People v. Uc CA1/1

CourtListener 10660966Calctapp26.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/26/25 P. v. Uc CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170520
v.
ALBERTO UC, (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. Nos. 21001364,
Defendant and Appellant.
21007696, 22014976)

A jury convicted defendant Alberto Uc of numerous crimes, including
attempted burglary of one residence and completed burglaries of two others,
and the trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison. On appeal, Uc claims
the court erred under People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322 (Kurtzman) by
instructing the jury that it could not consider a lesser included offense of one
of the burglary charges before it resolved the greater charge. He also claims,
and the Attorney General concedes, that a pair of two-year enhancements
imposed under Penal Code1 section 12022.1 (bail enhancements) are invalid
in light of intervening authority establishing a right to a jury trial on such
enhancements.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We conclude that although Kurtzman error occurred as to one of the
burglary counts, it was harmless. We also accept the Attorney General’s
concession that the bail enhancements cannot stand. Thus, we affirm, except
we reverse the bail enhancements and remand for further proceedings.2
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Uc was convicted of crimes arising from separate incidents at three San
Francisco residences. We discuss the incidents in chronological order.
A. Attempted Burglary on Balboa Street (February 2021)
Around 4:30 a.m. on February 5, 2021, the resident of a house on
Balboa Street was awakened by “a loud cracking sound of . . . metal breaking
through wood.” He went to the window and “saw that it was [his] garage that
was being broken into,” as there was someone standing “right next to [his]
car in front of [the] garage.” The resident could not see the person’s features,
but he took a photograph that showed “pretty distinctly the clothing [the
person] was wearing.”
The resident called 911 to report that “somebody was trying to break
into [his] house” with “what sounded like a crowbar.” During the call, which
was played for the jury, the resident described the person as a “skinny” male
wearing “a gray or black sweatshirt with a hoodie.” The resident testified
that he noticed the man’s shoes were black and white.
The resident also reported to 911 that he saw the man walk away on
Balboa Street toward Eighth Avenue. At one point, the resident heard “what

2 The parties also agree that the abstract of judgment inaccurately

reflects that one of the bail enhancements was imposed under section 667.5,
subdivision (c)(21), instead of section 12022.1, subdivision (b). In preparing a
new abstract of judgment on remand, the trial court shall ensure that this
mistake is not repeated.

2
sounded like a crowbar hitting the ground,” and the man turned around and
picked something up before continuing to walk away. When the resident
later inspected his garage door, there was a large hole in it that was not there
before.
After hearing a dispatch about the attempted burglary, a police officer
on patrol in the area quickly located Uc on Eighth Avenue, about a block
away from the Balboa Street residence. Uc “was wearing a dark jacket, did
have a gray hoodie,” and was carrying a black bag. Believing Uc fit the
suspect’s description, the officer detained him. Uc had a crowbar on his
person, and his bag contained bolt cutters, a mallet, a chisel, and a
screwdriver.
The police took the resident to the location where Uc was detained to
conduct a “cold show,” a field identification procedure. The resident
identified Uc as the person he saw trying to break into the garage, based on
Uc’s clothing, shoes, “build[,] and size.” Uc was arrested but released from
custody after being charged.
B. Burglary on Arguello Boulevard (August 2021)
The parties stipulated that as a condition of his release after his
February 2021 arrest, Uc “was required to wear an ankle monitor that
tracked his movement with GPS, and on August 5, 2021, he was wearing the
ankle monitor.” Early on the morning of August 5, police officers began
tracking Uc’s movements as part of a “burglary surveillance operation.” For
a while, Uc walked around the Richmond District, sometimes “us[ing] a
flashlight to illuminate garage doors” and other times using his cell phone.
At 3:35 a.m., the sergeant conducting the operation was notified that
Uc “appeared to be inside [a] building” on Arguello Boulevard. Upon arriving
at the address, an apartment building, the sergeant saw that the building’s

