CourtListener 10637978•People v. Smith CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/21/25 P. v. Smith CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B338666
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA108960)
v.
REMONE SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher W. Dybwad, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon and Megan
Moine, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Remone Smith (defendant) challenges the trial court’s
order denying his motion to suppress the gun and drugs that
police found in his backpack. We need not decide whether the
search was unreasonable because the discovery of the gun and
drugs was inevitable. We accordingly affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
On a Saturday night in early October 2023, defendant was
leaving a public park near 7th and Broadway in Venice. This
area is a “stronghold for the Venice Shoreline Crip gang.”
Two Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers drove
up alongside defendant, who held a backpack in his hand, as he
walked down the sidewalk; from inside the patrol car, the officer
put a light on defendant and “engaged” him “in conversation.”
The officers got out of their car. When they did, defendant
“dropped” the backpack he was carrying onto the ground between
the sidewalk and a parked car; as the backpack hit the ground,
one of the officers heard a “metal cling” consistent with the sound
a gun would make. Defendant then offered that he was “fresh
out of prison” and he “just did 16 years,” but said he was not on
parole.
The officers placed defendant in handcuffs. One of the
officers picked up the backpack, supporting the bottom of it with
his palm, and moved it to rest atop a nearby retaining wall. As
he did, the officer felt the distinctly L-shaped form of a firearm
through the backpack’s material.
2
The officers at the scene called for backup, and two more
officers arrived. An officer then moved the backpack more than a
car length away from where defendant was standing while cuffed.
The officer then opened the backpack to verify that what he had
heard and had felt was, in fact, a firearm. Inside, he found a
loaded firearm, methamphetamine and two bags of candy.
Defendant was placed under arrest. The officers ultimately
determined that defendant was not on parole.
II. Procedural Background
The People charged defendant with (1) possessing a
controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Safety Code, §
11370.1, subd. (a)), (2) being a person with a prior violent
conviction—namely, a prior conviction for voluntary
manslaughter—in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29900,
subd. (a)(1))1, (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)), and (4) being a felon in possession of ammunition (§
30305, subd. (a)(1)). The People further alleged that defendant’s
prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter constituted a “strike”
within the meaning of our State’s Three Strikes Law (§§ 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(j)).
At the preliminary hearing on these charges, defendant
moved to suppress the gun and drugs. The trial court denied the
motion, ruling that (1) the officers were “justified” in detaining
defendant for both the “parole check” as well as potential
possession of a firearm by a felon after “hear[ing] a metal cling”;
(2) the officers were “justified in picking up the backpack” after
defendant dropped the backpack—which the court found to be
“highly suspicious”—and after the officer heard a “metal cling”;
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
3
and (3) the officers were “justified” in “look[ing] inside” the
backpack after “feel[ing the] weapon” through the backpack’s
exterior.
Defendant renewed his motion to suppress before the trial
court. After soliciting briefing from the People and entertaining
argument, the court denied the motion.
Defendant subsequently entered a no contest plea to the
charge of being a person with a prior violent conviction in
possession of a firearm. The trial court imposed a prison
sentence of 16 months.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress. Because defendant litigated the motion
during the preliminary hearing and did not introduce any
additional evidence before the trial court, “we are ‘concerned
solely with the findings of the [preliminary hearing court].’”
(People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242.) “We defer to the
magistrate’s express and implied findings of fact if supported by
substantial evidence,” but “independently assess whether the
challenged search . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.;
People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.)
Because our review of the Fourth Amendment analysis is
independent, we are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning.
(People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 814.)
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the validity of the
officers’ conduct in stopping him or in seizing his backpack;
instead, he argues that the officers’ search of his backpack
violates the Fourth Amendment.
As pertinent here, the Fourth Amendment protects the
4
“right of the people to be secure in their . . . effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)
Searches of personal property are “per se unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment” unless (1) law enforcement
has a warrant or (2) the People establish that an exception to the
warrant requirement applies. (United States v. Place (1983) 462
U.S. 696, 701; Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 382;
United States v. Jeffers (1951) 342 U.S. 48, 51.) A warrantless
search conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant
requirement is valid only if it stays within the scope of that
exception. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500 [“‘The scope
of the search must be “strictly tied to and justified by” the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible’”].)
