People v. Drake CA5

CourtListener 10658925Calctapp22.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/22/25 P. v. Drake CA5
Opinion following rehearing

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088235
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF115244A)
v.

GARNETT LAWRENCE DRAKE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Tiffany
Organ-Bowles, Judge.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Dina Petrushenko and Eric L.
Christoffersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Meehan, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Garnett Lawrence Drake (appellant) appeals from a resentencing
proceeding pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.751 and Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.). Appellant argues the abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects his sentence,
the trial court failed to correctly calculate his presentence and actual custody credits and
abused its discretion by denying appellant’s request to strike his prior serious felony
enhancement. The Attorney General concedes error. We vacate the sentence and remand
the matter for resentencing to allow the trial court to calculate appellant’s actual custody
credits, correct the abstract of judgment, and to exercise its discretion pursuant to
section 1385 consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

On November 9, 1988, appellant was convicted in Los Angeles County of
two counts of rape in violation of section 261, subdivision (a)(2), one count with a
section 12022.3, subdivision (a) firearm use enhancement, robbery in violation of
section 211 with a section 12022.5 firearm use enhancement, and additional
enhancements, for an aggregate sentence of 30 years.3
While in custody, on April 4, 1996, appellant was convicted of possession of a
manufactured weapon in prison in violation of section 4502. Appellant was sentenced to
four years consecutive to his 30-year sentence.4
In 2007, while in custody, appellant was convicted of assault with intent to commit
rape in violation of sections 220 and 261, battery by a prison inmate on a nonprisoner in
violation of section 4501.5 and kidnapping with intent to commit rape in violation of

1 Further undesignated references to code shall be to the Penal Code.
2 We omit the facts underlying appellant’s convictions as they are not pertinent to
the issues presented in this appeal.
3 Los Angeles County case No. A740514.
4 Imperial County case No. CF-1836.

2.
section 209, subdivision (b)(1). It was found true appellant had two prior serious felony
convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (c)–(j),
1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)), two prior serious felony convictions pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (a) (five-year enhancements) and two prior prison terms pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b) (one-year enhancements). On August 29, 2007, appellant
was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of 25 years to life, two consecutive five-year
sentences for the prior serious felony allegations, and one consecutive year for the prior
prison term enhancement, for a total of 11 years plus two consecutive terms of 25 years to
life. The sentence was ordered to run consecutive to appellant’s four-year Imperial
County case.
On appeal, this court reversed the sentence and remanded the matter for the trial
court to stay the sentence imposed on count 1, assault with intent to commit rape.
(People v. Drake (July 8, 2008, F053667) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, on September 24,
2008, the trial court stayed the sentence in count 1 pursuant to section 654, bringing
appellant’s sentence to a total of 11 years plus one consecutive term of 25 years to life.
On June 22, 2023, appellant filed a petition for resentencing, requesting the trial
court strike his one-year section 667.5 enhancement, strike one of his five-year
section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements pursuant to section 1385, and to consider
striking one of his prior strike convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
The trial court held a resentencing hearing on September 15, 2023. The court
struck the one-year section 667.5 enhancement, but declined to strike the section 667,
subdivision (a) five-year enhancements or the strike priors. The court ruled, “[a]t this
time as the Court considers the very lengthy RAP sheet, and particularly the nature of the
offenses contained in the RAP sheet, the Court cannot exercise in good faith discretion to
strike … either strike, nor the [section] 667[, subdivision] (a) priors in this case. [¶]
However, the Court will proceed under [section] 1172.75.… [¶] I will at this time strike

