CourtListener 10660965•Sharma v. Gomez CA1/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/26/25 Sharma v. Gomez CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
RAJ SHARMA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168552
v.
LUIS GOMEZ et al., (Solano County
Defendants and Appellants. Super. Ct. No. CU2300585)
Luis Gomez appeals from an order denying his special motion to strike
Raj Sharma’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16).1 The trial court denied the motion on the basis that none of
Sharma’s causes of action against Gomez are based on protected activity
under section 425.16. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Gomez’s 2020 Lawsuit Against Sharma
On November 13, 2020, Gomez sued Sharma and Sharma’s business
entity, Sunrise Orchards, alleging breach of a contract to convey real property
located in Dixon, California (the property), and related claims. On
November 30, 2020, Gomez recorded a lis pendens with the Solano County
1 All statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise stated.
1
Assessor–Recorder, which provided notice of Gomez’s complaint involving the
property.2 On July 14, 2022, Solano County Superior Court Judge
Christine A. Carringer granted Sharma and Sunrise Orchards’s motion to
expunge the lis pendens and issued an order stating, “Gomez is ordered to
expunge the lis pendens.”
II. Sharma’s 2023 Complaint Against Gomez and His Counsel
On April 3, 2023, Sharma sued Gomez and his counsel, Ali Ari Aalaei
and Ari Law, P.C., alleging that the defendants damaged Sharma by not
removing the lis pendens on the property after the court in the Gomez v.
Sharma lawsuit ordered removal. Sharma alleged that he was forced to sell
the property at a reduced price because the defendants did not remove the
lis pendens. The complaint attached a copy of the July 14, 2022, order and
alleged it required the defendants to remove the lis pendens. As of March 2,
2023, the defendants had not complied with the order. Sharma alleged
damages “that resulted directly from the negligent and intentional failure of
Defendants to remove a lis pendens, even seven (7) months following the
Court’s Order requiring Defendants to remove the lis pendens, such that
Sharma was forced to cut his losses and sell the property with the lis pendens
. . . at a reduced price of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).” He
alleged professional negligence against Gomez’s counsel, and negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants. He also
alleged general negligence and conversion against Gomez only.
2 A lis pendens is a recorded document giving constructive notice that
an action has been filed affecting title or right to possession of the real
property. (Park 100 Investment Group, LLC v. Ryan (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
795, 807.)
2
III. Anti-SLAPP Motion
Gomez filed a special motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16. The
motion argued Sharma’s complaint was based on Gomez’s protected activity
of recording and maintaining a lis pendens in the prior breach of contract
action.3 Following argument, the trial court (Judge Stephen Grizzi) adopted
its tentative ruling denying Gomez’s motion to strike. The trial court’s order
first explained that it disregarded Gomez’s arguments as to the first cause of
action, for professional negligence against Gomez’s counsel, because Gomez
had no standing to move to strike a cause of action not alleged against him.
It then summarized Sharma’s causes of action for negligence and negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress as alleging that Gomez had a
duty to remove the lis pendens following the July 14, 2022 court order;
Gomez breached the duty by not removing the lis pendens; and the breach
damaged Sharma because he had to sell the property for $1.5 million instead
of $2 million. The trial court found: “None of Sharma’s causes of action are
founded on protected activity. In refusing to remove the lis pendens Gomez
made no written or oral statement in a judicial proceeding that could qualify
as protected conduct under . . . section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1)–(2). It
cannot be protected activity within a judicial proceeding to maintain a
lis pendens in the face of a court order demanding that lis pendens’
expungement. Where the evidence conclusively establishes that conduct is
illegal as a matter of law, that conduct is not protected activity, and the
evidence available conclusively establishes that Gomez had been ordered to
expunge the lis pendens. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 305
3 Gomez’s motion states that Gomez is the only movant, but it appears
to argue the entire complaint (including the professional negligence cause of
action against only Gomez’s counsel) should be struck.
