CourtListener 10655890•People v. Molina CA2/6
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Filed 8/18/25 P. v. Molina CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333086
(Super. Ct. No. 21CR00147)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
ROBERT ANTHONY MOLINA
III,
Defendant and Appellant.
Robert Anthony Molina III appeals the judgment entered
after a jury convicted him of the second-degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true the allegation
that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
in causing the victim’s death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In a
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
1
Code, unless otherwise noted.
bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that
appellant had suffered a prior serious felony and strike conviction
(§§ 667, subds. (a), (d) & (e), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)). The trial
court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 55 years to life plus
9 years. Appellant raises claims of evidentiary, prosecutorial,
instructional, and cumulative error. We affirm.
Facts
On January 2, 2021, victim Kevin Najarro was living in
Santa Maria with his friend Brian Miller in one of two detached
garages (the east and west garages) on the property where
Brian’s2 parents Luana and Charles Miller also lived. Najarro,
Brian, and others often used drugs together in both garages.
That afternoon, neighbors’ video surveillance cameras
recorded appellant—who was known as “Skills”—arriving at the
property wearing black and white checkered shorts and Nike
shoes with one red toe and one blue toe. Christina Reyes testified
that she drove to the property that same day with a man named
Elmer. Reyes went into the west garage and played dice with
appellant, Najarro, and two other individuals named Miguel and
Linda while they all smoked methamphetamine. Several other
people also entered and left the garage while Reyes was there.
When she left the garage that evening, only appellant and
Najarro remained; Brian was in the main residence eating dinner
with Luana and Charles.
As Reyes was getting into her car across the street, she
heard gunshots and hid in nearby bushes. Neighbors’ video
surveillance cameras recorded the sound of four gunshots at 7:21
p.m., then showed appellant leaving the area 11 seconds later
Because Brian, Luana, and Charles have the same last
2
name, we refer to them by their first names for clarity.
2
carrying a bi-colored blue and silver revolver. Appellant is also
seen rubbing the revolver on the right front part of his shorts.
Reyes testified that she saw Elmer in the street after she
heard the gunshots, but previously told a detective that she saw
Elmer before the gunshots. According to Reyes, she hid in the
bushes for three to five minutes and then drove away.
Shortly before the gunshots, Luana and Brian had finished
eating dinner. When Brian opened the front door to go outside,
Luana heard a “scraping banging noise” on the side of the house.
Luana went outside and saw a car parked across the street. A
woman “came out” and was walking toward the garages and said
“‘Kevin is hurt.’” Another woman was also in the yard by the
garages. Luana looked inside the west garage, saw a pool of blood
on the floor, and called 911.
The police arrived and found Najarro’s body on a mattress
in the east garage. Najarro had gunshot wounds to his neck,
right arm, chest, and left thigh. Three of the bullets were .22-
caliber and the fourth was too damaged to determine the caliber.
In the west garage there was a pool of blood and a backpack that
had apparently been rummaged through, and narcotics bindles
were strewn on the floor. There was also smeared blood and
droplets of blood on the pathway between the garages. The police
subsequently determined that Najarro had been shot in the west
garage.
When appellant was arrested at his mother’s house a few
days later, he was wearing the same black and white checkered
shorts under a pair of jeans. Inside the house the police found a
.22-caliber blue and silver revolver frame, a .22-caliber revolver
cylinder, and .22-caliber ammunition. In appellant’s car which
was parked nearby, officers found four .22-caliber spent shell
3
casings in the driver’s side door handle, a metal rod consistent
with a revolver’s cylinder retaining pin, over 50 live .22-caliber
rounds of ammunition, and a pair of Nike shoes with one red toe
and one blue toe. It was subsequently determined that at least
three of the spent shell casings were fired from the revolver
cylinder found in appellant’s mother’s house.
