People v. McQueen CA1/5

CourtListener 10658919Calctapp22.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/22/25 P. v. McQueen CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
A169527
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Solano County
Super. Ct. No. VCR235809)
MICHAEL PAUL McQUEEN, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Michael Paul McQueen, Jr. (appellant), appeals from his convictions,
following a jury trial, for charges relating to his assault and robbery of victim
L.H. Appellant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct and the trial
court made sentencing errors. We remand for resentencing and otherwise
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Prosecution Case
L.H. testified that on September 3, 2018, Emily Blase1 asked him for
marijuana she could resell to make money. L.H. had known Blase for about

1 Blase was charged as a codefendant with appellant.In a separate
proceeding, she was convicted of being an accessory after the fact.

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20 years and their relationship had at times been sexual, but he had not seen
her for more than a year. L.H. knew Blase and appellant had an “on-
again/off-again” relationship, and he had met appellant once before. L.H.
thought Blase’s messages seemed too “eager” and “something felt off.” He
asked Blase if her “crazy boyfriend” or anyone else would be there, and she
assured him that no one else would be there.
About 8:00 p.m., L.H. met Blase in the parking lot of her apartment
complex. Blase told L.H. not to leave anything in his car, so he took a bag
containing the marijuana and a glass bottle of tequila, as well as a backpack
with clothes and other items, and followed Blase into her apartment. After
L.H. took a few steps into the apartment, appellant came out of a bedroom or
closet and said something like, “[N]ot in my house.” Appellant had a pipe
wrench and grazed the back of L.H.’s head with it. L.H. grabbed for the
wrench and, while he and appellant scuffled, appellant told L.H. to drop his
bags and yelled for Blase to stab L.H. L.H. and appellant exited Blase’s
apartment while continuing to fight. About 10 feet from Blase’s apartment,
appellant “sliced” L.H.’s hand. L.H. dropped his bags to hold his arm, and
appellant grabbed the bags and ran into Blase’s apartment. L.H. called 911
and told the dispatcher that when he tried to “sell some weed” to appellant’s
girlfriend, appellant “ambushed” him, hitting him with a wrench and then
cutting him with a “pocket knife.”2
Dr. Stephen Daane operated on L.H. on September 3, 2018 to repair the
two arteries, two nerves, and 12 tendons that had been cut. Dr. Daane
performed a second operation a year later. L.H. testified he still experienced
pain, twitching, and limited mobility in his hand at the time of trial.

2 A recording of the 911 call was played for the jury.

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Dr. Daane testified L.H. said he had been cut by a machete. Dr. Daane
opined that the wound was consistent with a large, sharp knife because the
cut “went through everything in his wrist down to the bone.” Although it was
possible the wound was caused by glass, it was “really unlikely” because glass
would not have cut “down to the bone and left a crease in the bone.”
Defense Case
Appellant testified in his own defense. He and Blase had dated “on and
off” for 15 years. On September 3, 2018, they had been on a break for three
or four days. Blase had appellant’s dog, and they agreed appellant could pick
up his dog from her apartment on September 3. Appellant called Blase
before going over but she did not answer. When he arrived at her place, he
did not see her car and assumed she was not home.
When appellant let himself into Blase’s apartment, he was shocked to
see a man he had never seen before. Seconds later, the man threw a glass
bottle at appellant, who ducked. The man charged at appellant and they
began fighting near where the bottle had broken. The man began choking
appellant, so appellant grabbed a piece of glass and cut the man’s hand.
After he cut the man, appellant was able to get away. The glass had
also cut appellant’s hand. Appellant did not see a doctor, but the next day,
his friend Kyle P. helped appellant use superglue to stop the bleeding.
Appellant still had a scar from the cut. Appellant did not report the attack to
the police because he was scared of law enforcement after officers beat up his
father when he was a child.
Kyle P. testified that he was in the process of moving into a new
apartment on September 4, 2018. Appellant was supposed to help with the
move, but when he arrived, he told Kyle his hand was hurt and he could not

