CourtListener 10633357•Pylypchenko v. Linda L. CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/15/25 Pylypchenko v. Linda L. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
ANDRIY PYLYPCHENKO, 2d Civ. No. B336497
(Super. Ct. No. D408447)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Ventura County)
v.
LINDA L.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Andriy Pylypchenko (Pylypchenko) appeals an order
granting a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) (Fam.
Code, § 6320) against him for the protection of Linda L., his ex-
wife. We affirm.
FACTS
Pylypchenko and Linda L. were married in June 2022.
They separated in December 2022 after a marriage of five
months. They have one minor child.
Linda L. filed a request for a DVRO against Pylypchenko.
She declared he “imprisoned [her] in [their] home and told his
relatives to ‘watch [her]’ so [she] could not leave.” Pylypchenko
threatened to hurt her if she “tried to leave the home without his
permission.” He “screamed at [her] for hours calling [her]
derogatory names.” He called her a “stupid bitch,” a “fucking
cunt,” and a “moron.” She was afraid for her child’s safety as he
continued to scream at her “for hours.”
Pylypchenko also attempted to restrict Linda L.’s ability to
communicate with her family. When her mother called to talk
with her, he “sat next to” her “to monitor [her] call to make sure
[she] did not tell [her] family about his abuse.”
Linda L. “tried to escape,” but Pylypchenko “angrily
dragged [her] into [their] bedroom, threatening [her],” and telling
her that she could not leave. She was eventually able to “escape”
when her uncle called the police and the police “escorted” her and
her child out of the home.
Linda L. stayed at her mother and grandmother’s home.
Pylypchenko stalked her and tried to break into that home. He
started “banging loudly on the front door.” She opened the door
and then tried to quickly close it. Pylypchenko “tried to push his
way inside” the home. The police arrived. They told Pylypchenko
to leave. They told Linda L. “to get a Restraining Order against
[Pylypchenko] as soon as possible.”
Linda L. followed the advice and filed an action for a
restraining order. She testified Pylypchenko controlled her by
confining her to her room multiple times, checking her
communications, screaming at her, and calling her “vile names.”
She was afraid and felt she had to do whatever he said. Her child
had a serious health condition. She believed Pylypchenko’s
abusive behavior could impact the child’s health. She asked him
to stop that conduct. He refused. He physically abused her. He
2.
squeezed her breasts causing pain. She asked him to stop. He
told her he enjoyed seeing her in pain.
Pylypchenko denied that he abused Linda L. He testified
that he did not confine her to her room. “She’s an adult.” “[S]he
can do whatever she wants to.” He never “laid a finger on” her
and was “never” aggressive with her. “I’ve only treated her with
respect.”
The trial court ruled that Linda L. had sustained her
burden of proof and issued a DVRO. It found that Linda L. was a
“protected” person and ordered Pylypchenko not to “[h]arass,
attack, strike, threaten, . . . follow, [or] stalk” her. Pylypchenko
“must stay at least” 100 yards away from her. He was prohibited
from disturbing her “peace” and her “mental or emotional calm.”
It ruled “[d]isturbing the peace includes coercive control.”
“Coercive control” means “a number of acts that unreasonably
limit the free will and individual rights of any person protected
by this restraining order.”
DISCUSSION
The DVRO
The trial court may issue a DVRO to protect a person from
abusive conduct. Such conduct includes “coercive control,” which
is a “ ‘pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably
interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.’ ”
(Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 121,
italics added.) A single event may not “ ‘rise to the level of
destruction of [the petitioner’s] mental and emotional calm,
sufficient to support [a DVRO].’ ” (Ibid.) Coercive control
includes “[i]solating the other party from friends, relatives” (Fam.
Code, § 6320, subd. (c)(1)), and “[c]ontrolling, regulating, or
monitoring the other party’s movements” (id., subd. (c)(3)).
3.
The DVRO expired on January 31, 2025. But this appeal is
not moot because Pylypchenko is subject to future potentially
negative consequences because a DVRO was issued against him.
(Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 141, 148.) An appeal
from an expired order is not moot, however, if it “could have
consequences for [a party] in . . . future court proceedings.” (In re
Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 209.)
Pylypchenko contends that during the hearing the trial
court made several comments indicating that he did not
intentionally abuse Linda L. The court said the parties were
immature young parents and he may not have realized the
impact of his actions on her. Pylypchenko claims these comments
show the court determined that he did not intentionally subject
her to coercive control and it erred by issuing the DVRO.
The trial court’s comments were made before the court
made its final ruling on Linda L.’s DVRO request. The court
found she met her burden of proof, Pylypchenko subjected her to
coercive control, and she was entitled to DVRO relief.
Pylypchenko may not rely on comments the court made before it
made its final ruling to challenge the judgment. (Burbank-
Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Hensler (1991) 233
Cal.App.3d 577, 591.) Those comments “may never be used to
impeach the order or judgment.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Neither an oral
expression nor a written opinion can restrict the power of the
judge to declare his [or her] final conclusion . . . .” (In re
Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 643, 647, italics added.)
In its final decision, the court “ ‘may enter a wholly different
judgment’ ” than the one it previously announced. (Id. at p. 646.)
“ ‘[We] are concerned with the correctness of the decision and
4.
judgment,’ ” not comments the court previously made. (Id. at
p. 647.)
The trial court’s ultimate findings – that Linda L. met her
burden of proof, was a “protected” person under the DVRO
statute, and was subject to Pylypchenko’s coercive control – show
the court found she had adequately shown the grounds and
necessity for the DVRO. (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c); Parris J.
v. Christopher U., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 121; McCord v.
Smith (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 358, 364-365.) The finding that
Linda L. met her burden of proof showed her claims that his
actions controlled her movements were true. Pylypchenko’s claim
that the court’s prior comments support a different result is not
relevant because the court had the authority to change its
position in its final ruling. (In re Marriage of Ditto, supra, 206
Cal.App.3d at p. 647.)
Moreover, as Linda L. correctly notes, the dispositive issue
for this appeal is “whether substantial evidence supports” the
DVRO. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we draw all
reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. (In re
Alexandria P. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 331, 355.) We do not decide
credibility of the witnesses or weigh the evidence.
Pylypchenko cannot challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the order because he has not cited to the
parties’ testimony in his opening brief. (Parris J. v.
Christopher U., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 122.) His claim that
there is no evidence to show he intentionally abused Linda L. is
refuted by her testimony. Moreover, evidence of a pattern of
behavior that has the “effect” of interfering with another person’s
liberty is sufficient to constitute “coercive control” under the
DVRO statute. (Id. at p. 121.) Linda L.’s testimony showed his
5.
conduct subjected her to his coercive control. Consequently,
substantial evidence supports the finding that Pylypchenko
engaged in a “ ‘pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect
unreasonably interfere[d] with [Linda L.’s] free will and personal
liberty.’ ” (Id. at p. 121, italics added.) He has not shown error.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J. CODY, J.
6.
JoAnn Johnson, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Bergman Law Group and Daniel A. Bergman for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Law Offices of Sharif & Wilkerson and Roger L.
Wilkerson III for Defendant and Respondent.
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