CourtListener 10644617•People v. Hernandez CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/30/25 P. v. Hernandez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B338131
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA019906)
v.
JOSE HERNANDEZ III,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rob B. Villeza, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Linda L. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Louis W. Karlin, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Thirty-two years ago, defendant and appellant Jose
Hernandez III committed terrible gang-related crimes as a
youthful offender. He shot and killed two people—one execution-
style—and attempted to murder a third. Much more recently,
however, after Hernandez had served decades of the life without
possibility of parole prison sentence he received, renounced the
gang (at significant personal cost), and committed himself to
rehabilitation, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
petitioned to reduce Hernandez’s sentence to a 30 years to life
term that would keep him in custody but give him a chance to
make a case for release to the Parole Board. Despite a statutory
presumption favoring the grant of relief sought by the People, the
trial court denied the petition and concluded Hernandez, now age
52, still poses an unreasonable risk of committing a “super strike”
offense.1
1 “The felonies commonly referred to as super strikes are (1)
a ‘ “sexually violent offense,” ’ as defined in Welfare &
Institutions Code, section 6600, subdivision (b); (2) oral
copulation or sodomy, or sexual penetration of a child under 14
years of age and more than 10 years younger than the defendant,
as defined in Penal Code sections 286, 288a and 289; (3) a lewd or
lascivious act involving a child under 14 years of age, in violation
of [Penal Code] section 288; (4) any homicide offense, including
attempted homicide, as defined in [Penal Code] sections 187 to
191.5; (5) solicitation to commit murder, as defined in [Penal
Code] section 653f; (6) assault with a machine gun on a peace
officer or firefighter, as defined in [Penal Code] section 245,
subdivision (d)(3); (7) possession of a weapon of mass destruction,
as defined in [Penal Code] section 11418, subdivision (a)(1); and
(8) any serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in
California by life imprisonment or death.” (People v. Valencia
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351, fn. 3.)
2
Hernandez contends that the trial court’s denial of relief
was an abuse of discretion. He argues the court failed to apply
the statutory presumption in favor of recall and resentencing and
he maintains there is insufficient evidence he would pose an
unreasonable risk to public safety if and when ultimately
released on parole. Hernandez believes, correctly, that the trial
court solely relied on the immutable circumstances of the
commitment offenses to deny relief.
Hernandez’s crimes of conviction were concededly heinous,
but we agree with the District Attorney (and with the
Legislature) that relief must be available even for heinous crimes
in cases like this one that involve a truly extraordinary decades-
long record of rehabilitation and public service that demonstrate
there is no unreasonable risk Hernandez will commit a “super
strike” crime if and when Hernandez is ever released on parole.
Hernandez is over the age of 50, he long ago renounced his gang
membership, he has three decades of sobriety, he has no criminal
history other than the offenses of conviction, and he has zero
disciplinary history in prison. Hernandez has accepted
responsibility for his crimes, he currently suffers from “end stage
liver disease,” and the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation has calculated his risk of reoffending score as a
“one”—the lowest score possible.
We hold the trial court’s denial of the District Attorney’s
request to recall Hernandez’s sentence was an abuse of its
discretion in light of the statutory presumption favoring relief
and Hernandez’s extraordinary record of rehabilitation—one that
prompted a 24-year veteran of the District Attorney’s office who
worked in the hardcore gang crimes unit to remark that it was
the best he had ever seen.
3
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts2
In the evening on August 10, 1993, Hernandez and Robert
Cota were riding a bicycle when they encountered Raphael
Torres. Hernandez was carrying a firearm; Torres was unarmed.
Hernandez and Torres exchanged gang challenges and insults.
Hernandez got off the bicycle, pulled out the gun, and shot and
killed Torres. Hernandez and Cota left on the bicycle.
A few hours later, Hernandez and Cota were riding a
bicycle again. Cota was pedaling and Hernandez was sitting on
the handlebars. They stopped a car that Alberto Gonzalez was
driving. Julio Silva was a passenger in the car. Hernandez
dismounted the bicycle and approached the front passenger area
of the vehicle where Silva was seated. Hernandez asked Silva
where he was from—i.e., which gang he belonged to. Silva was
not a gang member. He said he was from Rosemead. Hernandez
ordered Silva out of the car and made him kneel on the ground.
