Larson v. Hsu CA2/5

CourtListener 10646336Calctapp01.08.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 8/1/25 Larson v. Hsu CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

KIRBY LARSON et al., B331378

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22TRCV00079)

CLARK HSU,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald F. Frank, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Newmeyer & Dillion, Benjamin P. Pugh, and Gabriella N.
Stevens for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Cox, Castle & Nicholson, Robert R. Begland, Jr., Stanley
W. Lamport, and Scott R. Laes for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiffs and appellants Kirby Larson (Kirby) and Sarah
Susan Larson (Sarah) (collectively, plaintiffs) allege landscaping
maintained by their neighbor, defendant and respondent Clark
Hsu (defendant), violates the Palos Verdes Homes Association’s
(the Association’s) covenants, conditions, and restrictions
(CC&Rs). The trial court granted defendant’s motion for
summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ causes of action for nuisance
and breach of contract based on its finding that plaintiffs have no
right to an ocean view (and plaintiffs thereafter voluntarily
dismissed their only other remaining cause of action). In this
appeal from the subsequently entered judgment, we consider
whether there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether
defendant’s deviation from approved landscaping plans
constitutes a violation of the CC&Rs independent of any asserted
right to an ocean view.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiffs’ Home and the Hedge That Triggers This
Litigation
Plaintiffs bought a single-story home in Palos Verdes
Estates in 2002. Defendant’s home is situated between plaintiffs’
home and bluffs overlooking the ocean. An alley runs between
the two properties. Plaintiffs and defendant are members of the
Association, and they are governed by the Association’s CC&Rs.
In or around “the early 2010s,” defendant rebuilt his home
and added a second story. As part of this process, defendant
prepared a fuel modification plan with a diagram depicting new
landscaping. The plan shows a prunus caroliniana hedge along
the side of defendant’s yard bordering the alley. The diagram
shows an eight-to-ten-foot tall hedge, but the schematic’s legend

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states the hedge is to be kept to a maximum height of six feet.1
The plan was approved by the Los Angeles County Fire
Department (the Fire Department), the City of Palos Verdes
Estate’s Planning Department, and the Association’s “Art Jury.”
The Art Jury’s approval includes the condition that “[a]ny
deviation from approved plan must have approval of art jury
prior to execution.”
Instead of planting the prunus caroliniana specified in the
approved plan, defendant planted a ficus microcarpa hedge along
the boundary between his and plaintiffs’ homes. The ficus grows
faster and taller than the prunus, and it requires more frequent
pruning to maintain a desired height. Defendant never sought
Art Jury approval to plant a ficus hedge in lieu of a prunus
hedge, or to allow the hedge to grow above six feet.
Plaintiffs rebuilt their home to add a second story in or
around 2018, after defendant planted the ficus hedge. For the
first couple years following their rebuild, plaintiffs enjoyed an
ocean view from their second floor that they did not have before
the renovation.2 By early 2020, however, the ficus hedge had
grown to a height between 10 and 20 feet and blocked plaintiffs’
view of the ocean.

1
None of the several copies of the plan included in the
appellate record is fully legible. Our discussion of the plan’s
height restrictions is accordingly based partly on defendant’s
deposition testimony.
2
Plaintiffs admitted this in response to defendant’s special
interrogatories, but Kirby offered contradictory testimony after
defendant moved for summary judgment.

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B. Pertinent Provisions of the CC&Rs
The CC&R provisions that are important in this appeal are
a “summary” section at the beginning of the document,
subsequent sections addressing enforcement and landscaping,
and an interpretive resolution by the Association. We will
describe each.

1. The summary
Two portions of the summary are relevant to this appeal.
First, the summary states “[t]he restrictions have been most
carefully worked out for every part of Palos Verdes Estates, to
accomplish” several enumerated “results,” including preserving
“the fine views of ocean, mountains, and park.” Second, the
summary states that “[f]ences, walls, hedges and poles will be
limited to a reasonable height.”

2. Approval requirements and remedying
violations
Article III, Section 2 of the CC&Rs provides, in pertinent
part, “[n]o building, fence, wall, sidewalk, steps, awning, tent,
pole or other structure, improvement, utility, parking, sculpture,
or planting shall be erected, constructed, altered or maintained
upon, under or above any portion . . . of any property at any time
within the jurisdiction of the Art Jury or of Palos Verdes Homes
Association . . . unless plans and specifications therefor, including
the exterior color scheme, together with a block plan indicating
location, shall have been submitted to, [sic] approved in writing
by the Art Jury and a copy of such plans, specifications, and block
plans as finally approved deposited for permanent record with