3
garage door was partially open and “a piece of mail [was shoved] in the door
jam[b]” of the front door to hold it open. The sergeant also heard “a loud
bang.” Uc then left the building, about 20 minutes after the GPS first
showed he was at that location. The sergeant observed him walk away down
the street, again “using his flashlight to illuminate garage doors of the
houses” he passed.
The apartment building that Uc entered had three residential floors,
which were accessible by the stairs or elevator on the ground floor. No key or
passcode was required to access the stairs or elevator from the lobby. The
building’s garage, which was not open to the public, was accessible from the
lobby. At the time, the building’s front door lock was functioning, but the
door between the lobby and the garage did not have a lock. The building’s
manager testified that the only ways to access the garage were by using the
garage door, using the lobby door, or “cross[ing] a few fences from [a
different] street” and entering through an open area at the back of the
garage.
The apartment building’s surveillance cameras recorded an unknown
person in various areas, including by the garage’s bike racks and in the lobby.
The footage, which was played for the jury, also showed the person take a
letter from above a mailbox in the lobby and place it in the front door. None
of the apartments were broken into, and no residents reported any lost or
damaged property.
Soon after Uc left the apartment building, the police detained him. He
had a backpack and was carrying a flashlight on his person. The backpack
contained a power drill, a small crowbar, two sets of bolt cutters, a knife
wrapped in a t-shirt, and two credit cards not in Uc’s name. Uc stated that
he was on his way to see a friend and give him the backpack. Uc admitted he

4
entered the apartment building but claimed he did so “to take recyclables,”
even though he did not ultimately do so.
C. Burglary on Jefferson Street (December 2022)
Around 2:00 a.m. on December 9, 2022, a special police officer hired to
patrol the Marina neighborhood noticed a house on Jefferson Street had its
garage door open. There was a hole in the garage door’s glass and broken
glass on the ground. After confirming no one was inside the garage, the
officer notified the homeowner of the break-in. The homeowner’s wife and
children were also in the house.
The homeowner went to the garage and noticed that one of his electric
bicycles was missing. He estimated its value at $4,000. Footage from the
house’s surveillance cameras, which was played for the jury, showed a person
the homeowner did not know wearing a blue top inside the garage. There
was a metal rod attached to the garage door’s emergency release cord,
suggesting the stranger gained access by pulling that cord and manually
pushing up the door.
About an hour later, after reviewing the surveillance footage, the police
detained Uc because he matched the suspect’s appearance. Uc had on “a
white hoodie underneath a bluish gray long-sleeved shirt.” He was wearing a
backpack, which contained a “make[]shift window[-]breaking item, a multi-
tool flashlight, screwdrivers, . . . a pick[-]looking thing[,] and a wire cutter.”
Uc also possessed “four ID[-]type cards,” none of which were in his name.
D. Procedural History
Uc was charged in separate cases for (1) the Balboa Street incident
(no. 21001364), (2) the Arguello Boulevard incident (no. 21007696), and
(3) the Jefferson Street incident (no. 22014976). In July 2023, after the trial

5
court granted the prosecution’s motion to consolidate the three cases, a
consolidated information was filed.
For the Balboa Street incident, Uc was charged with a felony count of
attempted first degree burglary and misdemeanor counts of vandalism and
possession of burglary tools. For the Arguello Boulevard incident, he was
charged with a felony count of first degree burglary—count four, which is at
issue in his claim of instructional error—and misdemeanor counts of
possession of burglary tools and petty theft of lost property (access cards).
Finally, for the Jefferson Street incident, he was charged with felony counts
of first degree burglary and grand theft (e-bike) and misdemeanor counts of
possession of burglary tools and petty theft of lost property (identification
documents).3 This burglary was alleged to be a violent felony because Uc
committed it when another person was in the residence, and it was alleged as
to each felony count that Uc was released from custody on bail or his own
recognizance when he committed the crime.4 Finally, the information also
alleged that Uc was ineligible for probation based on three prior convictions
of second degree burglary.5
The jury acquitted Uc of both counts of petty theft and found him guilty
of the remaining charges. It also found true that he committed the Jefferson
Street burglary while another person was in the residence. In March 2024,
after finding Uc ineligible for probation, the trial court sentenced him to

3 The charges were brought under sections 459 (burglary) and 664

(attempted burglary), 594, subdivision (b)(1) (vandalism), 466 (possession of
burglary tools), 485 (petty theft), and 487, subdivision (a) (grand theft).
4 The violent-felony allegation was made under section 667.5,

subdivision (c)(21), and the bail allegations were made under section 12022.1,
subdivision (b).
5 This allegation was made under section 1203, subdivision (e)(4), based

on 2016, 2017, and 2019 convictions under section 459.