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help. Appellant’s hand had a “fat, nasty” cut, which Kyle helped him
bandage with superglue.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury convicted appellant of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.
Code,3 § 245, subd. (a)(1)), second degree robbery (§ 211), and conspiracy to
commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true allegations that
appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury as to the assault and
robbery counts (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of eight years
in prison, which included the upper term of five years on the robbery count.
DISCUSSION
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Appellant argues his trial was tainted by various instances of
prosecutorial misconduct, primarily stemming from certain testimony of L.H.
We reject the challenge.
“ ‘ “A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such unfairness
as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ [Citations.] In other
words, the misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the
denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] Even
when the misconduct does not attain that level, it may be error under state
law, but ‘ “ ‘only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to
attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury.’ [Citation.] When a
claim of misconduct is based on the prosecutor’s comments before the jury,
. . . ‘ “the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury

3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable
fashion.” ’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] Generally, ‘ “[t]o preserve a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a defendant must make a timely and
specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the
improper argument.” ’ [Citation.] A failure to ‘object and request an
admonition will be excused if doing either would have been futile, or if an
admonition would not have cured the harm.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62
Cal.4th 856, 905 (Mendoza).)
A. Additional Background
Towards the end of L.H.’s direct examination, the prosecutor asked a
line of questions about L.H.’s knowledge of appellant prior to September 3,
2018, including the question, “Personally did you and the defendant have any
beef with each other?” L.H. answered, “To some degree I guess. He called me
and talked a bunch of stuff over the phone more than ten years prior because
[Blase] spent the night at my house one night for her safety. I guess her co-
worker saw that she had been beaten up and wouldn’t let her go home, so she
indicated that she trusted me to her co-worker. So I picked her up, let her
stay at my house for the night, dropped her off at her car the next morning.
And then he called me an hour later with a lot to say.”
At that point, defense counsel moved to strike and an unreported
sidebar was held. After the sidebar, the court did not rule on the motion to
strike. On appeal, appellant does not separately challenge the admission of
this testimony, but argues it was hearsay and prejudicial. The People
concede that the testimony about statements made by Blase’s coworker is
inadmissible hearsay.
The following morning, outside of the presence of the jury, the court
recounted that defense counsel “had requested a mistrial because . . . [L.H.]

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related a conversation with the coconspirator in this case about domestic
violence.” Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor should have known to
admonish L.H. about the potential testimony. Defense counsel further
argued the comment was highly prejudicial as “a lot of people are very, very
turned off to the idea of domestic violence” and, in particular, one of the
jurors had mentioned that she “had been a victim of domestic violence.”4
The prosecutor represented that he did not know L.H. was going to
respond as he did to the question, and that, while the prosecutor “was
familiar with a domestic violence incident,” he “had no idea that [L.H.] even
knew about that.” The prosecutor explained that when he “asked the
question if [L.H.] had any prior personal issues with [appellant],” he was
“under the impression his answer would be no since I had no information to
the contrary.” Defense counsel clarified that he was “not accusing [the
prosecutor] of knowing that [L.H.] was going to say that.”
With respect to prejudice, the prosecutor argued the testimony was
ambiguous as to who harmed Blase: while the jury could infer it was
appellant, L.H. “never said it was [appellant] who did it.” Given that there
was “no evidence and no allegations the defendant ever committed domestic
violence” and that the challenged testimony “lack[ed] any serious details,”
such as “if there were any injuries, how bad it was, [or] what the context
was,” the prosecutor argued it was not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial.
The trial court denied the mistrial motion.5 The court offered to
admonish the jury but defense counsel declined, stating, “I don’t want

4 During voir dire, one of the jurors stated she was involved in a

criminal case as “a domestic violence victim” about nine years earlier.
5 Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s ruling on the mistrial

motion.

