People v. Torres CA4/3

CourtListener 10633358Calctapp15.07.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/15/25 P. v. Torres CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063366

v. (Super. Ct. No. 20NF0898)

JOSE MARTIN TORRES, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Scott A. Steiner, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Jose Martin Torres appeals an order denying his petition for
1
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. He contends the trial
court erred in finding he failed to make a prima facie showing for relief, and
we agree. Because the record of conviction does not conclusively establish
Torres is ineligible for resentencing, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2020, Torres and three codefendants were jointly charged with
attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. (§§ 664/187, 245, subd.
(a)(1).) The complaint alleged the attempted murder was premeditated and
gang related, and that Torres vicariously discharged a firearm during that
offense. (§§ 664, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1).) In
addition, the complaint alleged Torres had suffered a prior serious felony
conviction and a prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), (c) & (e)(1),
1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
The preliminary hearing began on March 11, 2021. After it
became clear from the testimony that Torres was not the shooter and no one
was injured during his alleged offenses, the trial court interrupted the
hearing to accept a plea agreement between the parties. Pursuant to that
agreement, Torres pleaded guilty to both charged offenses and admitted the
prior strike allegation. In exchange, the court struck the remaining

1
That section was originally housed in Penal Code section
1170.95, but it was subsequently renumbered without substantive change as
Penal Code section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the
latter section for ease of reference. All further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
allegations and sentenced Torres to 10 years in prison. As the factual basis
for his plea, Torres admitted in pertinent part:
“I, along with Fernando Roman, Rosa Salgado-Ayala and Josue
Salgado-Ayala did a [sic] attempt to kill Travon B., who is a person, and we
did so with the intent to kill Travon B. This act was done with premeditation
and deliberation. During the course of the attempted murder, I also aided
and abetted the commission of an assault with a deadly weapon, namely a
firearm, against Travon B.”
On August 7, 2023, Torres petitioned for resentencing on his
attempted murder conviction under section 1172.6. He argued he was
entitled to relief because, pursuant to Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), section 1172.6 was amended effective January 1,
2022, to add attempted murder to the list of crimes for which resentencing is
available. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) However, the trial court determined that
amendment was merely intended to clarify the parameters of Senate Bill No.
1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which, as discussed more
fully below, limited the scope of California’s murder statutes. (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, §§ 2–4.) Based on that understanding, the court ruled Torres was
ineligible for resentencing because he was convicted of attempted murder
after Senate Bill 1437 became effective on January 1, 2019. Therefore, it
denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing.
DISCUSSION
Torres contends the basis for the trial court’s denial order was
erroneous and, because the record does not conclusively prove he is ineligible
for resentencing, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition. The
Attorney General concedes the court’s reasoning was wrong, but he urges us

3
to affirm on the ground the court’s decision to summarily deny Torres’s
petition was nonetheless correct. We find Torres’s position more persuasive.
I.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Torres’s claim for resentencing is grounded in Senate Bill 1437,
which narrowed the scope of vicarious liability for the crime of murder in
California. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–4.) As relevant here, Senate Bill 1437
eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory for that offense.
Under that theory, a defendant could be convicted of murder if he aided and
abetted a lesser crime and murder was a foreseeable consequence of that
lesser offense. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161.) But, by amending
the murder statutes to provide that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3)),
Senate Bill 1437 effectively abolished the natural and probable consequences
theory as a means of proving murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 845–848.)
Senate Bill 1437 did not affect the direct theory of aiding and
abetting, however. Accordingly, “[o]ne who directly aids and abets another
who commits murder is . . . liable for murder under the new law just as he or
she was liable under the old law.” (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588,
596.)
Senate Bill 1437 also led to the enactment of section 1172.6,
which is the procedural mechanism for challenging a murder conviction
based on vicarious liability. As originally enacted, section 1172.6 applied only
to defendants who were convicted of murder, but as noted above, that
changed in 2022, when Senate Bill 775 expanded the statute to include
defendants who were convicted of attempted murder. To be eligible for relief