6
10 years in prison. The sentence was composed of a term of four years for the
Arguello Boulevard burglary and consecutive terms of two years for the bail
enhancement accompanying that offense, 16 months for the Jefferson Street
burglary, two years for the bail enhancement accompanying that offense, and
eight months for the Balboa Street attempted burglary. The court imposed
concurrent terms of three months in jail for each misdemeanor conviction and
stayed punishment for the grand theft.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Uc Is Not Entitled to Relief on His Claim of Kurtzman Error.
Uc claims the trial court violated Kurtzman by giving the jurors “a de
facto instruction” on count four, regarding the Arguello Boulevard incident,
“that they were not permitted to even consider [a] lesser included trespass
offense” on which they were instructed “before they resolved the greater
charge” of burglary. Although we agree that instructional error occurred, we
conclude that it was harmless.
1. Additional facts
The jury was instructed under CALCRIM No. 2932 on trespass by
entering a dwelling as a lesser included offense of the Arguello Boulevard
burglary charged in count four. (See § 602.5, subd. (a).) The trial court also
instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 3515 that “each of the counts
charged in this case is a separate crime. [¶] You must consider each count
separately and return a separate verdict for each one, except for count Four
which has a lesser included offense for you to consider; how to handle [the]
verdict forms for count Four and its lesser included offense will be explained
separately.”
The trial court then explained how to evaluate count four in the
challenged instruction, an oral instruction that was not included in the

7
written instructions. The challenged instruction’s source is unclear, as not
all of the preceding discussion of jury instructions was reported. The
challenged instruction provided:
“[A]s to Count 4, you’ve heard the references. You’re going
to get two verdict form[s] for Count 4. One for the charged
offense of residential burglary, and one for the lesser included
offense of trespass. When you’re discussing the case and all the
issues for all the counts, you can discuss in any order you want.
Okay? You can start at the beginning, you can start at the end,
you can start in the middle. You can take on Count 4 at any
point you choose. But here’s where you need to listen carefully.
When you start to vote, if you decide unanimously that Mr. Uc is
guilty of the charged residential burglary in Count 4, you’d fill
that in, sign it, and date it, your foreperson, and you never reach
the lesser included offense and its verdict form because you’ve
resolved Count 4 with the greater charge. . . .

“If in your voting on Count 4, you cannot reach a
unanimous decision. . . . You are split. You’re hung. That means
you can’t resolve the greater charge. And if you can’t resolve the
greater charged offense in Count 4, you never reach the lesser
offense of trespass. You only reach the lesser offense of trespass
for Count 4, if, first, you have unanimously voted not guilty as to
the charged residential burglary. . . .

“I’ll say it again. Only if you unanimously agree that
Mr. Uc is not guilty of [the] charged residential burglary for
Count 4, then turn your attention to the lesser trespass. And
then you approach the lesser trespass at that point the way you
would any other count. Have your discussion and have your vote.
If you’re unanimous for guilt, you fill in guilty, sign and date. If
you’re unanimous for not guilty, put in not guilty, sign and date.
And if when you’re discussing and voting on trespass, you cannot
reach unanimity, you don’t sign and date the form because as I
told you, you only have a verdict if you unanimously agree either
way.”
After the jurors began deliberating, the trial court indicated that the
next day the parties could memorialize their objections to the jury

8
instructions. But no further discussion of the instructions was reported, and
our record does not otherwise indicate that one occurred.
2. Analysis
Under the “acquittal-first rule,” when a jury is instructed on a lesser
included offense, it “ ‘must acquit of the greater offense before returning a
verdict on the lesser included offense.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2009)
47 Cal.4th 92, 114.) The rule is meant to enforce double jeopardy protections
by avoiding “retrial when the jury agrees that the greater offense was not
proven but cannot agree on a lesser included offense. Without the rule, a
general declaration of mistrial would disguise the fact that the jury agreed
the defendant was not guilty of the greater offense, making the defendant
subject to retrial on both the greater and lesser offenses.” (Ibid.)
In Kurtzman, our state Supreme Court clarified that the acquittal-first
rule dictates the order in which a jury returns verdicts, but the jury may
“consider or discuss the offenses in any order it chooses.” (People v.
Anderson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 114; Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at
pp. 329–330.) The Supreme Court thereby “rejected a strict acquittal-first
rule, applied in some states, ‘under which the jury must acquit of the greater
offense before even considering lesser included offenses.’ ” (People v. Olivas
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 758, 773 (Olivas).) Thus, it is error to instruct the
jury that it may not even consider a lesser included offense before it reaches a
verdict on the greater offense. (Kurtzman, at pp. 329–330; Olivas, at p. 774;
People v. Perez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 395, 399.) “ ‘The danger to the
defendant of [an instruction] requiring acquittal of the greater offense before
the lesser offense is considered is clear: “If the jury is heavily for conviction
on the greater offense, dissenters favoring the lesser may throw in the sponge
rather than cause a mistrial that would leave the defendant with no

