People v. Farrell CA5

CourtListener 10644526Calctapp30.07.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/29/25 P. v. Farrell CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088081
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CRF71147)
v.

DUSTIN BLANE FARRELL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Laura
Leslie Krieg, Judge.
Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberly A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri and
Barton Bowers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant and defendant Dustin Blane Farrell was convicted of two counts of
felony drunk driving and sentenced to the upper term of three years prison. On appeal,
defendant first claims the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial by
relying on the aggravating circumstance under California Rules of Court, rule
1
4.421(b)(2), which was not found true by a jury, to increase his sentence. The People
agree the court erred but contend any error was harmless. Second, defendant claims the
court improperly made dual use of the facts of his prior felony DUI convictions to elevate
his offense to a felony and impose the upper term. The People contend this claim was
forfeited and that it lacks merit.
We conclude the trial court’s error in relying on the aggravating circumstance
under rule 4.421(b)(2) was not harmless. As such, we vacate defendant’s sentence and
remand the matter to give the People an opportunity to try the aggravating facts. In all
other respects, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
California Highway Patrol Officer Nathaniel Minick was driving when he
observed three individuals and two pickup trucks stopped on the shoulder of the road.
Mr. Pimentel was in the driver seat of the truck in rear position, C.B. was sitting in the
driver seat of the lead truck, and the defendant was standing at the front fender of the lead
truck. Officer Minick stopped to offer assistance. The individuals explained they had
slid off the road and were having mechanical issues.
Officer Minick first made contact with defendant along the passenger side of the
lead truck. Minick detected the odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath and observed he
displayed signs of intoxication such as red, watery eyes and slurred speech. Defendant
repeatedly told Minick that his girlfriend, C.B., had been driving the truck. C.B. also had
an odor of alcohol coming from her, appeared very intoxicated and exhibited signs and
symptoms of alcohol intoxication. When Minnick told C.B. that defendant said she had
been driving, she yelled at defendant who eventually confessed he had been the one

1 Hereinafter, undesignated rules are to the California Rules of Court.

2.
driving. Minick had to evaluate both defendant and C.B. for potentially driving under the
influence. Defendant admitted he drank about 12 beers between noon and 7:00 p.m. that
day. Based on defendant’s performance on the field sobriety tests, Minick determined
defendant was under the influence of alcohol and placed him under arrest. Defendant
submitted to a breath test, which showed 0.17 percent blood-alcohol level.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol within
2
10 years of a felony DUI (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5, subd. (a); count 1)
and driving with a 0.08% blood-alcohol content within 10 years of a felony DUI
(§§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550.5, subd. (a); count 2). It was alleged as to both counts that
defendant had a blood-alcohol content of 0.15% or more at 0.17% (§ 23578) and that
defendant had the following prior felony DUI convictions under Penal Code section
1203, subdivision (e)(4): April 2010 DUI in Tuolumne County (case No. CRF31537),
October 2013 DUI in Mariposa County (case No. SC02CRF1300 11669002), August
2017 DUI in Tuolumne County (case No. CRF53436), and October 2017 DUI in
Alameda County (case No. 16CR015724).
The following sentencing allegations pursuant to rule 4.421 were alleged: (b)(1)
defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society; (b)(2)
defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency
proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness; (b)(3) defendant has served a
prior prison term in prison or county jail under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h);
and (c)(1) defendant was out on bail or his own recognizance at the time of the offense in
two other felony cases. The information also included a Watson advisement warning
defendant that if he “continue[s] to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or
both, and, as a result of that driving, someone is killed, you can be charged with murder.”

