People v. Rodriguez CA2/1

CourtListener 10638713Calctapp22.07.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/21/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337305

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA031120)

v. ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION (NO CHANGE
SANTIAGO AGUILAR RODRIGUEZ, IN JUDGMENT); ORDER
DENYING APPELLANT’S
Defendant and Appellant. PETITION FOR REHEARING

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 26, 2025
is modified as follows:

1. On page 9, a footnote is inserted at the end of part B
of the Discussion following the sentence: “Because the disparate
treatment of which defendant complains is supported by a rational
basis, the defendant’s equal protection argument fails.” The inserted
footnote 5 shall read:

5 Rodriguez also asserts that section 3051 deprives him of
equal protection because, as a young adult sentenced to LWOP,
he is treated differently than young adults not sentenced to
LWOP. He concedes, however, that our Supreme Court recently
rejected this argument in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834, and
that we are bound to follow it under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455. Nevertheless, he
raises the issue to preserve it “for purposes of eventual further
review in the federal courts.” We agree that we are bound to
follow Hardin and therefore reject his additional argument.

2. The footnotes following the newly inserted footnote 5 shall
be renumbered accordingly.

These modifications do not constitute a change in judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed on July 11, 2025 is
denied.

________________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J. WEINGART, J.

2
Filed 6/26/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337305

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA031120)
v.

SANTIAGO AGUILAR RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Terrell, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________________
Defendant Santiago Aguilar Rodriguez appeals from
an order denying his motion for a Franklin1 proceeding. He
contends the statute that excludes him from a youth offender
parole hearing violates his constitutional rights to equal
protection of the laws. He also contends that his sentence of
two terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for
one murder is unauthorized. Lastly, he contends his sentence
violates California’s constitutional prohibition against cruel or
unusual punishment. We reject his constitutional arguments but
agree with him that only one LWOP sentence is authorized for a
conviction of one count of murder. We therefore affirm the order
denying the Franklin proceeding but strike the unauthorized
LWOP sentence.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 1998, defendant, then 25 years old, fired a
handgun from inside a vehicle killing one person and wounding
another. In January 2000, a jury convicted defendant of first
degree murder (count 1; § 187, subd. (a)) and willful, deliberate,
and premeditated attempted murder (count 2; §§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)). The jury found true a special circumstance allegation
that the defendant committed the murder “by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at
another person outside the vehicle.” (See § 190.2, subd. (a)(21).)
The jury also found true certain firearm enhancements. (Former
§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1); §§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022.55.) He
admitted a prior strike conviction for voluntary manslaughter.

1 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).

2
The court sentenced defendant to LWOP on the special
circumstances murder conviction (§§ 190, subd. (a)), 190.2,
subd. (a)), doubled under the “Three Strikes” law to two LWOP
terms (former § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1); former § 667, subd. (e)(1)),
plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and five years for a prior
serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
On the attempted murder conviction, the court sentenced
defendant to life with the possibility of parole (§ 664, subd. (a)),
doubled under the Three Strikes law (former § 1170.12,
subd. (c)(1), former § 667, subd. (e)(1)), plus 10 years for the
firearm enhancement under former section 12022.5, subdivision
(a)(1). We affirmed the judgment in November 2002. (People v.
Rodriguez (Nov. 25, 2002, B142910) [nonpub. opn.].)
On November 3, 2022, defendant filed a motion under
section 1203.01 and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 451
(Cook) for a Franklin proceeding for the purpose of preserving
mitigating evidence for use in a future youth offender
parole hearing. Defendant also requested the appointment of
counsel. Although youth offender parole hearings are statutorily
unavailable to persons sentenced to LWOP who were 18 years
or older at the time they committed their crimes (§ 3051,
subd. (b)(4)), defendant argued that he is entitled to such a
parole hearing and a Franklin proceeding based on federal and
state constitutional equal protection guarantees.
The court appointed counsel for defendant, who filed a
supplemental brief in support of defendant’s motion.
On March 7, 2024, the court found that defendant is not
eligible for a Franklin proceeding and denied defendant’s motion.
Defendant timely appealed.