Because defendant’s backpack was not searched pursuant
to a warrant, the People seek to justify the search as a
permissible frisk for weapons under the Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392
U.S. 1 (Terry) exception to the warrant requirement. Under the
Terry exception, police may pat down a suspect—as well as the
suspect’s personal effects—for weapons if “police have a
reasonable belief” that (1) “the suspect poses a danger,” and (2)
“the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” (Michigan
v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (Long); People v. Lafitte (1989)
211 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1431 [authorizing Terry “search for
weapons in the area within a suspect’s reach”].)
Currently, the courts are split on whether a Terry pat down
search is reasonable when, at the time of the search, the suspect
is secured and cannot realistically reach the item being searched.
In People v. Ritter (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 274, the court held
that “Terry does not restrict a preventive search to the person of a
detained suspect even when the detainee is under the control of
5
the officer and cannot gain access to weapons.” (Id. at p. 279.)
Ritter went on to uphold a search of a “fanny pack” by a lone
officer who could see the outline of a gun inside the pack worn by
the suspect and who searched the pack after placing the suspect
in the back of a patrol car. (Id. at pp. 276-277, 280.)
The bulk of cases in federal court, however, have construed
the reach of Terry frisks more narrowly to permit pat down
searches only if officers “have a reasonable belief that [the
suspect] could get ‘immediate control’” of a weapon from the place
being searched. (United States v. Leo (7th Cir. 2015) 792 F.3d
742, 750 (Leo).) Whether a suspect is detained or handcuffed is
not dispositive of whether they can gain immediate control of a
weapon; instead, courts look to whether it is reasonable to believe
that the suspect can still “break away from police control and
retrieve a weapon” from the place being searched. (Long, supra,
463 U.S. at p. 1051.)
Under this narrower rule, police may conduct a Terry pat
down search of the suspect’s personal effects for weapons if a
suspect is uncuffed, in the midst of being patted down, or within
“easy” or “lunge reach” of a personal item (even if handcuffed).
(United States v. Johnson (5th Cir. 1991) 932 F.2d 1071, 1072
[officer search of coveralls resting on nearby chair through which
outline of a gun was visible, while suspect was “within the lunge
reach” of coveralls; Terry search of coveralls valid]; United States
v. Flippin (9th Cir. 1991) 924 F.2d 163, 166-167 [officer search of
unexpectedly heavy bag, while officer was alone with uncuffed
suspect; Terry search of bag valid]; United States v. Atlas (8th
Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 447, 449, 451 [officer search of nylon bag after
hearing “thud” when bag hit the ground and feeling barrel
through the bag’s exterior, immediately after suspect was
6
subdued and cuffed by two officers; Terry search of bag valid];
United States v. Johnson (8th Cir. 1980) 637 F.2d 532, 533-535
[officer search of bag after seeing cloth-covered gun barrel
protruding from top, while suspect was within feet of the bag
being patted down by another officer; Terry search of bag valid].)
But, under this approach, Terry does not justify a search of a
personal effect where a suspect is handcuffed and where there is
no possibility that they can reach or gain control of a weapon
from that effect. (Leo, supra, 792 F.3d at pp. 749-750 [officer
search of backpack when suspect was cuffed and out of reach of
the backpack; Terry does not apply]; United States v. Buster (4th
Cir. 2022) 26 F.4th 627, 634 [officer search of bag when suspect
was “handcuffed on the ground” and out of reach of the bag; Terry
does not apply]; United States v. Vaughan (9th Cir. 1983) 718
F.2d 332, 333-334 [officer search of briefcase when suspect was
handcuffed and three other agents were on the scene; Terry does
not apply].) In this situation, and unless a different exception to
the warrant requirement applies, the officers must obtain a
warrant to search the personal effect. (Accord, United States v.
Walker (6th Cir. 2010) 615 F.3d 728, 730-731 [officers obtained
warrant to search suspect’s bag].)
Which rule we apply would normally be outcome
determinative in this case. That is because defendant could not
realistically reach the backpack at the time of the search: At that
time, defendant was cuffed behind his back, there were three
other officers at the scene, and the backpack was more than a car
length away from where defendant was being detained.2
2 The same analysis applies even if we examine whether the
officers searched defendant’s backpack incident to his arrest.
Searches incident to arrest are another exception to the warrant
7
We need not decide which rule to apply (and need not
consider the People’s further arguments regarding which rule to
apply)3 because, even if we apply the narrower rule applied in
federal court and invalidate the search, the police would have
inevitably discovered the gun and drugs in this case.4 The
requirement. (United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218,
224; People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213.) Although
such searches may occur prior to the arrest itself (Rawlings v.
