People v. Rivera CA3

CourtListener 10642781Calctapp28.07.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/28/25 P. v. Rivera CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101230

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23FE015929)

v.

HUGO LEONEL RIVERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found defendant Hugo Leonel Rivera guilty of vandalism (Pen. Code,
§ 594, subd. (a)—count two)1 and resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer
(§ 148, subd. (a)(1)—count three).2 In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true
that defendant had suffered a prior strike. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The jury found not true the aggravating fact that the vandalism involved damage of
great monetary value. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(9).) The jury could not reach a

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The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in prison for count two (an upper
term of three years doubled for his prior strike conviction), and a consecutive term of 120
days in county jail for count three. The trial court imposed the upper term on count two
based on the fact that defendant had served a prior prison term.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred when it imposed an
upper term based on an aggravating fact that was not found true by a jury. The People
concede the error but argue it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally,
defendant argues, and the People concede, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to
reflect 120 days of additional custody credits awarded by the court at sentencing. We
will order the abstract of judgment and minute order corrected to conform to the trial
court’s oral pronouncement of judgment with respect to count three and custody credits.
The judgment is affirmed.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Prior Prison Term Finding
The trial court imposed the upper term on count two based on the aggravating fact
that defendant had served a prior prison term. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3).)
The court made the prior prison term finding itself based on the certified record of
defendant’s prior strike conviction.
Our Supreme Court recently held that “a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all
aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that
expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily
provided midterm.”3 (People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086, fn. omitted (Wiley).)

verdict as to a charge of arson (§ 451, subd. (d)—count one). The court declared a
mistrial as to that count.
3 This conclusion required the court to overrule its contrary holdings in People v. Towne
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 and People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799. (Wiley, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 1084.) At issue in Wiley were the aggravating facts for “increasing

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Defendant contends the court erred in imposing an upper term because the prior prison
term aggravating fact had not been found true by a jury. The People concede this was
error but argue it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with the People that
any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
“When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify
imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman
standard of review. ([Citation]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 87.) Under
that standard, ‘a sentence imposed under . . . section 1170[, subdivision ](b) must be
reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt
that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating
facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those
facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.’ [Citations.]
Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if ‘the record contains evidence that
could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.”
(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.) “We may also find the omission harmless if we can
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that the omitted [fact] was uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence.’ ” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775.)
We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found true the
prior prison term aggravating fact. Certified, admissible documents demonstrated the
existence of defendant’s prior conviction and prior prison term, and defendant did not
dispute the existence of the prior prison term. We disagree with defendant’s suggestion
that the fact the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the arson charge suggests we cannot
determine what the jury would have found regarding a prior prison term allegation. We

seriousness” of a defendant’s prior convictions (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)) and
“unsatisfactory” “performance on probation” (id., rule 4.421(b)(5)). (Wiley, supra, at p.
1082.) The court did not expressly address the aggravating fact of a prior prison term
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)).

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conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the aggravating fact
that defendant served a prior prison term to be true.
B. Custody Credits
Defendant argues, and the People concede, that the abstract of judgment does not
accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of the court with respect to custody credits and
must be corrected to reflect his entitlement to 120 additional days of custody credits. We
accept the People’s concession, and order additional related corrections. At sentencing,
the court stated it would “impose a sentence of 120 days as to Count 3 consecutive to the
time imposed . . . . The defendant does have credits in this case of 241 days actual. The
Court will also impose 240 days of good-time/work-time.” The abstract of judgment and
the sentencing minute order state that the court awarded 181 days of actual credit and 180
days for good conduct for a total of 361 credit days. It appears that the clerk deducted the
120 days from the custody credits to deem the sentence for count three served even
though the trial court did not do so in its oral pronouncement. “An abstract of judgment
is not the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different from the trial court’s oral
judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.”
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Likewise, the oral pronouncement of
judgment controls over the clerk’s minute order. (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381,
384, fn. 2.) We will direct the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment and a
corrected minute order correcting these clerical errors.

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II. DISPOSIITON
The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and
sentencing minute order to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment with
respect to custody credits and the sentence on count three. The amended abstract of
judgment shall be forwarded to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The
judgment is affirmed.

/S/

RENNER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/S/

KRAUSE, J.

/S/

FEINBERG, J.

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