Doe v. Johnson CA4/3

CourtListener 10648093Calctapp05.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/5/25 Doe v. Johnson CA4/3

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JANE DOE, G063220

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-
01270433)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
BRENNA JOHNSON et al., OPINION, DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING,
Defendants and Respondents. AND DENYING REQUEST
FOR PUBLICATION; NO
CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

This court hereby orders that the opinion filed on July 7, 2025, be
modified as follows:
1. On page 15, first complete paragraph, delete last complete
sentence, and replace with the following sentence: “Plaintiff
has not shown this finding was erroneous, and disclosing
information based on personal observation is not illegal.”
2. On page 15, first complete paragraph, add the following
footnote to the end of the above added sentence:
Plaintiff argues the employees combined
information from the report and information obtained
from the mother. But plaintiff did not attempt to
identify which information came solely from the
report, if any. She has not met her burden of
demonstrating illegal conduct. (Zucchet v. Galardi,
supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1479; Cahill v. San
Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at
p. 956.)
3. On page 20, first incomplete paragraph, last
sentence, add the following footnote:
In her petition for rehearing, plaintiff
argues she alleged tort and constitutional privacy
claims. She contends her constitutional privacy claim
is more similar to equitable claims than tort claims
and, as such, is not barred by the litigation privilege.
But plaintiff did not make this argument in her briefs
or during the hearing. She only argued the litigation
privilege did not apply to injunctive relief generally.
She never distinguished between her privacy claims,
let alone argue that her constitutional privacy claim
was distinct from her tort privacy claim for purposes
of the litigation privilege. Nor did she argue that a
constitutional privacy claim is similar to an equitable
claim. “Arguments cannot be raised for the first time
in a petition for rehearing.” (Pacific Bell Wireless,
LLC v. Public Utilities Com. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th
718, 746.) Thus, we do not consider this argument.

The petition for rehearing is DENIED.

2
The request for publication is DENIED.
These modifications do not change the judgment.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

DELANEY, J.

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Filed 7/7/25 Doe v. Johnson CA4/3 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G063220

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-
01270433)
BRENNA JOHNSON et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Walter P. Schwarm, Judge. Affirmed.
Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono,
Matthew C. Slentz and Julia W. Cohene for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bordin Semmer and Andrei V. Serpik for Defendants and
Respondents.
* * *
This is an atypical anti-SLAPP motion.1 Over a decade ago,
plaintiff Jane Doe (plaintiff) was the victim of child abuse perpetrated by her
mother (the mother) and the mother’s boyfriend (the incident). Orange
County Social Services Agency investigated the incident and prepared an
accompanying report (the report). After the incident, several employees (the
employees) of a company owned by the mother filed employment lawsuits
against her (the employee lawsuits). Among other things, the employees
alleged harassment claims against the mother, claiming she had forced them
into discussions about the incident while they were employed.
Plaintiff learned about the employee lawsuits against the mother
years after they were filed. She also discovered that confidential information
about her and the incident had been alleged in the employees’ complaints,
that the report had been produced in discovery, and that details about the
incident had been raised in depositions. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit
against the employees and their attorneys (the attorney defendants) for
violating her privacy. In response, the attorney defendants filed an anti-
SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP
statute), which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appeals this ruling.
While we sympathize with plaintiff for having her private details
disclosed in the employee lawsuits, we find no error in the trial court’s order.
The attorney defendants’ conduct was performed in connection with a judicial
proceeding and was protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. While plaintiff
argues their conduct was illegal and unprotected (see Flatley v. Mauro (2006)
39 Cal.4th 299, 305 (Flatley)), she has not conclusively shown they engaged

1 SLAPP stands for “‘strategic lawsuits against public

participation.’” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 85.)