After appellant’s arrest, samples were taken from his
hands and shorts and tested for gunshot residue (GSR). Particles
“characteristic of GSR” contain the elements of lead, antimony,
and barium. Particles containing only two of the three elements
are termed “consistent with GSR,” while particles containing only
one of the elements are “commonly associated with GSR.” Two
particles consistent with GSR and five particles commonly
associated with GSR were found in the sample taken from the
right-front side of appellant’s shorts. No particles characteristic
of, consistent with, or commonly associated with GSR were found
in the samples from appellant’s hands.
In a recorded jail call between appellant and his mother
five days after the murder, appellant said he “got a new charge.”
Appellant’s mother asked “was there anybody around” and
appellant responded “no.” Appellant’s mother then stated “they
obviously don’t have no witnesses or whatever. So I don’t know
how they charge you with anything.” Appellant replied, “Oh, I
know. I don’t know either.”
Discussion
I.
GSR Evidence
Appellant contends the evidence that particles consistent or
commonly associated with GSR were found on the shorts he was
4
wearing the night of the murder should have been excluded
under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly). We disagree.
Under California law, the Kelly test governs “the admission
of expert testimony regarding new scientific methodology . . . .”
(People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 591.) Under that test, the
proponent of such evidence must establish: (1) the new
methodology is reliable by showing it has gained general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community; (2) the witness
furnishing the testimony is qualified as an expert to give an
opinion on the subject; and (3) the individual performing the test
used the correct scientific procedures. (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at
p. 30.) This test “is applicable only to ‘new scientific techniques,’”
that is, “‘to that limited class of expert testimony which is based,
in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which
is new to science and, even more so, the law.’” (Leahy, supra, at
p. 605.) “[O]nce a trial court has admitted evidence based on a
new scientific technique, and that decision is affirmed on appeal
by a published appellate decision, the precedent so established
may control subsequent trials, at least until new evidence is
presented reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific
community.” (Kelly, supra, at p. 32.)
In People v. Palmer (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 239 (Palmer), the
court recognized that the scientific community had “uniformly
embraced” the technique of using a scanning electron microscope
(SEM) to observe and identify GSR particles. (Id. at p. 252.) This
is the same technique used to observe and identify the particles
found on appellant’s shorts.
Appellant nevertheless asserts as he did below that Palmer
is not controlling here because (1) “the relevant scientific
community does not accept GSR evidence as reliable without
5
adequate preservation and collection protocols;” (2) “the relevant
scientific community does not accept as reliable GSR samples
submitted for testing more than 12 hours after a shooting;” and
(3) “[t]he relevant scientific community does not accept GSR as
reliable evidence in the absence of control samples to determine
the origin of that evidence.” (Bold omitted.) He further asserts
that the evidence of particles consistent or commonly associated
with GSR that were found on his shorts should have been
excluded under Kelly “because the prosecution failed to prove
that it observed protocols in this case.” (Bold omitted.) None of
these assertions are persuasive.
As the trial court correctly found in denying appellant’s
motion to exclude the GSR evidence under Kelly, his assertions go
to the weight to be accorded the evidence rather than its
admissibility. Appellant does not dispute the scientific reliability
of the SEM technique itself, which was plainly employed here.
The evidence establishes that samples were obtained from
appellant’s shorts after the shorts were collected from him and
that an SEM was used to observe and identify particles on those
samples that are consistent or commonly associated with GSR.
As the People aptly put it, “[a]t most, appellant establishes a
conflict within the law enforcement community as to [the] best
practices for obtaining samples and minimizing the risk of
contamination.”
