In re M.T. CA2/7

CourtListener 10654047Calctapp14.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/14/25 In re M.T. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re M.T., a Person Coming B339384
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LB0257A)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sabina A. Helton, Judge. Affirmed.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Stephanie C.
Brenan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

M.T., a minor at the time the offenses were committed,
appeals the juvenile court’s disposition order sustaining a
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for
attempted murder and illegal possession of a firearm. The court
declared M.T. a ward of the court and ordered him placed in a
secure youth treatment facility for a baseline term of three years.
M.T. argues the prosecution’s use of statements he made in a
police van after his arrest violated his Fifth Amendment rights
because they were the product of a custodial interrogation and, as
a minor, he should have received additional warnings about the
van’s recording. We conclude the law does not support M.T.’s
arguments, and we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Offenses
Approximately a year before May 1, 2023, minor E.R. saw
M.T. with Q.M., E.R.’s high school classmate, at a high school
football game. E.R. learned that M.T. and Q.M. were friends.
E.R. was also “friends” with Q.M. on social media. While viewing
Q.M.’s social media page, E.R. encountered M.T.’s social media
account.

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On May 1, 2023, E.R., a known seller of vaping devices,
received a text message from an unknown number about a
potential sale. After discussing the quantity, price, and place of
the sale, E.R. drove to the agreed-upon location near an
apartment complex around 6:30 p.m. E.R. waited 10 to
15 minutes. A person whom E.R. did not know approached E.R.’s
car. As the pair discussed payment, E.R. saw someone walking
behind the vehicle from the rearview mirror.
Growing suspicious of the person approaching, E.R. began
rolling up the driver’s side window. The person approaching from
behind the vehicle had a small blue pouch and was wearing a ski
mask with his eyes and the top of his nose visible. E.R.
recognized him as M.T. As he rolled up the window, the masked
person shot through the driver’s side window, and the bullet
struck E.R. on the left side of his face.
E.R. drove away to a convenience store parking lot. He
called 911. Emergency services transported E.R. to the Long
Beach Memorial Hospital and then transferred him to UCI
Medical Center. E.R. received medical treatment and then
underwent surgery to remove the bullet and bullet fragments.
On May 2, 2023, Long Beach Police Detectives Sokhoeun
Kim and William Sentelle met with E.R. E.R. was intubated and
could not speak. He used a notepad to communicate with the
detectives. He provided the detectives with the social media
accounts for M.T. and Q.M. E.R. then showed detectives
photographs on social media and identified M.T. as the person
who shot him.
Multiple photographs depicted M.T. in front of a gas
station, which E.R. believed to be across from the convenience
store where E.R. called the police. In one photograph, the street

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sign was visible and confirmed the location to be across from the
street of that convenience store. Another photograph showed
M.T. holding a small blue pouch with the caption indicating the
post would be deleted in 30 minutes. Within a day or two, M.T.’s
social media account was deactivated.
Officers executed a search warrant for the social media
accounts provided by E.R. Officers received a phone number and
email address associated with the social media account believed
to belong to M.T. The phone number was connected to M.T.’s
mother.
On July 26, 2023, officers responded to a report of a person
being shot. Officer Charles Pruiet encountered M.T., Q.M., and
R.J.B. Q.M. had just been shot in the chest near his underarm.
M.T. told Officer Pruiet he encountered Q.M. with a
gunshot wound near an apartment complex. When Officer Pruiet
searched the area by the apartment complex, he found a nine-
millimeter bullet in the alley. Officers searched the surrounding
area and discovered signs of gunfire involving two guns: eight
nine-millimeter casings, two bullets that had struck a box truck
parked on the street, two .45 caliber fragments near the box
truck, and a bullet that struck the apartment complex’s second-
story window.
Police obtained video surveillance footage from the
apartment complex’s security cameras. The video showed M.T.,
Q.M., and R.J.B. M.T. and Q.M. were positioned behind a parked
box truck as a white car arrived. M.T. and R.J.B. then met the
person in the white car while Q.M. stayed behind the box truck.
Q.M. then approached the white car. A minute later, M.T. and
Q.M. began running away as Q.M. appeared to fire a gun twice in
the white car’s direction. R.J.B., shortly thereafter, joined them

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running down the alley towards the location where officers found
them.