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the Art Jury. . . .” (We shall hereinafter refer to Article III,
Section 2 as “the Art Jury provision.”)
Article V, Section 7 provides “representatives of [the
Association] and/or of the Art Jury shall have the right at any
time to enter on or upon any property for the purpose of cutting
back trees or other plantings which may grow up to a greater
height than in the opinion of [the Association] is warranted to
maintain the view and protect adjoining property.”
Article VI, Section 8 provides that any violation of the
CC&Rs “is declared to be and shall constitute a nuisance, and
may be abated by . . . [the Association] and/or by any lot owner
subject to the jurisdiction of [the Association] . . . .”
Article VI, Section 12 provides the CC&Rs “bind and inure
to the benefit of and [are] enforceable by . . . [the Association], by
the owner or owners of any property in said tract, their and each
of their legal representatives, heirs, successors and assigns and
failure by . . . [the Association] or any property owner . . . to
enforce any of such restrictions, conditions, covenants,
restrictions, liens or charges shall in no event be deemed a waiver
of the right to do so thereafter.”

3. Interpretive resolution
The CC&Rs expressly authorize the Association to
interpret the provisions therein. In April 2021, pursuant to this
authorization, the Association adopted Resolution No. 191 setting
forth its interpretation of Article V, Section 7’s view protection
provision.
In the resolution’s preamble, the Association stated its
purpose was “to implement guidelines and adopt written
procedures to promote the voluntary resolution of view

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impairment disputes and for use in the evaluation and resolution
of view impairment disputes arising from the restrictions set
forth in Article V, Section 7 of the [CC&Rs] so members may
better understand the procedures and remedies available and
have a clear process to manage and correct view impairments.”
The body of the resolution provides that for properties (like
plaintiffs’) purchased “prior to the date of the enactment of
[Resolution No. 191], ‘view’ means the view that existed on the
latest date the Restrictions were filed, or June, 26, 1923.”
Resolution No. 191 also sets forth criteria to be “considered in
determining whether a [s]ignificant [v]iew [o]bstruction has
occurred,” including “[t]he extent to which the foliage obstructs a
Scenic View from a Main Viewing Area.” A “[s]cenic [v]iew” is
defined as “a view of the community and its special features,”
including the ocean and coastline, and a home’s “[m]ain [v]iewing
[a]rea” is “the primary living area of the primary residential
structure.”

C. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit
Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant,
defendant’s wife, and two other neighbors in February 2022.
(Plaintiffs later dismissed their claims against defendant’s wife
and the other neighbors.) Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts a cause of
action claiming defendant’s hedge is a nuisance because the
hedge violates the CC&Rs and “Fire Department restrictions.”
The complaint also asserts two breach of contract causes of action
alleging defendant breached the CC&Rs by violating the
“summary” provision discussed ante, by “maintaining and
planting foliage that result[s] in a ‘Significant View Obstruction’”
in violation of Resolution No. 191, and by “maintaining and

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altering planting” without the Association’s approval and “in
violation of the specifications provided in the plans approved by
the Association.”3
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, damages, and attorney
fees.

D. Summary Adjudication
Defendant moved for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication. As to the contract claims,
defendant argued the summary provision in the CC&Rs is merely
a non-binding recital. Defendant argued Resolution No. 191
determines the scope of any view rights under the CC&Rs and
further contended that because plaintiffs admitted in
interrogatory responses they had no ocean view from the ground
floor of their home “at any time” and there was no ocean view
from the second floor in 1923 (the second floor did not exist at
that time) they have no protected ocean view under Resolution
No. 191. As to the nuisance cause of action, defendant argued
there is no general right to a view. Defendant argued plaintiffs’
alternative theory that the ficus hedge violates local ordinances
fails because the Fire Department found otherwise and, in any
case, plaintiffs lack standing to enforce such ordinances.
In opposition, plaintiffs argued “[t]he narrowest grounds to
deny summary judgment is that [defendant] failed to obtain
Association approval for two twenty-foot-high [f]icus hedges.”
Alternatively, plaintiffs maintained the summary provision of the

3
Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action that they later voluntarily
dismissed was a claim for breach of oral contract based on
defendant’s alleged promises not to block their view of the ocean.

