CourtListener 10656756•People v. Williams CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/19/25 P. v. Williams CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B336340
(Super. Ct. No. BA511858)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
SHAWN RANSOME
WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Shawn Ransome Williams appeals his conviction, by
jury, of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)),1 attempted
carjacking (§§ 664/215) and battery with injury on a police officer.
(§ 243, subd. (c)(2).) The trial court sentenced appellant to six
years, six months in state prison. Appellant contends the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied his pre-trial motion for
mental health diversion and when it declined to instruct the jury
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1
otherwise stated.
on the lesser included offense of battery without injury on a police
officer. (§ 243, subd. (b).) Respondent correctly concedes the
latter point. We reverse the conviction for the felony violation of
section 243, giving the People the option to retry that offense or
accept a reduction to a conviction for the lesser offense of
misdemeanor battery without injury to a police officer. (Id., subd.
(b).) In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Facts
Appellant approached Tadamieka Anderson’s car
while she was pumping gas. Anderson’s mother, Jimmie Burnley,
was sitting in the front passenger seat of her car. Appellant
opened the driver’s side door and “snatched” Burnley’s eyeglasses
off of her face. The two women struggled with appellant,
spraying him with gas and hitting him with a small bat.
Eventually, they allowed appellant to take the car and called
police from the gas station. Surveillance video of the incident
shows appellant push one of the victims out of the way “a little
bit” but does not show him using any other force. There is no
evidence he verbally threatened either victim.
Appellant drove a few blocks before stopping near
Rochelle Winn’s parked car. Winn was retrieving some
belongings from the back of her vehicle. Appellant got out of
Anderson’s car and into Winn’s, telling her to give him the keys.
She opened the passenger door, removed her bag and told
appellant to “‘Give me my stuff.’” He replied, “‘Take your stuff.’”
She opened the back door, took her things and ran to her friend’s
house with her car keys. Appellant got out of the vehicle and
walked away.
As Los Angeles Police Department officer Jared
Barahona and his partner responded to the carjacking report,
2
they saw appellant walking in the area. Appellant ignored
Barahona’s instructions to stop. Barahona chased appellant on
foot for a short distance before subduing him. Two other officers
arrived. Appellant resisted being taken into custody by flailing
his body, kicking his legs and trying to turn over rather than
remain face down on the ground. After appellant was handcuffed
and while the officers were placing him in the patrol car, he
forcefully headbutted Officer Barahona. The headbutting left a
small laceration above Barahona’s left eyebrow. The wound was
bleeding. Paramedics sterilized the wound and applied a band
aid. Officer Barahona did not receive stitches or other medical
attention.
Motion for Mental Health Diversion
Prior to trial, appellant moved for mental health
diversion as provided in section 1001.36. The motion was
supported by an evaluation prepared by Dr. Kimberly Smith, a
forensic neuropsychologist. Dr. Smith diagnosed appellant with
schizophrenia, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder,
methamphetamine use disorder and a neurocognitive impairment
due to a brain injury. The brain injury relates to a gunshot
wound appellant suffered to his eye and neck in 2015. The injury
put appellant in a coma for five days. Afterwards, he has
suffered from post traumatic amnesia and headaches among
other things.
Dr. Smith opined that appellant’s mental disorders
played a significant role in the commission of the charged
offenses and that the disorders would respond to mental health
treatment. She also opined that appellant did not pose an
unreasonable risk to public safety and was a low risk for
reoffending if treated in the community.
3
The motion was also supported by a letter stating
that appellant had been accepted into River Community, a
residential treatment program that would provide treatment for
both his mental health and substance abuse disorders. The
facility is not a locked facility but it is located in a remote area
making it difficult for residents to leave prematurely.
After a hearing, the trial court found that appellant
is eligible but not suitable for mental health diversion. In
reaching this conclusion, the trial court expressly considered the
goals of the mental health diversion statute, the circumstances of
the present offenses and and appellant’s prior convictions. The
court noted its disagreement with Dr. Smith’s opinion that
appellant presents a low risk to public safety finding, “that there
is a substantial likelihood that the defendant presents an
unreasonable risk that he will commit a new violent felony as
defined . . . section 1170.18.”
Distinguishing this matter from the facts of People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138 (Whitmill), the trial court
emphasized that appellant has a “15-year history of drug use.
The court does not have confidence in the defendant’s ability to
resist using drugs with that kind of history because previous
attempts at rehabilitation have been unsuccessful.”