The lack of control samples, any delay in collecting
samples, or the possibility that observed GSR particles were the
result of contamination rather than the discharging of a firearm
do not undermine the reliability of SEM’s ability to detect such
particles. (See Palmer, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 253
[recognizing that the lack of control samples or the potential for
6
contamination of tested samples “do not attack the SEM
technique, but instead raise the possibility of error, which
possibility goes to the weight accorded the evidence rather than
its admissibility”].) Accordingly, appellant fails to establish that
the challenged evidence should have been excluded under Kelly.3
To the extent appellant alternatively contends the evidence
should have been excluded on foundational, chain of custody, and
relevancy grounds independent of Kelly, we agree with the People
that these contentions are forfeited because they were not raised
below. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 671.) In any
event, these evidentiary challenges lack merit. The testimony of
the technician who collected and tested the samples from
appellant’s shorts was sufficient to make a foundational showing
for the evidence. Contrary to appellant’s claim, the authenticity
of the evidence for purposes of admissibility was not contingent
upon a showing that the GSR particles found on appellant’s
shorts were not transferred to the shorts after he was arrested.
3 As support for his Kelly claim, appellant filed a request for
judicial notice of five documents. We previously granted his
unopposed request for judicial notice of two scientific articles
(Exhs. (A) & (B)), but deferred ruling on his request for judicial
notice of three other documents pursuant to the People’s
opposition (Exhs. (C), (D) & (E)). We agree with the People that
those documents—two newspaper articles and the criminalist’s
gunshot residue report—are not matters properly subject to
judicial notice under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459 and
rule 8.252 of the California Rules of Court. Accordingly, we deny
appellant’s request for judicial notice of Exhibits C, D, and E. In
any event, nothing in those exhibits (or the two exhibits for which
judicial notice was granted) indicates that the SEM technique
employed in this case no longer has general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community.
7
(See People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 727, citation omitted
[“‘“[t]he fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding
authenticity goes to the [evidence’s] weight . . . , not its
admissibility”’”].)
Appellant’s challenge to the chain of custody is similarly
unavailing. People v. Jimenez (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 75, which
he offers for support, is plainly inapposite. In that case, there
was an insufficient showing that the chain of custody had been
maintained after the challenged evidence was collected. (Id. at p.
81.) Here, appellant complains that the particles found on his
shorts may have been transferred to the shorts before they were
collected from him. This complaint does not allege any break in
the chain of custody.
Appellant’s claim that the GSR evidence should have been
excluded as irrelevant also fails. Although he notes that the
prosecution’s criminalist was unable to conclude from that
evidence that appellant had handled a firearm, this testimony did
not render the evidence irrelevant. Evidence is relevant if it has
“any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact.”
(Evid. Code, § 210.) “This definition of relevant evidence is
manifestly broad. Evidence is relevant when no matter how
weak it is it tends to prove a disputed issue.” (In re Romeo
C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1838, 1843.) Evidence can be excluded
as irrelevant only if it has no tendency to prove a disputed fact.
(See People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 527
(Burgener), disapproved on other grounds by People v.
Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743.)
Even though the criminalist could not conclusively opine
from the GSR evidence alone that appellant had fired a gun or
even handled one, when considered under the totality of the
8
circumstances the evidence had some tendency to prove both
points. (See Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 527 [concluding that
“the presence of a substance which might be blood on a
defendant’s shoes certainly has some tendency in reason to prove
that he might have been present at the scene of a bloody
shooting” even though “human blood, animal blood, some
vegetable enzymes and fecal material could have produced this
[test] result”].) Only 11 seconds after Najarro was shot 4 times
with a .22-caliber firearm, appellant is seen leaving the property
holding a blue and silver .22-caliber firearm and rubbing it on his
shorts in the exact spot where the particles consistent or
commonly associated with GSR were subsequently found. And
after appellant’s arrest, the police found the components of a blue
and silver .22-caliber revolver and 4 expended shell casings.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
the GSR evidence was relevant to prove that appellant was the
shooter. (See People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 371,
[recognizing that “[t]he trial court has wide discretion in
determining relevance”].)