3
[conduct illegal as a matter of law not protected]; CU23-00585 Complaint,
Exhibit 2 [July 14, 2022 order stating ‘Gomez is ordered to expunge the
lis pendens’].) Gomez’s inaction cannot be construed as a statement or
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the rights of petition or free speech
under subdivisions (e)(3) or (e)(4) either because it does not relate to a matter
of public importance. The four [sic] causes of action based on the lis pendens
are not based on protected activity. The last cause of action, for conversion, is
based on Gomez’s alleged refusal to allow Sharma access to his own property,
which is also not a form of protected conduct.”
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Framework
Section 425.16 provides: “A cause of action against a person arising
from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or
free speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special
motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The statute is “designed to protect
defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their
rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable
News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).)
“A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. ‘Initially, the
moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant
has engaged. [Citations.] If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff
must then demonstrate its claims have at least “minimal merit.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) Both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute
must be satisfied for a claim to be struck under the statute. (Aguilar v.
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Goldstein (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1159.) If a court finds the defendant
has not satisfied the first prong, it must deny the motion and there is no need
to consider the second step. (Ibid.) We review the denial of a special motion
to strike de novo. (Ibid.) However, our de novo review does not relieve
defendant of his duty to present reasoned arguments supporting his position
that his anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted. (Allen v. City of
Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.)
A “claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or
forms the basis for the claim. . . . [T]he focus is on determining what ‘the
defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and
whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.]
‘The only means specified in section 425.16 by which a moving defendant can
satisfy the [“arising from”] requirement is to demonstrate that the
defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within
one of the four categories described in subdivision (e) . . . .’ [Citation.] In
short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the
elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply
those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park v. Board
of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062–1063,
1st bracketed insertion added, italics added by Park (Park).)
Section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines “ ‘act[s] in furtherance of a
person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue’ ”
to include: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
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(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or
(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.”
II. Gomez Fails to Establish that the Causes of Action Against Him
Arise from Protected Activity
Gomez’s opening brief argues the trial court erred in denying his anti-
SLAPP motion because recording a lis pendens is protected activity under
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), which states that
protected activity is “any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body”
and that it is also protected by the litigation privilege under Civil Code
section 47, subdivision (b)(4). He cites case law holding that recording a
lis pendens is a writing in connection with an issue under consideration by a
judicial body and which, therefore, falls “ ‘squarely within’ ” Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury
Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1050.) Gomez’s opening brief
includes a subheading stating that the complaint arose from protected
conduct. However, he provides no analysis of how his alleged failure to
comply with the July 14, 2022 court order to expunge the lis pendens is a
“written or oral statement or writing” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e))
and, instead, simply states that because “[t]he publication of the lis pendens
was absolutely privileged . . . the Superior Court should have found that the
anti-SLAPP statue applied.” (Italics omitted.) Gomez’s conclusory analysis
of his threshold burden to establish the claims against him “arise out of”
protected activity recharacterizes the claims as based on the initial recording
of the lis pendens, and ignores the trial court’s finding that the allegations
6
against him are based on his failure to comply with the court order to
expunge the lis pendens.
As explained in Park, “a claim may be struck only if the speech or
petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just . . . a step
leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) The moving defendant must demonstrate that “the
defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within
one of the four categories described in subdivision (e) [of section 425.16].”
(Id. at p. 1063.) Gomez fails to meet his burden of establishing that Sharma’s
causes of action against him arise out of protected activity within the
meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e). He provides no analysis of the
elements of each cause of action asserted against him and does not explain
how his alleged actions supply those elements and form the basis of liability.
(Park, at p. 1063.)
As the trial court explained, the causes of action for negligence and
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress all allege Gomez had
a duty to remove the lis pendens following the July 14, 2022, court order;
breached that duty; and caused Sharma damages. The complaint alleges
damages “that resulted directly from the negligent and intentional failure of
Defendants to remove a lis pendens, even seven (7) months following the
Court’s Order requiring Defendants to remove the lis pendens, such that
Sharma was forced to cut his losses and sell the property with the lis pendens
. . . at a reduced price of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).” (Italics
added.) Park teaches that in evaluating prong 1 of the anti-SLAPP analysis,
we must “respect the distinction between activities that form the basis for a
claim and those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or provide
evidentiary support for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1064.)