3
DISCUSSION
A. Correction of Unauthorized LWOP Sentence
Under the Three Strikes law in effect when defendant
committed his crimes, a defendant convicted of a felony who
“has one prior felony conviction that has been pled and proved,
the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate
term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment
for the current felony conviction.” (Former § 667, subd. (e)(1)
[Stats. 1994, ch. 12, § 1, p. 74]; former § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)
[Prop. 184, § 1, approved Nov. 8, 1994].) In People v. Hardy
(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1429 (Hardy), Division Two of this court
held that when the sentence for a crime is LWOP, this provision
of the Three Strikes law doubles the sentence to two LWOP
terms. (Hardy, supra, at p. 1434.) In accord with Hardy, the
trial court sentenced defendant to two LWOP terms.
Other courts disagreed with or declined to follow Hardy.
(See People v. Smithson (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 480, 504; People v.
Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 369.) In Smithson, the court
explained that under the one prior strike provision of the Three
Strikes law, “only two types of sentence terms are doubled: a
determinate term and the minimum term of an indeterminate
term.” (Smithson, supra, at p. 503.) “An LWOP sentence,”
however, “is an indeterminate sentence without a minimum
term. . . . Because an LWOP sentence is not a determinate
term and does not contain a minimum term, it is not subject
to the doubling requirement.” (Smithson, supra, at p. 503.)
In 2024, the same court and division that decided Hardy
changed its view. (People v. Mason (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
411, 416.) By agreeing with the “better reasoned” cases “holding
that it is improper to double an LWOP sentence under the Three

4
Strikes Law” (Mason, supra, at p. 416), the court “harmonize[d]
the law in California and [brought] uniformity (and hence
certainty) to the law on this issue” (id. at p. 418). The Attorney
General agrees with this view, as do we.
Mason, like the instant case, was an appeal from a
postconviction order denying defendant’s motion for a Franklin
proceeding. Although the challenge to the defendant’s original
sentence was arguably too late and therefore beyond the court’s
jurisdiction, the court explained that an unauthorized sentence
“may be corrected whenever the error is brought to a reviewing
court’s attention.” (Mason, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 415;
see People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 827, fn. 5 [if an
unauthorized sentence “comes to [the court’s] attention in a case
pending before [the court], it is subject to correction”].) This
principle applies here and, as in Mason, the Attorney General
does not dispute that we can, and should, correct the sentence
in this case. We therefore strike the second LWOP sentence on
count 1, murder.

B. Youth Offender Parole Hearings and Equal
Protection
Under section 3051, a person who commits a crime when
he or she is under 18 years of age and is sentenced for that
crime to LWOP is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing
and eligible for release on parole after 25 years of incarceration.
(§ 3051, subd. (b)(4).) In Franklin, our state Supreme Court
established that defendants who are entitled to receive a youth
offender parole hearing in the future have the right to make
a record of information that may be relevant to that future
parole hearing. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) Courts
refer to this information-preserving opportunity as a “Franklin

5
hearing” (Mason, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 414) or “Franklin
proceeding.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 450.)2 An incarcerated
person whose judgment is “otherwise final” may file a motion
under section 1203.01 for a Franklin proceeding if the person
is “entitled” to a youth offender parole hearing. (Cook, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 451; see id. at p. 458 [“[t]he motion should establish
the inmate’s entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing”].)
The Legislature has determined that “an individual . . .
sentenced to [LWOP] for a controlling offense that was committed
after the person had attained 18 years of age” is not entitled to
a youth offender parole hearing. (§ 3051, subd. (h); see People v.
Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 839 (Hardin).)3 The controlling

2 In Cook, our Supreme Court explained that “Franklin
processes are more properly called ‘proceedings’ rather than
‘hearings.’ A hearing generally involves definitive issues of law
or fact to be determined with a decision rendered based on that
determination. [Citations.] A proceeding is a broader term
describing the form or manner of conducting judicial business
before a court. [Citations.] While a judicial officer presides
over a Franklin proceeding and regulates its conduct, the officer
is not called upon to make findings of fact or render any final
determination at the proceeding’s conclusion.” (Cook, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 450, fn. 3.)
3 Section 3051, subdivision (h) also provides that where a
person is sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes law, he is not
entitled to a youth offender parole hearing. Defendant argues
that this provision does not apply to him because, as explained
in part A, ante, the sentence for his controlling offense of murder
under count 1 cannot be doubled under the Three Strikes law.
He contends, therefore, that he was not sentenced on that count
pursuant to the Three Strikes law for purposes of section 3051,