B. M.T.’s Arrest
On September 7, 2023, police executed a search and arrest
warrant for M.T. and Q.M.1 After arresting the minors, officers
read them their Miranda rights.2 The officers did not question
M.T. or Q.M. Both were escorted to a police van for
transportation to juvenile hall. The van was equipped with audio
and video recording capacities. Officers directed Q.M. to state his
full name after placing him in the van. After a few minutes,
officers brought M.T. to the van, and when M.T. was inside, they
directed him to state his name. In his opening brief, M.T.
concedes that “[i]t was clear that the detective was making a
recording and he asked that both Q.M. and appellant state their
names for the recording. Appellant expressly acknowledged that
they were being recorded” when he stated, “they got a camera in
here.” The officers gave them each a copy of the search warrant,

1 M.T. moved to augment the record to include various
Miranda-related documents, including a transcript of the van
recording prepared by the prosecution, a police incident report
confirming Miranda rights were provided to M.T. upon his arrest,
and a police department manual regarding the form of Miranda
warnings. We grant the motion to augment the record with the
transcript and the police incident report. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 8.340, 8.155(a)(1)(A) [allowing augmentation to
include “[a]ny document filed or lodged in the case in superior
court”].) The police manual was not provided to the trial court; it
is unnecessary to our analysis, and we decline to augment the
record with it.
2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

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which contained photographs from M.T.’s social media account.
The officers tended to paperwork outside of the van and left M.T.
and Q.M. alone inside.
While in the van, M.T. and Q.M. spoke to each other. M.T.
said: “We [are going to] have our lawyer make up a story. We
know there isn’t shit to it.” Later, he stated: “Like how you get
shot after you selling drugs to somebody, feel me?” and “I ain’t got
time to be gone and shit like this. At first I thought the Asian
snitched.” E.R. is of Cambodian descent.
Later in the conversation, M.T. referenced his social media
account and said: “They tried looking at my account but that shit
deactivated. They’ve been looking at this shit though. . . . They
must have found something.” Q.M. also mentioned a “30 stick,”
which Detective Hector Lizardo believed to be referring to an
extended firearm magazine. M.T. and Q.M. were held in the van
for almost an hour. Detective Lizardo reviewed and confirmed
the van recording’s transcript to the best of his ability.

C. Juvenile Court Proceedings
The People filed a petition on September 8, 2023, to declare
M.T. a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged M.T. had
committed attempted murder (count 1; Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), illegal possession of a firearm (count 2; Pen. Code,
§ 29610, subd. (a)), and attempted second degree robbery
(count 3; Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211).
On February 26, 2024, M.T. moved to suppress his
statements made in the police van. M.T. argued the audio
recording was undiscernible as to who was speaking or what was
being said and therefore the recording was unreliable and

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prejudicial. M.T.’s counsel did not challenge the recording on
Miranda grounds. The juvenile court denied M.T.’s motion.
The juvenile court sustained the petition for attempted
murder, illegal possession of a firearm, and attempted second
degree robbery. The court declared M.T. a ward of the court and
ordered him placed in a secure youth treatment facility for a
baseline term of three years.
M.T. timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

M.T. contends the true findings for attempted murder
(count 1) and illegal possession of a firearm (count 2) should be
reversed for violation of his right against self-incrimination.3
M.T. argues that the admission of his statements made while in
the police van violated his Fifth Amendment rights under
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.’” (Colorado v. Spring (1987)
479 U.S. 564, 572.) Miranda held the Fifth Amendment guards
against “‘mental as well as physical’” coercion by law enforcement
during custodial interrogation. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at
p. 448.) Miranda also held that if a suspect was not informed of
his right to remain silent and other constitutional rights,

3 M.T. presents no argument on appeal as to count 3.

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statements made during a custodial interrogation are
inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. (See id. at p. 444.)
Miranda safeguards exist when a person is in custody and
in an interrogation. (See Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S.
291, 300-301 (Innis) [custodial interrogation involves “a measure
of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself”].)
An interrogation refers to “express questioning” and “any words
or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.” (Id. at p. 301.)
The privilege against self-incrimination “protects an
accused only from being compelled to testify against himself[] or
otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature[.]” (Schmerber v. California (1966)
384 U.S. 757, 761.) Additionally, a government agent may not
compel a person to be a source of “‘“real or physical evidence.”’”
(United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 222-223 (Wade),
quoting Schmerber, at p. 764.) There is “‘no protection against
compulsion to submit to . . . speak for identification.’” (Wade, at
p. 223.)
A suspect’s age may also be a relevant consideration
“‘affect[ing] how a reasonable person’ in the suspect’s position
‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’” (J.D.B. v. North
Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 271 (J.D.B.).) Thus, if a minor’s
age is known or apparent to the officer at the time of police
questioning, the minor’s age should be considered in the custody
analysis of the Miranda test. (See ibid.) (As further addressed
below, the parties here all agree M.T. was in custody.)

