People v. Jackson CA2/6

CourtListener 10637854Calctapp21.07.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/21/25 P. v. Jackson CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B338448
(Super. Ct. No. 2003004442)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

DAMION JACKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

Damion Jackson appeals the denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 He contends the
trial court erred in: (1) summarily denying his petition because
nothing in the record of conviction renders him ineligible for
relief as a matter of law; and (2) denying his petition without
fully setting forth its reasons as required in section 1172.6,
subdivision (c). We will affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
“On the evening of January 31, 2003, Edgar Guerrero and
Peter Torres were in a car parked near the ‘bridge’ area in
Oxnard when [appellant] approached them and told them he
wanted them to assist him in robbing Mark Droney, a drug dealer
who sold methamphetamine from his house on nearby Geronimo
Drive in Oxnard. Guerrero and Torres knew [appellant] as
‘Peanut,’ the moniker he used as a member of the ‘AWK’ tagging
crew. . . .
“[Appellant] told Guerrero and Torres he needed them to
provide a distraction by weighing marijuana inside Droney’s
house while [appellant] went to the bathroom. [Appellant] told
them he planned to return from the bathroom with a gun and
steal the drugs from Droney, which he kept in a black leather
bag. [Appellant] assured them he would not shoot Droney.
“The following morning, Guerrero left Droney voice
messages asking to borrow his scale to weigh marijuana and
Torres left a message inquiring about a methamphetamine
purchase. Shortly thereafter, [appellant], Guerrero, and Torres
arrived together at Droney’s house. [Appellant] went to the
bathroom while Torres used Droney’s scale to weigh marijuana
and Droney measured methamphetamine at a desk. [Appellant]
returned from the bathroom, pulled out the gun, pointed it at
Droney and said, ‘Give me your shit’ or ‘Give me all your stuff.’
Droney got up, ran at [appellant], and tried to take the gun from
him. During the ensuing struggle, the gun discharged, and

2 We quote from this court’s unpublished opinion in People

v. Jackson (Aug. 28, 2006, B183306) [nonpub. opn.]. We
previously granted appellant’s unopposed request for judicial
notice of the record in his direct appeal. (Evid. Code, § 452.)

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Droney fell to the floor. [Appellant] grabbed something from the
desk where Droney had been sitting, and ran from the house.
“At 7:14 a.m., Torres called 911 to report that Droney had
been shot. He identified himself to the 911 dispatcher as ‘David,’
and waited on the telephone until the police arrived. The police
arrived shortly thereafter and separated Guerrero and Torres.
Droney was found lying on the floor. Oxnard Police Officer
Jessica Hines asked Droney what had happened, and he told her
he had been shot. When asked who had shot him, Droney said he
did not know and that he was in pain.
“Officer Hines accompanied Droney to the hospital, where
doctors told her he had suffered a life-threatening injury and that
he might not survive surgery. The officer conveyed this to
Droney, and asked him again who had shot him. Droney replied
that ‘Peanut’ had shot him when he tried to fight back.
Approximately an hour later, Droney reiterated that an
individual he knew only as ‘Peanut’ had pulled a gun and shot
him.
“Torres gave a tape-recorded interview at the scene of the
crime. He initially identified himself as David Santiago, and
refused to identify the shooter or provide any other information
because he did not want to be labeled a ‘rat.’ Torres subsequently
admitted his true name after the interviewing officer found it
tattooed on Torres’s body. In later interviews, Torres said that
Peanut was the shooter, and provided an accurate physical
description of [appellant]. . . .
“Guerrero also gave a taped interview at the scene.
Guerrero was initially evasive because he too was afraid of being
labeled a ‘rat.’ He did, however, identify the shooter as ‘Peanut,’
and gave a physical description that matched [appellant’s]. In a
subsequent interview at the police station, Guerrero was again