2 Hereinafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.

3.
On October 24, 2023, defendant admitted he had the following three prior DUI
convictions: 2013 DUI out of Mariposa County, 2017 DUI out of Tuolumne County and
a 2017 DUI out of Alameda County.
On November 7, 2023, the jury found defendant guilty of counts 1 and 2, and
found true that he drove with a blood-alcohol content of .15% or more for both counts.
On December 21, 2023, the court found the aggravating circumstances under rule
4.421(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) true and imposed the upper term of three years prison on
count 1 and three years imposed but stayed on count 2. Defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal on February 16, 2024.
DISCUSSION

I. TRIAL COURT’S ERROR RELYING ON RULE 4.421(b)(2) IN
VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE SECTION 1170, SUBDIVISION (b) WAS
NOT HARMLESS.
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it imposed the upper term on counts
1 and 2 “based on its conclusion that [defendant’s] priors were of increasing seriousness”
which had to be submitted to a jury because it “requires ancillary assessments and
comparisons beyond the mere identification of a conviction.” The People concede the
court erred by relying on aggravating circumstances in violation of Penal Code section
1170, subdivision (b), but argue the error was harmless. We agree the court relied on
aggravating circumstances in violation of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) and
cannot conclude the error was harmless. We vacate the sentence and remand for further
litigation of the aggravating circumstances.
A. Relevant Factual and Procedural History
The trial court expressed it was troubled by this case, stating, “[w]hile the conduct
in this case may not be the worst facts that the Court has ever read regarding a DUI, what
troubles the Court -- what makes this case, in the Court’s view, an aggravated case is not
so much the facts, but the fact that it is his seventh driving under the influence … [at]

4.
only 40 years old.” The court noted there was nothing presented to the court indicating
he had worked on the factors or reasoning that kept him in “this position.” As such, the
court felt defendant “lack[ed] complete insight into [his] addiction, which makes [him]
extremely dangerous to society because [he had] been to prison -- not only [had he]
suffered six prior DUI’s, [he had] been sent to prison on three separate occasions for
DUI’s.” Probation reported that defendant expressed no interest in a residential treatment
program or remaining sober.
The court found that “due to the successive nature of these driving under the
influence [convictions], that it is an extreme risk to public safety, that indicates -- and I
will find the (b)(1) factor to be true; that this kind of conduct that you’ve been engaging
in at least as far back as 2013 -- actually, 2009 was your first DUI out of this county.
And then 2013, and then ’16 and then ’17 and on and on, that you are a serious danger to
society. [¶] Until you stop that, that is a serious danger to everybody else on the road.
People are killed by DUI’s every single day.”
The court found the aggravating circumstance under rule 4.421(b)(2) true, that his
“prior convictions as an adult are numerous and increasing in seriousness. [¶] The Court
views these successive DUI’s, every time you get one, more and more serious because as,
you know I know, I’ve advised you of in prior court appearances under Watson, if you
continue to drink and drive and someone is killed as a result of that drinking and driving,
I can absolutely promise you that they will file murder charges on you because of the
number of DUI’s you have. And then you’re looking at 15 to life in prison.”
The court also found the aggravating circumstance under rule 4.421(b)(3), that he
served a prior term in prison, true.
In imposing the upper term on count 1, the court stated it “found the aggravating
factors to be true to support imposing the aggravated term, as [it] previously stated on the
record.”

5.
B. Standard of Review
“ ‘The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo.’ ”
(People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.)
C. Applicable Law
The Sixth Amendment and due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments require jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of any sentence-
enhancing facts which increase the maximum authorized term, except “the fact of a prior
conviction.” (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 489-490.)
Under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), “[w]hen a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court
shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle
term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” Subdivision (b)(2) explains “[t]he
court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
“Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s prior
convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
In the past, California’s Supreme Court cases rejected a literal or narrow
construction of the fact of a prior conviction and read the exception to include related
determinations, such as the “increasing seriousness” of prior convictions under rule
4.421, subdivision (b)(2), which was considered “more typically and appropriately
undertaken by a court.” (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 819, overruled by
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069; People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 77-82,
overruled by People v. Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1069 [includes prior prison term and