9
conviction at all, although the jury might have reached sincere and
unanimous agreement with respect to the lesser charge.” ’ ” (People v.
Hishmeh (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 46, 54 (Hishmeh).)
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Mitchell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579; Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.) In doing
so, we view the challenged instruction “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a
whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ”
(Mitchell, at p. 579; People v. Taylor (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1195, 1205.)
The Attorney General contends that Uc forfeited his claim. Since not
all discussions below of the jury instructions were reported, it is unclear
whether Uc in fact objected to the challenged instruction. Although it is
generally an appellant’s burden to show that an issue was preserved (see
People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 728), we will consider the claim
on the merits because Uc argues that the error violated his substantial
rights. (§ 1259; see, e.g., Hishmeh, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 52
[considering Kurtzman claim on merits despite failure to object]; Olivas,
supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 772 [same].)
We begin by noting that although neither party raises the issue,
trespass is actually a lesser related offense of burglary. (People v. Foster
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1343; People v. Sigur (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 656,
667.) A defendant is not entitled to instructions on lesser related offenses,
which require “ ‘mutual assent of the parties.’ ” (People v. Alvarez (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 781, 790; People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 112–113.)
But the record does not show any objection to the trespass instruction, which
the defense apparently requested, and it seems the trial court and parties all
mistakenly believed trespass was a lesser included offense of burglary.

10
Ultimately, this discrepancy does not affect our analysis of whether error
occurred: Once a court chooses, rightly or wrongly, to give an acquittal-first
instruction, we see no reason why prohibiting discussion of a lesser related
offense before the jury reaches a verdict on the greater offense would be any
less problematic than the same prohibition as to a lesser included offense.
Uc identifies three portions of the challenged instruction, which we
italicize in the following discussion, that he claims constituted “obvious
Kurtzman error.” We disagree with him regarding the first two portions.
The first portion, in the instruction’s first paragraph, directed the jury,
“When you start to vote, if you decide unanimously that Mr. Uc is guilty of
the charged residential burglary in Count 4, you’d fill that in, sign it, and
date it, your foreperson, and you never reach the lesser included offense and
its verdict form because you’ve resolved Count 4 with the greater charge.”
(Italics added.) This sentence clearly addresses filling out verdict forms,
however, and in context the directive not to “reach the lesser included offense
and its verdict form” did not preclude the jury from merely discussing the
lesser offense first.
Likewise, the next portion of the instruction to which Uc objects, in the
instruction’s second paragraph, does not address the order of the jury’s
deliberations. This portion instructed the jury that if it could not “resolve the
greater charged offense in Count 4”—meaning it could not “reach a
unanimous decision” when “voting on” that offense—“you never reach the
lesser offense of trespass. You only reach the lesser offense of trespass for
Count 4, if, first, you have unanimously voted not guilty as to the charged
residential burglary.” (Italics added.) Again, in context, the directions about
“reaching” the lesser offense are more naturally interpreted to refer to voting
on it and filling out its verdict form, not considering it.

11
We agree with Uc, however, that the final portion of the challenged
instruction improperly conveyed to the jury that it could not even discuss
trespass before it reached a verdict on burglary. In its final paragraph, the
instruction directed the jury, “Only if you unanimously agree that Mr. Uc is
not guilty of [the] charged residen[tial] burglary for Count 4, then turn your
attention to the lesser trespass.” (Italics added.) Had the instruction stopped
there, we might conclude that the italicized language was most reasonably
read as still referring to voting and completing a verdict form, as opposed to
considering the lesser charge at all. But the instruction continued, “And then
you approach the lesser trespass at that point the way you would any other
count. Have your discussion and have your vote. . . . And if when you’re
discussing and voting on trespass, you cannot reach unanimity, you don’t sign
and date the form.” We conclude there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
understood this to mean it should not even “discuss” the lesser offense unless
it found Uc not guilty of the greater offense, in violation of Kurtzman.
Nor did anything else in the record serve to correct this likely
misunderstanding. Notably, the trial court did not instruct the jury under
CALCRIM No. 3517, which the Attorney General agrees is the standard
instruction on deliberating and completing verdict forms for a greater offense
and lesser offense that would apply here. In addition to addressing the order
in which the forms should be completed, CALCRIM No. 3517 provides, “It is
up to you to decide the order in which you consider the greater and lesser
crimes and the relevant evidence. You do not have to reach a verdict on the
greater crime before considering a lesser crime.” But for unknown reasons,
the challenged instruction was given instead, and the jurors did not receive
CALCRIM No. 3517’s clear directive that they could discuss the lesser offense
before reaching a verdict on the greater offense.