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evasive and stated his concern about being harmed for giving
information about the shooter. One or two days later, however,
Guerrero identified [appellant] as the shooter from a
photographic lineup.
“Inside Droney’s house, the police found several baggies of
marijuana, three marijuana plants, drug paraphernalia for
ingesting marijuana and methamphetamine, a scale, and a ‘pay-
owe’ sheet containing various names with corresponding dollar
amounts. No shell casings or a black bag containing drugs or
money were found. . . . None of [appellant’s] prints were found at
the scene or in Guerrero’s car, but latent prints found on the
bathroom doorknob and sink were matched to Guerrero and
Torres, respectively.
“The autopsy revealed that Droney died from a single
gunshot to the abdomen. A forensics expert determined that the
bullet recovered from Droney’s body was either a .380 automatic
or a 9-millimeter caliber bullet from a semiautomatic firearm,
although no such weapon was ever identified or linked to
[appellant]. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Appellant’s] evidence highlighted the inconsistencies in
the numerous statements Guerrero and Torres made to the
police, as well as the indications of untruthfulness during their
polygraph examinations. Most notably, both men had initially
indicated that they were unable to identify the shooter, were
evasive, and denied or downplayed any involvement in the crime.
. . .” (People v. Jackson, supra, B183306.)
A jury convicted appellant of first degree murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 189) and first degree residential robbery (§ 211). The
jury found true allegations appellant committed the murder in
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of robbery (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)), and that he personally used a firearm in the

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commission of both offenses (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The jury
found not true allegations appellant personally and intentionally
used and discharged a firearm causing death (id., subd. (d)) and
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (id., subd. (c)).
The court sentenced appellant to life without the possibility
of parole plus ten years. We affirmed the judgment in People v.
Jackson, supra, B183306.
In 2023, appellant filed a form petition requesting section
1172.6 relief. Appellant failed to check the box indicating he
could not presently be convicted of murder because of changes to
sections 188 or 189, effective January 1, 2019. Thus, his petition
was facially insufficient. Nevertheless, we will consider his
contentions.
The court appointed counsel, and the People filed an
opposition. Appellant did not file a reply. Both parties submitted
at the hearing without argument. The court ruled as follows:
“Based on the review of the relevant materials, it appears that
this defendant is not eligible for the relief that he is requesting,
and his request is denied.”
DISCUSSION
Legal Principles
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) narrowed the felony murder rule’s
scope. The bill added section 189, subdivision (e) (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 3; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708
(Strong)), which provides that defendants are liable on a felony
murder theory only if they (1) were the actual killer; (2) were not
the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in committing first degree murder; or (3) were a

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major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (See Strong, at p. 708.)
Senate Bill 1437 also established a procedure for
defendants convicted under prior law to petition for relief.
(§ 1172.6.) The process “begins with a facially valid petition that
entitles petitioner to counsel, continues with asking whether
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, and, if so,
proceeds to an evidentiary hearing on the ultimate question of
whether petitioner should be resentenced.” (People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 604 (Patton); § 1172.6, subds. (a)-(d).)
The prima facie inquiry is “‘limited.’” (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 562.) “It is not, however, simply duplicative of the
facial inquiry.” (Ibid., footnote omitted.) “A petition’s facial
validity . . . is readily established by recitation of section 1172.6’s
requirements.” (Ibid.) The prima facie inquiry “is more
demanding . . . .” (Id. at p. 566.) As in the analogous habeas
corpus context, “‘“‘the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations
as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether
the petitioner would be entitled to relief if [those] factual
allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause.’”’” (Id. at p. 563.)
“‘“However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.’”’” (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 563.) Conclusory allegations “are particularly
subject to refutation by the record of conviction.” (Id. at p. 564.)
The Court has cautioned that “‘[i]n reviewing any part of the
record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court
should not engage in “factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.”’” (Id. at p. 563.) “If the

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petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the
defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the
petition.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 450; see also
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
“We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage.” (People v. Bodely (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
Analysis
Appellant is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief because the
jury convicted him as the actual killer. Thus, the trial court
properly denied his petition at the prima facie stage.
The information charged only appellant, who was the only
person tried. The prosecution argued for murder liability solely
on a felony murder theory and asserted appellant “shot and killed
Mark Droney . . . .” Likewise, the court’s instruction defining
murder addressed only felony murder.3 Appellant’s felony
murder conviction did not itself require a finding he was the
actual killer. However, viewed alongside the remaining record of
conviction, the personal use true findings demonstrate the jury

3 Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.10, the court instructed:

“Defendant is accused in Count 1 of having committed the
crime of murder, a violation of Section 187 of the Penal Code.
Every person who unlawfully kills a human being during
the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, is guilty of
the crime of murder in violation of Penal Code Section 187. A
killing is unlawful if it was neither justifiable nor excusable.
In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements
must be proved:
1. A human being was killed;
2. The killing was unlawful; and
3. The killing occurred during the commission or
attempted commission of a robbery.”

