CourtListener 10642782•People v. Marshall CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/28/25 P. v. Marshall CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B340802
(Los Angeles County Super.
Plaintiff and Respondent, Ct. No. NA044251)
v.
DERRICK MARSHALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
California Appellate Project and Andrew F. Alire, under
appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Derrick Marshall appeals from an order rejecting a joint
recall and resentencing recommendation of the Secretary of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
and the Los Angeles County District Attorney under Penal Code
section 1172.1.1 Marshall contends the superior court abused its
discretion by ignoring the presumption favoring recall and
resentencing that applies because the CDCR and the district
attorney sponsored the resentencing request. He also argues no
evidence was presented that he poses an unreasonable risk of
committing a super-strike offense, and thus there was
insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption favoring recall and
resentencing. The People agree on both points. We accept the
People’s concessions and remand for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2000, Marshall was released from state prison
after serving a sentence for nine counts of second degree robbery.
Over the next six weeks, Marshall committed six robberies at fast
food restaurants and a convenience store; some of the robberies
involved him brandishing a gun, feigning having a weapon, or
making threats to shoot the victim.
In October 2000, a jury convicted Marshall of eight counts
of second degree robbery (§ 211). The trial court found true that
he had 10 prior serious or violent felony convictions qualifying
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code. The CDCR
made its recommendation in 2022 pursuant to section 1170.03.
Effective June 30, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 9) renumbered section 1170.03 as section 1172.1,
without substantive changes. (People v. E.M. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1080, fn. 3.)
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him for sentencing under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds.
(b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), two of which were prior serious
felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court also found true
but struck for sentencing purposes two prior prison term
enhancements (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). The court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 160 years to life.
This court affirmed Marshall’s convictions but remanded
for resentencing because the trial court had improperly imposed
terms under the Three Strikes law on counts for which no prior
strike allegations had been made. (People v. Marshall (Dec. 27,
2001, B146090) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court
vacated the original sentence, declined to dismiss any prior
strikes, and sentenced Marshall to 92 years to life. The court
again struck the prior prison term enhancements. This court
affirmed the judgment, rejecting Marshall’s claim on appeal that
the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his prior
strikes. (People v. Marshall (Jan. 27, 2003, B159683) [nonpub.
opn.].)
In August 2022, the CDCR sent a letter to the superior
court recommending that “Marshall’s sentence be recalled and
that he be resentenced in accordance with [section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1)].” In support of the resentencing request,
Marshall filed briefs that attached a social history and reentry
recommendation report summarizing his in-prison
accomplishments (including being a “model student” while
successfully pursuing a GED and engaging in vocational training)
and his self-improvement programming (including on victim
impact and anger management).
In August 2024, the district attorney’s office joined the
CDCR’s recall and resentencing recommendation after Marshall
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completed additional programming and secured placement in a
residential reentry program. The parties jointly requested that
Marshall be resentenced to time served, such that he would be
immediately eligible for parole after more than 24 years in
prison.
At a hearing, the prosecutor advised the superior court
that, under section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2), “the presumption is
in favor of resentencing unless we present evidence to the court
that he is likely to commit a super strike.” Because the
prosecutor had “no evidence to support the idea that [Marshall]
would commit a super strike, [she had] nothing to present to the
court to overcome the presumption in favor of resentencing.”
Instead, the prosecutor noted that although Marshall, then 64
years old, had been in prison for more than two decades, his
prison record was free of any incidents involving violence, fights,
gang involvement, or possession of drugs or weapons. The
prosecutor further commended Marshall for completing all
requested programming and working to earn a GED, earning
instructors’ praise for his respectful and positive behavior. She
also emphasized that Marshall’s drug use had been a factor in his
prior criminal behavior, but he had achieved and maintained
sobriety during his lengthy period of incarceration.
The court rejected the recall and resentencing
recommendation, citing Marshall’s history of serious felonies and
the fact that he was not young when he committed some of the
offenses. The court concluded that Marshall “is a threat to
society and the court exercises its discretion in declining to
resentence” him.
Marshall timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
Under section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), upon the
recommendation of the CDCR or the district attorney, a superior
court may recall the sentence of a defendant committed to state
prison and resentence him or her. A court may then, “in the
interest of justice,” reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment by
modifying the sentence or vacating the defendant’s conviction
and imposing judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense
or lesser related offense. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3).) The court must
“apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).)
When deciding whether to resentence the defendant, the
court “shall consider postconviction factors, including, but not
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).) The court must also
consider if the defendant experienced “psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma.” (Ibid.) The court must “state on the record
the reasons for its decision to grant or deny recall and
resentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(7).)
Where the CDCR or district attorney has recommended
resentencing, “[t]here shall be a presumption favoring recall and
resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a
court finds the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section
5
1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) Section 1170.18, subdivision
(c), defines an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as
“an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new
violent felony within the meaning of” section 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1170.18, subd. (c); see People v. Valencia (2017)
3 Cal.5th 347, 351.) Known colloquially as “super-strike”
offenses, the felonies listed under section 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv), include sexually violent offenses, sex crimes against
children, homicide offenses, solicitation to commit murder, and
other serious or violent felony offenses punishable by life
imprisonment or death. (See Valencia, at p. 351 & fn. 3.)
We review the rejection of a recommendation for recall and
resentencing under section 1172.1 for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082; People v.
McCallum (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 202, 211.) A court abuses its
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or bases its
decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Whitmill (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147; see also People v. Knoller (2007)
41 Cal.4th 139, 156.)
Marshall argues the superior court abused its discretion in
rejecting the CDCR and district attorney’s joint recommendation
because the court failed to apply the presumption favoring recall
and resentencing under section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2). He
also argues that even if it applied the statutory presumption, the
court abused its discretion by rejecting the recommendation to
recall and resentence Marshall because the record does not
support a finding that Marshall “currently poses an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety,” as defined in section 1170.18,
subdivision (c).
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The People agree that remand for resentencing is
necessary. They assert the record suggests the court did not
apply the statutory presumption under section 1172.1,
subdivision (b)(2). Further, at oral argument, they argued that
because there was no evidence presented from which to conclude
Marshall currently poses an unreasonable risk of committing a
super-strike offense, the presumption was not overcome.
We accept the People’s concessions and remand for recall
and resentencing under section 1172.1.
DISPOSITION
The order rejecting the CDCR and district attorney’s recall
and resentencing recommendation is reversed. The matter is
remanded, and, consistent with section 1172.1, the superior court
is directed to recall Marshall’s sentence and the commitment
previously ordered and to resentence Marshall in the same
manner as if he had not previously been sentenced.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.
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