4
under section 1172.6, defendants who were convicted of attempted murder
must allege they were convicted under the natural and probable
consequences theory, and they could not currently be convicted of that offense
in light of the changes wrought by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–
(3).)
If the defendant makes a prima facie showing to that effect, the
trial court is required to issue an order to show cause and conduct an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) At the hearing, the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is ineligible for
resentencing because his conduct did in fact rise to the level of attempted
murder as redefined by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) In other
words, the prosecution would have to prove the defendant was an actual
perpetrator of that offense, or he directly aided and abetted its commission.
Otherwise, the defendant is entitled to vacatur and resentencing per the
terms of section 1172.6.
In People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, our Supreme Court
ruled the bar for establishing a prima facie case for resentencing is very low
and the trial court’s role in determining whether that bar has been cleared in
a given case is quite limited. (Id. at pp. 970–972.) Although the court may
consider the underlying record of conviction, judicial factfinding is not
allowed. (Ibid.) Unless the record of conviction proves the defendant is
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law, the court must issue an order to
show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing on his entitlement to relief.
(Id. at p. 971; accord, People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708–709.)
“‘When the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea
rather than a trial, the record of conviction includes the facts “the defendant
admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea.”’” (People v. Ramos (2024) 103

5
Cal.App.5th 460, 464–465.) We may also consider the wording of the charges
and evidence presented at the preliminary hearing in determining whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie showing for resentencing under section
1172.6. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 560; People v. Verdugo (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 320, 329–330, abrogated on another ground by People v.
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961–963.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
The trial court denied Torres’s petition without an evidentiary
hearing based on its belief Senate Bill 775 did not change the law on
resentencing. Before that bill became effective in 2022, however, the
appellate courts were divided on the question whether attempted murderers
were included in Senate Bill 1437, so as to be able to seek resentencing under
section 1172.6. (See People v. Love (Oct. 1, 2020) B302892, opn. ordered
nonpub. Jan. 26, 2022 [summarizing the split of authority on that issue].)
The California Supreme Court was poised to resolve that issue in People v.
Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175.
But the Legislature rendered the issue moot through Senate Bill 775 by
expressly including attempted murder as a crime for which resentencing is
available under section 1172.6. (See People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
191, 193–194.)
This history proves Senate Bill 775 did not merely clarify existing
law, as the trial court found in this case. Rather, the bill substantively
amended the law by guaranteeing attempted murderers like Torres an
opportunity for resentencing. Thus, we agree with the parties that the court’s
reasoning for denying Torres’s petition was flawed.

6
Nevertheless, our task as an appellate court is to review the trial
court’s decision, not its reasoning: We will affirm the court’s order if it
reached the correct result, “‘“regardless of the considerations [that] may have
moved the trial court to its conclusion.”’” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th
929, 976.) Therefore, irrespective of the trial court’s reasoning for denying
Torres’s petition, we must determine whether that decision was ultimately
correct.
III.
THE RECORD OF CONVICTION DOES NOT RENDER TORRES
LEGALLY INELIGIBLE FOR RESENTENCING
As set forth above, the charges against Torres and the evidence
presented at his preliminary hearing make clear he committed his offenses
with three other people, and he was not the one who fired at the victim.
Therefore, his liability for attempted murder was based on the theory of
aiding and abetting. In the factual basis for his guilty plea, however, Torres
did not specify whether he was pleading guilty to attempted murder under
the direct theory of aiding and abetting, which is still a valid theory of
liability, or the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and
abetting, which was abolished by Senate Bill 1437. Nevertheless, the
Attorney General contends the substance of Torres’s plea proves he was
convicted under the former theory, which renders him ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. We disagree.
The Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433 (Curiel) is instructive on this issue. In that case, the court ruled a
finding or admission in the record of conviction that the defendant acted with
the intent to kill does not foreclose resentencing under section 1172.6.
(Curiel, supra, at pp. 460–463.) Rather, the record must establish all of the