6.
commission of an offense while on probation or parole].) Facts that were considered
related to recidivism, such as prior prison terms, status on parole at the time of offenses
and poor performance on parole were considered exceptions to the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right. (Towne, at p. 79.)
The United States Supreme Court in Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821
(Erlinger) recently held that the “prior conviction” exception persists only “as a ‘narrow
exception’ permitting judges to find only ‘the fact of a prior conviction.’ [Citation.]
Under that exception, a judge may ‘do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment,
than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.’ ” (Id.
at p. 838.) Any other determinations regarding a defendant’s prior criminal history,
including judgments requiring comparisons of the prior offenses and their relationship to
one another, come within the core Sixth Amendment jury trial right rather than the
narrowly circumscribed “fact of a prior conviction” exception. (Ibid.)
Following Erlinger, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730 and concluded Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(3)’s “plain
language” commands that, “excepting prior convictions and in the absence of a waiver or
stipulation, aggravating facts relied upon to justify an upper term must be resolved by the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Lynch, at p. 755.) It explained, the “current statute
specifically empowers the court to choose an upper term only if the facts supporting each
aggravating circumstance on which it relies have been resolved by the jury or otherwise
established as the statute allows.” (Id. at p. 757.)
D. Analysis
Defendant only challenges the trial court’s reliance on the aggravating
circumstance that defendant’s prior convictions were of increasing seriousness under rule
4.421(b)(2) and therefore, we limit our analysis to this factor.

7.
It is undisputed that the court did not comply with Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b) when it found true the aggravating circumstance that defendant’s prior
convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness. Before trial, defendant
admitted he had suffered three prior felony DUI convictions within 10 years: a Tuolumne
3
County conviction in 2017, an Alameda County conviction in 2016 , and a Mariposa
County conviction in 2013. A certified RAP sheet was presented to the court at the time
of sentencing which listed three additional previous DUI convictions. Based on this
information the court concluded that defendant’s convictions were of increasing
seriousness. In so concluding, the court went well beyond the narrow confines of
determining the fact of defendant’s prior convictions. It engaged in an analysis of
whether multiple DUI convictions could be considered as increasing in seriousness,
regardless of the facts involved, which goes beyond the basic fact of the convictions
alone. The court also made judgments about whether a prior Watson admonition would
cause a subsequent DUI conviction to be considered more serious.
The parties agree, as does this court, that Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles
prohibit the trial court from having made the aggravating circumstance finding that
defendant’s prior convictions were of increasing seriousness without following the
procedures set forth in Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). As explained in
Erlinger, judges are permitted under the section 11720, subdivision (b)(3) exception to
find “only ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ ” and “ ‘do no more.’ ” (Erlinger, supra, 602
U.S. at p. 838.) We conclude the trial court erred when it went beyond the fact of the
existence of prior convictions, and made factual findings based on the prior convictions
that they were increasing in seriousness.

3 The Alameda County DUI conviction had a sentencing date of October 31, 2017.

8.
Harmless Error
Where a trial court relied on facts not proven in compliance with Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b) to impose the upper term, the sentence must be vacated and
the matter remanded unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would
necessarily have found the facts underlying every circumstance in aggravation relied
upon by the trial court true beyond a reasonable doubt. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp.
742–743, 761, 775.) “In making this determination, we may ‘ “examine[ ] what the jury
necessarily did find and ask[ ] whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the
jury to find that without also finding the missing fact as well.” [Citation.] In other words,
if “ ‘[n]o reasonable jury’ ” would have found in favor of the defendant on the missing
fact, given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence, the error may be found
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] We may also find the omission
harmless if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that the omitted [fact] was
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 775, italics omitted.)
Our Supreme Court in Lynch “cautioned that a prejudice analysis following a
change in the law respecting proof of aggravating circumstances ‘can be problematic.
The reviewing court cannot assume that the record reflects all of the evidence that would
have been presented to the jury, or that the defendant had the same incentive and
opportunity at a sentencing hearing to contest the aggravating circumstance. [Citation.]
... “[T]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests
on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to
conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would
have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” [Citation.] ... “Many of
the aggravating circumstances described in the rules require an imprecise quantitative or
comparative evaluation of the facts.” ’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 775-776.)
Here, the court primarily relied on aggravating circumstances under rule
4.421(b)(1) and (b)(2) to justify imposing the upper term. The court determined that