He told Silva he was going to die and shot him in the head.
Gonzalez charged at Hernandez and struggled with him for
2 The transcripts of Hernandez’s trial are not contained in
the record. For background at the 1172.1 hearing, the trial court
simply relied on the Court of Appeal’s opinion from the direct
appeal, the People’s petition for recall and resentencing pursuant
to section 1172.1, and Hernandez’s memorandum in support of
the petition. Our recitation of the facts relies on these same
sources, and the superior court’s summary of them. The facts
relating to the crimes for which Hernandez was convicted are not
contested in this appeal.
4
control of the gun. Cota joined the fight, kicking Gonzalez in the
stomach repeatedly. The gun discharged and struck Gonzalez in
the chest. Hernandez shot Gonzalez two more times. Hernandez
and Cota drove the car from the scene and later abandoned it.
Gonzalez survived the shooting.
Hernandez admitted to police that he was involved in the
shootings but said he was under the influence of drugs and not
thinking clearly. He said that he shot Silva and Gonzalez after
Gonzalez nearly hit him with the car. Hernandez said that Silva
and Gonzalez rushed at him and Cota and cursed at them. Silva
began fighting Hernandez, so Hernandez shot him.
Hernandez was 21 years old when he committed the
crimes.
B. Procedural History
In 1995, the jury found Hernandez guilty of the second
degree murder of Torres (Pen. Code,3 § 187, subd. (a), count 1),
the first degree murder of Silva (§ 187, subd. (a), count 2), the
willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted murder of Gonzalez
(§§ 187, subd. (a) & 664, count 4), and robbery (§ 211, count 5).
The jury found true allegations that Hernandez personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), personally inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and acted for the benefit of a
criminal street gang in commission of the crimes (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)). The jury also found true felony murder and multiple murder
special circumstances.
3 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
5
The trial court sentenced Hernandez to 15 years to life in
count 1, plus five years for the firearm use enhancement, plus
three years for the gang enhancement. In count 2, the court
sentenced Hernandez to life without the possibility of parole, plus
five years for the firearm use enhancement, plus three years for
the gang enhancement. In count 4, the court sentenced
Hernandez to life, plus five years for the firearm use
enhancement, plus three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement. In count 5, the court imposed the high term of five
years, plus five years for the firearm use enhancement, plus three
years for the gang enhancement.
In 2024, the People petitioned, pursuant to section 1172.1,
to have Hernandez’s sentence recalled and for Hernandez to be
resentenced. The People requested that Hernandez’s conviction
for first degree murder in count 2 be reduced to second degree
murder and that his sentence in that count be reduced to 15
years to life. The reduction and resentencing would not result in
immediate release, but would provide Hernandez an opportunity
to obtain parole at some future time. Hernandez filed a motion
joining the petition, to which he attached voluminous evidence of
his rehabilitation, good behavior, and achievements during the
more than 30 years he spent in prison.
At a hearing on the matter, defense counsel argued that
Hernandez had been a model prisoner for over 30 years, with no
record of discipline while incarcerated. Hernandez also made
great efforts at rehabilitation and self-improvement, even
without the hope of release.
Hernandez made a statement to the court in which he
explained that he began to change his behavior after listening to
Silva’s mother testify. The grief that she displayed impacted him
6
and he was overcome with shame. At that moment Hernandez
was able to see “the monster [he] was.” He took full
responsibility for the murders and attempted murder and for the
pain and trauma he caused the victims’ families, friends, and the
community. He decided to change so that he would never hurt
anyone again.
Hernandez explained that he denounced all gang ties at
that time. While in custody, he was assaulted three times for
cutting ties with his gang, but was not deterred. He sought help
from the church and participated in programs to support his
recovery and rehabilitation. Hernandez worked with youths and
helped them to avoid gang participation. He trained five service
dogs for autistic children and wounded veterans. These activities
gave him self-worth and purpose. Hernandez entered prison with
a ninth-grade education and was able to earn associates degrees
in sociology and social behavioral science while incarcerated. At
the time of the hearing, he was working on his bachelor’s degree
in sociology at the University of California Irvine. Hernandez
hoped to use his degree to be a Christian counselor helping to
rebuild families. Hernandez had been incarcerated for over
thirty years with no rules violations. If given the opportunity, he
would continue to make amends to the victims’ families and serve
society. Hernandez pursued many avenues in an attempt to give
letters of remorse to the victims’ families, but was prohibited
from doing so by law. In lieu of those apologies he lived his
amends by helping others.