12
The closing arguments also did not clarify the issue. Uc argues that in
fact, the prosecutor’s argument only compounded the problem. On rebuttal,
the prosecutor told the jury, “[T]he only way to render a verdict on [trespass]
is if you unanimously agree that [Uc] is not guilty of the burglary at Arguello
[Boulevard]. Suffice to say, . . . the People’s position . . . [is] that you should
never need to consider a trespass.” (Italics added.) It is true that Kurtzman
and subsequent cases have held that instructions that the jury cannot
“consider” a lesser included offense before reaching a verdict on the greater
are erroneous. (Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 324; Hishmeh, supra,
52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 48, 51; Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) But
we do not think that the presence or absence of the word “consider” in a given
instruction is determinative. Since the prosecutor had just told the jury that
it could not “render a verdict” on the lesser offense unless it found Uc guilty
of the greater, the statement that the jury would “never need to consider” the
lesser offense could be read to refer to reaching a verdict, not mere
discussion. Conversely, the challenged instruction does not contain the word
“consider,” yet it can be reasonably interpreted as precluding the jury from
discussing trespass before reaching a verdict on burglary. Although we thus
do not view the prosecutor’s argument as reinforcing the error in the
challenged instruction, it did not counteract the error either.
Having determined that the challenged instruction violated Kurtzman,
we turn to whether the error requires reversal. The parties disagree on the
applicable standard for assessing prejudice. Kurtzman asked whether it was
reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a better result
absent the error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).
(Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 335; see People v. Berryman (1993)
6 Cal.4th 1048, 1077, fn. 7 [Kurtzman-related error “appears to implicate

13
California law only”], overruled on another ground in People v. Hill (1998)
17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1; Olivas, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 775 [applying
Watson in reliance on Kurtzman and Berryman].) But more recently, in
Hishmeh, the Fourth District Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that
Kurtzman error is harmless only if it did not contribute to the verdict beyond
a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
(Chapman). (Hishmeh, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 53–55, citing U.S. v.
Jackson (9th Cir. 1984) 726 F.2d 1466, 1470.)
We conclude that Watson applies. Unlike Hishmeh and Jackson,
Kurtzman and subsequent decisions from our state Supreme Court are
binding upon us. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d
450, 455.) In his briefing, Uc fails to recognize that Kurtzman itself applied
the Watson standard to hold that the error in restricting deliberations it
identified was harmless. (Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 335.) Moreover,
in concluding that such error amounts to federal constitutional error, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on “the rule that a defendant is entitled
to a lesser-included offense instruction in a proper case,” which “ ‘ensures
that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-
doubt standard.’ ” (U.S. v. Jackson, supra, 726 F.2d at p. 1470.) Uc,
however, was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser related offense of
trespass. Thus, even if we were otherwise able to disregard binding
authority, we do not think that Jackson’s reasoning supports applying
Chapman here.
The Attorney General argues that we can find the Kurtzman error
harmless because the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt.
Although we generally presume that a jury follows all instructions, Kurtzman
is premised on the possibility that a juror will vote to convict on the greater

14
offense despite not being convinced of the defendant’s guilt of that crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, unlike in other cases finding such
error harmless, the record before us does not show that the jury actually
discussed the lesser offense before reaching its verdict. (See, e.g., Kurtzman,
supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 335; People v. Perez, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 400.)
Nonetheless, based on the evidence as a whole, it is not reasonably
probable that Uc would have obtained a better result absent the instructional
error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) The jury was instructed that to
be guilty of burglary, Uc had to enter the Arguello Boulevard apartment
building with an intent to commit theft, whereas to be guilty of trespass he
need only have willfully entered the building without consent. We agree with
the Attorney General that there was ample evidence that Uc had the intent
to commit theft. Crucially, Uc admitted that he entered the building
intending to take recyclables. As the prosecutor emphasized in closing
argument, Uc’s intent to steal recyclables “that [did] not belong to him” was
sufficient to support a burglary conviction.
In addition, on the night Uc entered the apartment building he had
burglary tools with him and was seen shining a flashlight on garage doors,
evoking his behavior during the two other charged incidents. Even though he
did not ultimately steal anything from the apartment building, the similarity
of his acts on this occasion to the incidents when his intent to commit theft
was plainer bolstered the inference that he had the requisite intent for
burglary. In other words, given all the evidence presented—which the jury
was specifically instructed it could consider in determining Uc’s guilt of any
of the crimes charged—it is not reasonably probable that any juror failed to
be convinced of Uc’s intent to commit theft when he entered the apartment
building. The claim of instructional error fails.

