In re K.S. CA2/7

CourtListener 10633391Calctapp15.07.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/15/25 In re K.S. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re K.S. et al., Persons Coming B341596
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22PSJP00124A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.S. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stacy Weise, Judge. Conditionally reversed
with directions.
Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.S.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.S.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

In this dependency appeal, mother K.S. (Mother) and
father C.S. (Father) each appeal from the juvenile court’s
termination of their parental rights as to their children Kyle
(born 2013), Ch.S. (born 2015), and Jacob (born 2016) under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 The parents’ sole
argument on appeal is that the Los Angeles County Department
of Child and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with
the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law, by
failing to inquire of an available paternal aunt and an available
paternal uncle whether the children might be Indian children
under ICWA.
We agree the juvenile court and the Department failed to
comply with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and related
California law. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the court’s
order terminating the parents’ parental rights and remand the
matter to allow the Department and the juvenile court to comply

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

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with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and California
law.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Petition and ICWA Inquiry
In August 2022, the Department investigated a referral
concerning the children, who were living with Father and their
stepmother J.C. During Jacob’s investigation interview, Jacob
stated his paternal uncle Corey lived in the apartment upstairs
and smoked cigarettes with his father on the porch. There is no
record that Corey was ever interviewed or asked about Indian
ancestry.
In September 2022, the Department filed a section 300
petition alleging physical, medical, and emotional abuse of the
children by Father and J.C., substance abuse by Father and J.C.,
domestic violence, and neglect.2 The Department subsequently
filed an amended petition adding allegations against Mother.
Father and Mother each filed an ICWA-020 form denying any
known Indian ancestry. At the detention hearing, the juvenile
court inquired of each parent whether they had any American
Indian ancestry. K.S. stated maternal grandmother Linda J. had
told Mother she did but did not identify which tribe, and the
court ordered the Department to contact Linda J. Father stated
he had no American Indian ancestry that he knew of, but “my
mom does speak of being some kind of Indian,” and his deceased

2 Section 300 was amended effective January 1, 2023, after
the juvenile court issued its jurisdiction findings in this case.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1.) The amendments do not impact our
analysis.

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uncle Clifford M. “had a big Cherokee-style nose.” Father stated
paternal grandmother Dawn H. would have further information,
and the court ordered the Department to contact Dawn H. The
court detained the children from Father and Mother. The court
found it had reason to believe the children may be Indian
children under ICWA, and ordered the Department to further
investigate.
The parents do not argue there was any ICWA error in the
inquiry of maternal relatives. The Department interviewed or
attempted to interview the following maternal relatives: On
October 19 and November 11, 2022, maternal grandmother
Linda J. stated she had no known American Indian ancestry.
Linda J. stated it was rumored maternal grandfather Edward M.
may have Indian heritage, but he left when Mother was young
and she had no contact information for him or his family, or
knowledge whether he was still alive. On November 14, 2022
and January 2, 2023, the Department left voicemail messages for
maternal grandfather Edward M., but there was no return call.
In April 2023, the Department called Edward M. twice with no
answer, and mailed him both a contact letter and certified
contact letter. On November 14, maternal aunt Silver B.
(Linda B.’s daughter and Mother’s half-sister) said she had not
heard of American Indian ancestry in her family.
The Department interviewed the following paternal
relatives: On September 27 and December 23, 2022, paternal
grandmother Dawn H. stated she had no known American Indian
ancestry. On September 30, paternal aunt Debra N. (also known
as Debra L.) stated the family had no known American Indian
ancestry. Father continued to deny any Indian ancestry or
additional information.

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In February 2023, the juvenile court sustained the
amended petition and removed the children from both parents.
The court found there was no reason to know the children were
Indian children within the meaning of ICWA and ICWA did not
apply. The court instructed the Department to continue to reach
out to all relatives regarding potential American Indian ancestry.