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convicted appellant as the actual killer. (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 557 [conclusory allegations in response to a record of
conviction demonstrating the conviction was under a still-valid
theory do not constitute a prima facie showing].)
The jury found true the enhancements that appellant,
during the commission of both the robbery and murder,
“personally used a firearm, to wit: a handgun . . . .” Pursuant to
the court’s instruction, “‘personally used a firearm’” meant
appellant “must have intentionally displayed a firearm in a
menacing manner, intentionally fired it, or intentionally struck
or hit a human being with it.” (CALJIC No. 17.19.) A personal
use true finding does leave room for the theoretical possibility
that a felony murder defendant was not the actual killer. For
example, “[i]f two robbers display guns to intimidate robbery
victims and one shoots and kills a victim, both robbers could be
found to have personally used a gun in the robbery and the felony
murder, even though only one is the actual killer.” (People v.
Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1120.) However, the record of
conviction does not support any such possibility here.
In closing argument, appellant’s counsel acknowledged that
“clearly someone shot Mark Droney and he died as a result of
that.” In line with the court’s aiding and abetting and special
circumstance instructions (CALJIC Nos. 3.01, 8.80.1), counsel did
address the possibility appellant aided and abetted the robbery
without being the actual killer. But counsel did not contend
appellant somehow personally used a firearm without shooting
Droney. Nor did she argue both appellant and a second robber
displayed a firearm. Instead, counsel cast Torres as the “actual
killer” and argued Torres “pull[ed] out his gun and . . . trie[d] to
rob Mr. Droney . . . .” By convicting appellant of murder and
finding true the personal use enhancements, the jury rejected

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these arguments and identified appellant as the gun wielder and
actual killer.
The verdicts and the prosecutor’s argument point to the
same conclusion. Because the shooting may have been
accidental, the prosecutor argued he had not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt the “intentional firearm allegations”
(§ 12022.53, subds. (c)-(d)) but had proven the personal use
firearm allegation (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The jury’s verdicts
align with this argument. We cannot believe this alignment was
merely coincidental. (Cf. People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1227, 1247-1248 [“We conclude no reasonable juror
who found that Beaudreaux personally discharged his gun and
caused great bodily injury and death might have believed [former
codefendant] personally did the same thing, with Beaudreaux
only indirectly involved in the fatal act, but liable for it
nonetheless.”].)
Prima facie denial of appellant’s petition does not entail
factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or exercise of
discretion. Appellant’s “petition contains only a checkbox
declaration with legal conclusions, he submitted no reply, and he
made no argument when invited to do so at the prima facie
hearing.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.) “[A]bsent specific
facts, . . . mere latent, speculative possibilities” do not create a
dispute regarding a conviction’s basis. (Id. at p. 567)
During her opening, appellant’s trial counsel stated: “[T]he
bottom line, so to speak, at the end of this trial is going to be this
question, who shot Mark Droney?” The record of conviction
shows the jury’s answer was appellant.
Both parties rely on People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735. There, the court concluded that “[b]y admitting
that he personally used a weapon, Garrison necessarily admitted

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that he was the actual killer simply because there was no
evidence either at the preliminary hearing or at the section
1170.95, subdivision (d)(3) hearing supporting any other
scenario.” (Id. at p. 743.4) Appellant asserts Garrison “supports
the contention that appellant should have been issued an
evidentiary hearing before the trial court could find him
ineligible based on his firearm enhancement.” But, unlike
appellant’s case, Garrison did not involve a denial at the prima
facie stage. (Id. at pp. 747-748 [“[T]his case involves a section
1170.95, subdivision (d)(3) hearing, not a prima facie inquiry
. . .”].) “A case is not authority for propositions not considered.”
(People v. Chavez (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 477, 480.)
Finally, given our conclusion that appellant was convicted
as the actual killer, any error the trial court committed in failing
to articulate its reasons for denying the petition was harmless
under any standard. (See People v. Hurtado (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 887, 893; § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J. YEGAN, J.

4 Assembly Bill No. 200 (Reg. Sess. 2021–2022) renumbered

section 1170.95 as section 1172.6. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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David M. Hirsch, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

Keilana Truong, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Chung L. Mar,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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