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the two prior [section] 667.5 enhancements. The remaining enhancements will stay on
the case. Again, that’s based on the very lengthy history that there had been multiple
prison stays, lengthy prison stays .…”
When the trial court attempted to announce appellant’s custody credits, the
probation representative stated, “[y]our honor, he’s not entitled to credits, as this is being
served consecutive to a Los Angeles case .…” The court concluded the resentencing
hearing without announcing appellant’s actual custody credits.
The abstract of judgment filed on September 28, 2023, did not reflect any actual
custody credits. The abstract also did not indicate the sentence on count 1 was stayed,
and instead indicated a sentence of 25 years to life on both counts 1 and 3. Finally, the
abstract did not indicate the two five-year section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements and
did not indicate the total determinate term imposed.
On July 9, 2025, this court issued an unpublished opinion in this matter. On
July 11, 2025, on its own motion, this court struck the prior opinion, granted rehearing,
and ordered further briefing on the question of whether petitioner’s in-custody offenses
must be aggregated pursuant to section 1170.1, subdivision (c). The Attorney General
conceded the in-custody offenses must be aggregated in a supplemental brief filed on
July 24, 2025. Appellant argued the sentence itself is correct and noted that resentencing
cannot result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed, in a supplemental brief
filed on July 24, 2025.
DISCUSSION
I. THE TRIAL COURT MUST CALCULATE AND AWARD ACTUAL
CUSTODY CREDITS AT RESENTENCING
Appellant argues he is entitled to have the trial court calculate and award his
pretrial and actual custody credits at resentencing. The Attorney General agrees. We
vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing for the trial court to calculate

4.
and award appellant custody credits which reflect the actual time he served before his
resentencing hearing.
When appellant was resentenced in 2008, he had three operative abstracts of
judgment against him. First, the 1988 abstract of judgment from Los Angeles County for
his outside offense of rape and robbery, which imposed a prison term of 30 years.
Second, the 1996 abstract of judgment from Imperial County for his in-prison offense
(possession of a manufactured weapon in prison), which imposed a consecutive prison
term of four years. Finally, the Kern County abstract of judgment for his in-prison
offense (assault, battery, and kidnapping with intent to commit rape), which imposed a
term of 11 years plus 25 years to life.
The sentence on the out-of-prison offense remains distinct from the sentence on
the in-prison offenses. “Viewed schematically, the term for an in-prison offense does not
become part of the aggregate prison term imposed for those offenses which were
committed ‘on the outside.’ Instead the defendant is imprisoned for a total term
consisting of the sum of his aggregate sentence computed under section 1170.1[,
subdivision] (a)[5] plus the new aggregate term imposed under section 1170.1[,
subdivision] (c).[6] [Citation.] The latter term starts to run at the end of the prison term

5 “Except as otherwise provided by law … when any person is convicted of two or
more felonies, whether in the same proceeding or court or in different proceedings or
courts, and whether by judgment rendered by the same or by a different court, and a
consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed …, the aggregate term of imprisonment for
all these convictions shall be the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any
additional term imposed for applicable enhancements for prior convictions, prior prison
terms, and [s]ection 12022.1.…” (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).)
6 “In the case of any person convicted of one or more felonies committed while the
person is confined in the state prison or is subject to reimprisonment for escape from
custody and the law either requires the terms to be served consecutively or the court
imposes consecutive terms, the term of imprisonment for all the convictions that the
person is required to serve consecutively shall commence from the time the person would
otherwise have been released from prison.…” (§ 1170.1, subd. (c).)

