CourtListener 10653129•People v. White CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/13/25 P. v. White CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101268
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 17FE008801)
v.
DEVON ANTHONY WHITE,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2018, defendant Devon Anthony White pleaded guilty to the negligent
discharge of a gun. He also admitted the allegations that he committed the crime for the
benefit of a criminal street gang and that he had prior felony convictions. Pursuant to a
plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years in state prison.
In 2023, the trial court resentenced defendant pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.75 because his original sentence included an enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court struck that enhancement but otherwise left
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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his sentence unchanged. On appeal, defendant argues his counsel was ineffective by not
arguing his gang enhancement conviction (§ 186.22) should be vacated because the law
changed in the interim to include an additional element he did not admit. Defendant
alternatively asks us to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on this
issue. The People concede defendant’s counsel was ineffective and ask that the case be
remanded for further proceedings. We agree the case should be remanded.
BACKGROUND
In this case, the amended felony complaint charged defendant with driving a
vehicle with the intent to evade peace officers (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)),
discharging a firearm in a negligent manner (§ 246.3), being a felon in possession of a
firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and carrying a loaded gun in a car in a public place
(§ 25850, subd. (a)). The complaint further alleged defendant committed these offenses
for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and defendant had prior
convictions (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b), & 1170.12).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to negligent discharge
of a firearm and admitted he had prior strike convictions under sections 667, subdivisions
(a), (b) through (i), 1170.12 and 667.5, subdivision (b). As relevant here, the factual
basis for the plea was as follows: “defendant did willfully and unlawfully discharge a
firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could have resulted in injury or death to a
person. [¶] Furthermore, defendant . . . committed the above offense for the benefit of,
at the direction of, in association with a criminal street gang, to wit, GMob and Guttah,
. . . with the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang
members, pursuant to [section] 186.22[, subdivision ](b)(1).”
In 2018, section 186.22 contained no requirement the benefit to the gang had to be
“more than reputational.” (Former § 186.22; Stats 2017, ch. 561, § 179.) By virtue of
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333) effective in 2022,
section 186.22, subdivision (g) includes that requirement.
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The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 15 years in state
prison: a two-year term for the discharge of a firearm doubled to four years, a five-year
term pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a), and a one-year term pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The matter returned to the trial court in 2023 because the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation identified defendant as having a sentence enhancement
imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b) which was no longer valid. Upon receipt of
the notice, the trial court appointed counsel and requested briefing as to whether
defendant sought other changes to his sentence.
Defendant filed three briefs asking the court to reduce his sentence further in light
of changes to the law embodied in Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), Senate
Bills Nos. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), and 483 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.). Defendant did not proffer Assembly Bill 333 as a reason to change his
sentence. The People argued defendant’s sentence of 14 years, after the court dismissed
the single one-year enhancement, remained appropriate.
At resentencing, the trial court stated, “[Defendant] entered a plea agreement,
which I don’t know who defense counsel was, they did a pretty good job for him, that he
was able to plea around another four and a half years, I believe. [¶] [Defendant]’s record
was somewhat problematic in that in 2010 he was sentenced to state prison following a
conviction for a [section] 10851 of the Vehicle Code as well as a [section]
2800[, subdivision ](a). He was accepted into prison on [April 15, 2010] and paroled
shortly thereafter on . . . November 4th of 2010, then shortly thereafter he was sentenced
to state prison for a [section] 12021[, subdivision ](a)(1), with a possession of an
automatic pistol. [¶] He was released and violated, and then on March 22nd, 2013,
received a four-year prison sentence for [section] 29800[, subdivision ](a)(1), was
accepted into prison custody on [April 11], was paroled on [January 15], and then
sentenced on this case in 2017. [¶] Had defendant gone to trial and had [he] received the
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maximum, I would have been prepared to sentence him to something less. But I believe
that the plea agreement that was reached is in the interest of justice. He received, I
believe, a mid term sentence, not an upper term, which was doubled pursuant to the
recent strike as well as the [section] 667[, subdivision ](a) and the gang enhancement for
a total of 15 years. The Court will strike the one year enhancement and sentence him to a
total of 14 years.”
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the facts he admitted in 2018 do not support the imposition of a
sentence under section 186.22 in 2023 because the statute was changed in 2022 to include
the additional element that the benefit to the gang be “more than reputational.” On this
basis, he alternatively argues this conviction should be vacated or we should remand this
case for further proceedings. He further asserts we should reach this issue despite the fact
his counsel failed to raise it because his counsel was ineffective. The People concede
defendant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance on this point and ask that we remand
the matter for further proceedings. We agree that remand is appropriate.
A. Forfeiture and Ineffective Assistance
The People argue this issue was forfeited but concede defendant’s counsel was
ineffective for not raising the issue and that defendant suffered prejudice as a result.
