CourtListener 10649732•In re K.F. CA1/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 8/7/25 In re K.F. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re K.F., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
A170960
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. JV-033644-13)
K.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
K.F. admitted to robbery and the juvenile court committed him to a
secure youth treatment facility (SYTF or secure track; Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 875)1 for a baseline term of confinement of three years. K.F. contends the
juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to secure track
because there is no substantial evidence demonstrating the commitment’s
probable benefit nor that a less restrictive, alternative disposition was
unsuitable. Additionally, K.F. argues the court abused its discretion in
setting a three-year baseline term. We affirm the commitment to secure
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
1
Institutions Code.
1
track and we reverse the setting of a three-year baseline term. Accordingly,
we remand to the juvenile court with directions to set the baseline term at
two years.
I. BACKGROUND2
A. Juvenile Wardship History
By the time of the underlying offense in 2024, K.F. had a history with
the juvenile justice system beginning in 2021 when he was 12 years old. In
August 2021, K.F. admitted to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and
the juvenile court adjudged him a ward of the court and assigned him to the
central supervision unit. In October 2021, he admitted to another second
degree robbery (ibid.) and was placed in an out-of-home placement. In
November 2021, he was placed with his grandmother as a resource family
approval (RFA) home. In December 2021, K.F. admitted to receiving a stolen
vehicle (id., § 496d, subd. (a)) and the court continued his out-of-home
placement order.
In January 2022, K.F. was placed at Promesa, a short term residential
therapeutic program (STRTP). There, he performed satisfactorily for one
month but, in late February 2022, he left school grounds after being found
with a vape pen on campus. He never returned and was deemed absent
without leave (AWOL), which was the day after his parents had visited. A
bench warrant was issued for his arrest. In April 2022, a subsequent petition
was filed alleging K.F. had committed five offenses. In May 2022, he
admitted to one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and the
juvenile court continued his placement order.
2We, like the parties, take the facts of K.F.’s wardship history and the
underlying offense from probation’s intake report and disposition report.
2
In August 2022, K.F. was placed at Boys Republic, an STRTP, where he
did not make a positive adjustment. He appeared nonreceptive to treatment
and was defiant, disrespectful, often under the influence, and refused to
attend school. He received weekly counseling regarding his negative
behaviors. He made a positive adjustment and was able to go on a trip to an
amusement park and he had an on-campus visit with his parents. His
positive behavior was short-lived and, as a final effort to encourage a change
in his behavior, he was placed on a behavioral contract. After he violated the
contract, a 14-day termination notice issued. In October 2022, he was
returned to the Alameda County Juvenile Justice Center (JJC) on a change of
placement.
In November 2022, K.F. was placed at Youth Homes, an STRTP in
Contra Costa County. He left after eight days and a warrant was issued for
his arrest. Shortly thereafter, in December 2022, he was arrested on
multiple counts of robbery. In March 2023, he admitted second degree
robbery.
In April 2023, K.F. was placed with his aunt in Stockton as an RFA
home. He performed well while on GPS. After about five weeks, K.F. left his
aunt’s home and did not return. His aunt reported that K.F.’s parents were
supposed to visit him in Stockton, but they did not show up. K.F. then asked
to visit them in Oakland and his aunt told him it was not a good idea. K.F.
left a few hours later. When K.F. did not return, his aunt reported that she
suspected he was at his mother’s house. She explained that K.F.’s parents
condoned his negative behavior and did not provide structure. Recently, K.F.
had become defiant when asked to do chores.
One month later, in June 2023, K.F. was arrested in San Leandro on
two charges. He admitted to assault with great bodily injury (Pen. Code,
3
§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). At the disposition hearing in August 2023, the juvenile
court gave him one more opportunity to live with his aunt as an RFA
placement. At this time, the probation officer discussed secure track with
K.F. and the importance of staying on the right path.
K.F. then returned to live with his aunt in Stockton. In early January
2024, K.F. again left his aunt’s home to go to Oakland. He returned the next
day and his aunt decided to give him another chance. The following day, he
again left her home without permission and then returned. A week later, in
mid-January 2024, K.F. left his aunt’s home without permission and a
warrant for his arrest was issued. He remained AWOL until he was arrested
for the underlying offense in February 2024. It appears that during this time
he was living with his parents.
B. Current Offense
On February 9, 2024, in Oakland, three Black males wearing ski masks
carjacked the owner of a green Honda CRV and took her Coach purse and
fled in the vehicle. Two days later, the victim here was carjacked in his
Toyota Camry. While he was sitting in his car in his parking garage, he was
approached by two Black males wearing masks, one of whom carried a gun.