The court noted that, according to the People, Hernandez
was 21 years old when he committed the crimes. He had served
31 years in prison at the time of the hearing. The court stated
that it understood it had discretion to reduce the degree of
7
Hernandez’s murder conviction in the interests of justice and
understood that there was a presumption in favor of recall and
resentencing. However, that presumption could be overcome if
Hernandez currently posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety. When considering the risk, the court intended to
consider the factors set forth in section 1170.18.
The court found that Hernandez’s post-conviction
rehabilitation efforts supported recall and resentencing.
Hernandez had no disciplinary record. He submitted
commendations; certificates; educational, vocational, and service
achievements; evidence of success in support groups and
mentorships; personal statements; and letters of
recommendation. Hernandez had no criminal history prior to the
commitment offenses, no history of violence after he committed
the offenses, and he had maintained sobriety for over 30 years.
Hernandez had a very low risk assessment of one out of five. He
grew up in an environment of drugs, alcohol, and gangs, and was
high on the night he committed the crimes. He showed extreme
remorse. If released Hernandez would have family support and
had conditional acceptance to a transitional program.
The court found that Hernandez’s “rehabilitation efforts,
while extensive and commendable, [did] not outweigh the
continued risk of danger that [he] pose[d] to . . . public safety.”
“After considering the horrific nature of the crimes committed by
the defendant, the court cannot ignore the callous, cruel, and
senseless manner in which the defendant in two separate
incidents shot and killed two people, one execution style, and
nearly killed a third, done so without any provocation against
young men who were unarmed and vulnerable. At least two who
were not gang members. And at least one, Julio Silva, was not a
8
gang member, did nothing to provoke the defendant, was ordered
by the defendant to kneel down and place his hands behind his
head. [¶] He then told him he was going to die and shot him in
the head, killing him. There is nothing remote about the timing
of the crimes of this case. After killing Torres, defendant and
Cota went out later that night and shot and killed Silva and shot
Alberto Gonzalez. [¶] While the People and the defendant focus
their arguments on the rehabilitation efforts of the defendant,
which is appropriate as a factor in this case, neither party
addresses how much weight the court should give to the
egregious circumstances of [the] killings in determining whether
or not the defendant still poses a risk to the public safety.” The
court found that nothing in the victims’ background explained or
mitigated Hernandez’s actions. The court stated that neither the
People nor Hernandez provided evidence that Hernandez would
be physically or mentally unable to commit similar violent crimes
if released from prison. The court found that Hernandez
currently posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society and
denied the petition.
Defense counsel argued that Hernandez’s criminal record
was immutable, and that the parole board had advised against
holding the commitment crimes against a defendant forever. The
only way that a defendant can show change is through efforts at
rehabilitation. Counsel also informed the court that Hernandez
had end stage liver disease due to hepatitis, which diminished his
physical condition. Counsel strongly disagreed with the court’s
current unreasonable risk to public safety finding. Counsel
argued that most inmates are unable to be nonviolent in prison.
Counsel had never seen an inmate with a clean history. The
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation rated Hernandez’s
9
risk as the lowest possible—a “one.” For someone with a
sentence to life without the possibility of parole that is a nearly
impossible score to achieve. Hernandez accrued no points against
him while incarcerated. Counsel further argued that the special
circumstances alleged were the sole reason for Hernandez’s life
without the possibility of parole sentence, and those were charged
at the sole discretion of the prosecution. The prosecution now
believed that it was no longer in the interests of justice, given
Hernandez’s rehabilitation and his record of 30 years of change.
Counsel emphasized that resentencing would not result in
Hernandez’s release. It would permit him to go before the parole
board, which only grants parole in 20 percent of cases.
Hernandez would not be released from prison—resentencing
would simply be an acknowledgement that the special
circumstance imposed was no longer just.
