People v. Diaz CA2/5

CourtListener 10660238Calctapp25.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/25/25 P. v. Diaz CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B336397

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA105654)
v.

FERNANDO DIAZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher W. Dybwad, Judge. Affirmed.
S.R. Balash, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

After a jury found defendant Fernando Diaz guilty of false
imprisonment, the trial court ordered that he register as a sex
offender pursuant to Penal Code1 section 290.006. On appeal,
defendant contends the trial court erred by requiring such
registration. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Summary

On May 3, 2022, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
charged defendant by information with one count of kidnapping.
(§ 207, subd. (a).)
On September 26, 2023, a jury acquitted defendant of
kidnapping, but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of
false imprisonment. (§ 236.)
On December 8, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant
to 364 days in county jail. The court also exercised its discretion
to order that defendant register as a sex offender pursuant to
section 290.006.

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.

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B. Trial

1. Prosecution Case

On July 22, 2021, Jennifer L. (Jennifer) and a friend went
to a bar in West Hollywood, where the two drank alcoholic drinks
over a period of four hours. At approximately midnight, the
friend told Jennifer that he had to go home and Jennifer
responded that she wished to stay out. The friend and Jennifer
then went their separate ways.
On July 23, 2021, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Herrera was on patrol in West
Hollywood when he saw a white van and a red car parked on the
street. The driver of the red car waved at Herrera to get his
attention. Herrera stopped his patrol car and the driver of the
red car pulled up to the passenger side of Herrera’s patrol
vehicle. The driver reported, “‘I just saw this guy carry a girl into
that white van, and she appears to be really drunk. And I think
she needs help.’” While the driver of the red car spoke with
Herrera, defendant, who was the driver of the white van, began
driving away. Deputy Herrera then made a U-turn and followed
behind defendant.
Defendant stopped his vehicle and pulled over. Herrera
activated his lights. Defendant then got out of the van and
started to walk away. Deputy Herrera got out of his vehicle and
asked defendant, “‘Hey, what are you doing?’” Defendant
appeared to be “nervous,” and “dismissive and sweating.”
Herrera noticed that all but the two front windows and
windshield of defendant’s van were covered by curtains. Herrera
asked defendant to open his van. Defendant complied, and

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Herrera saw Jennifer “slouched” over in a seat in the rear
compartment. She was not restrained by a seat belt and the top
button of her shorts was undone. Herrera tapped Jennifer’s
shoulder and repeatedly directed her to wake up. After about 10
seconds, Jennifer awoke. She appeared “very confused” and
Herrera had to repeat his questions to her multiple times.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Jose Flores arrived on
the scene and began to assist Herrera. He searched defendant
and found “an unopened box of condoms in his front left pants
pocket.” According to Flores, defendant appeared “fidgety” and
“struggl[ed] to make eye contact.” The deputies arrested
defendant.
Jennifer recalled being with her friend at a bar in West
Hollywood on the night of the incident. Her next memory was of
a sheriff’s deputy opening the back door of a patrol vehicle so that
she could get into the vehicle. When she “came to,” Jennifer
realized that she had urinated on herself. Jennifer did not know
defendant and did not recall seeing him on the night of the
incident.
A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s detective reviewed data,
including text and audio messages from social media apps, taken
from defendant’s cell phone, dated from July 19, 2021, to July 23,
2021. The messages indicated that defendant had quarreled and
broken up with his girlfriend prior to the incident. And, on the
date of the incident, defendant used a dating app to send and
receive messages that were “sexual in nature.”

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2. Defense Case

Two of defendant’s friends testified that defendant was a
helpful and nonviolent person. They had never seen defendant
drunk. Defendant’s coworker testified that defendant was
employed as a nonemergency medical transport driver. The
coworker was scheduled to meet defendant in West Hollywood on
the date of the incident. The coworker was not feeling well and
did not attend the scheduled meeting.

C. Sex Offender Registration

Prior to the sentencing hearing, the parties submitted
briefs on the issue of whether defendant should be required to
register as a sex offender. The prosecution argued that
registration should be imposed. Defendant disagreed and cited in
support a report from psychologist Lydia Bangston. Bangston
opined that, based on defendant’s statements, “[t]here is no
indication of sexually deviant preoccupations and no history of
deviant sexual behaviors” and “[h]e does not exhibit signs of
hypersexual behaviors or poor emotional self-regulation that
would be dynamic factors increasing risk of inappropriate sexual
behaviors.”
At sentencing, the trial court, having considered the briefs
and the parties’ arguments, ordered defendant to register as a
sex offender pursuant to section 290.006. The court found that
defendant committed his crime because of sexual compulsion or
for the purpose of sexual gratification. It cited to the following
evidence in support: defendant’s cell phone messages seeking a
sexual encounter on the night of the incident; Jennifer’s

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intoxication and location in the back of defendant’s van; Jennifer
not knowing who defendant was; one of the buttons on Jennifer’s
shorts being undone; defendant driving away in the vehicle when
the deputy arrived and walking away from the van when the
deputy stopped his vehicle; and the jury’s finding that Jennifer
was confined in the van against her will. Defendant timely
appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

Section 290.006, subdivision (a) provides: “Any person
ordered by any court to register pursuant to the act, who is not
required to register pursuant to Section 290, shall so register, if
the court finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the
person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or
for purposes of sexual gratification. The court shall state on the
record the reasons for its findings and the reasons for requiring
registration.” Unless the court makes additional findings, “[t]he
person shall register as a tier one offender . . . .” (Id., subd. (b);
see § 290, subd. (d)(1) [“A tier one offender is subject to
registration for a minimum of 10 years”].) The imposition of sex
offender registration pursuant to section 290.006 is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (See People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th
330, 340.) “‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified
standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect
of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of
fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law
are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ [Citation.] A trial
court abuses its discretion when its factual findings are not