They approached the victim’s car from either side, one of the males held a
gun to the window and, fearing for his life, the victim got out of his car,
leaving his belongings in it, including his phone. The suspects got into the
victim’s car and drove out of the parking garage. After the victim tracked his
car through his phone, a police officer found the car along with the victim’s
belongings, including a wallet and phone.
Dash camera footage from the victim’s vehicle showed that after the
carjacking, the victim’s Camry caravaned with a second vehicle, the green
Honda CRV from the earlier carjacking. After the Camry fled and then
4
parked at a different location where the officers found it, four suspects were
visible walking around the car. K.F. drove the green Honda CRV. He was
not one of the suspects who approached the victim in his car. When police
officers searched K.F.’s parents’ home in Oakland, they found, among other
things, a gun which had previously been reported stolen as well as the Coach
purse which had been stolen during the CRV carjacking.
In February 2024, a subsequent juvenile wardship petition (§ 602) was
filed alleging that K.F., then 14 years old, had committed five felonies: first
degree residential robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count one), first degree
residential burglary (id., § 459; count two), carjacking (id., § 215, subd. (a);
count three), receiving a stolen motor vehicle (id., § 496d, subd. (a); count
four), and possession of a firearm by a minor (id., § 29610; count five). The
petition also included a special allegation that the offenses in counts one
through three were committed while armed with a firearm (id., § 12022,
subd. (a)(1)).
In May 2024, K.F. admitted to an amended count of second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). The juvenile court dismissed the balance of the
petition at the People’s request.3 The parties agreed the offense made K.F.
eligible for secure track.
C. Probation Report
A probation report submitted in advance of the disposition hearing
recommended K.F. be committed to secure track. K.F. was assessed using
the youth level of service/case management inventory to measure his risk for
recidivism. His score of 27 placed him in the moderate risk category for
3 In their briefs, both K.F. and the People state that K.F. admitted the
firearm allegation. Our review of the record demonstrates that the parties’
recitation of this fact is inaccurate. K.F. did not admit to the firearm
allegation.
5
reoffending within the next year. His highest risk factors were
education/employment, offenses/dispositions, and attitudes/orientation.
K.F. reported to probation that he had a close relationship with his
parents but did not have a role model. While in custody he was participating
in therapy five times a week and trying to help his peers. Regarding the
offense, K.F. reported that he stayed in the car; he was not the one robbing
people, but he felt sad for the victim. He realized that his choices were
leading to the same outcomes. He did not want to go to secure track and
hoped the court would allow him to be placed in an STRTP followed by living
with his mother, or to be placed with his aunt. K.F. denied being in a gang,
but probation noted that his co-participants were gang-involved. The report
noted he was cooperative and remorseful.
K.F.’s mother reported that K.F. had suffered trauma from times when
his family had been homeless and he had been sexually abused at school as a
young child. His mother was open to family therapy. She explained that
when K.F. was sent to an STRTP in Los Angeles, he was too young and it was
too far away. She thought he was too young for secure track and wanted the
court to allow him to reside in her home.
K.F.’s aunt—his most recent RFA placement—reported that K.F. had
an unstable home life because both parents had drug issues. His parents
covered for him and encouraged negative behavior. When K.F. resided with
her, she held him accountable and enforced rules. His aunt believed an
STRTP would not work because K.F. was a master manipulator. She advised
that if K.F. was sent to a group home, his parents would pick him up like
they did when he was at the STRTP in Fresno.
In considering out-of-home placement, the screening committee
considered K.F.’s traumatic upbringing plagued by instability and neglect.
6
After a psychological evaluation was completed in 2021 it was recommended
that he take medication for ADHD, but K.F. refused at the time. The report
explained this was K.F.’s 19th referral with probation. He had been on
probation since 2021 and had been tried on formal probation, three different
STRTPs, and two RFA placements. He absconded from all his placements4
and continued committing new, serious offenses. While in custody, K.F.’s
behavior was poor. He was disrespectful and defiant towards staff. The
report stated K.F. had rejected all services offered by probation and had been
given ample opportunities to change his negative behavior. While he
expressed remorse towards the victims, he continued to commit serious
offenses and failed to realize the long-term trauma he was causing the
victims.
