People v. Escobar CA4/1

CourtListener 10637778Calctapp21.07.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/21/25 P. v. Escobar CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085996

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. INF2101151)

JOSE MARCIAL PORTILLO
ESCOBAR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Steven G. Counelis, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Tami
Falkenstein Hennick and Melissa Mandel, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In September 2023, a jury convicted Jose Marcial Portillo Escobar of
multiple offenses, including, as relevant to this appeal, misdemeanor
violation of a domestic violence pretrial protective order (Protective Order or
Order) stemming from an incident on April 2, 2022, involving victim Jane

Doe. (Pen. Code,1 § 166, subd. (c)(1)(A); count 5.) On appeal, Escobar
contends that his due process rights allegedly were violated because there is
no substantial evidence that, when he was served with the Protective Order
at his arraignment in July 2021 on separate domestic violence charges also
involving Doe, the certified Spanish language interpreter and/or his defense
counsel translated the entire Order into Spanish, his native language. For
reasons we explain, we disagree with his contention and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2021, during his arraignment on charges including for
inflicting a corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 4), the
trial court issued a three-year protective order in favor of Doe. Escobar,
assisted by defense counsel and a certified Spanish language interpreter, was
personally served with the Order. The court addressed Escobar directly and
said, “I’ve signed the protective order. Sir, do not come within 100 yards of
the named individual under [s]ection [1]4 of this order. Do not contact that
person by any means. You’ll be served a copy of this protective order here in
court. No further service is necessary.”
The Protective Order included four checked boxes. Three of them
provided Escobar was to have no personal, electronic, telephonic, or written
contact with Doe; no contact with Doe through a third party, except through
an attorney of record; and not to come within 100 yards of her.
Escobar followed the terms of the Protective Order for about six
months. At the time, Doe was living in Arizona. In December 2021, she
returned to California and moved in with Escobar for about a month, after

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
they had renewed contact over social media.2 She then returned to Arizona
for a few months. While back in Arizona, they remained in contact.
Doe returned to California when she unexpectedly lost her housing.
Initially, she planned on living with her mother. However, on the drive to
California she got into a car accident and ended up at Escobar’s home, where
she stayed. Doe testified that she and Escobar discussed the Protective
Order “multiple times” while it was in force; and that he expressed concern
his sister would find out he and Doe had rekindled their relationship and
would turn him in for violating the Order.
On April 2, 2022, Escobar and Doe were living together and in an
intimate dating relationship. Doe testified they argued that day over her
daughter, which led to a physical altercation and Doe sustaining injuries to
her face and body. Initially, she did not contact the police out of concern she
would be in trouble for living with Escobar while the Protective Order was in
place. After the incident, Doe went to a nearby fire station and asked,
allegedly on behalf of a “friend,” whether a person protected by a restraining
order would be in trouble and have his or her child taken away if he or she
resumed a relationship with a restrained person. Fire personnel reassured
her that would not happen and called the police on her behalf, after Doe
admitted she was describing her own situation.
The police arrested Escobar, and the People charged him with multiple
counts in connection with the April 2 domestic violence incident, including
count 5 of violating the Protective Order. Although the jury convicted him of
multiple counts, he appeals only from his conviction on count 5.

2 The parties agree that count 5 was based on the April 2, 2022 incident,
and not on Escobar’s myriad contacts with Doe prior to that incident.
3
DISCUSSION
Escobar concedes that Doe’s consent to renew contact is not a defense to
his violation of the Protective Order. (See Loeffler v. Medina (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1503–1504 [noting a domestic violence restraining
order is a type of injunction, and that under Code Civ. Proc., § 533, “ ‘the
court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining
order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts,’ ”
the law, “ ‘or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or
dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order’ ” (italics
added)].)
Instead, Escobar contends his due process rights were violated because
there is no substantial evidence that, as a native Spanish speaker, the entire
Protective Order had been translated from English to Spanish when it was
served on him. Escobar makes this claim of error despite conceding that,
even if the Protective Order had been translated in its entirety, it would not
have advised him that it was a violation for him to have contact with Doe
even if she consented to, or initiated, the contact.
A. Due Process of Law and Substantial Evidence
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States
the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense.” (Carella v.
California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265.) Among other requirements, to survive a
due process challenge the verdict must be supported by substantial evidence.
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Under this standard, we review the “whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—