9.
defendant posed an “extreme risk to public safety” based on “the successive nature of
these driving under the influence” convictions dating back to 2009, finding defendant to
be a “serious danger to society” under factor (b)(1). This is not challenged by defendant.
Nor does he challenge that he had previously served two separate prison terms under rule
4.421(b)(3), which is supported by the record. Although defendant does not dispute that
a reasonable jury would have found aggravating circumstances under rule 4.421(b)(1)
and (b)(3) true, we must “conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have
found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper
term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the
current statutory requirements.” (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743, 761,
italics added.) This is especially true here where the court appeared to rely more heavily
on the aggravating circumstance at issue under rule 4.421(b)(2), that defendant’s prior
convictions were numerous and increasing in seriousness.
The question of whether defendant’s successive DUI convictions are increasing in
seriousness rests on a vague and subjective standard. The court found this factor true
based on its view that each successive DUI conviction was more and more serious,
stating, “if you continue to drink and drive and someone is killed as a result of that
drinking and driving, I can absolutely promise you that they will file murder charges on
you because of the number of DUI’s you have.” However, the record does not reflect all
of the evidence that could have been presented to the jury to contest the aggravating
circumstance. At a trial, defendant could present facts or circumstances surrounding
prior DUI convictions. This court acknowledged the defendant’s conduct in this case was
not “the worst facts that the Court has ever read regarding a DUI”. Therefore, it is
difficult to conclude with any confidence that a jury would have assessed defendant’s
previous DUI convictions the same way as the trial court.
Whether a jury would find defendant’s prior convictions numerous also requires
“imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts” making it difficult for this

10.
court to assess what a jury would determine. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 775-
776.) Here, defendant had six prior DUI convictions. Whether six DUIs from 2006 to
2017 is “numerous” is a subjective determination. A jury may also find relevant the fact
that defendant’s last DUI conviction was in 2017, six years before the present 2023
conviction.
Based on this record, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury
would have found true that defendant’s prior convictions were numerous and increasing
in seriousness. “Because we cannot find the omission of a jury trial harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact relied upon by the trial court to impose an
upper term, [defendant’s] sentence must be reversed.” (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 775-776, original italics.) We remand the matter and give the People an opportunity
to retry the aggravating facts. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 776-778.)
II. DUAL USE
Defendant contends it was an improper dual use of facts for the trial court to
impose the upper term on counts 1 and 2 based on his prior convictions when his prior
convictions were already used to elevate the offenses to felonies. Defendant concedes
that he failed to raise this claim below but contends the court should consider this claim
because it violates his constitutional right to due process. Alternatively, defendant claims
his counsel was ineffective for failing to object below. The People contend the claim is
forfeited for failure to object at the trial court. The People also argue the claim lacks
merit and as such, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue below. We
agree defendant forfeited this claim and that regardless, the claim lacks merit.
A. Relevant Procedural History
The information alleged that defendant suffered three felony DUI convictions
within 10 years: a Tuolumne County conviction in 2017, an Alameda County conviction
in 2016, and a Mariposa County conviction in 2013. Prior to trial, defendant admitted the
truth of these convictions as alleged.