The report stated that K.F. was “not a good candidate for Camp
Sweeney based on his AWOL history.” The committee determined the most
suitable rehabilitative option was secure track. While at secure track, K.F.
would “be enrolled in school, participate in anger management, individual
therapy, mentorship program, and a new program called ‘Choices,’ to assist
with changing one’s behaviors.” To be successful, he needed to learn to make
the right choices and avoid associating with negative peers. The report
explained, “While at Secure Track, the minor can focus on obtaining his high
school diploma, therapeutic services to address past trauma, and participate
in a mentorship program. Secure Track also offers pro-social activities that
he can earn based on good behavior.” Because it was local, his family would
4 The probation report states that K.F. had “absconded from all his
placements.” However, based on K.F.’s wardship history summarized in the
probation report, K.F. had absconded from his two RFA placements and two
of the STRTPs. He was removed from the other STRTP after violating a
behavioral contract.
7
be able to support him. Also, “they can participate in family therapy to assist
once he completes his time at Secure Track.”
The probation report recommended a baseline term of two to three
years.
D. Other Submissions
K.F. submitted a disposition brief requesting a less restrictive
placement at an STRTP or Camp Sweeney. He argued, in pertinent part,
that a secure track commitment was inappropriate given his young age.
Additionally, he argued a less restrictive disposition could meet the goals of
both his rehabilitation and public safety. He explained that while he had a
prior AWOL history, he was very young the last time he was placed at
STRTPs. He argued camp could provide needed structure and therapy and
allow visits with his parents, which would mitigate AWOL concerns. If the
court placed him in secure track, K.F. requested the baseline term be set at
the lowest term of the range for his offense—two years—given his limited
participation in the crime and his age.
K.F.’s social worker, who had worked with him since 2022, submitted
an assessment. The social worker explained that from a young age K.F. had
faced significant traumatic events, including bouts of poverty, homelessness,
the loss of family and friends due to community violence, familial criminality,
medical trauma from his father’s stroke, and inconsistent parental care. He
had unsupervised time in the community and relationships with negative
peer groups, and he grew up trying to take care of himself. K.F. had
explained he started getting into trouble when he was 11 after his father’s
stroke.
The social worker advised that during the four months of K.F.’s
detention, he presented “positive development in his maturity.” There had
8
been an increase in meaningful conversations around his behavior, exhibiting
self-awareness, labeling and processing emotions, and managing conflict.
K.F. had made strides to implement coping strategies such as taking space
and engaging in physical activity to reduce stress and frustration. There
were instances during his current detention where he was able to manage his
emotions and disengage from situations which could have led to altercations.
His attitude towards talk therapy had changed significantly based on his
therapeutic work with the guidance clinic, and he stated that he would like to
continue therapy if he could talk to someone outside of JJC. His therapist
reported seeing a positive shift in K.F.’s mindset since he came into custody.
He was more future-oriented and reflective, presenting awareness and
insight regarding his actions.
The social worker reported that K.F. had originally expressed
ambivalence on engaging with programs in the unit, but he tried the
programming and had come to enjoy engaging with service providers, such as
Rite of Passage, Restorative Justice for Oakland Youth (RJOY), and the
Guidance Clinic. He was interested in continuing to engage with similar
programs, such as talk therapy and mentorship programming, outside of JJC.
K.F. also submitted support letters from two service providers—Rites of
Passage and RJOY. They explained that K.F. had been engaged in their
programs and they saw transformations in him, including his behavior and
his interactions with his peers and staff. The Rites of Passage consultant
stated K.F. demonstrated growth in his ability to communicate effectively
and handle challenging situations with maturity. The RJOY manager stated
K.F. understood the severity of his situation and took accountability for his
actions, and he was able to go deeper with his feelings and be vulnerable
about his life experiences. They believed K.F. had potential to continue
9
making positive strides and become a contributing member of the
community.
E. Disposition Hearing
The juvenile court held a disposition hearing in May 2024, shortly after
K.F. turned 15. The court explained it had considered probation’s disposition
report, K.F.’s disposition brief, the social worker’s assessment, and the two
support letters, and it took judicial notice of all prior findings, orders, and
judgments in the proceedings.
K.F.’s counsel requested a less restrictive alternative placement at
camp. She argued a less restrictive alternative was appropriate based on
K.F.’s young age, his minor involvement in the offense as a getaway driver or
a lookout, and letters in his support demonstrating he had made
improvements while he had been at JJC. She argued that while K.F. had an
AWOL history, he had been placed in the prior group homes when he was
young and he was now more mature and would be less likely to leave. The
prosecutor recommended secure track. He acknowledged that K.F. had
experienced significant trauma in his life and was “a victim himself.” But he
argued K.F. needed a higher degree of treatment because the current offense
was serious; it was his 19th referral to probation and 13th wardship petition
before he was 16 years old; less restrictive measures had been tried and
failed—he was placed at three different STRTPs and two RFAs and he
AWOL’d from all of them;5 and while in custody K.F. had been disrespectful
and defiant. The prosecutor agreed to the two-year baseline term requested
by K.F.