7
elements necessary to support a conviction for murder or attempted murder
under current law. (Id. at pp. 463–471.) This requires proof the defendant
possessed the necessary intent and committed the necessary act or acts to be
guilty under a presently valid theory of liability, such as direct aiding and
abetting. (Ibid.)
In this case, Torres admitted he and his codefendants attempted
to kill the victim. Because Torres pleaded guilty as an aider and abettor, this
admission proves he assisted his cohorts in the killing so as to satisfy the
actus reus requirement for attempted murder under the direct theory of
aiding and abetting. Importantly, however, Torries did not admit he harbored
the requisite intent to be liable under that theory. While admitting he and
his codefendants possessed the intent to kill (i.e., malice), that alone is not
enough. As Curiel explained, to satisfy the mens rea for direct aiding and
abetting, the defendant must also act with “‘“knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in achieving those
unlawful ends.”’” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
The Attorney General argues those knowledge and intent
requirements were encompassed in Torres’s guilty plea. In his view, because
Torres and his codefendants “committed the attempted murder together and
with the requisite mental state [meaning the intent to kill], they necessarily
had knowledge of each other’s unlawful purpose and the intent to facilitate
that end.”
In support of that claim, the Attorney General relies on this
court’s decision in People v. Ramos, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 460. But in
pleading guilty to attempted murder in that case, the defendant not only
admitted he harbored the intent to kill, he also admitted he “‘abetted’” that
offense. (Id. at p. 466.) It was the defendant’s admission to abetting the

8
attempted murder that convinced us he both knew of, and intended to
facilitate, the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose. (Ibid.)
Here, however, Torres admitted only that he intended to kill; he
did not further admit that he abetted the attempted murder. While the intent
to kill is certainly a blameworthy mental state, Curiel makes clear that
mindset alone is insufficient to render a defendant ineligible for resentencing.
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 461–468 [although the legislative history of
Senate Bill 1437 makes clear that malice is generally considered a necessary
prerequisite for murder, “[i]t is only one element. It does not by itself
establish any valid theory of liability”].)
The Attorney General draws our attention to two other cases in
which the defendant’s admission was deemed fatal to his resentencing
prospects under section 1172.6, People v. Romero (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 145
(Romero) and People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444 (Saavedra). The
sole disqualifying factor in Romero was the defendant’s admission he acted
with the intent to kill in helping his codefendant commit murder. (Romero,
supra, at p. 153.) But as the Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Curiel,
malice alone is insufficient to preclude resentencing under section 1172.6.
Because Romero predated Curiel’s guidance on this issue, it is not controlling
here. (See generally Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57
Cal.2d 450, 455 [under the doctrine of stare decisis, lower appellate courts
are required to follow Supreme Court authority].)

Saavedra also is no help to the Attorney General, because in that
case the defendant admitted he personally attempted to kill the victims by
discharging a firearm at their vehicle. (Saavedra, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 446–447.) Because the defendant admitted he was the actual perpetrator,
there was no possibility he was convicted on a now-invalid theory of vicarious

9
liability. (Id. at p. 448.) In fact, in Saavedra, there was nothing to suggest
that anyone other then the defendant was even involved in carrying out the
attempted murder. That is why he was deemed ineligible for resentencing as
a matter of law. (Ibid.)
In contrast to Saavedra, the record in this case proves Torres was
not the actual perpetrator of the attempted murder to which he pleaded
guilty. Furthermore, the admissions in Torres’s guilty plea were broad
enough to encompass the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding
and abetting. Because his plea does not conclusively establish he was
convicted of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor, the trial court
erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage of the proceedings. That
does not ensure Torres will ultimately prevail on his petition, but it does
require further proceedings on that issue.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s postjudgment order is reversed and the matter is
remanded for the issuance of an order to show cause and an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to section 1172.6.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

10

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.