11.
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of both counts of DUI within 10
years of a prior felony DUI conviction.
At sentencing, the court received defendant’s certified RAP sheet, which showed
defendant had six prior DUI convictions. The court relied on defendant’s six prior DUI
convictions in finding true the aggravating circumstances that he engaged in violent
conduct indicating a serious danger to society, that his prior convictions were numerous
and of increasing seriousness, and that he had served a prior prison term. (See rule
4.421(b)(1), (b)(2) & (b)(3).)
When the court imposed the upper term of three years on defendant, it stated:
“While the conduct in this case may not be the worst facts that the Court has ever read
regarding a DUI, what troubles the Court -- what makes this case, in the Court’s view, an
aggravated case is not so much the facts, but the fact that it is his seventh driving under
the influence ... not only have you suffered six prior DUIs, you have been sent to prison
on three separate occasions for DUIs.”
Defense counsel did not object to the court’s reliance on defendant’s prior
convictions to impose the upper term. Defense counsel did not object that the trial court
made impermissible dual use of any facts.
B. Applicable Law
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(5), provides in relevant part that “[t]he
court may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which
sentence is imposed under any provision of law.” Similarly, rule 4.420(h) provides that
“[a] fact that is an element of the crime on which punishment is being imposed may not
be used to impose a particular term.”
C. Analysis
“Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who does not challenge an assertedly erroneous
ruling of the trial court in that court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on
appeal.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880.) This rule includes “ ‘ “claims

12.
involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary
sentencing choices” ’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406; see In re Sheena K.,
at p. 881.) “ ‘The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the
attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected.’ ” (In re Sheena K., at p. 881.)
“It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely
brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided. …
‘ “ ‘The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling
the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the
party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too
late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of
an appeal.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.)
Defendant concedes that he failed to raise this issue below, which forfeits his
claim on appeal. Despite this failure, defendant contends his claim is cognizable because
the court’s improper dual use of factors violates his constitutional right to due process.
However, “claims deemed waived on appeal involve sentences which, though otherwise
permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner.” (People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) This category includes claims of dual use of facts, or
“cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular
sentencing factor....” (Id. at p. 353.) Therefore, defendant forfeited his dual use claim.
Even considering the merits of defendant’s claim, we conclude the trial court did
not improperly rely on a dual use of facts to impose defendant’s sentence. We agree with
the People that People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746 (Forster) is on point with
the facts of this case and agree with its reasoning.
In Forster, the defendant was convicted of drunk driving and admitted he had
three prior similar offenses, which elevated his conviction to a felony. (Forster, supra,
29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1750.) At sentencing, the court imposed the upper term of three
years. (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant contended the trial court erred by “improperly

13.
making dual use of facts” in imposing the upper term. (Id. at p. 1758.) The court
rejected this claim, explaining that “the elevation of the driving under the influence
offense to a felony under section 23175 required only three prior convictions of driving
under the influence. Forster had more than three prior driving under the influence
convictions; the probation report lists at least seven prior driving under the influence
convictions. Thus, there was a surplus of pertinent prior convictions sufficient to establish
a violation of section 23175 as well as to constitute a valid factor in aggravation, without
the purported overlapping or impermissible dual use of facts claimed by Forster.” (Ibid.)
Here we have similar facts: defendant had six prior DUI convictions, including
three felony convictions within 10 years. Under section 23550.5, subdivision (a), only
one felony DUI conviction is required to elevate a current offense to a felony. As such,
defendant had a surplus of DUI convictions available to aggravate his sentence to the
upper term: two out of the three felony DUI convictions he admitted, and three older DUI
convictions per his certified RAP sheet. As such, defendant fails to demonstrate the trial
court impermissibly relied on a “dual use” of his prior DUI conviction.
Accordingly, defendant’s alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to object to the trial court’s dual use of facts fails. In order to demonstrate
ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must first show counsel’s performance
was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms. Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e.,
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009; see
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688.) Since defendant fails to
demonstrate the trial court improperly made dual use of facts to impose the upper term,
he cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object. (See Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 696 [burden on defendant].) Any objection by counsel that the
court made improper dual use of facts would have been frivolous and would not have

14.
changed the outcome. (See People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122 [“Counsel is
not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile motions.”].)
DISPOSITION
We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the matter to give the People an
opportunity to try the aggravating circumstances in accordance with Penal Code section
1170, subdivision (b). In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

FRANSON, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, J.

SNAUFFER, J.

15.

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.