K.F.’s aunt and grandmother asserted he needed therapy. The juvenile
court agreed explaining, “[T]he question for me is what environment should
5 See footnote 4, ante.
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that therapy take place in. [¶] Camp is not a locked facility and he just has
not earned it with this Court for me to believe that he wouldn’t walk. If
things got hard, he would walk. And there’s nothing in this record or in his
history . . . that would indicate to me that when things got hard, [he] wouldn’t
take off.” The court explained it needed to “stabilize” the situation and
provide “structure.” The court stated that K.F. could earn his way to camp as
a “stepdown.”
For the purpose of disposition, the juvenile court stated it had
“considered a number of factors, including the severity of the offense,
including the youth’s role in the offense, the youth’s behavior, and the harm
done to the victims, the youth’s previous delinquent history, including the
adequacy and success of previous attempts by the [j]uvenile [c]ourt to
rehabilitate the youth; whether the programming, treatment, and education
offered and provided in a secure youth treatment facility is appropriate to
meet the treatment and secure needs of the youth; whether the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning the youth to an
alternative, less[ ]restrictive disposition available to the Court.” The court
also considered, among other things, K.F.’s age, developmental maturity, and
any special needs affecting the safety or suitability of committing him to an
SYTF. The court found that a less restrictive disposition was unsuitable and
it committed K.F. to secure track.
The permissible range for the baseline term of confinement was two to
four years. The juvenile court stated it had considered the criteria set forth
in California Rules of Court,6 rule 5.806(b), which criteria, and accompanying
factors, it listed out. The court set the baseline term at three years.
6 Further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
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II. DISCUSSION
K.F. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing
him to secure track because there is no substantial evidence demonstrating
the commitment’s probable benefit nor that a less restrictive, alternative
disposition was unsuitable. Additionally, he argues the court abused its
discretion in setting a three-year baseline term of confinement.
A. Commitment to Secure Track
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Juvenile law provides that removal may be necessary for a minor’s
“welfare or for the safety and protection of the public.” (§ 202, subd. (a).)
Delinquent minors “shall, in conformity with the interests of public safety
and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with
their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is
appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment
that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter.” (Id.,
subd. (b).)
Until recently, the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was “the state’s
most restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders.” (In re
Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 902 (Miguel C.).) In 2020, the
Legislature passed juvenile justice realignment through Senate Bill No. 823
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 337), which required the closure of
DJJ and the transfer of its responsibilities to counties (§ 736.5, subds. (a),
(e)). The stated purpose of these changes is “ ‘[t]o ensure that justice-involved
youth are closer to their families and communities and receive age-
appropriate treatment.’ ” (Miguel C., at p. 907.) While these changes do not
change section 202, “which recognizes punishment as a potential
rehabilitative tool, the new scheme implicitly places less weight on
12
punishment by prioritizing treatment and restricting commitment avenues.”
(Miguel C., at p. 907.)
“Section 875 . . . governs the commitment of juvenile wards to the
[SYTFs] that have replaced the [DJJ] as the most restrictive placement
alternative.” (In re Tony R. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 395, 406.) The statute
authorizes SYTF placement only if, among other findings, “[t]he court has
made a finding on the record that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for
the ward is unsuitable.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3).) In making this determination,
the court must consider “all relevant and material evidence, including the
recommendations of counsel, the probation department, and any other agency
or individual designated by the court to advise on the appropriate disposition
of the case.” (Ibid.) Additionally, the court must make its determination
based on all of the following criteria: “(A) The severity of the offense or
offenses for which the ward has been most recently adjudicated, including the
ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and harm done to victims. [¶]
(B) The ward’s previous delinquent history, including the adequacy and
success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward.
[¶] (C) Whether the programming, treatment, and education offered and
provided in a secure youth treatment facility is appropriate to meet the
treatment and security needs of the ward. [¶] (D) Whether the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning the ward to an
alternative, less restrictive disposition that is available to the court.
[¶] (E) The ward’s age, developmental maturity, mental and emotional
health, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and any
disabilities or special needs affecting the safety or suitability of committing
the ward to a term of confinement in a secure youth treatment facility.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(3)(A)–(E).) A decision to commit a minor must be supported by
13
evidence of probable benefit to the minor, as well as evidence that less
restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. (In re Carlos J.