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in any criminal conduct as a matter of law. As to the merits of her lawsuit,
plaintiff has not shown any error in the court’s finding that her claims are
barred by the litigation privilege.
For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order granting
attorney defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. But our ruling does not mean we
find attorney defendants blameless. We remind them to take measures to
protect plaintiff’s confidentiality in the employee lawsuits, some of which are
still ongoing. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(4) [right of crime victims
to prevent disclosure of confidential information that could be used to locate
or harass them]; Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1422-
1423 [private information of a third party may be disclosed after giving the
third party a chance to object]; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 621, 635-636 [litigants may object to discovery based on the
privacy rights of third parties].) We also remind them of the confidentiality
concerns surrounding juvenile records like the report. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 827.)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The incident occurred about 15 years ago. The mother and her
boyfriend were arrested and charged with various felony offenses.2 Orange
County Social Services Agency investigated the incident and filed a juvenile
dependency petition concerning plaintiff. It also prepared the report, which
summarized its investigation and contained private details about plaintiff
and the incident. Plaintiff’s claims in this lawsuit arise from the alleged theft

2 The mother was later convicted of a felony, but it is unclear

what happened with her boyfriend’s case.

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of the report and the purported dissemination of its information by the
employees and attorney defendants.
The mother co-owned a company (the company). Years after the
incident, several of the company’s former employees (defined above as the
employees)–R.D., K.I., P.G., and L.A.–filed three separate lawsuits against
the mother and the company (defined above as the employee lawsuits). R.D.
filed suit in 2014 (the 2014 lawsuit), K.I. filed in 2019 (the 2019 lawsuit), and
P.G. and L.A. filed their case in 2020 (the 2020 lawsuit). The 2019 and 2020
lawsuits were still pending when the trial court heard the underlying anti-
SLAPP motion. It is unclear how the 2014 lawsuit was resolved.
R.D. was represented in the 2014 lawsuit by defendants Brenna
Johnson and her law firm, defendant Johnson Employment Law (collectively,
Johnson). The other employees are also represented by Johnson in the 2019
and 2020 lawsuits. Defendant Virginia Ksadzhikyan, who is employed by
defendant B/B Law Group LLP (collectively, Ksadzhikyan), represents P.G.
and K.I and is co-counsel with Johnson in the 2019 and 2020 lawsuits.
In the employee lawsuits, the complaints filed by the employees
(the employee complaints) all alleged various torts against the mother and
the company, including harassment-based causes of action. Of relevance here,
the employee complaints all alleged the mother discussed details about the
incident and her resulting criminal case at work. In describing these
statements, the employee complaints contained graphic allegations about the
incident and identified the victim as “[the mother’s] daughter” (they did not
disclose plaintiff’s name).
In August 2021, when plaintiff was no longer a minor, she
learned about the employee lawsuits and the allegations about her in the
employee complaints. She then filed this lawsuit against Johnson and

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Ksadzhikyan (defined above as the attorney defendants), the employees, and
several witnesses who had been deposed during the employee lawsuits.
Plaintiff alleged that R.D. and P.G. had stolen a copy of the
report from a briefcase at the company’s office in 2013, while they were still
employees. They allegedly read the report, discussed it with others, and gave
copies of it to other employees and Johnson. Plaintiff claimed the attorney
defendants had misused the report in three different ways during the
employee lawsuits. First, during the 2014 lawsuit, Johnson produced copies
of the stolen report in discovery. Second, the attorney defendants included
private details from the report in the employee complaints filed in the 2019
and 2020 lawsuits. Third, the attorney defendants asked questions
concerning the report during depositions in the 2019 lawsuit.
Based on the above allegations, plaintiff set forth claims against
the attorney defendants for (1) invasion of privacy under the California
Constitution, (2) intrusion on private facts, (3) public disclosure of private
facts, (4) conspiracy to commit publication of private facts, (5) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and (6) abuse of process. Plaintiff sought
damages on all claims and injunctive relief as to her claims for constitutional
invasion of privacy and public disclosure of private fact.
The attorney defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion in response
(the anti-SLAPP motion). They argued their alleged conduct was protected by
the anti-SLAPP statute because it involved statements or writings made in
connection with a judicial proceeding. They also asserted plaintiff’s claims
were all barred by the litigation privilege and, therefore, she could not show a
probability of prevailing on the merits.
Plaintiff’s opposition contended the anti-SLAPP statute did not
apply because the attorney defendants’ disclosure of her private information