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CC&Rs is binding and the reasonableness of defendant’s conduct
in connection with that provision should be decided by a jury.
Plaintiffs disputed defendant’s argument that they had no
protected ocean view under Resolution No. 191 because,
according to Kirby’s declaration filed in support of their
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, “[i]n 1923, there
were no homes or trees to obstruct the potential view from the
second floor of [plaintiffs’] home . . . .” Plaintiffs further argued,
for the first time, that the ficus hedge constitutes a “spite fence”
and there are triable issues of fact as to defendant’s intent for
purposes of this theory.
In reply, defendant asserted Kirby’s declaration concerning
the view from plaintiffs’ property in 1923, which contradicted
plaintiffs’ responses to interrogatories, was a sham and lacked
foundation. Defendant also reiterated his argument that
plaintiffs have no view rights under Resolution No. 191 and
pressed the argument further to claim parties “[cannot] enforce
CC&R violations in state court” except as provided in Resolution
No. 191.
Prior to the summary adjudication hearing, the trial court
issued a tentative ruling in defendant’s favor. The court
tentatively concluded plaintiffs “failed to raise a triable issue that
they or their successor [sic] in title had any residential structure
or any view rights in 1923” and, “[a]ccordingly, as a matter of
law, [p]laintiff[s] have no contractual or statutory basis for any
view rights under the CC&Rs or under Resolution [No.] 191.”
The tentative ruling did not discuss the Art Jury provision,
implicitly accepting defendant’s position that Article V, Section 7
and Resolution No. 191 are alone dispositive in any dispute
relating to views.

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At the summary adjudication hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel
argued “this is not exclusively a view case” and highlighted
portions of the complaint relying on defendant’s violation of the
Art Jury provision. In response, the trial court asked whether
the “harm [is not] the obstruction of [plaintiffs’] view.” Plaintiffs’
counsel responded that this was not the only harm and argued
plaintiffs “are entitled to have the hedge as approved of six feet so
they can see the space between the houses.” Put in different
terms, plaintiffs’ counsel argued “the damage is not what they
can’t see. The damage is what they see sitting on their patio
looking at this . . . wall of vegetation. And so I don’t think to
reach a jury they have to prove a loss of ocean.” Plaintiffs’
counsel also argued “the CC&R[ ]s provide that owners have
standing to assert violations of the CC&R[ ]s and it’s not limited
to the matters set forth in Resolution [No.] 191.”
Unconvinced that plaintiffs could articulate an injury
arising from a violation of the CC&Rs independent of their
alleged view rights, the trial court stated its “tentative with
respect to the controlling nature of Resolution [No.] 191 with
respect to a view obstruction [would] stand[ ].” The trial court
invited supplemental briefing, however, solely on the question of
whether plaintiffs should be permitted to amend the complaint to
assert a cause of action for private nuisance based on their
argument that the ficus hedge constitutes a spite fence. After the
parties filed their supplemental briefs, the trial court granted
defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of each cause of
action in the original complaint and granted plaintiffs leave to
file a first amended complaint with “a separately labeled cause of
action for nuisance based on the so-called Spite Fence law . . . .”

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Plaintiffs thereafter filed a first amended complaint, but
they immediately requested the new spite fence cause of action be
dismissed without prejudice. The trial court so ruled and later
entered judgment for defendant, including an award of attorney
fees and costs.

II. DISCUSSION
There is a triable issue of material fact as to whether
defendant’s ficus hedge violates the Art Jury provision of the
CC&Rs, and that is all we need to decide to resolve this appeal
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); Rojas-Cifuentes v. Superior
Court of San Joaquin County (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1061
[“summary adjudication . . . is typically only appropriate when it
disposes of an entire cause of action”]).4 As we proceed to explain,
Article V, Section 7 and Resolution No. 191’s direct, but limited,
protection of view rights does not insulate defendant from
potential liability under the Art Jury provision; further trial
court proceedings are necessary to decide liability on that ground.
Plaintiffs’ contract and nuisance claims are partly
predicated on defendant’s alleged violation of the Art Jury
provision.5 As we have already mentioned, this provision

4
Defendant’s request for judicial notice of an amended fuel
modification plan approved by the Fire Department (but not the
Art Jury) after judgment is denied. (Center for Biological
Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th
1245, 1258, fn. 8.)
5
Defendant’s contention in his respondent’s brief that
plaintiffs “admitted . . . this view dispute is governed by
Resolution [No.] 191” mischaracterizes plaintiffs’ discovery
responses. The relevant interrogatory responses state

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prohibits members from “erect[ing]” or “maintain[ing]” a planting
without the Art Jury’s written approval. Here, the Art Jury’s
approval of defendant’s plans indicating a six-foot prunus hedge
along the border with plaintiffs’ property expressly stated “[a]ny
deviation from approved plan must have approval of art jury
prior to execution.” Article VI, Sections 8 and 12 provide for
enforcement of the CC&Rs by individual members under contract
and private nuisance theories.6

