.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Shinaia’s Counsel
Shinaia contends his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance during closing argument by making comments that
lowered the People’s burden of proof. We independently review
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Mayfield
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 199.)
A. Pertinent facts5
During his closing argument, Shinaia’s counsel stated:
“And just you know, this is the People’s case.
This is Mr. Hogue’s case, the district attorney of Los
Angeles. They’re the ones, you know, prosecuting.
It’s the People of the state of California versus Mr.
Shinaia. They’re the plaintiff. They’re essentially
suing Mr. Shinaia. It’s a criminal matter. And the
vast majority of cases in California these days, it’s
like 70, 80 percent, I think according to Judge Meyer
in Long Beach, I think she told a bunch of young
kids. And I don’t know if that’s true or not, but it
sounds accurate, a majority of these cases are
criminal. So think of in terms of a civil lawsuit, him
suing him. I point to Mr. Hogue is the first him. My
client, the second him. The plaintiff, or the People,
have the burden of proof, and it’s very, very high.
There’s a reason. We’re talking about someone’s
livelihood. We’re talking about someone’s life. We’re
talking about the well-being of Mr. Shinaia. And it’s

5 Shinaia objects to the italicized portions of counsel’s
argument.

23
higher than a civil case. It’s probably the highest
standard we have in California. It is the highest
standard, I’m sorry, we have in California. They
have to prove every single element beyond a
reasonable doubt.
(Italics added.)
B. Analysis
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that counsel’s performance was both (1) deficient and
(2) prejudicial. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
Attorneys should avoid drawing comparisons that risk confusing,
undermining, or trivializing the reasonable doubt standard.
(See People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 260; People v.
Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 111-112.) Reviewing courts will not
lightly infer the jury drew the most damaging meaning, as
opposed to the least damaging meaning, from the attorney’s
statements. (Bell, at p. 111.) “Reversals for ineffective assistance
of counsel during closing argument rarely occur; when they do, it
is due to an argument against the client which concedes guilt,
withdraws a crucial defense, or relies on an illegal defense.”
(People v. Moore (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 51, 57.)
Shinaia’s counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. To
begin, the argument was not deficient. Although counsel started
out by analogizing the case to a civil case by explaining there
were two parties, counsel never blurred the line between civil and
criminal cases when it came to the differing burdens of proof:
Counsel emphasized that the People’s burden of proof was
“higher than a civil case,” that this burden of proof is “the highest
standard we have in California” and that the People had to
“prove every single element beyond a reasonable doubt.” What is

24
more, counsel repeatedly referred to the higher burden the People
bear in a criminal case, urging the jury to ask if the People
“prove[d] to [the jury] beyond a reasonable doubt”; to find Shinaia
“not guilty” if it had “some doubt, reasonable doubt” about his
guilt; and to “hold [the People] to the legal standard.” The
argument was also not prejudicial. Not only did counsel correctly
refer to the higher burden of proof throughout his own argument,
the trial court also instructed the jury on the People’s burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and repeatedly referred to that
standard. Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions
(People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662), and nothing defense
counsel said rebutted that presumption.
V. Cumulative Error
Defendants contend the multiple errors they assert on
appeal collectively warrant reversal. We disagree. As explained
above, we find no prejudicial error at all, so there is no error to
cumulate. (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 832.)
VI. Error With Shinaia’s Sentence
Shinaia argues that the trial court erred in imposing a
sentence of seven years to life for the attempted murder count
rather than a term of life with the possibility of parole. As the
People concede, this argument is well taken. (§ 664, subd. (a)
[sentence for attempted premeditated murder is “life with the
possibility of parole”]; People v. Robinson (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th
69, 72, fn. 3 [this term has no “minimum determinate term of
seven years”]; People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977, fn.
4 [same].) We accordingly order the judgment modified to reflect
Shinaia’s attempted murder sentence as life with the possibility
of parole. (Robinson, at p. 79; see People v. Smith (2001) 24
Cal.4th 849, 854.)

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DISPOSITION
As to Rodriguez, the judgment is affirmed.
As to Shinaia, the judgment is modified to reflect that the
sentence for attempted murder is life with the possibility of
parole. The clerk of the Superior Court is directed to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment reflecting these changes and to
forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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