B. Further Proceedings and ICWA Inquiry
In November 2023, the Department filed a subsequent
petition under section 342 alleging Father created a dangerous
home environment by allowing J.C. to reside in the home and
have access to the children. The Department subsequently
reinquired of the parents regarding any known Indian ancestry.
Mother repeated she did but did not know which tribe, and was
“waiting on” Linda J. to get the paperwork. The Department left
a voicemail message for Linda J. Father repeated he had none.
In January 2024, the court dismissed the section 342 petition.
In March 2024, the Department interviewed paternal aunt
Ashley T., who along with Father was living with paternal
grandmother Dawn H. and paternal stepgrandfather F.G. Ray H.
There is no record that Ashley T. was asked about Indian
ancestry.
In April 2024, the juvenile court held the section 366.22
review hearing with Father, Dawn H., and F.G. Ray H. present.
Dawn H. and F.G. Ray H. denied any known American Indian
ancestry in the family. The court again found there was no
reason to know the children were Indian children within the
meaning of ICWA and ICWA did not apply. The court terminated
reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26

5
hearing. The court ordered that the section 366.26 report include
updated ICWA information.
In July 2024, the Department left voicemail messages for
Dawn H. and Linda J. The Department also interviewed Silver
B., who stated the maternal family had Native American
ancestry but she did not know anything about it and Linda J.
would have more information.
In August 2024, the juvenile court held a section 366.26
hearing. Father stated he had no new updated information on
American Indian ancestry. The court noted the Department had
interviewed the maternal and paternal grandmothers and
paternal aunt Debra N., all of whom denied Indian ancestry. The
court also noted that although Mother and maternal aunt Silver
B. indicated they may have some ancestry, Linda J. denied any,
and while “it was rumored that the maternal great [sic]
grandfather may have heritage,” Linda J. had no contact
information for him. The court again found there was no reason
to know the children were Indian children within the meaning of
ICWA and ICWA did not apply, and continued the hearing.
In October 2024, the Department again attempted to
contact Edward M., but the number was out of service. The
Department interviewed Silver B., who denied any Indian
ancestry or knowledge of family ancestry, and denied having any
information about Edward M. The Department interviewed
Linda J., who denied having any information about Edward M. or
contact with him since Mother was born. She stated he “always
said he was part Indian, but never had any tribal affiliations. I
know his family was from Alabama and none of them were with a
tribe.”

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On October 18, the juvenile court held the continued
section 366.26 hearing. Father was present and Mother
appeared by phone. The court summarized the ICWA inquiry
efforts of maternal relatives and asked Mother if she had any
additional information, contact information, or relatives available
that could provide any more information; she stated she did not.
The court summarized the ICWA inquiry efforts of paternal
relatives (Father, Dawn H., and Debra N.) and asked Father if
there was any updated information; he stated, “No.” The court
also denied Mother’s section 388 petition filed the same day and
terminated both parents’ parental rights.
Father and Mother each timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry and Notice
“ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to
follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes and does not
prohibit states from establishing higher standards.” (In re
Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1129; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1921;
see also In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206, 218.) “[W]hen
ICWA applies, ‘the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to
intervene at any point’ in a proceeding involving the removal of
an Indian child from their family.” (In re Dezi C., at p. 1129; see
25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).) “To ensure tribes have the opportunity to
exercise their rights in dependency proceedings, an investigation
of a family member’s belief a child may have Indian ancestry
must be undertaken and notice provided, where appropriate, to
the relevant tribes.” (In re T.R., at p. 218; see § 224.2, subd. (a).)

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An inadequate ICWA inquiry in a dependency case does not
involve “a conventional scenario in which the harm from error
directly and solely affects the appealing party.” (In re Dezi C.
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1138.) Rather, “an appealing parent ‘is in
effect acting as a surrogate for the tribe in raising compliance
issues.’” (Ibid.) “ICWA and Cal-ICWA ‘“‘recognize[] that the
tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on a
parity with the interest of the parents’”’ and other relatives.”
(Ibid.) “That interest is compromised and cannot be protected if
the social service agency and the juvenile court fail to perform
their inquiry duties.” (Ibid.)
The duty to inquire “‘begins with initial contact (§ 224.2,
subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective
agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether the
child may be an Indian child.’” (In re Rylei S. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316; see § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).) The juvenile
court is required to “ask each party to the proceeding and all
other interested persons present whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) The Department’s duty of
“[i]nquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2); see In re T.R., supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 218-219.)
ICWA and Cal-ICWA define “‘extended family member,’” if
not separately defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s
tribe, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who
is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second