5
was illegal as a matter of law. (See Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 305.)
Primarily, she argued the attorney defendants had violated Welfare and
Institutions Code section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(Q) by not following its
prescribed procedures before disclosing information from the report.
However, she also asserted in passing that the attorney defendants had
violated Penal Code sections 496 (receipt of stolen property) and 11167.5
(confidentiality of certain juvenile reports).3 Plaintiff likewise argued that the
litigation privilege did not “shield [attorney defendants] from liability from
obtaining, reading, and disseminating the [report], and the information in the
[report] without following the specific procedures in [Welfare and Institutions
Code] § 827.”
The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. It found attorney
defendants’ alleged conduct was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP
statute. As to plaintiff’s illegality argument, the court found the evidence was
inconclusive as to whether attorney defendants had engaged in illegal
conduct as a matter of law. For Ksadzhikyan, “the evidence [did] not support
that [she] possessed the [report].” For Johnson, the evidence did not show she
had disseminated the report’s contents. Rather, the statements at issue
“pertain[ed] to a plaintiff’s or a witness’ personal observations of [the
mother’s] statements or conduct.” Although the subject matter of these
statements “may have overlapped with the subject matter of the [report], the
[employee] Complaints allege that [the mother] was the alleged source of the
subject matter described in those [employee] Complaints.” Further, as to the
deposition statements, the court noted that the attorney defendants “did not

3 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.

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ask questions relating to the [report].” Rather, it was the company’s and the
mother’s attorneys that “conducted questioning about the [report].”
The trial court then explained, “[a]lleging statements from a
source other than the [report] in the context of complaints relating to a
hostile work environment is not illegal. Participating in depositions
pertaining to the statements and conduct occurring in the workplace is not
illegal.” Moreover, “the evidence [was] inconclusive as to whether [Johnson]
knew that the [report] was stolen as alleged in [plaintiff’s] Complaint.”
Next, the court found plaintiff had not established a probability
of prevailing on the merits. It concluded her claims were barred by the
litigation privilege because the alleged conduct involved communications
made in the course of judicial proceedings.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court’s order granting the
anti-SLAPP motion is erroneous for three reasons. First, the anti-SLAPP
statute does not apply because the attorney defendants’ conduct was illegal
under section 11167.5 of the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act
(CANRA). Second, even if the anti-SLAPP statute protects attorney
defendants’ conduct, the litigation privilege does not apply to violations of
section 11167.5. Third, the litigation privilege does not apply to claims
seeking injunctive relief. We are not persuaded by any of these arguments.4

4 Plaintiff’s complaint asserted claims against Joshua Silverman,

a former employee of the company. Silverman filed a separate anti-SLAPP
motion that the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed the order granting
Silverman’s motion. She later moved to dismiss this appeal, which we
granted. Since this portion of plaintiff’s appeal has been dismissed, we do not
discuss Silverman’s anti-SLAPP motion or plaintiff’s request to augment the
record to allow its inclusion.

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DISCUSSION
I.
THE PENDING MOTIONS

Before discussing the merits of this case, we first address
plaintiff’s outstanding motions and requests for judicial notice. Plaintiff seeks
judicial notice of certain documents that were not included in the clerk’s
transcript (the extra-record documents) but relate to her claims: (1) a
declaration the mother’s counsel filed in the 2019 lawsuit that includes a copy
of the report (there are no copies of the report in the current record), and
(2) unredacted excerpts from the employee complaints that contain
allegations concerning plaintiff (the record only contains redacted copies of
these documents). Plaintiff also moved to augment the record with the extra-
record documents.
As to the motion to augment, “‘[a]ugmentation does not function
to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court.
[Citations.] . . . Rather, normally “when reviewing the correctness of a trial
court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were
part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.”’” (Lewis v. YouTube,
LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 123.) Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown
the extra-record documents were before the trial court, so we deny the motion
to augment. (See ibid.) Instead, we will take judicial notice of these
documents. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda
(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1380.)
Plaintiff’s remaining motions seek to seal unredacted copies of
(1) her opening and reply briefs, (2) the extra-record documents, and (3) her
motions to seal. Attorney defendants likewise moved to file an unredacted
copy of their respondent’s brief under seal. We grant all these motions. The