Kentucky (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 111; In re Lennies H. (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 1232, 1239-1240), such searches—like Terry pat-
down searches—are also limited to only those areas it is
“possibl[e]” for an arrestee to reach (United States v. Horsley (4th
Cir. 2024) 105 F.4th 193, 208).
3 The People assert that the “plain feel” doctrine authorizes
the search; it does not. The “plain feel” doctrine authorizes an
officer to search an area that Terry permits the officer to pat
down in the first place (Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S.
366, 372-375); the doctrine cannot expand the area that may be
permissibly patted down. The People also assert that Illinois v.
Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119 upheld a Terry frisk of a personal
effect, but the issue in Wardlow was reasonable suspicion to stop
in the first place; because Wardlow did not opine on whether
Terry also authorized the search of the effect (id. at p. 124, fn. 2),
it is of no assistance. (B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10
Cal.5th 1, 11 [“‘“cases are not authority for propositions not
considered”’”].)
4 Although this issue was not raised below, it may be raised
for the first time on appeal so long as the necessary facts were
developed in the record below. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th
412, 449, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Barber v. Barnes (C.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2012) 2012 U.S. Lexis
179867; Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 138-139
[“When, as here, the record fully establishes another basis for
8
inevitable discovery doctrine applies when the People establish a
“strong probability” that the illegally seized evidence “would have
been discovered by the police through lawful means,” including
through “application of routine police procedures.” (People v.
Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 665, 680-681;
People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800; People v. Hughston
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072.) Defendant does not dispute
that there is probable cause to believe the backpack contained a
firearm based on the “metal cling”; the officer so testified, and we
have no basis to disregard the trial court’s finding that this
testimony was credible. Defendant also admitted to the police he
was a felon within seconds of encountering them. Thus, the
police had probable cause to arrest defendant before ever
searching his backpack. Upon his arrest, and because defendant
was alone, police would have seized the backpack and subjected it
to the usual procedures for taking inventory of an arrestee’s
personal effects. (People v. Scigliano (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 26,
29-30; see Illinois v. Lafayette (1983) 462 U.S. 640, 646-648
(Lafayette).) When they took that inventory, they would have
opened the backpack and found the gun and the drugs.
In supplemental briefing we solicited from the parties,
defendant resists our inevitable discovery analysis on what boils
down to three grounds. First, he cites United States v. Lundin
(9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3d 1151, for the proposition that the
inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply when “officers have
affirming the trial court’s ruling and there does not appear to be
any further evidence that could have been introduced to defeat
the theory, we hold that the failure to have urged the theory
below does not preclude our reliance on it to affirm the trial
court’s ruling”].)
9
probable cause to apply for a warrant but simply fail to do so.”
(Id. at p. 1161.) However, what makes discovery inevitable in
this case is not that the police had probable cause to search the
backpack, but that they had probable cause to arrest defendant
and that, as part of the arrest and booking process, the backpack
would have been inventoried and the gun and drugs inevitably
discovered. (E.g., People v. Dominguez (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d
345, 353 [upholding use of the doctrine on similar facts].) Second,
defendant argues that there was “no testimony that indicated
that [he] was going to be arrested prior to the searching of the
backpack,” and notes that the police considered their encounter
with defendant to be a “consensual encounter” prior to when he
dropped the backpack. But however the police characterized
their initial encounter with defendant, they later developed
probable cause to believe defendant was a felon (based on what
defendant told them) and to believe the backpack contained a gun
(based on what they heard and felt in the backpack); we may
reasonably infer that the officers would have arrested defendant
for being a felon in possession even in the absence of confirmatory
testimony. (Dominguez, at p. 353 [relying upon a “reasonable”
“inference” in applying inevitable discovery doctrine].) Third,
defendant argues that the inventory search doctrine only applies
to automobiles and that the People must introduce evidence of
the standardized procedures followed for such auto searches
(People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 138 [discussing
absence of a “policy supporting an inventory search” of an
automobile specifying which parts of the vehicle would be
searched]). Defendant is wrong: Inventory searches also include
a defendant’s belongings upon booking (see Lafayette, supra, 462
U.S. at pp. 646-648), and we may reasonably infer that the police
10
would have opened and looked inside the backpack in defendant’s
possession where, as here, there was no one else present to whom
the backpack could be entrusted when defendant was arrested.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
I concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
11
The People v. Remone Smith
B338666
BAKER, J., Dissenting
I read the opinion for the court to hold the police have
probable cause to arrest a person they think is a felon if they
hear a “metallic ping [sound] consistent with a firearm” when the
person drops a backpack to the ground. This sort of reaching
misapplication of the probable cause standard is bad enough, but
the opinion for the court then uses its probable cause finding to
justify a search on an “inevitable discovery” rationale that is
different from the rationale the trial court relied on to uphold the
legality of the search in this case.