Even if appellant could establish the GSR evidence should
have been excluded on any of the asserted grounds, his claim
would fail for lack of prejudice. His attempt to frame the alleged
error as one of constitutional magnitude is unavailing. Kelly
error and the other alleged evidentiary errors are reviewed under
the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
(People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 661 [Kelly error]
(Schultz); People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 336 (Harris)
[state evidentiary errors].) Accordingly, reversal would not be
warranted unless it is reasonably probable that appellant would
9
have achieved a more favorable result had the GSR evidence been
excluded. (Watson, supra, at p. 836.)
Appellant fails to make such a showing. By his own
account, the GSR evidence admitted at his trial was “exceedingly
weak[.]” Only two particles consistent with GSR (lead and
antimony) and five particles commonly associated with GSR
(either lead or antimony) were found on his shorts. No particles
characteristic of GSR were found on the shorts, nor were any
particles whatsoever found on his hands. The criminalist
admitted that “two particles alone are not indicative of [appellant
having fired or] handled a firearm.” The jury also heard the
criminalist admit that the limited particles found on appellant’s
shorts could have been transferred from various other sources he
may have come into contact with after he was arrested.
Appellant’s attorney vigorously cross-examined the criminalist on
these points.
Moreover, the independent evidence of appellant’s guilt was
strong. Reyes testified that when she left the garage on the night
of the murder, only appellant and Najarro were still present.
Shortly thereafter, Najarro was shot four times with a .22-caliber
handgun. Eleven seconds later, a neighbor’s video surveillance
cameras captured appellant—who had just been alone with
Najarro—leaving the property carrying a blue and silver
revolver. And when appellant was arrested a few days later at
his mother’s house, the police found a blue and silver .22-caliber
revolver frame, a .22-caliber cylinder, and .22-caliber
ammunition. Four .22-caliber spent shell casings were also found
in his car, at least three of which were fired from the cylinder
found in his mother’s home. Appellant also made an adoptive
admission of his guilt during a phone call with his mother after
10
his arrest. In light of this evidence, it is not reasonably probable
that appellant would have achieved a more favorable result had
the GSR evidence been excluded. Accordingly, any error in
admitting the evidence was harmless. (Schultz, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 661; Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 336.) In light of this
conclusion, appellant’s contention that the evidence should have
been excluded as more prejudicial than probative (Evid. Code, §
352) also fails. (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 471, 482.)
II.
Prosecutorial Error
Appellant next contends that the prosecutor prejudicially
erred by “repeatedly mischaracteriz[ing]” the GSR evidence
4
during closing argument. We conclude otherwise.
Claims of prosecutorial error are subject to federal and
state standards of review. (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th
774, 835.) The federal Constitution is violated when the
prosecutorial error infects the trial with such a degree of
unfairness as to render defendant’s conviction a denial of due
process. (Ibid.; People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127
(Shazier).) Prosecutorial error involving comments by
prosecutors to jurors has generally been viewed by California
courts as error of less than constitutional magnitude (see People
v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 214, fn. 4), warranting “reversal
only if it is reasonably probable the trial outcome was affected.”
4Although appellant labels the alleged error as
“misconduct,” “‘[t]he term prosecutorial “misconduct” is
somewhat of a misnomer to the extent that it suggests a
prosecutor must act with a culpable state of mind. A more apt
description of the transgression is prosecutorial error.’” (People v.
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666-667.)
11
(Shazier, supra, at p. 127.) Accordingly, to prevail on a claim of
prosecutorial error based on remarks to the jury, a defendant
must show a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood or
applied the prosecutor’s comments in an improper or erroneous
manner. (Jablonski, supra, at p. 835.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that
appellant “had [GSR] on his person.” Appellant’s attorney
objected on the ground that the evidence at trial had merely
established that particles consistent with GSR—i.e., only two of
the three elements that are characteristic of GSR—had been
found on appellant’s shorts. Defense counsel added “I believe the
[PowerPoint] slide says it tested positive for [GSR] . . . .