8
cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1,
subd. (c).)
The duty of further inquiry is triggered if the juvenile court
or the Department “has reason to believe that an Indian child is
involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information
to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); see In re T.R., supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 219.) That further inquiry requires
interviewing, “as soon as practicable,” extended family members;
contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs; and contacting “the tribe
or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected
to have information regarding the child’s membership,
citizenship status, or eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e), (e)(2)(C); see
In re T.R., at p. 219.)
If the further inquiry “results in a reason to know the child
is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of
section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052; accord, In re T.R., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 219; see
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3, subd. (a)].) “‘The duty to develop
information concerning whether a child is an Indian child rests
with the court and the Department, not the parents or members
of the parents’ families.’” (In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 317; accord, In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-1132.)
“[E]rror resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA
inquiry requires conditional reversal with directions for the child
welfare agency to comply with the inquiry requirement of
section 224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with rule
5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply with the notice provision
of section 224.3. When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is inadequate, it is
impossible to ascertain whether the agency’s error is prejudicial.

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[Citations.] ‘[U]ntil an agency conducts a proper initial inquiry
and makes that information known, it is impossible to know what
the inquiry might reveal.’” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1136; accord, In re T.R. supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 220; see
In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1094 [“a judgment must
be conditionally reversed when error results in an inadequate
ICWA inquiry”].)
However, “[i]f, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that
an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply
are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record
documentation as required by California law (rule 5.481(a)(5)),
there is no error and conditional reversal would not be warranted
even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest
in the child.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
“The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not
apply is ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).).” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1134.) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that
an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review.” (Id. at p. 1141; see § 224.2,
subd. (i)(2).) “‘On a well-developed record, the court has
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific
facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the
more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.’” (In re
Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101-1102.)

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B. The Department Did Not Adequately Comply with Its Duty
of Inquiry Under Section 224.2, Subdivision (b)
As discussed, the Department had a duty pursuant to
section 224.2, subdivision (b), to ask not only the parents, but
also extended family members whether the children had possible
Indian ancestry.
The parents identify the following available paternal
relatives likely to have information bearing on the children’s
ancestry, but who were not asked: (1) paternal uncle Corey, who
lived upstairs from Father and J.C. (according to Jacob) but was
never interviewed, and (2) paternal aunt Ashley T., who was
interviewed in March 2024 (at which time she was living with
Father, paternal grandmother Dawn H. and paternal
stepgrandfather F.G. Ray H.) but was not asked about any
possible Indian ancestry. The record contains no information
about the paternal grandfather.
As detailed above, the Department’s reports confirm its
social workers or investigators contacted and inquired about
Indian ancestry on the paternal side by asking Father, paternal
grandmother Dawn H., and paternal aunt Debra. N., all of whom
denied Indian ancestry. Paternal stepgrandfather F.G. Ray H.
also denied any knowledge of Indian ancestry in the paternal
family. As noted, the parents make no argument of error in the
inquiry of maternal relatives.
Section 224.2, subdivision (b), does not establish an
absolute (and often impossible) standard mandating that every
living extended family member be interviewed. What is required,
however, is that the Department interview known and available
maternal and paternal extended family members and make
reasonable efforts to identify and thereafter to interview any

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other extended family members, as well as other individuals who
have an interest in the child regarding the child’s possible Indian
ancestry.
Here, the Department did not interview or make any
showing of reasonable efforts to contact and interview Corey. In
addition, although the Department interviewed Ashley T. on
March 26, 2024, it made no inquiry of her regarding Indian
ancestry. Both of these relatives fall within the categories of
statutorily defined extended family members required to be
interviewed if available. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see also
§§ 224.1, subd. (c), 224.2, subd. (b)(2); In re T.R., supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 218-219.) Failure to do so was a failure of
the duty of inquiry. Further, on this record there appears to be
no determination by the Department or the juvenile court
whether the paternal grandfather (or anyone in his lineage) was
identified or available to be interviewed. Under the
circumstances, the inquiry was inadequate, “‘it is impossible to
know what the inquiry might reveal’” had these relatives been
interviewed, and the judgment must be conditionally reversed.
(In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1136; accord, In re T.R., at
p. 220; see In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1094 [“a
judgment must be conditionally reversed when error results in an
inadequate ICWA inquiry”].)

DISPOSITION

The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally
reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to ensure
the Department complies fully with the inquiry and notice
provisions of ICWA and related California law. If the court finds

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the minors are Indian children, it shall conduct a new
section 366.26 hearing, as well as all further proceedings, in
compliance with ICWA and related California law. If not, the
court’s original section 366.26 orders will remain in effect.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

STONE, J.

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