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such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261 (Cuevas).)
“ ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and the reasonable
inferences flowing therefrom . . . .’ ” (People v. Myles (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
711, 739 (Myles).) If a finding is supported by substantial evidence, we must
affirm that finding, “even if there is also substantial evidence to support a
contrary conclusion and the jury might have reached a different result if it
had believed other evidence.” (People v. Riley (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1152,
1165–1166.)
B. Sections 162, 166, and CALCRIM No. 2701
The trial court issued the Protective Order under section 136.2. As
relevant here, it provides that, when a defendant has been charged with a
crime involving domestic violence, the court on its own motion may issue a
pretrial protective order prohibiting a person from having any
“communication whatsoever with a specified witness or a victim except
through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may
impose.” (§ 136.2, subd. (a)(1)(D); see id., subd. (e).) Section 166,

subdivision (c)(1)(A)3 makes a violation of section 136.2 a misdemeanor.
The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version of
CALCRIM No. 2701 as follows: “The defendant is charged in [c]ount 5 with
violating a court order. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime,
the People must prove that: [¶] 1. A court issued a written order that the

3 Subdivision (c)(1) of section 166 provides in relevant part:
“Notwithstanding paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), a willful and knowing
violation of a protective order or stay-away court order described as follows
shall constitute contempt of court, a misdemeanor, punishable by
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, by a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and
fine: [¶] (A) An order issued pursuant to Section 136.2.”
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defendant have no contact with the protected person; [¶] 2. The court order
was a protective order, issued under . . . section 136.2 in a pending criminal
proceeding involving domestic violence; [¶] 3. The defendant knew of the
order; [¶] 4. The defendant had the ability to follow the court order; [¶] AND
[¶] 5. The defendant willfully violated the court order.
“Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or
on purpose.
“The People must prove that the defendant knew of the court order and
that he had the opportunity to read the court order or to otherwise become
familiar with what it said. But the People do not have to prove that the
defendant actually read the court order.”
C. Analysis
Here, the record shows the Protective Order was served on Escobar
during his arraignment on charges of domestic violence against Doe. At the
July 20, 2021 hearing, a certified Spanish language interpreter translated for
Escobar. He also was represented by counsel. As we have summarized, the
trial court gave Escobar explicit instructions not to come within 100 yards of
Doe and not to contact her “by any means.” In addition, the phrase “NO
CONTACT” was handwritten on the Protective Order, supporting the
inference that Escobar was separately advised not to have any contact with
Doe while the Order was in effect. (Myles, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 739.)
This evidence confirms the trial court apprised Escobar that any
contact with Doe would result in a violation of the Protective Order. It also
shows Escobar was afforded the “opportunity” to “become familiar with what
[the Protective Order] said,” as defense counsel was present during the
hearing and advising him with the assistance of the interpreter. (See
CALCRIM No. 2701.)

6
In addition, the evidence shows that, after being made aware of the
“NO CONTACT” requirement, Escobar “willfully” and “knowingly” violated
the Protective Order on April 2, when he engaged in domestic violence
against Doe, after the two had been living together and in a romantic
relationship. (CALCRIM No. 2701; see §§ 7, subd. (b)(1) [“ ‘willfully’ ” means
“simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act”], 166, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Doe also testified that she and Escobar talked about the Protective Order
“multiple times” prior to April 2; and that he expressed concern that his
sister would find out he and Doe had rekindled their relationship and report
him for violating the Protective Order. This is further evidence in support of
the jury’s findings he “willfully” and “knowingly” violated the Order.
Although Escobar acknowledges that Doe’s consent to resume contact
during the term of the Protective Order was not a defense to count 5, he
nonetheless contends it was “far from intuitive” that, as a protected person,
her willingness to rekindle their relationship would result in his prosecution
for violation of the Order; and that “[n]othing on July 20 told him otherwise
in a language he understood.” But as he also acknowledges, the Protective
Order itself did not include an advisement that a protected person’s consent
to contact would still result in a violation of the restraining order by a
restrained person. Therefore, whether or not the entirety of the Order was
translated into Spanish had no bearing on any purported violation of
Escobar’s due process rights, as he claims on appeal.
In sum, we conclude the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn from
it, amply support the jury’s conviction of Escobar on count 5. (See Cuevas,
supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 261; Myles, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 739.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

DO, J.

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