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anymore highlighting of that testimony to be done, but I think that bell can’t
be unrung.”
B. Prosecutor’s Intent
Appellant’s primary challenge—framed in various ways—rests on his
assertion that the prosecutor intentionally elicited inadmissible testimony.
(See People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 248 [“ ‘ “It is, of course,
misconduct for a prosecutor to ‘intentionally elicit inadmissible
testimony.’ ” ’ ”].) We reject the challenge.6
Appellant bears the burden of establishing the prosecutor committed
wrongdoing by intentionally eliciting inadmissible testimony and dishonestly
telling the court he did not do so. (See Evid. Code, § 520 [“The party claiming
that a person is guilty of crime or wrongdoing has the burden of proof on that
issue.”]; see also Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 3.3(a)(1) [lawyers “shall
not” “knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal” (asterisks
omitted)].) Appellant argues the preliminary hearing transcript establishes
that the prosecutor knew his question would elicit the response it did. At the
preliminary hearing, when asked what information he had about appellant
prior to September 3, 2018, L.H. testified, “[O]ne of [Blase’s] co-workers gave
me a call saying that she had been beat up and she told her co-worker I was
the person that she trusted to go to for that night and not stay with her co-
workers. So, I picked her up, brought her to my place for the night, dropped
her off back at her car the next morning, and --” at which point defense
counsel objected. During cross-examination by Blase’s counsel at the
preliminary hearing, L.H. testified that the coworker told him appellant was
the one who beat up Blase.

6 We need not and do not decide whether appellant is estopped from

raising the contention on appeal, as the People argue.

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Appellant emphasizes that the same prosecutor questioned L.H. at the
preliminary hearing and at trial. To be sure, the preliminary hearing
testimony demonstrates the prosecutor was aware, at the time of the
preliminary hearing, that L.H. had this connection with the alleged domestic
violence incident. However, it does not demonstrate the prosecutor
remembered this testimony at the time of trial, more than a year after the
preliminary hearing. Appellant contends it is not credible that the prosecutor
forgot, arguing the prosecutor must have reviewed the preliminary hearing
transcript before examining L.H. at trial, and noting the record shows the
prosecutor had the transcript with him at the mistrial hearing. Appellant’s
claim that the prosecutor must have reviewed the preliminary hearing
transcript is sheer speculation, and “ ‘ “speculation is not evidence.” ’ ”
(People v. Fielder (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234.) Moreover, even this
speculation is undermined by the fact that defense counsel below was also
present at the preliminary hearing, yet did not remember that testimony at
the time of trial and, apparently, had not reviewed this portion of the
preliminary hearing transcript. Had defense counsel done so, he presumably
would have raised this point at the mistrial hearing, and would have
refrained from expressly denying that he was claiming the prosecutor knew
L.H. would respond as he did.7 Appellant has failed to establish that the
prosecutor committed wrongdoing.
Appellant’s remaining arguments on this issue are easily disposed of.
Appellant points to the prosecutor’s representation at the mistrial hearing
that he “had no idea” L.H. “was involved with” Blase. Appellant argues this

7 If defense counsel had remembered the testimony or reviewed this

portion of the preliminary hearing transcript, the failure to raise this
challenge below would clearly constitute forfeiture.

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also was an intentional misrepresentation because the prosecutor knew L.H.
and Blase had a prior sexual relationship. The statement by the prosecutor
is almost certainly a misstatement (or possibly a mistranscription), given
that appellant’s cross-examination of L.H. the afternoon before the mistrial
hearing included several questions about his prior relationship with Blase,
many of which the prosecutor objected to. Moreover, defense counsel, who
was certainly aware of this prior relationship, did not object to or attempt to
correct this statement by the prosecutor. In any event, appellant fails to
explain any relevance this statement has to the challenged testimony of L.H.,
or any other possible prejudicial effect.
Appellant also argues statements in the prosecutor’s closing argument
indicate the prosecutor intentionally elicited the testimony. Appellant points
to statements that he contends “recalled the domestic violence incident in the
minds of the jurors.” As discussed below, we disagree with this contention.
But even if it were an accurate characterization of the argument, it would not
demonstrate the prosecutor intended to elicit the testimony during his direct
examination.
Because we find appellant fails to establish the prosecutor intentionally
elicited inadmissible testimony and lied to the court about it, we reject the
claims of prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the prosecutor’s
examination of L.H., representations at the mistrial hearing, and compliance
with the in limine order directing the prosecutor to admonish prosecution
witnesses to comply with court rulings.
C. Closing Argument
Appellant also argues the prosecutor committed misconduct during
closing arguments. We disagree.