As I will explain, I do not join the majority’s affirmance of
the judgment. Instead, I would reverse the trial court’s ruling
and remand with directions to consider the viability of an
alternative argument the People made but the trial court never
reached: whether defendant and appellant Remone Smith
(defendant) abandoned a backpack he was carrying such that he
lacks standing to contest the subsequent search.
I
A
The facts are fairly straightforward and documented in
most respects by footage from a police body-worn camera.
The police approached defendant in their patrol car as he
was walking in the area of a public park one evening. He was
carrying a backpack. The officer who was the passenger in the
patrol car trained his flashlight on defendant and spoke to him
while still in the vehicle, though the officer could not later recall
what he said. Soon thereafter, defendant “discarded” the
backpack he was carrying by dropping it on the ground behind a
nearby parked car. When he did, one of the police officers heard
a “loud metallic ping consistent with a firearm.” Nothing in the
appellate record indicates the officer had any training or
expertise in identifying the sounds that metal objects make when
striking the ground.
The officers exited their patrol car and one told defendant
that it was “[his] area,” he “want[ed] to know everybody,” and
that they were going to have a “free conversation” and defendant
could leave at any time. Defendant had removed his wallet by
that point and he produced an EBT card to the officers as ID.
Defendant told them he was “fresh out of prison; no parole, no
nothing.” At that moment, the officers told defendant they were
detaining him and placed him in handcuffs; the backpack
defendant had been carrying remained on the ground well out of
reach near the parked car.1 One of the officers told defendant
they were going to verify he was not on parole, and if they did,
the “cuffs will come right off.”2
1
After defendant was detained in handcuffs, one of the
officers asked if defendant had been in the park. Defendant said
he was going to the beach. When the officer expressed surprise
because it was cold out, defendant said “I just did 16 years,”
suggesting that is how long he had been in prison.
2
The officers later confirmed what defendant told them was
correct: he was not on parole.
2
While defendant remained handcuffed, one of the officers
said he would “get your bag so you [defendant] can see it and
stuff.” After the officer picked up the bag and walked with it over
to where defendant was standing, defendant complained it was
an “illegal search and seizure.” The officer said he “just picked it
up, bro.”
The officer who picked up the bag did not feel anything
suspicious inside when he picked it up. The officer would later
testify, however, that he felt an L-shape object consistent with a
firearm as he was walking the bag over to a nearby wall—though
the officer claimed he had not “manipulat[ed]” the backpack. The
officer then opened the backpack at the scene, saw a handgun,
and defendant was arrested.3
B
Defendant was subsequently charged with felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition offenses (and with
possessing a controlled substance with a firearm). Defendant
moved to suppress the gun and other evidence found as a result
of the search of the backpack he was carrying.
The magistrate held a suppression hearing at which the
facts I have already recited were developed. In arguing the
suppression motion, the People contended defendant had no
standing to challenge the search because he had abandoned the
backpack. The People additionally argued the police stop of
defendant was justified because the officers knew defendant had
3
In a police car after his arrest, defendant complained that
the police had “search[ed his] property illegally.” One of the
officers replied he searched the backpack because he “felt a gun
inside” and “knows what a gun feels like.”
3
been released from prison and they heard the metallic ping sound
when he dropped the backpack. (The People did not articulate,
however, how stopping defendant, even if permissible, justified
the warrantless search of the backpack.)
The magistrate denied the defense suppression motion and
articulated its rationale for doing so: “I do believe the officer
when he said he heard the metal cling, and I do believe that if
you follow from there, that the rest of the actions that the officer
takes are justified. He’s testified that after he hears the metal,
the object inside there clings. He’s justified in picking up the
backpack, and then he feels it. And, of course, after he feels this
weapon in there and after hearing it, he’s going to look inside
there, and he’s justified to look in there at that point.” The
magistrate did not reach the abandonment argument made by
the People.