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“[A] claim does not ‘arise from’ protected activity simply because it was filed
after, or because of, protected activity, or when protected activity merely
provides evidentiary support or context for the claim.” (Rand Resources, LLC
v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621.)
We agree with the trial court that Sharma’s claims against Gomez for
negligence and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress do
not arise out of protected conduct under section 425.16, subdivision (e). The
claims are not based upon Gomez’s initial recording of the lis pendens but,
instead, are based on Gomez’s alleged failure to remove the lis pendens after
the court ordered that Gomez “expunge the lis pendens.” Gomez fails to
persuade us that Sharma’s claims “arise from” protected activity simply
because they involve a lis pendens. The initial recording of the lis pendens
provides context for the claims against Gomez, but it is not the activity that
provides the basis for the claims. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 621.)4
4 Belatedly in his reply brief, Gomez attempts to reduce the “arising
from” requirement to a “but for” analysis. He cites O&C Creditors
Group, LLC v. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 546, 567,
as support for his assertion that he has met his “arising out of” threshold
burden by demonstrating that the claims against him “would not exist, but
for” the recording of the lis pendens. Gomez quotes O&C Creditors Group’s
statement that “the challenged claims are founded upon and would not exist
in absence of the protected settlement activity; the cross-claims thus ‘ “arise
from” ’ and are ‘ “based on” ’ the settlement agreement, making them subject
to the provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute” (O&C Creditors Group, at p. 567)
and, from there, argues that his burden is satisfied merely by showing that
the claims asserted against him “would not exist, but for the protected
activity.” Gomez’s reliance on an isolated quotation from O&C Creditors
Group without providing the relevant context is unpersuasive.
O&C Creditors Group detailed the cross-claims at issue and found that they
were based on and arose from a purportedly wrongful settlement agreement
which was a “a statement and writing ‘made in connection with an issue
8
We note that the trial court also relied upon Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39
Cal.4th 299, which held that conduct illegal as a matter of law is not
protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at p. 333.) Flatley
involved criminal extortion in the context of settlement demands. (Id. at pp.
326–330.) The trial court here found that the evidence conclusively
established that Gomez was ordered to expunge the lis pendens. The parties
do not dispute that the July 14, 2022, order states, “Gomez is ordered to
expunge the lis pendens.” However, Gomez’s reply brief argues that the
illegal conduct exception does not apply because his conduct was not criminal
and the continued publication was not illegal as a matter of law. We need not
decide these issues because even if Gomez’s alleged failure to comply with the
court order does not fall within the illegality exception under Flatley, he has
still failed to demonstrate that Sharma’s claims arise from protected activity.
We find the factual scenario and analysis of Jespersen v. Zubiate-
Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624 more closely analogous. There, the
Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion filed by
attorneys who were sued for litigation-related malpractice. (Id. at p. 627.)
The Jespersen court rejected the defendants’ argument that the complaint
was based on their activity in filing documents in the underlying litigation
and explained that “a moving defendant’s burden to show a ‘ “ ‘cause of action
. . . arising from’ ” ’ is not met simply by showing that the label of the lawsuit
under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.’ ” (Id. at p. 571.) Here,
in contrast, the complaint is based on Gomez’s alleged failure to comply with
the court order. The fact that the July 14, 2022, court order refers to a
previously recorded lis pendens does not make Gomez’s inaction protected
activity; nor is his inaction a statement or writing within the meaning of
section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060 [speech or
petitioning activity itself must be the basis for liability].)