The prosecutor stated that he had been a district attorney
for 24 years, in the hardcore gang division for eight years, and in
charge of murder resentencing since it commenced in 2019. The
prosecutor had handled thousands of murder resentencing
petitions and reviewed prison records in those cases. He
acknowledged that the crimes were cold-blooded, “[b]ut short of
him performing miracles, this is actually the best [prison record]
I have ever seen. . . . Mr. Hernandez has done everything
someone can do to try to rehabilitate themselves. [¶] And so
seeing that and after reviewing so many [prison records] where
people have not done a single thing to rehabilitate themselves
from the course of 30 years in prison, it does seem like the right
thing . . . .”
The trial court did not reconsider its ruling.
10
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
Section 1172.1 provides, in relevant part, that upon
recommendation of the district attorney of the county in which
the defendant was sentenced, a trial court “may . . . recall the
sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the
defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been
sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and
provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial
sentence.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Section 1172.1 further
authorizes a trial court “in the interest of justice” to “[r]educe a
defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence” and
“[v]acate the defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on any
necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense,
whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading,
with the concurrence of the defendant, and then resentence the
defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment.” (§ 1172.1, subd.
(a)(3)(A), (B).)
In recalling and resentencing pursuant to this provision,
“the court shall consider postconviction factors, including, but not
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).) As relevant here,
11
“[t]he court shall consider if the defendant . . . was a youth as
defined under subdivision (b) of [s]ection 1016.7 at the time of the
commission of the offense, and whether those circumstances were
a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.” (Ibid.)
Section 1016.7, subdivision (b) defines a youth as “any person
under 26 years of age on the date the offense was committed.”
“The court shall state on the record the reasons for its decision to
grant or deny recall and resentencing.” (1172.1, subd. (a)(7).)
When a resentencing request is made by a district attorney,
“[t]here shall be a presumption favoring recall and resentencing
of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the
defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of [s]ection 1170.18.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2); People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
809, 818.) Subdivision (c) of section 1170.18 defines an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as an unreasonable
risk that the defendant will commit a super strike offense.
(People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1310.)
When considering whether the defendant would pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the court may
consider: “(1) The petitioner’s criminal conviction history,
including the type of crimes committed, the extent of injury to
victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the
remoteness of the crimes. [¶] (2) The petitioner’s disciplinary
record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated. [¶] (3)
Any other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines to
be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.18,
subd. (b).)
12
Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a section 1172.1
petition is for abuse of discretion. (People v. E.M. (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082.) A court abuses its discretion when its
ruling “exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances
being considered.” (People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72;
accord, Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1339 [“ ‘ “The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason” ’ ”].)
B. Analysis
Hernandez contends the trial court abused its discretion by
relying on a single, static factor—his commitment offenses—and
failing to give sufficient weight to the copious evidence of his
rehabilitation in prison. We have carefully considered the record
and come to the same view.
The trial court did not explain how the nature of the crimes
or the manner in which the crimes were carried out served as
indicators that Hernandez posed an unreasonable risk of danger
to the public if and when he is later released pursuant to a grant
of parole—or if released now, for that matter. Here, the crimes
were very remote, having been committed over 30 years ago.
There was no evidence presented that murder and attempted
murder are crimes with high rates of recidivism or that anything
about the nature of those offenses suggested a likelihood that
Hernandez would reoffend or commit some other super strike
offense. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that
Hernandez committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal
street gang—a jury found true the gang allegations in all counts.
At the section 1172.1 hearing and in his motion joining the
13
district attorney’s recommendation, Hernandez stated that he
ended his association with gangs 30 years ago when he realized
the magnitude of the suffering that he had caused. There was no
evidence that gang participation or any other motivation would
cause Hernandez to commit a super strike offense if he was
resentenced. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrated that
Hernandez had committed to rehabilitating himself and helping
others for more than 30 years even when he believed he had no
hope of release from prison. Hernandez did not have a history of
violence prior to the night of August 10, 1993, and had not
engaged in any acts of violence—or indeed any misbehavior in
prison—in the more than 30 years since. In sum, none of the
evidence the trial court detailed in its ruling supports the
conclusion that Hernandez poses a current unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety.
Because the court did not rely on evidence tending to show
that Hernandez poses a current unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand with
directions to grant the District Attorney’s petition and resentence
Hernandez. In so holding, we do not minimize the callousness or
senselessness of the crimes that Hernandez committed. We
instead acknowledge that, in light of the copious evidence in the
record, Hernandez does not present a current unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety.
14
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is reversed and the matter is
remanded for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1
consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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