“Resolution [No.] 191 and the CC&R[ ]s control this dispute.”
(Emphasis added.)
6
The ability of homeowners to enforce CC&Rs provisions
akin to Article VI, Section 12 is reflected in prior cases. (See, e.g.,
Walker v. Haslett (1919) 44 Cal.App. 394, 396, 401 [holding
individual homeowner was entitled to injunction against
neighboring home being used as duplex under covenants
providing “that the original grantor, or any of its successors or
assignees or any owner of any lot in the tract, may enjoin or
abate, or remedy, by proper proceedings, the breach of any
covenant”]; Hotz v. Rich (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052
[reversing preemption finding against residents and
unincorporated association of residents who brought action to
enjoin construction of antenna exceeding height limit prescribed
in covenants providing for “enforce[ment] by an action in law or
equity by the owner of any lot”].) Plaintiffs cite Civil Code section
6856 as an additional basis for individual enforcement of the
CC&Rs, but that statute only applies to common interest
developments (Civ. Code, § 6582, subd. (a)) and there is no
evidence in the record suggesting the Association is so organized.
The weight of published authority also indicates Article VI,
Section 8’s provision that every violation of the CC&Rs “shall
constitute a nuisance, and may be abated by . . . [the Association]
and/or by any lot owner” is effective to render every violation of
the CC&Rs a nuisance. (See, e.g., Woodbridge Escondido

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Defendant does not contend the ficus hedge conforms to the
approved renovation plan he submitted or otherwise complies
with the Art Jury provision. He argues, rather, that plaintiffs
cannot enforce the Art Jury provision because Article V, Section 7
and Resolution No. 191 are the sole provisions under which a
member may seek to protect a view. The fact that the Art Jury
provision in this case may incidentally protect an ocean view,
however, does not mean that its scope is restricted by Article V,
Section 7 and Resolution No. 191. A judgment for plaintiffs
based on defendant’s alleged violation of the Art Jury provision
would not recognize, implicitly or otherwise, their right to an
ocean view. It would simply vindicate their right—shared with
other members of the Association—to enforce the CC&Rs.
Article V, Section 7’s grant of discretionary authority to the
Association “at any time to enter on or upon any property for the
purpose of cutting back trees or other plantings which may grow
up to a greater height than in the opinion of [the Association] is
warranted to maintain the view and protect adjoining property”
does not nullify or limit the Art Jury provision. The two
provisions serve distinct purposes. The Art Jury provision is a
prophylactic measure to ensure landscaping plans are consistent
with the Art Jury’s aesthetic judgments. Article V, Section 7 is a
remedial measure empowering the Association to restore views

Property Owners Assn. v. Nielsen (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 559,
570-571; Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 1379, 1389 [holding that the plaintiff “stated a
timely and viable cause of action for a continuing nuisance” based
on a violation of CC&Rs because, among other things, the CC&Rs
“provide[d] that any violation of a duty created by
the[m] . . . w[ould] give rise to an action for nuisance”].)

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obstructed by plantings regardless of whether those plantings
were part of an approved landscaping plan.7
Defendant also suggests plaintiffs suffered no cognizable
injury as a result of his alleged breach of the Art Jury provision
because they have no right to an ocean view. The issue for
purposes of summary adjudication, however, is not whether
plaintiffs have a right to an ocean view, but whether they have a
right to enforce the CC&Rs. In other words, defendant’s alleged
breach of the Art Jury provision may have caused damages
unrelated to the loss of an ocean view. (Knox v. Streatfield (1978)
79 Cal.App.3d 565, 574-575 [holding that the purpose of a
community’s CC&Rs was “to maintain a certain appearance” and
that “a declaration of restrictions such as the one in this case
gives rise to a cause of action for damages for the violation of the
restriction”].) Even if not, plaintiffs are entitled to pursue
injunctive relief even without evidence of damages. (Id. at 573
[“‘[w]here equitable relief is sought, proof of actual or substantial
injury is not essential, the establishment of a violation of a
uniform building restriction being all that is necessary to entitle
a complaining owner to relief’”]; accord Morgan v. Veach (1943)
59 Cal.App.2d 682, 691.)

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Plaintiffs complaint prays for an injunction requiring
defendant to trim foliage blocking their view of the ocean in their
prayer for relief (in addition to “other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper”) but this “prayer for relief is no
part of the statement of fact, and the fact that too much is asked
for does not affect the cause of action stated.” (Slovensky v.
Friedman (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1518, 1535.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The cause is remanded with
directions to vacate the order granting summary adjudication of
plaintiffs’ causes of action for nuisance and breach of contract (as
members of the Association and as third-party beneficiaries), and
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The trial
court may consider what, if any, limitations there should be on
the presentation of evidence concerning claims that are not the
basis for our reversal of the summary adjudication order.
Plaintiffs are awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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