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relevant documents meet the criteria set forth in California Rules of Court,
rules 8.46 and 2.550(d). Specifically, these documents contain sensitive
details concerning the incident. Plaintiff has a privacy interest in these
documents that outweighs the public’s right to access them, and this privacy
interest will be overridden if these documents are not sealed. Since redacted
copies of these documents have been publicly filed, the proposed sealing is
narrowly tailored, and there are no less restrictive means to protect plaintiff’s
privacy rights. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).)
At the end of this appeal when the remittitur has been issued, all
parties to the appeal and their attorneys are ordered to destroy or return to
plaintiff’s counsel any copies of the sealed documents in their possession.
II.
THE ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
A. Background Law
“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern.” (Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive
Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769, 783.)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are reviewed through a two-step process.
‘First, the court must determine “whether the defendant has made a
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action” arises from an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public
issue. [Citation.] Second, the court must “determine whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” [Citation.] If the
defendant makes a threshold showing that the cause of action arises from an
act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a
public issue and the plaintiff fails to demonstrate a probability of prevailing,

9
then the court must strike the cause of action.’” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health
System (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 288, 298.)
Orders granting or denying anti-SLAPP motions are reviewed de
novo. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 325-326.) “‘We consider “the pleadings,
and supporting and opposing affidavits . . . upon which the liability or defense
is based.” [Citation.] However, we neither “weigh credibility [nor] compare
the weight of the evidence. Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable
to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to
determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of
law.”’” (Id. at p. 326.) In our review, we presume the trial court’s order is
correct, and plaintiff has the burden of affirmatively showing error. (Billauer
v. Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 969.)
B. First Prong—Protected Activity
Plaintiff does not contest the trial court’s finding that her claims
against attorney defendants are based on communicative conduct made in
the course of litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1) & (e)(2); JSJ
Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1521 [filing a
complaint is protected activity].) Rather, she argues the anti-SLAPP statute
does not apply because attorney defendants engaged in illegal conduct.
The anti-SLAPP statute “cannot be invoked by a defendant
whose assertedly protected activity is illegal as a matter of law and, for that
reason, not protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and
petition.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 317.) This exception only applies to
criminal conduct. (Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 54–55.) And
the criminal conduct must be either conceded by the defendant or conclusively
established. (Zucchet v. Galardi (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1478–1479.)
“Our Supreme Court has emphasized that the exception for illegal activity is

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very narrow and applies only in undisputed cases of illegality.” (Id. at p. 1478,
italics added.) Plaintiff has not met this high burden.
1. Section 11167.5
Plaintiff contends the illegality exception applies because
attorney defendants violated section 11167.5. This statute provides, “[t]he
reports required by Sections 11166 and 11166.2, or authorized by Section
11166.05, and child abuse or neglect investigative reports that result in a
summary report being filed with the Department of Justice pursuant to
subdivision (a) of Section 11169 [(covered reports)] shall be confidential and
may be disclosed only as provided in subdivision (b). Any violation of the
confidentiality provided by this article is a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed six months, by a fine of five
hundred dollars ($500), or by both that imprisonment and fine.” (§ 11167.5,
subd. (a).) Section 11167.5, subdivision (b) identifies the persons authorized
to receive covered reports. We use the term “unauthorized persons” to refer to
people that are not listed in subdivision (b).
Plaintiff contends the report is a covered report and that attorney
defendants violated section 11167.5, subdivision (a) by disclosing its
information to unauthorized persons: (1) Johnson disclosed the report in
discovery; (2) attorney defendants disclosed details from the report in the
publicly filed employee complaints; and (3) attorney defendants asked
questions about the report in depositions.
The attorney defendants do not concede any illegal conduct.
Among other things, they contend the report is not a covered report because
it is missing certain information, so section 11167.5, subdivision (a) is
inapplicable. (Citing §§ 11167, 11167.5; Doe v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch.
Dist., (C.D.Cal. Oct. 20, 2020, No. CV19–06962–DDP(RAOX)) 2020 WL