Again, we agree.
As a general rule, failure to raise an issue at sentencing forfeits that issue on
appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.) Here, defendant failed to raise the
implications of Assembly Bill 333 in his original sentencing brief, his supplemental brief,
his second supplemental brief, or at the hearing
We retain the discretion, however, to disregard a forfeiture and take up the issue
on appeal. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161-162, fn. 6.) As conceded by
the People, it is proper for us to do so here, because the record demonstrates defendant’s
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counsel did not provide effective representation when counsel failed to raise this
applicable material change in the law.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that
(1) trial counsel’s representation was deficient because it fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficiency resulted in
prejudice to defendant. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009; Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688.) “When examining an ineffective assistance
claim, a reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a
presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. It
is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective assistance. On
direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record
affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or
omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Mai, at p. 1009.)
To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 694.)
Like the People, we do not see a satisfactory explanation for trial counsel not
arguing that defendant’s admission no longer supported a true finding that he violated
section 186.22. Further, it is reasonably probable defendant would have achieved a more
favorable outcome if his counsel had raised this issue during his resentencing.
B. Retroactive Application of Section 186.22
Turning to the merits, defendant argues the change in section 186.22 is
ameliorative and should be applied to his nonfinal judgment in these section 1172.75
proceedings. We agree.
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Under section 1172.75, subdivision (c), when a trial court reviews the judgment
and verifies the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement under section 667.5,
subdivision (b), it is required to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. Upon
recall of an original sentence, as occurred here, the original criminal judgment is no
longer final. (People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376, 378.)
Any subsequent resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) Upon resentencing, the court is also
required to “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) “By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not
merely that the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
In People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, our Supreme Court examined the
changes brought about by Assembly Bill 333 to the gang enhancement statute. (Lopez, at
pp. 395-396.) As relevant here, Assembly Bill 333 changed the law to require that any
“ ‘common benefit’ ” to a criminal street gang must be “ ‘more than reputational’ ” citing
section 186.22, subdivision (g). (Lopez, at p. 396; see also People v. Sek (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 657, 667.) The Supreme Court held the amendments brought about by
Assembly Bill 333 are ameliorative and thus retroactively apply to nonfinal judgments
under the rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740. (Lopez, at p. 396.)
At the time this defendant submitted his plea, the criminal street gang statute did
not contain the element requiring the benefit to the criminal street gang be more than
reputational. Further, the factual basis the prosecutor recited for the crime was that at the
time defendant discharged a firearm, he did so “for the benefit of, at the direction of, in
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association with a criminal street gang, to wit, GMob and Guttah, . . . with the specific
intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members, pursuant to
Penal Code [s]ection·186.22[, subdivision ](b)(1).” Thus, the “more than reputational
benefit” requirement was not contained in the statute, nor included in the language of the
stated factual basis. When the court resentenced defendant, there was no evidence
establishing defendant’s guilt on the reputational benefit requirement of the criminal
street gang enhancement. As a result, we reverse the true finding on the enhancement.
C. Remedy
The People argue we should remand the case to provide the prosecution an
opportunity to prove the gang offense and enhancements under the amended gang statute.
Defendant’s alternative argument concurs with this approach. We agree.
People v. Eagle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 275 is instructive. There, defendant
pleaded no contest to transportation of methamphetamine. (Id. at p. 278.) After his plea,
but before his conviction was final, the law changed to add an additional element to the
crime requiring that the transportation must have been for sale. (Ibid.) Defendant moved
to vacate his conviction. (Ibid.) While the parties and the appellate court agreed the new
law should be applied retroactively and that defendant had not admitted the new element,
this court held, “[w]hen a statutory amendment adds an additional element to an offense,
the prosecution must be afforded the opportunity to establish the additional element upon
remand. [Citation.] Such a retrial is not barred by the double jeopardy clause or ex post
facto principles because the question of whether defendant transported the
methamphetamine for sale was not relevant to the charges at the time of trial and
accordingly, this question was never tried. [Citation.] Accordingly, we must reverse
defendant’s conviction of transporting methamphetamine and remand the matter back to
the trial court for further proceedings.” (Id. at p. 280.)
The same rationale applies here. The new “more than reputational” benefit
requirement was not contained in the original statute. On remand, the People should have
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an opportunity to prove up the enhancement. Alternatively, defendant may stipulate to it,
or the trial court may find the enhancement not true as no evidence in the record supports
it as required under the current version of the statute.
DISPOSITION
The true finding for the criminal street gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with section 1172.75.2
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
2 In light of the reversal due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the clerk of this
court is directed to give the required notice and a copy of this opinion to the State Bar of
California and to trial counsel. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subd. (a)(2); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 10.1017.)
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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