People v. Young CA3

CourtListener 10635293Calctapp17.07.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/17/25 P. v. Young CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C100586

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 20FE009629)

v.

EDDIE YOUNG,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Eddie Young appeals from the trial court’s judgment resentencing him
following a remand from this court. He contends that the trial court failed to properly
exercise its discretion under Penal Code section 1385 when it declined to dismiss a
firearm enhancement attached to one of his convictions.1 Seeing no basis in the record
for concluding that the court acted outside of its discretion, we will affirm the judgment.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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BACKGROUND
I.
In June 2020, R.C. was walking down an alleyway when he was approached by
Young and two others in a car. Young exited the car and patted R.C. down. Young then
turned around as if to walk away, but then stopped and shot R.C. in the chest, paralyzing
him. (People v. Young (Oct. 11, 2023, C096971) [nonpub. opn.].)
In June 2022, a jury found Young guilty of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245,
subd. (b)), and unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 29820). The jury further found that
the attempted murder was committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation
(§ 664, subd. (a)). As to the attempted murder and attempted robbery counts, the jury
found true that Young personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great
bodily injury under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The jury likewise found true lesser
firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c)); as to the
assault conviction, it also found true that Young personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)) and inflicted great bodily injury causing paralysis (§ 12022.7, subd. (b)).
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found six aggravating circumstances to
be true: (1) the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily
harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)) (subsequent rule citations are to the California Rules of
Court); (2) Young engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society
(rule 4.421(b)(1)); (3) Young’s sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings
were numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); (4) Young was on
probation when the offense was committed (rule 4.421(b)(4)); (5) Young was armed with
or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime (rule 4.421(a)(2)); and
(6) Young’s prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)).

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Prior to sentencing, Young argued that one of the section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancements for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily
injury should be dismissed pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), which applies
when multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. At the sentencing hearing, the
trial court agreed, stating that “ ‘in order to not dismiss it, as the statute indicates that I
must, I would need to find that it’s necessary in order to avoid physical injury or serious
danger to others, and I don’t think I could make that finding because Mr. Young is getting
a life sentence—an indeterminate life sentence, and it’s not clear that he would be
released from that sentence at any point, and if he ever is released, it would only be after
a very long period of time and if the parole board found that he was suitable for release.
[¶] So under the new [section] 1385[, subdivision] (c), I am going to strike that second
enhancement of [section] 12022.53 . . . .’ ” (People v. Young, supra, C096971.)
The trial court sentenced Young to seven years to life for the attempted murder
conviction plus 25 years to life for the remaining firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The court also imposed the upper term of three years
for the attempted robbery and eight months (one-third the middle term) for the unlawful
possession of a firearm. The court stayed punishment pursuant to section 654 for
Young’s conviction for assault with a semiautomatic weapon. The total sentence was an
indeterminate term of 32 years to life plus a determinate term of three years eight months.
On appeal, Young asserted that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to seek dismissal of the remaining section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), which applies when an
enhancement could result in a sentence of more than 20 years. (People v. Young, supra,
C096971.) This court agreed that counsel performed ineffectively and remanded the
matter for resentencing.

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II.
On remand, Young petitioned the trial court to recall his sentence and, pursuant to
section 1385, dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement
imposed on his attempted murder conviction. Young relied on this court’s decision in his
prior appeal to support his petition.
As it did at the original sentencing, the trial court struck the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) firearm enhancement attached to Young’s attempted robbery conviction
“as well as all the other lesser enhancements based on section 1385[, subdivision] (c),
which says I shall afford great weight to dismissing an enhancement under [section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(B)], if there’s multiple enhancements alleged.” The court then turned
to the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement attached to the attempted
murder count. The court stated that there “was no case law” discussing whether
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), which applies when an enhancement would result in
a sentence of more than 20 years, applies when a defendant has received an indeterminate
term. The court then “specifically” found that, if section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) did
apply, “it would not be in the interest of justice to strike” the enhancement as to the
attempted murder conviction. The court said, “this is a really troubling, heinous act that
you did, Mr. Young. I don’t know how someone so young causes so much harm and
damage.”
Based on this conclusion and after striking all enhancements except for the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement appended to Young’s conviction for
attempted murder, the trial court resentenced Young to the same term as it had originally:
an indeterminate term of 32 years to life plus a determinate term of three years
eight months. That sentence consisted of seven years to life for attempted murder plus a
consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d); the upper term of three years for the attempted robbery; and eight months

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(one-third the middle term) for the unlawful possession of a firearm. The court stayed
punishment pursuant to section 654 for the assault with a semiautomatic weapon.
Young filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Young contends that the trial court failed to give “great weight” to the statutory
mitigating factor found in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) when the court resentenced
him on remand and declined to dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement attached to his attempted murder conviction. He argues that the mitigating
circumstance in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) applies even though he was
sentenced to an indeterminate term without the firearm enhancement and that the trial
court misunderstood its discretion by declining to strike that enhancement. We need not
address the former contention because we conclude that, even assuming the mitigating
circumstance applies, the record does not disclose that the trial court misunderstood its
discretion.
In People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, our Supreme Court explained: “[I]f
the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an
enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the
mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1029.) We review a trial court’s decision whether to strike an
enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the
absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate
sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence
will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-

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377.) “The court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence
of an affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305,
310.) But “ ‘an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on
impermissible factors . . . or on an incorrect legal standard.’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.)
We see no demonstration on the present record that the trial court misunderstood
its discretion. At resentencing, the court specifically cited the requirement under
section 1385, subdivision (c) to give “great weight” to applicable mitigating
circumstances and ultimately concluded that it would not be in the interest of justice to
dismiss the second firearm enhancement, emphasizing the aggravated nature of the
offense. This reasoning does not suggest that the court misunderstood its obligations
under the statute. Young maintains that the court’s decision is ambiguous as to whether it
gave the requisite weight to the mitigating circumstance. We do not perceive such
ambiguity, but even if we did, we do not presume error from an ambiguous record. (See
People v. Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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