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, 6 (Carlos J.) [evidence of probable benefit is required
by §§ 734 & 202]; see §§ 202, subd. (b), 734.)7
We review a juvenile court’s placement decision for abuse of discretion.
(Miguel C., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 908.) An abuse of discretion occurs
when the court’s factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the
evidence. (Ibid.) The appellate court therefore considers whether substantial
evidence—meaning evidence reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value—supports the juvenile court’s commitment order in light of the purpose
of the juvenile court law. (Ibid.; see § 202, subd. (b) [a minor “in need of
protective services shall receive care, treatment, and guidance consistent
7 The People argue Carlos J. does not apply because “it pertains to a
DJJ commitment, not a commitment to a [SYTF] pursuant to section 875.”
Specifically, the People take issue with the fact that the “probable benefit”
language of section 734 is absent from section 875. We find this to be a
distinction without a real difference. “Evidence of probable benefit is
required not only by section 734, but also by the language of section 202,
subdivision (b) mandating that delinquent minors ‘receive care, treatment,
and guidance that is consistent with their best interest . . . and that is
appropriate for their circumstances.’ ” (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at
p. 6; see § 202, subd. (b).) In essence, the “probable benefit” standard of
section 734 was derived from section 202. Although wards are no longer
committed to DJJ (see § 736.5, subd. (b)), section 875 still requires that the
court consider as one of five criteria “[w]hether the programming, treatment,
and education offered and provided in a[n] [SYTF] is appropriate to meet the
treatment . . . needs of the ward.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(C).) Therefore, the
juvenile justice realignment did not alter section 202 or abandon its general
purposes and standards when section 875 was enacted. While Carlos J. can
be distinguished from our case for other reasons, as stated below, we agree
with K.F. on this point that Carlos J., and cases alike, that analyzed the
probable benefit of a commitment to DJJ, remain applicable in determining
the appropriateness of SYTF commitments.
14
with their best interest and the best interest of the public”].) We must
indulge all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court’s decision. (In
re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1080.)
2. Probable Benefit
K.F. first argues that there is no substantial evidence supporting a
finding that committing him to secure track would benefit him. Specifically,
he contends there is insufficient evidence that the programming and
treatment at secure track meet his needs. (See § 875, subd. (a)(3)(C) [court
must consider “[w]hether the programming, treatment, and education offered
and provided in a[n] [SYTF] is appropriate to meet the treatment and
security needs of the ward”].)
We conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports a finding
that the programming and treatment at secure track is appropriate to meet
K.F.’s treatment and security needs. The juvenile court reviewed probation’s
disposition report. The report acknowledged K.F.’s age,8 ADHD diagnosis,
history of trauma, and limited schooling. The report explained, “While at
Secure Track [K.F.] will be enrolled in school, participate in anger
management, individual therapy, mentorship program, and a new program
called ‘Choices,’ to assist with changing one’s behaviors.” Probation reasoned
that secure track was “the most suitable rehabilitative option” because K.F.
“need[ed] to learn to make the right choices and avoid associating with
negative peers in order to be successful. While at Secure Track, [K.F.] can
focus on obtaining his high school diploma, therapeutic services to address
past trauma, and participate in a mentorship program. Secure Track also
offers pro-social activities that he can earn based on good behavior.”
8 A juvenile court may only commit a minor to an SYTF if they are 14
years old or older. (§ 875, subd. (a).)
15
Therefore, the disposition report identified programs and treatment at
secure track which would be appropriate to meet K.F.’s needs, including
building mentorships, having positive influences in his life, addressing his
need to catch up on high school credits, and participating in individual
therapy. As the court stated, it had considered “whether the programming,
treatment, and education offered and provided in a[n] [SYTF] is appropriate
to meet the treatment and secure needs of the youth” and it considered K.F.’s
age.
Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th 1, relied on by K.F., is easily
distinguishable because in that case, there was “no specific information in the
record regarding the programs” in the most restrictive placement (id. at p. 4,
italics added). Moreover, K.F. provided no evidence to dispute the
availability or efficacy of the secure track programs. (See id. at p. 13.) In
fact, the social worker’s assessment and service providers’ support letters
demonstrate that K.F. had, in fact, benefitted from the programs and
treatment he participated in while he had been detained in JJC prior to the
disposition hearing.
K.F. also argues that committing him to secure track will likely harm
him. We reject his contention.
K.F. argues that, at 15 years old, he is young for SYTF commitment
and, given his age, “there is a high probability that [he] will suffer verbal and
physical aggression at the secure track that will traumatize him and
exacerbate his current behavioral issues.” But he cites no evidence in the
record supporting his assertion. By the plain language of the statute, a
juvenile court may commit a minor who is at least 14 years old to an SYTF.