II
Setting aside the abandonment issue to which I shall
return in a moment, the key to a proper understanding and
resolution of this case is timing. The moment in time that
matters is the moment when the officer picks up and moves the
backpack defendant was carrying—because that is a seizure and
search of the backpack. Aside from exigent circumstances and
regulatory prerogatives not at issue here, the police cannot,
consistent with the constitution, indiscriminately pass through
public parks, public beaches, shopping malls, and the like picking
up bags, luggage, or purses belonging to others and moving them
about.4 (See, e.g., Bond v. United States (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 335-
4
The majority says defendant “does not dispute that there
was probable cause to seize the backpack.” That is to some
4
336, 339 [border patrol agent’s physical manipulation of bus
passenger’s bag in an overhead compartment was a warrantless
search violating the Fourth Amendment]; see also United States
v. Jacobsen (1984) 466 U.S. 109, 113 [“A ‘seizure’ of property
occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an
individual’s possessory interests in that property”].)
That is why the opinion for the court does not even attempt
to independently justify the warrantless seizure and search of the
backpack as the magistrate incorrectly did. Even assuming the
police had probable cause to believe there was contraband in the
backpack defendant was carrying, they still needed a warrant to
seize and search it; the backpack was not in a location that would
justify seizing and searching it for officer safety protective
reasons.5 (See generally U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Michigan v.
Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049.)
degree both irrelevant and incorrect. Probable cause alone does
not justify a seizure; a warrant is required unless an exception to
the warrant requirement applies. In addition, defendant did
contest the seizure of the backpack during the suppression
hearing; defense counsel argued the police had “no reason
whatsoever to seize the backpack.” Although appointed counsel
in this court retreats some from that position (“officers may have
had the probable cause necessary to seize [defendant’s] backpack
once the metal sound was heard”) to focus on other issues and
expound on his view of “life as a Black man in the United States,”
defendant has not conceded the seizure and search of the
backpack was proper.
5
The parties have not asked us to decide whether there was
an appropriate basis to stop and detain defendant in handcuffs,
so I do not address that point.
5
Instead, the majority takes a more circuitous path to
uphold the search and seizure. The majority says the fruits of
the warrantless search and seizure of the backpack need not be
suppressed because (1) the police had probable cause to arrest
defendant, (2) the contents of the backpack would have inevitably
been inventoried if and when he was arrested, and (3) the gun
and contraband would have been discovered during this
inventory process. The first step of this reasoning is the problem.
Even crediting the testimony of the officer who testified at
the suppression hearing (as supplemented by the irrefutable body
camera footage), at the time the police seized and searched the
backpack defendant was carrying the only material facts they
knew were these: defendant had recently been released from
prison and he had been carrying a backpack that had something
inside that made a loud metallic ping sound when dropped to the
ground. That is not probable cause for an arrest, as the officers
in this case knew and admitted themselves when telling
defendant the “cuffs would come right off” once they verified he
was not on parole—that is, after they knew he had been in prison
and heard the metallic ping sound.
There are myriad innocuous metal objects that could be in
a backpack and make a pinging sound when dropped to the
ground: water bottles, construction tools, lunch boxes, children’s
toys—I could go on. There was no evidentiary basis to conclude
the police in this case had any expertise in distinguishing one
metal pinging sound from another, which is why the magistrate
made a factual finding only that the officer credibly testified he
heard a metallic ping, not a finding that this ping was necessarily
(or even probably) made by a firearm.
6
The notion that the police can make a custodial arrest of
anyone dropping a bag with a metal object in it (at least if they
believe the person has previously been in prison) is troubling
enough—gymgoers beware. But even worse, the majority uses its
defective but expansive probable cause arrest rationale to
retroactively justify the police’s warrantless search of the
backpack on inevitable discovery grounds that the magistrate
never relied on, that the People never argued below, that the
Attorney General did not even argue on appeal—until specifically
invited by the majority, and that was practically unnecessary
when the police had ample ability here to obtain a warrant. I
cannot join this sort of bootstrapping affirmance.
Though I believe the majority’s rationale for affirming is
flawed, I would not reverse the suppression ruling and the
criminal judgment outright. That is because there is an
argument that was made below by the People that the trial court
never reached and that I believe merits serious consideration:
whether defendant abandoned the backpack by dropping it
behind the car when the police approached. (See, e.g., People v.
Brown (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1442, 1451.) I would accordingly
reverse with directions to decide that issue.
BAKER, J.
7
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