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1. Statements Regarding the Challenged Testimony
Appellant first argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by
referring to inadmissible evidence, highlighting this portion of the
prosecutor’s rebuttal argument: “We know that the victim had a relationship
with Emily Blase, but we know it was more casual, friendly, on-and-off
occasionally sexually and nothing too deep. And we know [appellant] was
[an] on-and-off boyfriend of hers for 15 years and had a prior incident where
he expressed some sort of jealousy to the victim. . . . [T]he only reasonable
explanation in this case is not that the defendant was defending himself. He
attacked the victim when he saw the opportunity and took the opportunity to
take the property of the victim. Substantially more likely he used [Blase] to
do this. Even if you don’t feel that’s the case, it’s obviously [sic] he wanted to
harm the victim when he got the chance or take advantage of him. Beyond a
reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the
charge is true. It would be great if we have everything recorded, if we had a
lot of the people to witness these individual crimes. But unfortunately crime
happens behind closed doors too. That doesn’t mean that you can’t find that
the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt when there is corroboration,
when there is reliable testimony from the witnesses.”
We need not decide whether the claim is forfeited for failure to object
below, as the People contend. As an initial matter, to the extent appellant
challenges the prosecutor’s statements that “the only reasonable explanation
in this case is not that the defendant was defending himself,” but that
appellant “attacked the victim when he saw the opportunity and took the
opportunity to take the property of the victim,” and that it was
“[s]ubstantially more likely he used [Blase] to do this,” we reject the claim.
These statements directly responded to defense counsel’s closing argument,

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which argued there was reasonable doubt as to whether appellant acted in
self-defense, and relied on the instruction in CALCRIM No. 224 that “[i]f you
can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial
evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions points to innocence and
another to guilt, you must accept the one that points to innocence.”
Appellant argues the statement that “crime happens behind closed
doors” was a reference to domestic violence because that crime often occurs
behind closed doors. “When a claim of misconduct is based on the
prosecutor’s comments before the jury, . . . ‘ “the question is whether there is
a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the
complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.” ’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 62
Cal.4th at p. 905.) Both the prosecutor and defense counsel emphasized that
the heart of the case was L.H.’s word against appellant’s, because there were
no other testifying witnesses to the incident. Given this context, and that,
other than L.H.’s brief testimony, there was no other evidence or reference to
an alleged incident of domestic violence, we find no reasonable likelihood that
the jury construed this comment as a reference to domestic violence.
Finally, appellant’s challenge to the prosecutor’s statements arguing
appellant had a motive to want to harm L.H.—that there was “a prior
incident where [appellant] expressed some sort of jealousy to the victim” and
that appellant “wanted to harm the victim when he got the chance”—is
unavailing. The parties dispute whether the portion of L.H.’s testimony
referred to by these statements—that appellant called L.H. and “talked a
bunch of stuff over the phone” and had “a lot to say”—was admissible or not.
We need not decide this issue because the trial court never ruled on
appellant’s motion to strike and defense counsel did not request an
admonishment. Therefore, the trial court did not determine which, if any,

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portions of the challenged testimony were admissible. “It is . . . misconduct
for a prosecutor to make remarks in opening statements or closing arguments
that refer to evidence determined to be inadmissible in a previous ruling of
the trial court.” (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839, italics added.)
Appellant has failed to establish misconduct by these remarks.8
2. Statements About the Fight
Appellant separately argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by
misstating two facts about the fight. Appellant argues the prosecutor’s
statement, “We know from the victim’s testimony that the defendant
attacked him from behind when he was refusing to drop the bag as the
defendant told him to,” was a misstatement because L.H. testified appellant
first attacked him from behind and then told him to drop the bags. Appellant
also argues the prosecutor’s statement that “the victim testified he was
attacked with a knife in the parking lot, not in the apartment,” was a
misstatement because L.H. testified the knife attack happened between the
apartment and the parking lot.
Appellant has forfeited these challenges by failing to object below. His
cursory assertion that an admonition could not have cured any error is
entirely unpersuasive. In any event, appellant fails to establish prejudice
from any misstatement. Neither fact was critical, and the jury was properly

8 To the extent appellant argues that the prosecutor also misstated the

evidence because L.H. did not expressly testify appellant exhibited jealousy,
we reject the challenge. “Where the alleged misconduct arises from the
prosecution’s rebuttal argument, ‘[p]rosecutors may make vigorous
arguments and fairly comment on the evidence; they have broad discretion to
argue inferences and deductions from the evidence to the jury.’ ” (People v.
Thomas (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 924, 954.) L.H.’s testimony that, the morning
after Blase spent the night at L.H.’s house, appellant called L.H. “with a lot
to say,” gives rise to a reasonable inference that appellant was jealous.

