People v. Williams CA2/1

CourtListener 10660261Calctapp25.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/25/25 P. v. Williams CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B336210

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA504700)
v.

KWAME WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark Hanasono, Judge. Affirmed.
Sarah S. Sanger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Yun K. Lee and Roberta L. Davis,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Defendant Kwame Williams argues his trial attorney
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to
the scientific reliability of testimony by an expert firearm witness
who linked cartridge cases recovered from the scene of two
shootings in which Williams was charged with attempted
murder. Williams bears the burden of showing his attorney acted
unreasonably by failing to seek to exclude the testimony (see
People v. Delgado (2017) 2 Cal.5th 544, 559), and on the record
before us, he cannot meet his burden. Because Williams did not
challenge the expert’s testimony at trial on the grounds he now
advances, there is little evidence in the record by which we can
evaluate the propriety of the expert’s methods or the soundness
of his conclusions. In addition, Williams has failed to show that
he was prejudiced, in that he has not shown a reasonable
probability of a better outcome in his trial if his attorney had
challenged the expert’s testimony. We therefore affirm his
convictions.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
The People charged Williams with four felony counts based
on three separate incidents. They accused him of two counts of
attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) for
shooting at the driver of a vehicle near Fifth and Hill Streets in
downtown Los Angeles on January 10, 2022 (count 1), and for
shooting at an alleged gang rival 12 days later outside a dollar
store in South Los Angeles (count 2); and two counts of robbery

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

2
(§ 211; counts 4 and 5)2 for robbing a convenience store in
Inglewood on July 26, 2021.
The jury acquitted Williams on count 1 but convicted him
on the three remaining counts. The jury found true a great
bodily injury allegation (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on count 2, as well
as firearm allegations (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) on all three
convictions. The trial court sentenced him to 20 years to life for
attempted murder and 17 years four months for the robberies.
Because this appeal concerns only the attempted murder
conviction (count 2), we focus on the facts of that offense,
describing the other charges only as necessary to elucidate the
issues Williams raises.
Surveillance video footage showed a white Volkswagen
enter the dollar store parking lot late in the afternoon of
January 22, 2022. The car had a black roof, tinted windows, low-
profile tires with custom rims, a white driver’s side mirror, and a
black passenger’s side mirror. A witness to the shooting testified
that the car had Nevada license plates. Four men got out of the
car and walked toward the store’s entrance. One of the men wore
all black. Another wore a dark gray hoodie. The third wore a
black hoodie with a large white Nike emblem, and the fourth
wore a white or light gray hoodie. As he reached the door, the
man in dark gray appeared to notice another car nearby, where a
15-year-old boy named K.B. was seated in the passenger seat.
The man pointed a gun at the windshield of the car, and K.B. got
out of the vehicle. The man in gray and the man in the black
Nike hoodie began firing at K.B. K.B. fled into a nearby flower

2 Count 3 was dismissed before trial and is not relevant to
this appeal.

3
shop, and the men got back into the Volkswagen and drove away.
K.B. survived but was wounded in his legs, chest, and arm. He
testified that he did not see who shot him.
The surveillance videos did not show the perpetrators’ faces
clearly, but a police officer who had encountered Williams several
times identified him as the man in the black Nike hoodie based
on his height, weight, gait, and mannerisms. In the same
manner, he identified the man in the gray hoodie as Devin
Washington. According to the officer, Williams and Washington
were both members of the Van Ness Gangster Brims street gang.
An officer who spoke with K.B. after the shooting testified that
K.B. told him that he believed the shooters were asking him what
gang he was from before they shot him. K.B. told the officer he
was not a member of any gang, but another officer who had
encountered K.B. numerous times testified that he believed K.B.
was a member of the Rollin’ 40’s gang. The Rollin’ 40’s, who are
affiliated with the Crips, are a rival of the Brims, a Bloods gang.
At around 2:00 a.m. on February 10, 2022, about three
weeks after the shooting, sheriff’s deputies stopped Williams as
he was driving a white Volkswagen with Nevada license plates
and a black passenger’s side mirror, and with unique stitching on
the leather seats. Williams claimed the car belonged to his uncle.
The prosecution produced evidence of social media posts
from around the time of the shooting. In two of the videos, which
were posted within one hour of the shooting, Williams was
wearing a black hoodie with a white Nike logo, and was seated in
a Volkswagen with distinctive stitching on the seats beside
someone in a white or light gray hoodie like that worn by one of
the men in the surveillance videos. Cell phone records showed
that Williams’s and Washington’s phones were both located near