In contrast to the defendant in Whitmill, who had
prior convictions of drug related offenses, the trial court noted
that appellant’s “criminal history includes three violent felonies
and a prior strike offense . . . .”2 In addition, while the defendant
2The probation report, however, discloses juvenile
adjudications in 2009 for robbery (§ 211) and grand theft. (§ 487,
subd. (c).) In 2013, appellant was convicted of burglary (§ 459)
and sentenced to two years in state prison. He suffered a 2013
4
in Whitmill immediately complied with law enforcement orders,
the trial court noted that appellant did not comply with Officer
Barahona and instead physically resisted arrest.
The trial court concluded appellant was not
“amenable to treatment in the way that the court feels public
safety would be met.” While it acknowledged that appellant
could have been more violent, the trial court characterized the
present offenses as violent and concluded that they
“evidence[] . . . a pattern of criminal conduct that leads the court
to believe there is substantial evidence that the defendant cannot
reasonably be expected to be safely treated within the community
without a conviction and supervision.” Finally, the trial court
referenced “the very extensive history of this case,” including
many pre-trial hearings and appellant’s rejection of favorable
plea offers from the prosecution.
Contentions
Appellant contends the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion for mental health diversion
because there is no substantial evidence that he will pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety within the meaning
of section 1170.18. The parties agree the trial court erred when it
declined to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
battery on a police officer without injury.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion.
(Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135
(Vaughn).) “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an
conviction for misdemeanor possession of burglary tools and a
2021 conviction of misdemeanor battery. (§§ 466, 242.)
5
arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal
standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied
factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence
. . . .” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449; see also
Vaughn, supra, at p. 135.)
A trial court is required to instruct the jury, sua
sponte, on a lesser included offense “‘when the evidence raises a
question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense
were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that
the offense was less than that charged.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 194-195.) We review de novo the
question whether the trial court was required to instruct on a
lesser included offense, considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant. (People v. Brothers (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 24, 30.)
Discussion
Mental Health Diversion
Section 1001.36 broadly authorizes the trial court to
grant mental health diversion where a defendant meets the
statute’s eligibility and suitability criteria. (Sarimento v.
Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890-891.) The
defendant in a criminal case is eligible for diversion if he or she
has been “diagnosed with a recognized mental disorder that was
a significant factor in the commission of the criminal offense with
which [the defendant is] charged. [Citation.] [A defendant is]
suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert,
the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2)
the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4)
the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to
6
public safety’ as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv). [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 891.)
The statute narrowly defines an “unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety,” by reference to the definition found in
section 1170.18. Section 1170.18, in turn, defines “the concept as
‘an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new
violent felony within the meaning of’ subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) of
section 667 . . . .’” (People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990,
1001.) Violent offenses enumerated in section 667, commonly
referred to as “‘super strikes,’” include “any homicide offense
(including any attempted homicide offense), solicitation to
commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or
firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any
serious or violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or
death, and certain sex offenses.” (Williams, supra, at p. 1001.)
Even where the defendant meets the statute’s
eligibility and suitability criteria, the trial court retains some
“residual discretion” to deny diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a);
Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) This discretion is not,
however, “unfettered and must be exercised ‘“consistent with the
principles and purpose of the governing law.”’” (Id. at p. 135.)
The trial court here concluded appellant was not
suitable for mental health diversion because he posed an
unreasonable risk of committing a “super strike” if treated in the
community. Appellant contends the trial court abused its
discretion because there is not substantial evidence of his
dangerousness. We are not persuaded.
First, appellant’s behavior in the present offenses
was violent, even though, as the trial court noted, he could have
used more force. Appellant confronted Anderson and Burnely at
7
the gas station, forcing his way into the car and snatching the
eyeglasses off of Burnely’s face. The circumstances he created
could very easily have become deadly, if any of the people
involved had been armed. In addition, when confronted by police,
appellant fled on foot and then violently resisted being taken into
custody. This is another circumstance, created by appellant, that
could easily have devolved into a use of deadly force.
In this regard, the trial court’s reference to Whitmill,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, is particularly apt. There, although
carrying a handgun, the defendant immediately dropped his
weapon and complied with instructions when confronted by law
enforcement. (Id. at pp. 1142-1143.) By contrast, appellant
refused to stop walking when ordered to by Officer Barahona. He
led the officers on a foot chase and, when finally caught,
appellant used his body to fight being taken into custody. The
fact that no one was seriously injured during these confrontations
seems to have been the product of blind luck in appellant’s choice
of victims, rather than his choice to avoid or minimize the
possibility of harm to others.
Appellant’s criminal history also shows a willingness
to create circumstances that could very easily result in violence
and even death. He has juvenile adjudications for robbery (§ 211)
and grand theft from a person (§ 487, subd. (c).) His adult
convictions are for felony burglary (§ 459), and two
misdemeanors, possession of burglary tools (§ 466) and battery.