11
11271845, at pp. *3–*4.) We need not address this argument. As we explain
next, even if the report is a covered report, plaintiff has not met her burden of
conclusively showing that attorney defendants violated section 11167.5,
subdivision (a).
2. Production of the Report in Discovery
As to Johnson’s production of the report in discovery during the
2014 lawsuit, plaintiff has not shown such an act is criminal under section
11167.5. Criminal statutes are narrowly construed. (Hale v. Morgan (1978)
22 Cal.3d 388, 405.) Thus, it is unclear whether production of the report in
discovery would subject a person to criminal liability. Plaintiff does not
address this issue. Nor has she provided any analysis of section 11167.5 or its
legislative history showing the Legislature intended the statute to have such
an expansive interpretation. And we cannot assume such a broad
interpretation of this statute. (Hale, at p. 405.) Thus, plaintiff has not met
her burden of conclusively showing defendant’s production of the report in
discovery was criminal as a matter of law. (Billauer v. Escobar-Eck, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 969; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [appellant must support positions with reasoned
argument].)
Further, while we do not decide the issue, such conduct does not
appear to be criminal given the narrow interpretation of criminal statutes.
(Hale v. Morgan, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 405.) Privacy rights in other contexts
must be balanced against a litigant’s discovery rights. As our Supreme Court
said in the context of the constitutional right to privacy, “‘[o]n occasion [a
party’s] privacy interests may have to give way to [the] opponent’s right to a
fair trial. Thus, courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discover

12
relevant facts against the privacy interests of persons subject to discovery.’”
(John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1199.)
While state courts have not addressed whether covered reports
can ever be produced in discovery without violating section 11167.5, the issue
has arisen in federal courts. In one such case, the defendant subpoenaed
investigation records from the San Bernardino County of Children and
Family Services (CFS). (Shinedling v. Sunbeam Products Inc. (C.D.Cal., Mar.
4, 2014, No. ED CV12–438–CJC(SPX)) 2014 WL 12600964, at p. *1
(Shinedling).) CFS objected to the subpoena on grounds the requested records
were confidential under section 11167.5, among other statutes. (Id. at pp. *1
& *3.) The defendant then moved to compel CFS to produce the records. (Id.
at p. *2.) In evaluating this motion, the district court noted that under
California law, “[w]here communications are ‘tendered under a guaranty of
confidentiality,’ they fall ‘manifestly within the [California] Constitution’s
protected area of privacy.’ [Citations.] ‘The right to privacy is not absolute,
but it may be abridged only where there is a compelling and opposing state
interest.’ [Citation.] ‘One such compelling public need lies in facilitating the
ascertainment of truth in connection with legal claims.’” (Id. at p. *4.) The
court then conducted a balancing test and denied the motion to compel after
finding the confidentiality concerns outweighed the defendant’s need for
discovery. (Id. at pp. *4–*5.) Based on its analysis, Shinedling provides some
support for the proposition that covered reports may be disclosed in discovery
without violating section 11167.5.
We also note that certain provisions of the Welfare and
Institutions Code indicate that criminal liability under section 11167.5,
subdivision (a), is not as expansive as plaintiff suggests. For example,
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 contains rules governing the

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inspection of “juvenile case files,” some of which contain covered reports. (See
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827, subd. (e) [defining “‘juvenile case file’”]5; In re
Elijah S. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1551–1552 [the definition of “‘juvenile
case files’” necessarily includes investigative reports of abuse by social
workers and child protective investigators].) Yet a “juvenile case file” may be
inspected under certain conditions by persons not identified in section
11167.5, subdivision (b). For instance, a “juvenile case file” may be inspected
by “[a]ny . . . person who may be designated by court order of the judge of the
juvenile court upon filing a petition.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 827, subd.
(a)(1)(Q); In re Elijah S., at pp. 1541–1542.) “A juvenile court has broad and
exclusive authority to determine whether, and to what extent, to grant access
to confidential juvenile records.” (R.S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055.) Though plaintiff relied heavily on Welfare and
Institutions Code section 827 in the lower court, she does not discuss the
interplay between it and section 11167.5 in her appellate briefs.
Here, while the record shows the report was produced in
discovery in the 2014 lawsuit, the circumstances of its production are
unclear. We do not know if there was a court order allowing for disclosure of
the report. Nor do we know whether it was produced subject to a protective
order, or whether Johnson took any steps to maintain the report’s

5 “[A] ‘juvenile case file’ means a petition filed in a juvenile court

proceeding, reports of the probation officer, and all other records, including
any writing as defined in Section 250 of the Evidence Code, or electronically
stored information relating to the minor, that is filed in that case or made
available to the probation officer in making the probation officer’s report, or
to the judge, referee, or other hearing officer, and thereafter retained by the
probation officer, judge, referee, or other hearing officer.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 827, subd. (e).)