4
the corner of Century Boulevard and Prairie Avenue at 4:24 p.m.,
about 25 minutes before the shooting. There was no cell site data
on Williams’s phone for the next hour and a half, indicating the
phone was not used to make or receive calls or to send or receive
certain text messages during that time. Washington’s phone,
however, produced more granular data, allowing its location to be
tracked regardless of whether it was in active use. The records
showed Washington’s phone traveled north and arrived near the
dollar store at 4:48 p.m., just before the shooting.
Officers recovered cartridge cases from the dollar store, as
well as from the scene of the alleged shooting at Fifth and Hill
Streets downtown, and two more cartridge cases from the inside
of the windshield of a BMW driven by Demoraey Herron, another
member of the Brims who police believed had been involved in
the downtown shooting. One of the officers investigating the
dollar store shooting received notifications from the National
Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) suggesting
that the firearms used in the dollar store shooting were linked to
those used in the downtown shooting, and to one of the cases
recovered from the search of Herron’s BMW.
Srinivasan Rathinam, a firearms examiner for the Los
Angeles Police Department, investigated the cartridge cases
further. Rathinam testified that when a gun is fired, different
parts of the gun leave distinctive marks on the cartridge, known
as toolmarks. “By examining those marks, we can tell whether a
particular cartridge case [was] fired in a specific firearm or not.”
According to Rathinam, his work is independently verified by a
second examiner, as well as a tech reviewer who tests the validity
of the photos used in the review. Rathinam testified that his
work is more thorough than that produced by NIBIN, which only

5
flags possible matches. Rathinam looks at cartridge cases under
a microscope to reach a more specific conclusion.
Rathinam concluded that six of the cartridge cases
recovered from the scene of the dollar store shooting came from
one weapon, which he labeled 1-A, and the other four came from
a different weapon, 1-B. In addition, Rathinam concluded that
the two cases recovered from the scene of the downtown Los
Angeles shooting were fired from the same weapon as the 1-B
cases, and that one of the two cases from the traffic stop of
Herron came from the same weapon as the 1-A cases.
On cross-examination, Williams’s attorney challenged
Rathinam’s conclusions, suggesting that ballistics is not “an exact
science” and that “[s]omeone else could examine the same
evidence and reach a different conclusion; correct?” Rathinam
replied, “Reproducibility is the hallmark of science.
Reproducibility is established within this science. There is
subjectivity involved. That doesn’t mean there is no
reproducibility. Meaning, the error rates are extremely low, like
1 percent or 2 percent, depending on how you define the error
rates.” Williams’s attorney did not press Rathinam further on
this point, asking him instead whether he was given the firearms
to examine, and whether the cartridge cases from the traffic stop
of Herron came from separate guns.
DISCUSSION
Williams contends his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to Rathinam’s testimony. To
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “the
defendant must show [both] that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d

6
674]), and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense”
(id. at p. 687). Williams has done neither. He claims that expert
toolmark testimony is “scientifically invalid and inadmissible,”
but he has cited no case law deeming such testimony generally
inadmissible. Nor does the record include information that would
allow us to evaluate the level of acceptance of toolmark analysis
in the scientific community. In addition, Rathinam’s testimony
appears not to have contributed significantly to the jury’s verdict.
The testimony claimed to establish a link between the guns used
in the dollar store shooting and those used in the downtown
shooting, but there was no physical evidence connecting Williams
to any specific weapon, and the jury acquitted Williams of
attempted murder in the downtown shooting.
In support of his claim that his attorney was deficient for
failing to object to Rathinam’s testimony, Williams relies
primarily on People v. Azcona (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 504
(Azcona). In that case, the defendant committed three separate
shootings, and the prosecution relied on testimony from a firearm
expert to show that casings from two of the shootings came from
the same gun. (Id. at pp. 509-510.) On appeal, the defendant
argued that the validity of toolmark analysis had been “recently
undermined to such a degree that it is no longer admissible” (id.
at p. 511, italics omitted) under the standard established by
People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, which provides that “[e]xpert
testimony based on the application of a scientific technique is
admissible in California if the technique is generally accepted in
the pertinent scientific community.” (Azcona, supra, at p. 510,
citing Kelly, supra, at p. 32.)
At a hearing on the defendant’s motion in limine seeking to
exclude the evidence, the defendant in Azcona “called as a

7
witness a research scientist trained in assessing the foundational
validity of scientific techniques generally. The scientist opined
that the method of visual toolmark comparison employed by the
prosecution expert is unreliable; in his opinion, ‘there is no good
evidence yet that the [method] will arrive at the correct answers.’
He testified extensively about three scientific reports—two
produced by the National Academy of Sciences in 2008 and 2009,
and another similar study from 2016. Those reports sharply
criticize visual analysis of firearm toolmarks as an unreliable
method, not tethered to objective standards and without a
measurable error rate.” (Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at
p. 512.)
The court was skeptical as to whether the Kelly standard
should be applied to toolmark analysis at all, “as visual
comparison of marks on physical objects is not so foreign to
everyday experience that jurors would have unusual difficulty
evaluating it.” (Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 511.) To the
extent Kelly principles applied, however, the court stated that it
“cannot find the [toolmark comparison] method categorically
inadmissible here because [the] defendant did not meet his
burden to show that a clear majority of the relevant scientific
community no longer accepts the method as reliable.” (Azcona,
supra, at p. 512.)
Nevertheless, the court held that the trial court erred by
failing to “act as a gatekeeper to ensure the opinions offered by
an expert are not ‘based on reasons unsupported by the material
on which the expert relies.’ ” (Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at
p. 513, quoting Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 771; see also Evid. Code, §§ 801,
subd. (b), 802.) The certainty of the expert’s testimony “that the