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supported by the evidence, or its decision is based on an incorrect
legal standard. [Citation.]” (People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
427, 433; see People v. Mary H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 246, 256,
citing Evid. Code, § 115 [“‘Except as otherwise provided by law,
the burden of proof [at trial] requires proof by a preponderance of
the evidence’”].)
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that he committed false imprisonment because
of a sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification. We
disagree. Data retrieved from defendant’s cell phone indicated
that on the day of the incident he was using an app to send and
receive sexual messages. Defendant had condoms on his person
and the deputies found Jennifer slumped over in a seat,
unrestrained. Jennifer’s posture supported a finding that
defendant was not in the process of transporting Jennifer as a
passenger in a van but was instead preparing to engage in sexual
conduct with her. Indeed, defendant walked away from the van
when the sheriff’s deputy activated the lights of his car, which
evidenced a consciousness of guilt and demonstrated that
defendant was not engaged in the act of transportation. The top
button of Jennifer’s shorts was undone. Because Jennifer was
unconscious and had difficulty waking up, the court could have
reasonably concluded that defendant, and not Jennifer, had
undone her shorts. The court could have further reasonably
inferred that defendant undid Jennifer’s shorts in order to engage
in sexual conduct with her. The trial evidence therefore
supported a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
when defendant falsely imprisoned Jennifer, he did so with the
purpose of sexual gratification.

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Defendant also argues that the imposition of sex offender
registration was precluded by the jury’s acquittal of defendant as
to the kidnapping count. The crime of kidnapping includes as an
element that defendant moved the victim with an illegal intent or
for an illegal purpose. (CALCRIM No. 1201; see People v. Lewis
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 896.) The crime of false imprisonment
does not have an “illegal intent or illegal purpose” element. (See
§ 236; CALCRIM No. 1242.) Defendant reasons that because he
was acquitted of kidnapping and convicted of false imprisonment,
the jury impliedly found that he moved Jennifer without an
illegal intent or illegal purpose, and therefore sex offender
registration was improper. We disagree. The trial court was not
bound by the jury’s verdict in determining the facts related to sex
offender registration. (See People v. Picklesimer, supra, 48
Cal.4th at pp. 343–344 [because sex offender registration is not
punishment, jury findings were not required to support
registration order].)
Moreover, in evaluating whether to impose sex offender
registration under section 290.006, subdivision (a), a court does
not examine whether a defendant has an “illegal intent or illegal
purpose,” but instead examines whether the defendant
committed the offense for purposes of sexual gratification. Thus,
the fact that the jury acquitted defendant of kidnapping is not
inconsistent with a finding that defendant committed false
imprisonment for the purpose of sexual gratification, and does
not preclude the trial court from exercising its discretion to
impose sex offender registration. (See, e.g., People v. Mosley
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1044, 1049–1050 [affirming trial court’s
imposition of sex offender registration under § 290.006 even
though jury acquitted defendant of committing lewd act on child
under 14 and convicted him of simple assault].)

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Defendant also contends the trial court, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, considered
defendant’s failure to testify when it found that defendant acted
for the purpose of sexual gratification. “Under the rule in Griffin
v. California [(1965)] 380 U.S. [609, 612–613 (Griffin)], it is a
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution for the prosecutor or court to comment on the
defendant’s failure to testify. The Griffin rule has been extended
to prohibit a prosecutor from commenting, either directly or
indirectly, on the defendant’s failure to testify. [Citations.] This
rule does not prohibit a prosecutor’s comments on the state of the
evidence, or on the failure of the defense to introduce material
evidence or to call logical witnesses. [Citations.]” (People v.
Hubbard (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 555, 563.)
Defendant cites the following exchange at sentencing which
he claims violated his Fifth Amendment right:
“[Defense Counsel]: Well, our contention and what is the
truth is that he was trying to help her. He did not run from the
van. He went around the side but was stopped before he could.
It couldn’t come in because he didn’t testify. I understand.
“The Court: I’ll push back a little bit. [¶] I understand you
are putting forward the argument he was trying to help her, but
as you just noted, he didn’t testify at trial. That version was not
tested by cross-examination. I did allow you to present character
witness[es] who said he has a trait for being helpful, but there
was no testimony from [defendant] that on the night in question
he was being helpful.
“[Defense Counsel]: Well, he shouldn’t be punished for
exercising his Fifth Amendment right.

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“The Court: Not punishing him. Just stating I have a trial
record in front of me, and that’s—those are the witnesses who
[were] tested by cross-examination.”
We disagree with defendant’s characterization of the trial
court’s statements. It was defense counsel who first referenced
defendant’s failure to testify when counsel cited it as the reason
for the lack of evidence to support a finding that defendant was
trying to help. In response, the court agreed with counsel that
defendant had not testified about his purported motive. The
court, however, disagreed with defense counsel’s assertion that
defendant was being “punished” for exercising his Fifth
Amendment right to not testify, stating expressly that the court
was “[n]ot punishing him” but rather reciting what occurred at
trial. As noted, there is no Griffin error for commenting on the
state of the evidence. (People v. Hubbard, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th
at p. 563.) “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the trial
court knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10
Cal.5th 983, 1042.)
Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err by exercising
its discretion to require defendant to register pursuant to section
290.006.

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IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.

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