People v. Dang CA6

CourtListener 10654038Calctapp14.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/14/25 P. v. Dang CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H052934
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1094291)

v.

THANH TOAN DANG,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Thanh Toan Dang appeals from an order denying his petition for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Dang’s appointed counsel asks that
we independently review the record under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo). Dang has filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf, asserting that his
petition should not have been denied at the prima facie stage.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Dang’s section 1172.6 petition.
We have independently reviewed the entire record for unraised issues in accordance with
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, and we see no claims having any arguable merit. We
will affirm the order denying Dang’s petition.

1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts of the Offenses2
The facts of the offenses are largely irrelevant to our analysis. Briefly, as stated in
this court’s opinion in Dang’s initial appeal from the judgment at trial, the charges in this
case arose from a shooting at a restaurant. The victim was shot in the leg and back. The
victim identified Dang as the shooter in a photographic lineup and at a preliminary
examination. At trial, Dang primarily contested the issue of identity.
B. Procedural Background
A jury convicted Dang in 2012 of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder (§§ 187, 664, subd. (a)) and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245,
subd. (b)). The jury found that Dang personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) in committing the attempted murder,
and that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) in the assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The trial
court found true allegations that Dang had previously been convicted of a prior serious
felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a prior strike (§§ 667.5, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial
court sentenced Dang to an aggregate term of 30 years to life.
In the initial appeal from the judgment, this court found no errors that required
reversal of Dang’s convictions but we reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for
resentencing because the sentence was unauthorized in several respects. (People v. Dang
(July 30, 2014, H038871) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court imposed a sentence

2
This factual summary is taken from this court’s opinion in Dang’s initial appeal
from the judgment at trial, which is contained in the appellate record in this case. This
brief factual summary is offered to provide general background regarding this matter, not
to resolve any contested factual issues. (See People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238 [factual summary in a prior appellate opinion cannot establish
ineligibility for section 1172.6 relief at the prima facie stage].)

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of 39 years to life consecutive to a five-year determinate term, and this court then
affirmed the judgment. (People v. Dang (May 9, 2016, H042807) [nonpub. opn.].)
Dang filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6) in 2022. After taking judicial notice of several documents from Dang’s
case, the trial court denied the petition, finding Dang failed to make a prima facie case for
relief. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petition, Dang’s appointed counsel
filed a brief pursuant to Delgadillo that did not raise any issues. This court affirmed the
order denying the petition, concluding that: (1) Dang’s petition challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted murder, an issue not
properly raised in section 1172.6 proceedings; (2) the jury was instructed that to find
Dang guilty of attempted murder it had to find that he intended to kill the victim; and
(3) the jury was not instructed regarding the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(People v. Dang (Oct. 5, 2023, H050181) [nonpub. opn.].)
Dang then filed a second section 1172.6 petition in November 2024. He
contended that he was not the person who shot the victim, citing evidence presented at
trial. The trial court denied Dang’s petition in a written order, stating: “Petitioner is not
entitled to file another section 1172.6 petition absent a change in the relevant law or facts.
Here, Petitioner alleges no such change.”
Dang timely filed a notice of appeal. After Dang’s counsel submitted a brief
pursuant to Delgadillo stating the case and facts but raising no issues, we notified Dang
of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. Dang filed a
supplemental brief on his own behalf asserting that his section 1172.6 petition should not
have been denied at the prima facie stage, again citing evidence from his trial to assert he
was not the person who shot the victim.
II. DISCUSSION
In his supplemental brief, Dang asserts that he was not the person who shot the
victim, citing testimony and other evidence from his trial. He asserts that he merely

3
participated in the fight leading to the victim being shot, and he asserts that evidence
pointing to him being the shooter is not sufficient to convict him of attempted murder
under current law.
A. Penal Code Section 1172.6
“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or
was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference
to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 842, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v.
Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869 (Wilson).) As codified in section 1172.6, Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) “created a special procedural
mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the
law as amended. [Citations.]” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended what is
now section 1172.6 to provide that a person convicted of “attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” is eligible for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), as
amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
“Under section 1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition declaring
that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189’ made by Senate Bill 1437. [Citation.] The
trial court then reviews the petition to determine whether a prima facie showing has been
made that the petitioner is entitled to relief. [Citation.] ‘If the petition and record in the
case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may
dismiss the petition. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Otherwise, the court must issue an order to
show cause [citation] and hold an evidentiary hearing . . . .” (Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 869.) “While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment

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of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for
section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited.” (People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) At this stage of the proceedings, the court
“ ‘should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “ ‘However, if the record, including the
court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”
then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
To petition for relief, a section 1172.6 petition must allege “[t]he petitioner could
not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics
added.) “[T]he purpose of proceedings under section [1172.6] is to decide ‘issues not
previously determined, not to [retry] . . . disputes that have already been resolved.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Flint (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 607, 615.) “The mere filing of a
section [1172.6] petition does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims
of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings. To
the contrary, ‘[n]othing in the language of section [1172.6] suggests it was intended to
provide redress for allegedly erroneous prior factfinding. . . . The purpose of
section [1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with
respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide a do-over on factual disputes
that have already been resolved.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
942, 947.)
“We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima
facie stage. [Citation.]” (People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
B. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Petition
In Dang’s second section 1172.6 petition, he did not assert that he could not
presently be convicted of attempted murder “because of” recent changes to California

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murder law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Instead, he cited evidence presented at trial to
assert that he was not the person who shot the victim. However, the jury that heard this
evidence convicted Dang of attempted murder and found he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm despite his claims that he was not the shooter. The jury thus
necessarily rejected the arguments Dang raised in his second petition and now on appeal.
The record of conviction conclusively establishes Dang was found to be the person
who shot the victim. “[W]ith respect to attempted murder, section 1172.6 affords relief
only to a person convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
[Citation.]” (People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 276.) As this court’s
opinion following the denial of Dang’s first section 1172.6 petition noted, Dang’s jury
was not instructed regarding the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In addition,
Dang’s jury was instructed that it had to find Dang “intended to kill” the victim to find
him guilty of attempted murder. Dang does not specify how any changes to section 188
or 189 affect his culpability for attempted murder. Dang seeks to relitigate matters
already decided at trial, particularly that he was the person who shot the victim.
Section 1172.6 proceedings do not permit a person to retry disputes that have already
been resolved concerning the sufficiency of the evidence.
Thus, the trial court properly denied Dang’s second petition without issuing an
order to show cause. We have independently reviewed the entire record for unraised
issues in accordance with Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pages 231-232, and we see no
other claims having any arguable merit.3

3
The trial court denied Dang’s second section 1172.6 petition because it
concluded that a person may not file multiple section 1172.6 petitions absent a change in
the relevant law or facts. The trial court did not specifically analyze the merits of Dang’s
petition. Because we conclude that the jury’s verdicts demonstrate Dang’s ineligibility
for section 1172.6 relief and because Dang does not substantively assert he is entitled to
relief because of changes to section 188 or 189, we need not address whether a trial court
may deny a section 1172.6 petition on the ground that multiple petitions have been filed

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III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Dang’s petition for relief under Penal Code
section 1172.6 is affirmed.

without alleging an intervening change in the facts or law. We review the trial court’s
order denying the petition de novo and we must affirm the trial court’s ruling even if it
rested on different considerations than those we find dispositive in this appeal. (People v.
Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807 [“Our task is to review the trial court’s ruling, not its
reasoning.”)

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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

___________________________________________
Grover, J.

______________________________________
Lie, J.

People v. Dang
H052934

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