6
offense in this case is murder, for which defendant was sentenced
to LWOP. (See § 3051, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Defendant murdered his
victim when he was 25 years old. He is thus statutorily ineligible
for a youth offender parole hearing and, accordingly, not entitled
to a Franklin proceeding to preserve evidence for such a hearing.4
Defendant contends that denying these procedures to him
deprives him of equal protection of the laws under the federal
and state Constitutions because, as a young adult sentenced to
LWOP, he is treated differently than juvenile offenders sentenced
to LWOP. We disagree.
When, as here, a defendant challenges a law that
distinguishes between identifiable groups or classes of persons
on the basis that the distinctions are inconsistent with equal
protection, the “pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of review. The burden is on the party
challenging the law to show that it is not.” (Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at pp. 850–851.) Defendant and the Attorney General
agree that the applicable standard for evaluating the defendant’s
equal protection challenge is whether there is a rational basis

subdivision (h). We do not address this contention because,
regardless of whether defendant’s LWOP sentence was imposed
pursuant to the Three Strikes law, defendant is not eligible for a
youth offender parole hearing because he was “sentenced to
[LWOP] for a controlling offense.” (§ 3051, subd. (h).)
4 A person who is not eligible for a youth offender parole
hearing but otherwise eligible for parole, may be entitled to a
Franklin hearing. (See People v. Delgado (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
95, 103–104.) Defendant, sentenced to LWOP, does not contend
that he is otherwise eligible for parole.

7
for the Legislature’s disparate treatment of individuals serving
LWOP sentences who, like defendant, committed their crimes
when they were adults and those who committed their crimes
as juveniles. (Cf. Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.) This
standard “sets a high bar before a law is deemed to lack even
the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive constitutional
scrutiny.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 289.)
The Courts of Appeal that have considered this issue
have unanimously upheld the disparate treatment defendant
challenges. In People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193
(Sands), the court explained that “[t]he Legislature had a
rational basis to distinguish between offenders with [LWOP
sentences] based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such
a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment. [Citations.]
But the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment
when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26.”
(Sands, supra, at p. 204.) The Sands court thus “agree[d] with
the other courts of appeal that the Legislature could rationally
decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further.”
(Ibid.; accord, Mason, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 415; People v.
Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 285–286, revd. on other
grounds by Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834; In re Murray (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 456, 464; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
326, 347; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779–780.)
We agree with these authorities and note that defendant does not
cite any controlling contrary authority.
Defendant contends that the cited cases are wrongly
decided and that considerations that have shaped the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence concerning the
punishment of juveniles—such as the juvenile defendant’s lack

8
of maturity, undeveloped sense of responsibility, susceptibility to
negative influences and outside pressures, and underdeveloped
characters (see, e.g., Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460,
469-472; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 569–570 (Roper);
Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68–69; People v. Caballero
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268)—“should apply to [defendant], even
though he was 25 years old” when he committed his crimes.
State and federal courts, however, have determined that 18 years
of age—“the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood”—is the point where
the Eighth Amendment compels different treatment of youth for
the most severe sentences. (See Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 574;
accord, People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 405 (Gamache)
[the United States Supreme Court has drawn a “line, prohibiting
the death penalty for those younger than 18 years of age, but
not for those 18 years of age and older”].) This is a line the
Legislature adopted in enacting section 3051 to address and
render moot Eighth Amendment challenges to lengthy juvenile
sentences. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 276–277; Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 845.) As the Sands court concluded,
in doing so “the Legislature could rationally decide to remedy
unconstitutional sentences but go no further.” (Sands, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 204.) Because the disparate treatment of
which defendant complains is supported by a rational basis, the
defendant’s equal protection argument fails.