5.
imposed for the defendants original ‘outside’ offense.” (People v. White (1988) 202
Cal.App.3d 862, 870.) Likewise, “new crimes committed while in prison are treated as
separate offenses and begin a new aggregate term.” (People v. Langston (2004) 33
Cal.4th 1237, 1242.)
However, in-prison offenses must be aggregated pursuant to section 1170.1,
subdivision (c), which “requires ‘computation of a single term of imprisonment for all
convictions of felonies committed in prison and sentenced consecutively, whether
multiple convictions occur in the same court proceeding or in different
proceedings.’ ([People v. McCart (1982) 32 Cal.3d 338, 343].)” (People v. Venegas
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1743.) This rule does not distinguish between
contemporaneous and noncontemporaneous offenses, even if the offenses occurred
several years apart. (Ibid.)
This aggregate term is calculated as provided in section 1170.1, subdivision (a).
Likewise, “[l]ife sentences, whether with or without the possibility of parole, may be
imposed to run consecutively with one another, with any term imposed for applicable
enhancements, or with any other term of imprisonment for a felony conviction.
Whenever a person is committed to prison on a life sentence which is ordered to run
consecutive to any determinate term of imprisonment, the determinate term of
imprisonment shall be served first and no part thereof shall be credited toward the
person’s eligibility for parole as calculated pursuant to [s]ection 3046 or pursuant to any
other section of law that establishes a minimum period of confinement under the life
sentence before eligibility for parole.” (§ 669, subd. (a).)
In 2007, appellant should have been sentenced to one aggregate term for his
in-prison Imperial County offense and his in-prison Kern County offense pursuant to
section 1170, subdivision (c). Upon remand and amendment, his September 24, 2008
abstract of judgment should have reflected an aggregate term of four years on the
Imperial County offense, plus 11 years plus 25 years to life on the Kern County offenses.

6.
Appellant argues the trial court must generally recalculate the number of actual
days appellant has spent in custody and award such credits toward his current sentence.
“Everyone sentenced to prison for criminal conduct is entitled to credit against his term
for all actual days of confinement solely attributable to the same conduct.” (People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 30.) “[C]redit shall be given only where the custody to
be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the
defendant has been convicted.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b).) A defendant is not entitled to
credit towards his sentence for a period of presentence time spent simultaneously serving
a prison term for a prior unrelated offense. (In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 154.)
Thus, appellant is not entitled to custody credit toward his current aggregate sentence for
all actual time he spent in custody since first entering custody for his 1988 offense, but
only for the time spent in custody following completion of his 1988 offense. As appellant
pointed out in his supplemental brief, the probation department stated that appellant
completed his sentence for his 1988 offense on April 14, 2007. For purposes of actual
time and custody credit calculation, appellant’s aggregate sentence for his in-custody
offenses begins to run following that date.
It is important to note that although appellant’s aggregate sentence for his
in-prison offenses is comprised of convictions from multiple counties, Kern County
Superior Court retains jurisdiction as the sentencing court. In People v. Phoenix (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1119, the defendant’s aggregate sentence was comprised of convictions
from Yolo County and Sacramento County. “In pronouncing a single aggregate term and
imposing the combined sentences as though they were all counts in the current case as
required under sections 669 and 1170.1 and [California Rules of Court,] rule 4.452, the
Yolo County trial court became the sentencing court for both the Yolo and Sacramento
cases. The Sacramento County trial court was no longer a sentencing court, as its
sentence was replaced by the consecutive sentence imposed by the Yolo County trial
court.” (Id. at p. 1126.) “The court that imposes the consolidated sentence pursuant to

7.
sections 669 and 1170.1 and [California Rules of Court,] rule 4.452 … must obtain the
information it needs to award defendant all the credits to which he is entitled, including
those connected with the earlier case, even if the sentence in that case was imposed in
another county.” (Id. at p. 1129.)
Following resentencing, the trial court is directed to prepare a new and corrected
abstract of judgment aggregating the 1996 Imperial County conviction sentence and the
2007 Kern County conviction sentence.7 This aggregate sentence replaces the 1996
Imperial County sentence and Kern County Superior Court remains the sentencing court
for both convictions. The trial court is then directed to determine the actual custody
credits appellant is entitled to for time spent in custody attributable to the aggregate
sentence, and award appellant such credits in the abstract of judgment.
II. THE ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT MUST BE CORRECTED
Appellant argues the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that count 1
was stayed pursuant to this court’s order in the prior appeal. The Attorney General
agrees, and notes the abstract also fails to denote the two section 667, subdivision (a)
enhancements. On remand, we will order the trial court to correct the abstract of
judgment accordingly.
III. DISCRETION TO STRIKE THE SECTION 667, SUBDIVISION (A)
ENHANCEMENTS
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to strike the
two section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements pursuant to section 1385. Appellant
argues the court erred because it only considered whether appellant currently posed a
danger to public safety, and not whether dismissing the enhancement would have
endangered public safety on the date appellant was released. The Attorney General
agrees.