15
B. Uc Was Entitled to a Jury Trial on the Bail Enhancements.
The parties agree that the two-year bail enhancements were imposed in
violation of the federal Constitution under Erlinger v. United States (2024)
602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger). We accept the Attorney General’s concession and
reverse the enhancements, which can be tried to a jury on remand.
As noted above, the information alleged under section 12022.1,
subdivision (b), that Uc was on bail when he committed the four felonies
charged. The jury was not instructed or asked to make findings on these
allegations. Indeed, the trial court specifically stated that the jury did “not
have to establish” them. Instead, in the court’s view, the jury’s verdicts
supplied “all of the conditions necessary” to impose the bail enhancements.
Accordingly, the court imposed two-year terms for the enhancements
attached to the Arguello Boulevard and Jefferson Street burglaries.6
In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), the United
States Supreme Court held that criminal defendants have a federal
constitutional right to a jury trial on “any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,” except for “the fact of a
prior conviction.” (Id. at pp. 476, 490.) California courts then repeatedly
“ ‘rejected a narrow or literal application of [Apprendi’s] reference to “the fact
of a prior conviction,” ’ ” construing it to encompass “recidivistic” factors
enhancing punishment based on prior offenses as opposed to “conduct
involved in the charged offense(s).” (People v. Johnson (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1099 (Johnson).) In Johnson, the Third District Court

6 The other two bail enhancements alleged were not imposed,

apparently because (1) the allegation attached to the Balboa Street
attempted burglary was based on Uc’s being out on bail for an earlier offense
of which he was not convicted in this case (see § 12022.1, subd. (d)) and
(2) the trial court stayed punishment for the grand theft.

16
of Appeal relied on such authorities to conclude that section 12022.1 is such
“a recidivist statute,” meaning defendants have no federal right to a jury trial
on bail enhancements imposed under it. (Johnson, at p. 1100.)
At the time of Uc’s sentencing in March 2024, Johnson was still good
law. But three months later, the United States Supreme Court decided
Erlinger, which concerned enhanced punishment for “committ[ing] three
violent felonies or serious drug offenses on separate occasions.” (Erlinger,
supra, 602 U.S. at p. 825.) Erlinger held that the defendant was entitled to a
jury trial on whether the previous offenses “took place on at least three
different occasions,” which the Court described as “a fact-laden task.” (Id. at
pp. 834–835.) In so holding, the Court reaffirmed that Apprendi’s “prior
conviction” exception is “narrow,” permitting a trial court to do no “more than
identify [a defendant’s] previous convictions and the legal elements required
to sustain them.” (Id. at p. 838.)
We agree with the parties that under Erlinger, Uc was entitled to a
jury trial on the bail enhancements. The enhancements required findings
that he was “released from custody on bail or on his . . . own recognizance”
when he committed the offenses at issue. (§ 12022.1, subd. (a).) Such
findings plainly go beyond the mere existence of other convictions. (See
Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 838; People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069,
1076, 1084 [applying Erlinger to require jury trial on whether convictions
were of increasing seriousness and whether performance on probation was
unsatisfactory].) We also agree with the parties that the omission of a jury
trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as there is no conclusive
evidence in the record to indicate Uc’s bail status at the time he committed
the crimes at issue. (Wiley, at p. 1087; Chapman v. California, supra,
386 U.S. at p. 24.) Thus, we reverse the bail enhancements and remand for

17
the prosecution to have an opportunity to try the section 12022.1 allegations
to a jury.
III.
DISPOSITION
The enhancements imposed under Penal Code section 12022.1,
subdivision (b), are reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion, including a full resentencing. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.

18
_________________________
Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

People v. Uc A170520

19

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.