8
matching marks on the relevant projectiles are ‘much more than
can ever happen by random chance,’ and therefore the projectiles
came from the same gun, ‘to the practical exclusion of all other
guns’ ” (Azcona, supra, at pp. 513-514), was “a leap too far from
what the underlying method allowed. There was support for the
opinion that the projectiles likely came from the same gun,
perhaps more likely than not, but there was no basis to present it
as a scientific certainty. The trial court abused its discretion by
failing to limit the expert’s opinion to what was actually
supported by the material the expert relied on.” (Id. at p. 514.)
Williams argues that Rathinam’s testimony was just as
flawed as the expert testimony in Azcona, and that an objection
from his attorney would have prevented Rathinam from drawing
“a purportedly infallible conclusion” from the toolmark data.
(Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 514.) But Azcona did not
purport to state a general rule on the admissibility of toolmark
testimony. The toolmark issue was fully litigated before the trial
court in that case, and the court’s decision relied on the testimony
of a defense expert who cited three scientific reports on the use of
toolmark analysis. Because Williams’s attorney did not object to
Rathinam’s testimony, we have nothing like the same record in
this case. We do not know whether Rathinam employed the same
methods as the prosecution expert in Azcona, and we have no
complete picture of how views of toolmark analysis have evolved
in the scientific community in the four years since Azcona.3 The

3 Williams asks us to take judicial notice of an amicus brief
filed in another case by the Wilson Center for Science and Justice
at Duke Law School. (Available at
<https://wcsj.law.duke.edu/wp-

9
Azcona court suggested the differences in toolmarks from one
bullet to another are visible even to nonexperts, but as far as we
can see, the appellate record does not contain any photos of the
cartridge cases at issue in this case. We are simply not equipped
to act as a factfinder on the basis of an incomplete record.
In short, the record is devoid of the evidence we would need
to judge whether Williams’s attorney acted reasonably in
deciding not to challenge Rathinam’s testimony. “It is [the]
defendant’s burden to show that counsel performed
deficiently . . . .” (People v. Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 559.)
Williams has not met that burden.
Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance also fails because
he has not shown that his attorney’s failure to object prejudiced

content/uploads/2024/05/2024.05.14-Amicus-Brief.pdf> [as of
Aug. 25, 2025].) “While we may take judicial notice of court
records and official acts of state agencies (Evid. Code, § 452,
subds. (c), (d)), the truth of matters asserted in such documents is
not subject to judicial notice.” (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.) The amicus brief
contains information not presented to the trial court and we
cannot determine if the “[f]acts and propositions that [it contains]
are not reasonably subject to dispute . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (h); see also Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) The brief provides additional
information on studies calling into question the validity of
toolmark analysis, but in the absence of testimony from a defense
expert, we cannot judge to what extent the flaws identified in the
studies apply to Rathinam’s methods. In addition, because
Williams did not object to the testimony, the prosecution had no
occasion to present information supporting the accuracy of
toolmark analysis, and Rathinam himself had no opportunity to
explain or defend his methods.

10
him. In other words, he has not “demonstrate[d] a reasonable
probability that,” if his attorney had challenged Rathinam, “the
trial’s outcome would have been more favorable.” (People v.
Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 568.) Rathinam’s testimony did
not connect Williams personally to the shootings. The police did
not recover any of the guns at issue, and Rathinam did not claim
that any cartridge case was fired from any particular weapon.
Instead, he testified that the cartridge cases recovered from the
dollar store came from two different guns—something the video
surveillance already established as it showed two different
individuals firing guns at the victim. One of those guns was also
used in the downtown shooting, and the second gun produced a
casing found in Herron’s BMW. That BMW was suspected of
being involved in the downtown shooting but was not seen in the
parking lot of the dollar store.
The jury appears to have found the evidence of a link
between the two shootings less than fully persuasive because it
acquitted Williams of attempted murder in the downtown
shooting while convicting him of the shooting at the dollar store.
This does not imply that Rathinam’s testimony had no impact on
the verdict in the dollar store shooting, but it does suggest the
jury relied principally on other evidence in convicting Williams of
the attempted murder of K.B. This included the officer’s
identification of Williams in surveillance video footage, the
presence of Williams’s white Volkswagen in the parking lot, and
the social media postings within an hour of the shooting showing
Williams in that same Volkswagen wearing a hoodie identical to
the one seen in the surveillance video. In light of this evidence,
which tied Williams much more closely to the shooting than did
the toolmark testimony, it is not reasonably probable that

11
Williams would have obtained a more favorable result if
Rathinam’s testimony had been excluded.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

M. KIM, J.

12

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.