7 As it was amended on September 24, 2008.

8.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) directs “[i]n exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I)
are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other
serious danger to others.”
In relevant part, section 1385, section (c)(2)(B) states where multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case, “all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed.”
The question of whether recalculation of custody credits requires a full
resentencing and new pronouncement of judgment is currently before the Supreme Court.
(See People v. Gonzalez (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 741, review granted Apr. 30, 2025.)
Should recalculation of custody credits require a full resentencing, we need not reach the
issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion declining to strike appellant’s
section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements, because appellant would be entitled to a new
resentencing hearing regardless.
However, if the issue is not rendered moot, because appellant and the Attorney
General agree the trial court acted in error, we briefly address the issue and remand for
resentencing so that the trial court may exercise its discretion pursuant to section 1385
consistent with this opinion.
In People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215 (Gonzalez), the defendant was
serving a sentence of 75 years to life for first degree murder with a firearm enhancement.
The term included a sentence of 50 years to life for murder and a sentence of 25 years to
life for the firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
(Gonzalez, at p. 220.) During resentencing, the trial court declined to strike the firearm

9.
enhancement pursuant to recently amended section 1385, finding “ ‘presently [the
defendant] does represent a danger to society .…’ ” (Gonzalez, at p. 224.)
The appellate court found the standard used by the trial court improper.
(Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.) The court stated, “[t]he plain words of
[section 1385] do not support the trial court’s singular focus on whether the defendant
currently poses a danger. Notably, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) focuses on the danger
associated with the dismissal of an enhancement, phrasing the inquiry as whether
‘dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety’ and whether ‘there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other
serious danger to others.’ ” (Ibid.)
“Although the current dangerousness of the defendant is an appropriate factor to
consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would
endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement
will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. A currently dangerous defendant who
will be released from prison within a short timeframe might be found by the trial court to
pose a greater danger to the public than a defendant who is currently dangerous but who
has no prospect of release from prison until he is elderly.” (Gonzalez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)
“Further, an inquiry into whether public safety will be endangered by the dismissal
of an enhancement for a defendant serving a lengthy indeterminate sentence should also
take into account that the defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the
Board of Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have
the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time. [Citations.] That
future review will act as a safety valve against a release that would endanger the public
and is relevant to a trial court’s analysis of whether the dismissal of an enhancement
imposed on a defendant serving an indeterminate prison term will endanger public
safety.” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)

10.
In this case, the trial court declined to strike appellant’s five-year prison prior
enhancement because of his “very lengthy history” and “that there had been multiple
prison stays, lengthy prison stays .…” Much like the defendant in Gonzalez, appellant in
this case is serving an indeterminate life sentence of 25 years to life plus 11 years. The
court is required to consider whether dismissing one of the five-year enhancements would
endanger public safety within the context of appellant’s indeterminate sentence.
As discussed in Gonzalez, current dangerousness is an appropriate factor to
consider, as is appellant’s prior criminal history, but the fact that appellant is serving a
lengthy indeterminate sentence and his release from prison is contingent on review by the
Board of Parole Hearings, which will review appellant’s dangerousness prior to release,
must also be taken into account.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing so that
the trial court may exercise its discretion pursuant to section 1385 consistent with this
opinion. Following resentencing, the trial court is instructed to (1) prepare a new and
corrected abstract of judgment which aggregates the sentences for appellant’s 1996
Imperial County conviction and 2007 Kern County conviction, (2) determine the actual
custody credits appellant is entitled to for time spent in custody attributable to the
aggregate sentence and award such credits in the abstract of judgment, (3) indicate the
sentence as to count 1 is stayed, and (4) indicate the sentence for any imposed
enhancements. The court is ordered to forward a copy of the corrected abstract of
judgment to all appropriate authorities.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

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