9
appears to involve the rights of free speech or petition; he or she must
demonstrate that the substance of the plaintiff’s cause of action was an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” (Id. at p. 630, italics
omitted.) In analyzing the “arising out of” prong, the Jespersen court
“discern[ed] that [defendants’] conduct allegedly consisted of (1) a failure to
serve timely discovery responses, resulting in a waiver of objections . . . ; (2) a
failure to comply with a court order to serve responses without objections;
and (3) a failure to comply with a second court order. Thus, . . . the alleged
attorney malpractice did not consist of any act in furtherance of anyone’s
right of petition or free speech, but [defendants’] negligent failure to do so on
behalf of their clients.” (Id. at p. 631.) It further rejected one defendant’s
argument that a declaration she filed in the underlying action, in which she
admitted she continued to apply her interpretation of a discovery request and
refused to produce documents despite a court order to do so, was protected
speech from which the cause of action arose. (Id. at pp. 631–632.) Jespersen
explained the challenged cause of action was not based on the defendant
attorney’s declaration. Instead, the defendants were sued for “their failure to
comply with a discovery statute and two court orders to do so,” and they
failed to demonstrate that such alleged failures were protected activity under
the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at p. 632.)
Similarly, here, Gomez was not sued for recording the lis pendens
initially, but for his failure to comply with the order that he expunge the
lis pendens. Gomez’s attempt to distinguish Jespersen on the basis that the
claims against him are not for legal malpractice is unavailing. Gomez’s
alleged failure to comply with the court order is not a “written or oral
statement or writing” under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1)–(3).
(Callister v. James B. Church & Associates, P.C. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 185,
10
196 [“[U]nder the plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute, ‘[a] failure to
speak cannot fall in any of the first three categories, which protect only
“statement[s] or writing[s],” and not the failure to make them’ ”
(1st bracketed insertion added)].)5
Sharma’s complaint also asserts a cause of action for conversion
alleging that “Gomez wrongfully exercised control over Sharma’s personal
property agriculture” and that Gomez “has and continues to substantially
interfere with Sharma’s attempt to care for the agriculture, by not allowing
Sharma possession of the agriculture portion of the Subject Property, pending
eviction of Gomez.” (Sic.) As the trial court correctly found, this cause of
action is based on Gomez’s alleged refusal to allow Sharma access to his own
property, which is not protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Gomez’s briefing does not even mention the conversion cause of action, much
less explain how it is based on or arises from protected conduct.
We agree with the trial court that Gomez failed to make a threshold
showing that the causes of action against him arise from protected activity.
Accordingly, the burden does not shift to Sharma to demonstrate that his
claims have minimal merit, and we need not reach the second prong of the
anti-SLAPP analysis. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 [only “[i]f
5 Gomez’s briefing does not argue that his alleged failure to comply
with the July 14, 2022, court order constitutes “other conduct in furtherance
of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest”
under subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16, and we do not consider this issue.
(Allen v. City of Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [“We are not
required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the
litigants”].)
11
the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from
activity protected by the statute” is the “second step . . . reached”].)6
DISPOSITION
The order denying Gomez’s anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Sharma is
entitled to his costs on appeal.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Burns, J.
Chou, J.
A168552/Sharma v. Gomez
6 Sharma filed a request for judicial notice asking that we take notice of
the following documents: “(1) the complaint filed in Solano Superior Court
case number CU23-05722 by Luis Gomez and as against Raj Madam and Raj
Sharma, on December 5, 2023, (2) the Minute Order dated August 27, 2024
denying Sharma’s motion to strike Gomez’s complaint filed in case number
CU23-05722 and filed with the Court on September 4, 2024, (3) Notice of
Trial and Management Orders in case number CU23-05722 filed on
January 6, 2025, (4) Gomez’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Consolidate
cases filed in Case No FCS055666 with Related Cases FCS059299,
CU23-00585, CU23-05722 on January 16, 2025, and (5) Gomez’s
Memorandum of Points & Authorities In Support of Notice of Motion and
Motion to Consolidate cases filed in Solano Superior Court case number
FCS055666 on January 16, 2025.” Sharma states that these matters
occurred after the July 21, 2023 order that is the subject of this appeal. He
asserts the related litigation in Solano County Superior Court case Nos.
CU23-05722 and FCS055666 “embody the petitioning activity that is at-issue
on the present appeal, including the issues in contemplation of litigation at
the time” and that the setting of a trial date in Solano County Superior Court
case No. CU23-05722 “weighs in favor of this Court determining the second-
step of the Anti-SLAPP analysis . . . .” We are unpersuaded that the matters
Sharma requests we notice are relevant to the issues in this appeal. We deny
the request for judicial notice.
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