14
confidentiality that might have precluded potential criminal liability under
section 11167.5. (Cf. Shinedling, supra, WL 12600964, at pp. *3–*5.) For
these reasons, plaintiff has not shown that attorney defendants conclusively
engaged in criminal conduct by producing the report in discovery.
3. Use of the Report’s Details in the Employee Lawsuits
Next, plaintiff contends attorney defendants violated section
11167.5, subdivision (a) by using details from the report in the employee
complaints and by asking questions about the report in depositions.6
However, the trial court found “[t]he allegations [from the employees’
complaints] and deposition testimony pertain to a plaintiff’s or a witness’
personal observations of [the mother’s] statements or conduct.” (Italics
added.) Plaintiff has not argued this finding was erroneous, and disclosing
information based on personal observation is not illegal. (See People v.
Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1314–1315 [proposed testimony did not
violate Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 if it was based on personal
observation rather than juvenile case file].)
Further, as to the deposition questions, the court found attorney
defendants “did not ask questions relating to the [report].” Plaintiff has not
shown any error in this finding. Indeed, the deposition testimony she cites
consists of questions that attorney defendants asked deponents about the
mother’s statements at work concerning the incident, not the report.

6 The parties dispute whether Ksadzhikyan ever possessed the

report. Plaintiff contends we should presume this fact since Ksadzhikyan is
co-counsel with Johnson in the 2019 and 2020 lawsuits. Attorney defendants
disagree. This dispute is immaterial to our analysis, so we will not address
the issue.

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As to the allegations in the employee complaints, the trial court
concluded, “[a]lthough the subject matter of the alleged statements and
conduct may have overlapped with the subject matter of the [report], the
[employee] Complaints allege that [the mother] was the alleged source of the
subject matter described in those Complaints. Specifically, those Complaints
allege that [the mother] disseminated the subject matter alleged in those
Complaints.” Plaintiff does not contest this finding. Rather, she argues that
attorney defendants “cannot be allowed to launder confidential information in
this way. It would defeat CANRA’s purpose if disclosing information from a
confidential report could be immunized by a simple, disputed allegation the
information was also obtained in part from other sources.”
We are not persuaded. Attorney defendants did not violate
section 11167.5 if these allegations were based on the employees’ personal
observations of the mother’s statement. (See People v. Espinoza, supra, 95
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314–1315.) To apply the illegality exception, plaintiff
must conclusively show at least some of the allegations in the employee
complaints were derived solely from the report. (City of Montebello v. Vasquez
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424 [the evidence must “conclusively demonstrate” the
illegal conduct].) She has not done so. Based on the current record, it is
unclear if any of the disputed allegations originate solely from the report.
C. Second Prong—Probability of Prevailing on the Merits
The trial court found plaintiff had not shown a probability of
prevailing on the merits because her claims were barred by the litigation
privilege. Plaintiff has shown no error in this ruling.
Codified in Civil Code section 47, the litigation privilege
precludes a defendant’s liability on nearly all tort claims. (Timothy W. v.
Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 648, 661–662.) It exists “‘“to afford litigants

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and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without
fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.”’” (Id. at p.
662.) It is also meant “‘“to encourage open channels of communication and
zealous advocacy, to promote complete and truthful testimony, to give finality
to judgments, and to avoid unending litigation.”’” (Ibid.) “[T]he privilege is
absolute and precludes recovery on all tort theories, including claims for
invasion of privacy.” (Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1296,
1302–1303.) Claims for malicious prosecution are the only recognized
exception to the privilege. (Timothy W. v. Julie W., at pp. 661–662.)
The litigation privilege “‘“applies to any communication (1) made
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that
[has] some connection or logical relation to the action.”’” (Timothy W. v.
Julie W., supra, (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 661–662.) It is “‘“broadly applied
and doubts are resolved in its favor.”’” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 300.)
1. Specific Statute Exception
It is undisputed that attorney defendants’ alleged conduct meets
the above elements. Plaintiff relies on an exception in “which courts have
refused to apply the [litigation] privilege when its general provisions conflict
with a specific statute. Under this line of cases, application of the litigation
privilege has been deemed inappropriate where the specific statute ‘would be
significantly or wholly inoperable if its enforcement were barred when in
conflict with the privilege.’” (McNair v. City and County of San Francisco
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1164.) Plaintiff contends application of the
litigation privilege here would render section 11167.5 significantly
inoperable. We need not discuss the merits of this argument because plaintiff