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instructed that “Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening
statements and closing arguments the attorneys discuss the case, but their
remarks are not evidence.” (See CALCRIM No. 222.) Where “the jury was
. . . informed that the arguments of counsel are not evidence (see [citation];
CALCRIM No. 222), . . . we assume it followed this instruction.” (People v.
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1345.)
II. Sentencing
Appellant argues the trial court committed reversible error in imposing
the aggravated term on the robbery count based in part on a factor not found
true by the jury. We agree.
“[S]ection 1170, subdivision (b) . . . prohibit[s] imposition of an upper
term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term and the
facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, ‘have
been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.’ ” (People
v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742 (Lynch).) A defendant “is entitled to a
reversal and remand for resentencing unless, after examining the entire
cause, including the evidence as to all relevant circumstances [citation], we
can conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an
upper term sentence.” (Id. at p. 775.)
In imposing the upper term on the robbery count, the trial court relied
on four aggravating factors. Three were found true by the jury, but one was
not: that appellant’s “criminal acts are increasing.” (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(2) [aggravating circumstances include “[t]he defendant’s prior
convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency
proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness”].) The People

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concede the trial court erred by relying on this unproven factor, and further
concede the challenge is not forfeited, but argue the error is harmless. We
disagree.
The People first argue appellant’s criminal history as set forth in the
probation report demonstrates a jury would have found the factor true beyond
a reasonable doubt. Criminal convictions may be proved by certified court
records. (Evid. Code, § 452.5; see also Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(3) [“[T]he
court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the
prior convictions to a jury.”].) But “a probation report is not a certified record
of conviction.” (People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 401, disapproved
on another ground in Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 768–769; accord, People
v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 953, disapproved on another ground in
Lynch, at pp. 768–769.) The record does not establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that a jury would have found this factor true.
The People next contend “ ‘the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial
court would have reached the same conclusion’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 771) had it been aware that it could not rely on the prior convictions factor,
relying on the trial court’s comments that L.H. had been “horribly injured”
and could have died, and that the attack was planned. In Lynch, “the trial
court found eight circumstances in aggravation and none in mitigation. It
emphasized, among other things, that [the defendant] had committed
repeated acts of violence; his use of multiple weapons in this case involved
great violence, cruelty, viciousness, and callousness; and his criminal record
demonstrated a serious danger to society.” (Id. at p. 777.) However, the
Supreme Court found the trial court “did not make the kind of definitive
statements that we have found to clearly indicate it would not impose a lesser

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sentence under any circumstances.” (Ibid.) The court cited as examples of
such definitive statements instances where, “in finding the defendant
‘ “deserving [of] the ultimate sentence of death,” ’ [the] trial court observed
that the defendant was ‘ “the worst of the worst,” ’ that he ‘ “show[ed]
absolutely no remorse” ’ and that ‘ “[i]t’s as if he has no soul” ’ ” (ibid., quoting
People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432), and “where ‘the sentencing court
announces that it is aware of forthcoming legislation and then explains how
it would exercise its discretion under that legislation’ ” (ibid., quoting People
v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431). No comparable statements are
present here.
Accordingly, we will remand for resentencing. Appellant raises two
additional sentencing challenges, neither of which was raised below. Because
we are remanding for resentencing, we need not and do not decide these
challenges. (People v. Acosta (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 19, 26 [“ ‘[W]hen part of a
sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing “a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate . . . .” ’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is remanded for resentencing, and otherwise affirmed.
Following resentencing, the trial court shall forward a certified copy of the
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

SIMONS, J.

We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.

(A169527)

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