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We accept the trial court’s finding of facts and reasonable
inferences therefrom if they are supported by substantial
evidence. (See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1194;
People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1033.) We
independently determine whether the challenged statements
were unlawfully obtained based on the undisputed facts and facts
properly found by the trial court. (See Bradford, at p. 1033.)

B. The Van Recording Did Not Violate M.T.’s Miranda Rights4
M.T. acknowledges that he was read his Miranda rights
after he was arrested and before he was placed in the police van.
He also concedes the officers did not question him in violation of
these rights. M.T. instead contends he was in a custodial
interrogation when placed in the van because interrogation
“refers not only to express questioning, but also to any . . . actions
on the part of the police that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.” M.T. further argues that, because of his age and lack of
a criminal record, he “was therefore due” additional Miranda
warnings about the van recording. As explained below, we
conclude M.T.’s arguments are unsupported by the law.
As stated, a defendant must demonstrate he was in
“custody” and subject to “interrogation” to invoke the protections
of Miranda. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444; Innis, supra,
446 U.S. at pp. 300-301; see Thompson v. Keohane (1995)
516 U.S. 99, 102; People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 923;

4 Although M.T. did not object on Miranda grounds before
the juvenile court, the People responded to M.T.’s Miranda
argument in the respondent’s brief, and we exercise our
discretion to reach the issue.

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People v. Alvarez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 28, 32.) M.T. and the
People concede that M.T. was in custody after his arrest and
while in the van. Accordingly, we examine whether M.T.’s
placement in the van with recording capabilities constituted an
interrogation for purposes of Miranda.
An interrogation is “express questioning or [] functional[ly]
equivalent” words or actions. (Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at pp. 300-
301; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 387. An
interrogation does not include spontaneous utterances that were
not in response to questions from police officers or their known
agents. (See, e.g., People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 575
[a defendant’s spontaneous statement made after his arrest and
while being searched is admissible]; People v. O’Sullivan (1990)
217 Cal.App.3d 237, 241 [a defendant’s spontaneous utterance is
admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings].)
Additionally, investigatory tactics “‘that do not rise to the level of
compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda’s
concerns.’” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1402
[Miranda warnings not required before conversation between
defendant and his father in an interrogation room, where officers
“did not compel or coerce defendant to talk to his father”]; accord,
Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 297.)
Here, after arresting M.T., officers informed M.T. of his
Miranda rights. The officers placed M.T. into the van and asked
him to state his full name, apparently for the recording. But the
officers did not ask M.T. any questions. The officers did not say
or do anything to elicit statements from M.T. In other words,
although M.T. was in custody, the officers did not interrogate him
through express questioning or functionally equivalent actions or
words designed to elicit an incriminating statement. And, as the

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People note, the police did not compel or coerce M.T. to speak to
Q.M., nor was Q.M. acting as an agent of the police. Accordingly,
we conclude M.T. was not in a custodial interrogation when he
made the challenged statements.5
M.T. asserts that although he had already received a
Miranda warning, he should have been given additional
warnings when placed in the van because he was a minor, and it
was unreasonable “for police to assume that [M.T.] understood
the Miranda warnings extended to the interior van recording.”
For this proposition, M.T. relies on J.D.B., supra, 564 U.S. 261.
But that case does not hold that minors must receive additional
Miranda warnings or that officers must ensure such arrestees
subjectively understand their scope. In J.D.B., the United States
Supreme Court examined “whether the age of a child subjected to
police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda”
and it held that “a child’s age properly informs the Miranda
custody analysis.” (J.D.B., at pp. 264-265.) J.D.B. does not help
M.T because there is no dispute that M.T. was in custody.
Additionally, M.T. makes no reasoned argument explaining how
J.D.B. should be extended to interrogations. Although J.D.B.
observed at page 272 that minors “‘often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them,’” it did not address whether
additional Miranda warnings are required under circumstances
like those presented in this case.

5 Indeed, M.T. concedes that, “[s]tatements made while in
custody but outside of formal interrogation have in many
instances not yet formed a basis for relief under a Miranda
theory, or under any other Fifth Amendment concern.”

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M.T. also contends he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or
intelligently waive his Miranda rights when he made the
challenged statements. A person in custodial interrogation may
waive his or her Miranda rights if the person knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waives their rights. (See People v.
Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 641, 683.) As stated, M.T.’s
statements were not the product of an interrogation. Therefore,
we need not determine whether M.T. knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights.6

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s disposition order is affirmed. The
motion to augment the record is granted in part and denied in
part as noted in the opinion.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. STONE, J.

6 Because we consider M.T.’s Miranda argument on the
merits, we also need not reach his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.

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