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has not asserted any claim against attorney defendants under section
11167.5.
In all the cases plaintiff cites that discuss this exception, the
relevant plaintiffs sought to vindicate rights under the statute that allegedly
conflicted with the litigation privilege. (People ex rel. Alzayat v. Hebb (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 801, 807–808 (Hebb) [qui tam claim against the defendants
under the Insurance Frauds Prevention Act]; McNair v. City and County of
San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1160, 1168 (McNair) [claims based
on violations of the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act];
Begier v. Strom (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 880–881, 883–884 [seeking
damages allowed by section 11172, subdivision (a)].)
Here, plaintiff’s complaint did not seek to vindicate any right
under section 11167.5. In fact, it did not mention section 11167.5 at all, let
alone allege any violation of the statute. Rather, her complaint only alleged
violations of (1) Welfare and Institutions Code sections 827, 827.12, and 828,
(2) California Rules of Court, rule 5.552, (3) “‘Marsy’s Law’ and the ‘Victim’s
Bill of Rights,’” and (4) the constitutional right to privacy. Thus, this case is
distinct from Hebb and McNair, where the plaintiffs argued the litigation
privilege did not apply to the statutes that formed the bases of their claims.
(Hebb, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 807–808; McNair, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1160, 1168.) Nor does plaintiff argue that section 11167.5 authorizes
civil claims for damages as was the case in Begier v. Strom, supra, 46
Cal.App.4th at pp. 883–884. Because plaintiff’s complaint does not seek to
vindicate any right under section 11167.5, she has not shown the exception
applies here.

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2. Injunctive Relief
Finally, plaintiff contends the litigation privilege does not apply
to her claims for constitutional invasion of privacy and public disclosure of
private fact because they sought injunctive relief. She cites case law stating,
“the litigation privilege does not provide a defense to a cause of action that,
by its nature, does not seek to impose tort liability for damages on a
defendant based on his or her litigation related publications.” (Weeden v.
Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 289 (Weeden).)
Weeden is inapposite. It found the litigation privilege did not
apply to claims for quiet title and cancellation of an instrument because they
were not tort claims. (Weeden, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 289, 291–292.) As
to the former, it explained that “[a] cause of action to quiet title is clearly not
a tort claim, and it does not seek to hold a defendant liable for damages.
Rather, ‘actions to quiet title, like true declaratory relief actions, are
generally equitable in nature.’” (Id. at p. 291.) As to the latter, it explained,
“[t]he same analysis applies to the . . . claim for cancellation of a written
instrument. A claim for cancellation of written instrument is an equitable
claim” that “allows a plaintiff to obtain cancellation of an instrument that
creates a cloud on the plaintiff’s title.” (Id. at p. 292.) Significantly, however,
Weeden found the privilege applied to the plaintiffs’ claim for slander of title
because it was “a tort claim” that “has been held to be subject to a litigation
privilege defense.” (Id. at p. 293.)
Unlike the equitable claims asserted in Weeden, plaintiff’s claims
for invasion of privacy and public disclosure of private fact are both torts.
(Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 214.)
Moreover, plaintiff cannot avoid the litigation privilege by adding an
injunctive relief remedy to a barred tort claim. (See Rubin v. Green (1993) 4

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Cal.4th 1187, 1202-1203 [unfair business practices claim seeking injunctive
relief was barred by the litigation privilege because it was based on the same
conduct as tort claims that were barred by the privilege].) Thus, plaintiff has
failed to show that her tort claims seeking injunctive relief are not barred by
the litigation privilege.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion is
affirmed. The attorney defendants are entitled to their costs incurred in this
appeal.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

DELANEY, J.

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