(§ 875, subd. (a).) Merely observing that K.F. is on the younger side of the
allowed age range for SYTF commitment is insufficient, by itself, to
16
demonstrate harm. K.F. also argues that his mother stressed to the court at
the disposition hearing that in secure track he would be placed with the peers
with whom he was getting in trouble. The record demonstrates, though, that
the court considered his mother’s concerns and explained that “[t]hose kids
are at camp too.” K.F. has not, therefore, identified evidence in the record
that placement in secure track will be harmful.
K.F.’s citation to articles and reports alleging the general dangers and
disadvantages of incarceration for youth fares no better. To the extent this
evidence was not before the court, we decline to consider it. (Carlos J., supra,
22 Cal.App.5th at p. 13, fn. 8.) In any event, the disadvantages associated
with incarceration for youth are precisely why section 875 was drafted to
require consideration of various factors and an express finding that a less
restrictive, alternative placement was not suitable prior to any such
commitment. (See Miguel C., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 907 [goal of juvenile
court law has shifted recently “toward primarily rehabilitative aims, with the
Legislature in 2020 overhauling the juvenile court law through ‘juvenile
justice realignment’ ”]; Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1(a) [“[j]ustice-system involved
youth who remain in their communities have lower recidivism rates and are
more prepared for their transition back into the community”].) Commitment
to an SYTF, however, remains within the court’s discretion if it finds that a
less restrictive, alternative disposition is unsuitable. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3).)
3. Less Restrictive Alternatives
Next, K.F. argues there was no substantial evidence demonstrating
that less restrictive alternatives—specifically camp—were inappropriate.
The juvenile court could place K.F. in secure track only if it found “that
a less restrictive, alternative disposition” was “unsuitable.” (§ 875,
subd. (a)(3).) In making this determination, the court was required to
17
consider the five criteria set forth in section 875, subdivision (a)(3)(A)–(E). At
the disposition hearing, the court acknowledged its duty to consider a less
restrictive alternative and expressly considered a placement at camp. The
court clearly indicated it had considered all the criteria set forth in section
875, subdivision (a)(3), including the severity of the offense, including the
youth’s role in it; K.F.’s previous delinquent history, including the adequacy
and success of previous attempts to rehabilitate him; whether the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety could be met by assigning him to an
alternative, less restrictive disposition; and his age and developmental
maturity. The court had read the probation report and recommendation, as
well as the social worker’s assessment and letters of support.
K.F. acknowledges that his previous delinquent history, including the
adequacy and success of previous attempts at rehabilitation (§ 875,
subd. (a)(3)(B)), weighs in favor of the juvenile court’s decision. The record
demonstrates that for more than two years before K.F. committed the
underlying offense, the juvenile court attempted less restrictive placements,
which had failed. He was put on formal probation and placed at two RFAs
and three STRTPs. He went AWOL from both RFAs and two of the three
STRTPs. He was removed from the other STRTP after violating a behavioral
contract. When he absconded from these placements, he continued to commit
offenses. The disposition report stated that K.F. was “not a good candidate
for Camp Sweeney based on his AWOL history.” Probation, the social
worker, K.F.’s family, and the court agreed K.F. would benefit from therapy.
He also needed mentorship and schooling. Because he had not previously
been in a secure facility, and therefore was able to leave, any attempts to
treat these needs were unsuccessful. Therefore, evidence supports the court’s
finding that a less restrictive alternative was unsuitable, including because
18
“[c]amp [was] not a locked facility” and “nothing in this record or in [K.F.’s]
history” demonstrated that “when things got hard, [he] wouldn’t take off.”
K.F. argues the court could not rely entirely on his history of AWOLing
from placements to justify his commitment to secure track. Instead, he
argues that the other criteria weigh in favor of being placed at a less
restrictive setting. We disagree. Evidence in the record demonstrates that
the programming, treatment, and education offered in secure track is
appropriate to meet K.F.’s treatment and security needs, as discussed ante.
(See § 875, subd. (a)(3)(C).)
K.F. contends that the goals of rehabilitation and community safety
could be met by assigning him to an alternative, less restrictive setting. (See
§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(D).) He acknowledges the record demonstrates that during
his three months in custody prior to the disposition hearing he had
participated in programming at JJC and made progress. This weighs in favor
of a secure track commitment, as previous rehabilitation efforts at open
placements had failed and K.F. only began to make progress while in custody.
K.F. does not point to any evidence in the record showing similar potential for
rehabilitation at an open setting such as camp.