(§ 242.) These are not “super strikes” within the meaning of
section 1170.18 or section 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv). However, both
robbery and first degree burglary are classified as serious and
violent felonies. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9); § 1192.7, subd. (c)(18).)
Appellant’s willingness to create these volatile situations
8
supports an inference that he could pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety within the meaning of section 1001.36,
subdivision (c)(4).
The trial court concluded it lacked confidence in
appellant’s ability to achieve and maintain sobriety. It also
concluded appellant was not “amenable to treatment” in a way
that would protect public safety. Substantial evidence supports
these conclusions. The mental health expert’s report indicated
that, in addition to his multiple mental illnesses, appellant
suffered a serious gun shot wound in 2015 leaving him with a
brain injury that required follow-up care. Appellant did not
participate in that follow up care until 2019. He then “required
intensive tracking to help him manage his medical and
psychiatric treatment. [Appellant’s] cognitive impairment
impacted his ability to effectively keep track of, and manage, his
medical and mental health treatment.” Even with the assistance
of a care coordinator, appellant continued his methamphetamine
use and committed the offenses at issue here. The expert also
concluded that appellant’s severe substance abuse disorder would
require “an intense inpatient treatment program” and that he
would “likely relapse if he is not in a program.” The trial court
recognized the risk that appellant would not overcome his
decades long substance abuse disorder and would be unable to
manage his multiple diagnoses in the community. It did not
abuse its discretion when it found that community treatment
would not protect public safety.
Lesser Included Offense
Appellant contends the trial court erred when it
declined to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
9
battery without injury to a peace officer. Respondent correctly
concedes the issue.
A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on
a lesser included offense where “‘there is evidence which, if
accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve [the] defendant from
guilt of the greater offense’ [citation] but not the lesser.” (People
v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871, emphasis in original.)
Battery without injury to a peace officer, in violation of section
243, subdivision (b), is a lesser included offense of battery with
injury to a peace officer in violation of section 243, subdivision
(c)(2). (People v. Hayes (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 175, 180, fn. 3
(Hayes).) The distinction between the two offenses is whether the
peace officer suffered an “injury” within the meaning of the
statute. For this purpose, an “injury” is, “any physical injury
which requires professional medical treatment.” (§ 243, subd.
(f)(5).) Thus, if there is substantial evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that appellant committed a battery
against a peace officer, but the peace officer did not suffer a
“physical injury which require[d] professional medical
treatment,” appellant is entitled to an instruction on the lesser
offense described in section 243, subdivision (b). (Hayes, supra,
142 Cal.App.4th at p. 181; see also People v. Longoria (1995) 34
Cal.App.4th 12, 17 [distinction between the two offenses is
“objective and factual,” and based on the “nature, extent, and
seriousness” of any physical injury].)
Here, there is substantial evidence that appellant
headbutted Officer Barahona while he was being arrested. This
caused a laceration over Officer Barahona’s left eye that was
bleeding. Paramedics arrived at the scene of the arrest. They
sterilized Barahona’s wound and “just placed a band aid” on it.
10
He did not receive any stitches or other medical care for the
injury.
A reasonable jury could find, based on this evidence,
that Officer Barahona did not suffer an “injury” as that term is
defined in section 243, subdivision (f). Consequently, there is a
reasonable probability that, had the jury been instructed on the
lesser included offense, at least one juror would have voted to
convict appellant of that offense. (People v. Vasquez (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 786, 798.) The trial court prejudicially erred in
failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense defined
in section 243, subdivision (b).
The evidence we have summarized, however, would
substantially support a finding that appellant committed the
lesser included offense of battery without injury on a peace
officer. Where, as here, “a greater offense must be reversed, but a
lesser included offense could be affirmed, we give the prosecutor
the option of retrying the greater offense, or accepting a reduction
to the lesser offense.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 528.)
We will remand the matter for that purpose. (Hayes, supra, 142
Cal.App.4th at p. 184.)
Conclusion
The judgment is reversed with regard to appellant’s
conviction of battery with injury on a peace officer. If, after the
filing of the remittitur in the trial court, the People do not bring
appellant to retrial on the charged offense within the time limit
of section 1382, subdivision (a)(2), the trial court shall proceed as
if the remittitur constituted a modification of the judgment to
reflect a conviction of the lesser included misdemeanor offense of
battery without injury on a peace officer in violation of section
11
243, subdivision (b), and shall resentence appellant accordingly.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
12
Kevin P. Stennis, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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