9
C. Cruel or Unusual Punishment
Defendant contends that his LWOP sentence violates
our state constitutional prohibition against “[c]ruel or unusual
punishment.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.)5
As the Attorney General argues, defendant did not raise
this issue below and has therefore forfeited the issue on appeal.
(See People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 239–240; People v.
Brewer (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 199, 212; People v. Baker (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720.) Moreover, defendant does not explain
how his contention would have been relevant to the trial
court’s consideration of his motion for a Franklin proceeding or
cognizable in this postconviction appeal from the denial of such
a motion.
Even if the argument is properly before us, it is without
merit.6 Punishment may violate the California Constitution
if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted
that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.) Under
Lynch, court may determine that a sentence is cruel or unusual
under three “techniques”: (1) by examining the “nature of

5 Although defendant discusses cases arising from the
United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment guaranty
against cruel and unusual punishment in connection with
his equal protection argument, his separate argument that
his sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment relies
solely on the California Constitution’s provision.
6 Because we address and reject defendant’s claim on the
merits of his claim, we do not reach the question whether his trial
counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to raise the issue
below.

10
the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the
degree of danger both present to society” (id. at p. 425); (2) by
“compar[ing] the challenged penalty with the punishments
prescribed in the same jurisdiction for different offenses,
which, by the same test, must be deemed more serious” (id.
at p. 426); and (3) by comparing “the challenged penalty with
the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other
jurisdictions” (id. at p. 436).
Defendant concedes that his sentence “may not meet
the three-part test set forth in Lynch,” and he does not
assert any argument that it does. Indeed, an LWOP sentence
imposed on a 25-year-old for a premeditated murder with a
special circumstance does not shock the conscience or offend
fundamental notions of human dignity. The sentence is less
severe than death sentences our state Supreme Court has upheld
against individuals younger than defendant. (See People v.
Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429–430 (Flores) [death penalty for
defendants between 18 and 20 years old is not unconstitutional];
People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191 (Powell) [death penalty
for 18-year-old with “intellectual shortcomings” does not violate
federal and state Constitutions]; Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th
at p. 407 [death penalty imposed on defendant for murder
committed when defendant was 18 years old and his “lengthy
confinement under a sentence of death” does not violate
California Constitution].)
Instead, defendant contends that the Legislature, in
enacting section 3051, has rendered his LWOP sentence cruel
or unusual by recognizing “the reduced culpability of offenders
who commit their offenses in question before they become
26 years old and . . . for giving some such offenders youth

11
offender parole hearings at some point.” That is, although
his sentence was constitutional when imposed, it has become
unconstitutional because the Legislature has since provided
juvenile offenders and young adults sentenced to terms other
than LWOP, but not him, with youth offender parole hearings.
Defendant does not support the point with apposite authority
and acknowledges that there is contrary authority, citing
People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482 [rejecting
argument that sentence was “categorically cruel and/or
unusual” because defendant committed his crime just “five
months after [his] 18th birthday”].) Defendant suggests,
however, that Argeta is not persuasive because it was decided
before the enactment of section 3051. Numerous recent Supreme
Court and Court of Appeal decisions, however, have upheld death
or LWOP sentences for young adults since the enactment of
section 3051. (See Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 429–430 [death
penalty for defendants between 18 and 20 years]; Powell, supra,
6 Cal.5th at p. 191 [death penalty for 18-year-old]; Gamache,
supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 407–408 [same]; People v. Ellis (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 536, 551 [“de facto LWOP sentence imposed on
a young adult offender”]; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
427, 438–439 [LWOP sentence for 21-year-old]; People v.
Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1032 [LWOP sentence
for 18-year-old]; People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
183, 190 [19-year-olds sentenced to de facto LWOP terms],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Williams (2024)
17 Cal.5th 99, 137, fn. 12; People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
612, 617 [rejecting 20-year-old defendant’s argument that his
de facto LWOP sentence was unconstitutional].)

12
In his reply brief, defendant attempts to distinguish
some of the cases cited above on the ground that they addressed
arguments under the Eighth Amendment to the federal
Constitution, which is concerned with “cruel and unusual
punishment,” not the disjunctive “[c]ruel or unusual punishment”
provision in our state Constitution. (Compare U.S. Const., 8th
Amend. with Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) He does not, however,
explain why courts should reach a different conclusion under our
state Constitution; and, as noted above, he does not attempt to
apply the Lynch techniques for analyzing violations of our state’s
constitutional provision.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendant’s argument
that his sentence violates California’s prohibition against cruel or
unusual punishment.

13
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s motion for a Franklin
proceeding is affirmed.
The second of the two LWOP terms imposed on count 1 is
stricken. The court is directed to prepare an amended abstract
of judgment reflecting the imposition of only one LWOP term on
count 1 and to send a copy of the amended abstract of judgment
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

14

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.