K.F. also argues the severity of the offense, including his role in it, does
not warrant placement in secure track because second degree robbery is not
severe compared to a violent offense and because he merely drove a getaway
car. (See § 875, subd. (a)(3)(A).) The juvenile court considered this criterion
and explained that a violation of Penal Code section 211 was “a serious and
violent offense.” Moreover, even if this criterion weighed against a secure
track commitment, there is no demonstration that it should be weighed more
heavily than any other criteria. Finally, the juvenile court considered K.F.’s
19
age and developmental maturity (see § 875, subd. (a)(3)(E)) and had
reviewed, among other things, the social worker’s assessment.
Essentially, K.F. asserts that the juvenile court relied “entirely” on his
delinquent history—specifically his history of AWOLing from placements
(§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(B))—and he contends that the finding of unsuitability
should not be based on this criterion alone. But again, the record here
reflects the court considered all relevant and material evidence presented and
all criteria set out in section 875. Section 875 does not require the court to
assign weight to any of the criterion in a specific manner; it only requires
that the court consider all the criteria in making its determination. (§ 875,
subd. (a)(3).) Thus, we reject K.F.’s suggestion that the court failed to
consider all the criteria, misweighed the criteria, or should have weighed
them differently. In conducting a review for substantial evidence, we do not
reweigh the evidence. Further, even “if the evidence is such that rational
people could reach conflicting conclusions, there is by definition substantial
evidence to support the [decision].” (People v. Riley (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th
1152, 1166; see In re Reynaldo R. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 250, 256 [commitment
was not an abuse of discretion even though minor’s record justified a less
restrictive disposition].)
In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s finding that there was no suitable alternative that was less restrictive
than secure track. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s commitment decision.
B. Baseline Term
K.F. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by setting the
baseline term of confinement at three years.
20
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
When a juvenile court commits a minor to an SYTF, the court must set
a baseline term of confinement. (In re Jose R. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 839,
846; § 875, subd. (b)(1).) The baseline term “is based on the most serious
recent offense for which the ward has been adjudicated” and “represent[s] the
time in custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment needs of
the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge.” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1); see
rule 5.806(b).) The baseline term must fall within the range set forth in
rule 5.806(d). (§ 875, subds. (b)(1), (h).) For robbery, the range is two to four
years. (Rule 5.806(d).)
Rule 5.806 lists four general criteria that juvenile courts must consider
in selecting a baseline term “based on the individual facts and circumstances
of the case . . . that is no longer than necessary to meet the developmental
needs of the youth and to prepare the youth for discharge to a period of
probation supervision in the community.” (Rule 5.806(b).) These criteria are:
(1) the circumstances and gravity of the commitment offense; (2) the youth’s
prior history in the juvenile justice system; (3) the confinement time
considered reasonable and necessary to achieve the rehabilitation of the
youth; and (4) the youth’s developmental history. (Rule 5.806(b)(1)–(4).)
Rule 5.806 also contains a nonexclusive list of relevant factors to be weighed
when evaluating each criterion. (Ibid.) Under the rule, a court must “state
on the record its reasons for selecting a particular term, referencing each of
the criteria and any factors the court deemed relevant.” (Rule 5.806(b).)
The Advisory Committee comment to rule 5.806 explains that a
juvenile court should consider three primary goals as objectives when setting
a baseline term: “positive youth development, public and community safety,
and the establishment of flexible and fair commitment terms.” (Advisory
21
Com. com., rule 5.806.) The “persistent focus” is the “end goal of successful
reentry into the community.” (Ibid.) “The flexibility inherent in the matrix is
intended to result in a baseline term of commitment that is no longer than
necessary to protect the public but is of sufficient length to assure the victim
and the community that the harm committed can be redressed by the
juvenile justice system in a developmentally appropriate manner.” (Ibid.)
The comment explains that setting a baseline term requires an
“individualized approach” which must be “based on the needs of the
individual being committed.” (Ibid.)
We review the juvenile court’s commitment decision for abuse of
discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile
court’s decision. (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.)
“ ‘ “[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason,
all of the circumstances being considered.” ’ ” (In re Oscar A. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) “ ‘A [juvenile] court [also] abuses its discretion
when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the
evidence.’ ” (In re Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.)
2. Analysis
As a threshold matter, the People argue that K.F. forfeited his
challenge to the baseline term. We agree as to one of K.F.’s arguments. He
first argues that the juvenile court “failed to specifically apply the factors set
forth in rule 5.806” to his individual facts and circumstances. He contends
the court “did not cite to any single or multiple factors or facts” affecting its
determination in setting the baseline term, and thus the court did not
properly apply the rule 5.806 factors. K.F. forfeited this contention by failing
to object at the disposition hearing.