Absolutely he can argue consistent with.” The trial court agreed
the prosecutor could argue that particles consistent with GSR
had been found and told the prosecutor “to made sure your
[PowerPoint] slide is clear about that too.” The court then told
the jury “[t]he statement it’s consistent with [GSR] is appropriate
for argument sake.”
During his rebuttal, the prosecutor stated: “The next
theory they put forth . . . is that the particle[s] consistent with
[GSR] that were located on the shorts, must have come from
some [sort] of contamination. And they spent a bunch of time
walking through the interview room and who touched what, and
who touched where. What is of significance is all those gloves
touched [appellant’s] hands, but his hands came back with zero
[GSR] particles. The only place there was [GSR] was the right
front short.” After the court sustained defense counsel’s objection
that the prosecutor had once again misstated the evidence, the
prosecutor stated “[t]he only place there was [sic] particles
consistent with [GSR] was the defendant’s right front short.”
12
Later, the prosecutor stated “you have the fact that several
particles characteristic of [GSR] were located on the defendant’s
shorts.” (Italics added.) After defense counsel objected, the court
told the prosecutor “[r]ephrase that one more time.” The
prosecutor then stated “that several particles, characteristics of
[GSR] were located on the defendant’s short.” Defense counsel
once again objected that the prosecutor had misstated the
evidence. The court overruled the objection. A PowerPoint slide
the prosecutor introduced during his closing argument stated
that “Defendant had [GSR] on his shorts,” while another slide
introduced during the rebuttal closing argument stated that
appellant was the “Only person with [GSR] on his clothing”
Appellant fails to demonstrate it is reasonably probable
that the prosecutor’s misstatements regarding the GSR evidence
affected the outcome of his trial. The jury was instructed prior to
both opening statements and closing arguments that “[n]othing
the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and
closing arguments the attorneys will discuss the case, but their
remarks are not evidence.” We presume the jury understood and
followed these instructions. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th
1, 30.)
The evidence at trial made clear the distinctions between
particles commonly associated with GSR (either lead, antimony,
or barium), particles consistent with GSR (two of the three), and
particles characteristic of GSR (all three). The evidence also
made clear that only particles consistent with or commonly
associated with GSR were found on appellant’s shorts. As
defense counsel emphasized to the jury, no particles
characteristic of GSR were found and the criminalist testified
that “two particles alone [i.e., particles consistent with GSR] are
13
not indicative of [appellant having fired or] handled a firearm.”
In light of this, it is not reasonably probable the jury found that
particles characteristic of GSR (rather than particles consistent
with GSR) were found on appellant’s shorts. As we have
previously noted, the independent evidence of appellant’s guilt
was also strong. (See ante, p. 11.) Appellant’s claim of
prosecutorial error thus fails. (Shazier, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p.
127.)
III.
Refusal Of Instruction on Lack of Motive (CALCRIM No. 370)
Appellant finally contends the trial court erred in declining
his request to instruct the jury on lack of motive pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 370.5 Our Supreme Court has held, however, that
the trial court does not err by refusing such an instruction.
(People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 196 [“even if [instructions
on motive are] requested, it has been held not to be error to
refuse such instructions”]; People v. Bermijo (1935) 2 Cal.2d 270,
278; People v. Wilkins (1910) 158 Cal. 530, 536-537.) We are
bound to follow this authority. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
IV.
Cumulative Error
Appellant finally contends that the cumulative effect of the
alleged errors compels reversal of his conviction. Because
5 CALCRIM No. 370 states: “The People are not required to
prove that the defendant had a motive to commit [murder]. In
reaching your verdict you may, however, consider whether the
defendant had a motive. [¶] Having a motive may be a factor
tending to show that the defendant is guilty. Not having a
motive may be a factor tending to show the defendant is not
guilty.”
14
appellant has not demonstrated error, there is no error to
cumulate. (People v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1, 32.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
15
Patricia Kelly, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Seth McCutcheon, Stefanie Yee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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