22
The forfeiture rule applies to claims raised for the first time on appeal
“involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its
discretionary sentencing choices.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.)
K.F.’s challenge falls squarely within the categories of appellate challenges
Scott says must first be objected to in the lower court: the “stated reasons
allegedly do not apply to the particular case” or the court erred because it
“misweighed the various factors” or “failed to state any reasons or give a
sufficient number of valid reasons.” (Ibid.) Assuming for argument that the
juvenile court did, in fact, fail to specifically apply the rule 5.806 criteria to
K.F.’s facts and circumstances, a timely objection would have permitted the
court to fix any asserted error. That K.F. had clearly requested the court set
a two-year baseline term and the court disagreed with his request does not
save his challenge. An objection does not merely allow the court to change
the result; it may, instead, permit the judge to clarify his or her reasoning in
making a decision. (See Scott, at p. 351.)
K.F. makes an additional challenge, though, to the baseline term,
arguing that substantial evidence does not support the finding that the
baseline term should be three years. He contends that instead, considering
the rule 5.806 criteria, the baseline term should be two years. The People
acknowledge that K.F. makes this argument and they do not contend that his
claim is forfeited. We therefore address K.F.’s substantial evidence
challenge.
We conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in setting the
baseline term at three years because the decision is not supported by
substantial evidence. Probation’s disposition report recommended a baseline
of two-to-three years. The report did not analyze the rule 5.806(b) criteria.
In his disposition brief and at the hearing, K.F. requested a two-year baseline
23
term given his age and limited participation in the crime. The prosecutor
agreed to K.F.’s request for two years based on his age and mitigating
circumstances. The court listed out the four criteria set forth in rule 5.806(b),
and for each criterion it listed out the factors that may be considered as
stated in the rule. The court stated it had considered these criteria and
accompanying factors, however it did not discuss any specifics related to K.F.,
his delinquent history, or the underlying offense. Despite the prosecutor’s
agreement to a two-year baseline term, the court set the baseline term at
three years. This was an abuse of discretion.
K.F.’s involvement in the offense was limited. His co-participants
walked up to the victim’s car, stood on either side of it, pointed a gun at the
victim, and entered the car after the victim got out. K.F. drove a separate
vehicle which served as a getaway car for one of the assailants and which
caravaned with the stolen vehicle. While we do not discount the seriousness
of an armed carjacking nor any trauma inflicted on the victim, K.F. did not
approach the victim or his vehicle and the victim was not physically harmed.
(See rule 5.806(b)(1).)
K.F. had a lengthy history in the juvenile justice system and had been
placed out of his home multiple times. Prior rehabilitation efforts were
unsuccessful. However, K.F.’s upbringing, family issues, and childhood
trauma played a large role in his delinquent history. (See rule 5.806(b)(2),
(4)(D).) Further, K.F. was only 14 years old at the time of the offense and
had just turned 15 at the time of the disposition order. (See rule
5.806(b)(4)(A).)
No evidence was presented to the juvenile court estimating the
reasonable length of time necessary to rehabilitate K.F. That is, in neither
the disposition report nor elsewhere in the record was it recommended that
24
three years was necessary. In the mere three months that K.F. had been in
custody at JJC prior to the disposition hearing, he had already made
progress, which he acknowledges in his opening brief. The record
demonstrates that when provided suitable treatment and programs—
including therapy, mentorship, and education—in a structured, secure
environment, it was reasonably likely he could be prepared for discharge at
the lower baseline term. Additionally, the record shows that once released
from commitment there were programs in the community to assist K.F. with
continuing his progress. (See rule 5.806(b)(3)(E).)
We cannot find substantial evidence in the record to support a
conclusion that a three-year baseline term of confinement is “no longer than
necessary to meet the developmental needs of the youth and to prepare the
youth for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the community.”9
(Rule 5.806(b); § 875, subd. (b)(1).) The juvenile court’s decision was
arbitrary and lacking in factual support and, therefore, the court abused its
discretion in setting the baseline term.
III. DISPOSITION
The disposition order is reversed insofar as it set the baseline term of
confinement at three years. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court
and the court is directed to issue a new order setting the baseline term at two
years. In all other respects, the disposition order is affirmed.
9 We observe that while the People contend the juvenile court properly
considered the rule 5.806 criteria, they set forth no argument for what
substantial evidence supports the three-year baseline term.
25
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Banke, J.
A170960, In re K.F.
26
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