CourtListener 10632542•People v. Rogers CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/14/25 P. v. Rogers CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051251
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. SS110099B)
v.
KEVIN ROGERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Kevin Rogers was sentenced to 63 years in prison in 2014 after
pleading no contest to various offenses including two counts of voluntary manslaughter.
In 2023, he petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court
vacated one of his manslaughter convictions as well as a corresponding sentencing
enhancement, and he was resentenced to 54 years in prison. On appeal, he argues he
received ineffective assistance of counsel in the resentencing proceeding. As we will
explain, we see no ineffectiveness on this record and will affirm the judgment.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
In 2011, defendant was charged in case No. SS110022A with possessing a loaded
firearm in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 12031, subd. (a)(1); unspecified statutory references
are to the Penal Code); possessing a firearm as a convicted felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1));
driving or taking of a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); receiving
or concealing stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)); possessing a concealed firearm in a
vehicle (§ 12025, subd. (a)(1)); active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)); and resisting or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). It was
alleged that defendant committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang;
had served a prior prison term; had been convicted of a prior serious or violent felony;
and had been convicted of a prior strike. According to the record from the direct appeal,
of which we have taken judicial notice at defendant’s request, the charges stemmed from
an encounter in which defendant was in a car with his then-girlfriend, fled when
approached by police, and left a loaded gun behind in the car. Both the car and the gun
were identified as stolen.
In 2013, defendant was charged in case No. SS110099B with murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)); active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)); conspiracy
to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)); dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1,
subd. (c)(1)); solicitation of murder (§ 653f, subd. (b)); and voluntary manslaughter
(§ 192, subd. (a)). It was alleged that defendant had committed those offenses for the
benefit of a criminal street gang; had been convicted of a prior serious felony; and had a
prior strike conviction. The murder, gang participation, and manslaughter charges arose
from a December 2010 incident in which defendant “stood by as backup” while a
codefendant shot and killed the 18-year-old victim in retaliation for an earlier shooting.
The conspiracy, witness dissuasion, and solicitation charges were based on a recorded jail
call in which defendant made statements suggesting a plan to kill his then-girlfriend.
Also in 2013, defendant was charged with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) in case No. SS130495A. It was alleged that defendant
committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang; personally discharged a
firearm at a vehicle causing death; and had a prior strike conviction. According to the
record in that case, defendant and the victim were involved in a dispute regarding cocaine
that defendant had sold to the victim. The victim was unhappy with the cocaine and
wanted a refund, which defendant was unable to provide as a “middle man” in the
transaction. Defendant was also upset that the victim had insulted defendant’s girlfriend.
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On the day of the crime, defendant spoke with the victim on the phone and asked him to
meet at an apartment building for his refund. When the victim arrived, defendant killed
him with multiple gunshots to the face, chest, and arms.
All three cases were resolved in a single negotiated disposition. Defendant
pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted the gang, firearm, and prior
conviction allegations in case No. SS130495A; he pleaded no contest to voluntary
manslaughter and solicitation of murder and admitted the prior conviction allegations in
case No. SS110099B; and he pleaded no contest to possession of a loaded firearm and
admitted a gang allegation in case No. SS110022A. Consistent with the terms of the
negotiated disposition, defendant received a stipulated sentence of 63 years in prison
(composed of 22 years for voluntary manslaughter with 10-year gang and firearm
enhancements for a total term of 42 years in case No. SS130495A; a consecutive 12-year
sentence for solicitation of murder, a consecutive four-year sentence for voluntary
manslaughter, and a five-year prior serious felony enhancement for a total consecutive
term of 21 years in case No. SS110099B; and a concurrent three-year sentence for
possessing a loaded firearm plus a three-year gang enhancement for a total concurrent
term of six years in case No. SS110022A). All other charges and allegations were
dismissed or stricken.
Defendant agreed as part of the negotiated plea that he would “be responsible for
any restitution” associated with the dismissed counts. He also entered a waiver allowing
the trial court to “consider the entire factual background of the case, including any
unfiled, dismissed, or stricken charges or allegations or cases when granting probation,
ordering restitution, or imposing sentence.” (See People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754,
758 (Harvey) [dismissed charges may not be used to impose sentencing consequences
unless the defendant waives that right]; § 1192.3.) The court imposed restitution fines of
$10,000 in case No. SS130495A, $10,000 in case No. SS110099B, and $1,800 in case
No. SS110022A. The court also ordered restitution of $9,500 in case No. SS110099B
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and $7,500 in case No. SS130495A to the California Victim Compensation Board;
$396.60 to the mother of the manslaughter victim in case No. SS130495A; and ordered
further restitution in all three cases to the victims or their families in amounts later to be
determined.
In 2023, defendant petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6 (formerly
section 1170.95). The prosecution initially opposed the petition. After the trial court
found defendant had stated a prima facie case for relief, the prosecution conceded that the
manslaughter conviction and prior conviction enhancement in case No. SS110099B
should be vacated. The prosecution proposed a new sentence of 54 years, reflecting the
original 63 years less the four-year sentence for the vacated manslaughter conviction and
the associated five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement.
At a hearing on the resentencing petition, the prosecutor raised the possibility that
the concurrent sentence in case No. SS110022A could be modified to a consecutive
sentence given the change in circumstances. Defense counsel responded that he was in
agreement with the prosecution’s proposed sentence of 54 years but that, if the trial court
instead elected to impose a consecutive sentence in case No. SS110022A, defendant
should be afforded a full resentencing hearing. Consistent with the parties’ agreement,
the trial court resentenced defendant to 54 years and left all fines and fees unchanged.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Attached to the notice of appeal is a
request for a certificate of probable cause containing the following handwritten note:
“I’m requesting relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. I was back in the
Superior Court of California, Monterey County for resentencing and I asked the attorney
who was appointed to represent me if he was willing to make an argument on my behalf
to get the unlawful enhancements on one of my cases vacated. I also requested to see if
he could have my restitution waived. He told me no to both requests. The judge was
willing to look at the enhancements and restitution because she asked my public defender
if he wanted to address those impositions and how much time would he need in order to
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do so. My public defender declined. Because the judge did not ask me if I had anything
to say, I was not afforded an opportunity to address the court. I had explained to my
public defender that my sentence on case [No.] SS110099B affected how I was sentenced
on a separate case, (case [No.] SS130495A) which if resentenced under today’s law the
courts cannot impose those enhancements. Since I had part of case [No.] SS110099B
vacated, it should have allowed for my enhancements in case [No.] SS130495A to be
stricken as well. Furthermore, I should not have been made to continue paying the fines
and restitution fees on charges that now do not exist, as they have been vacated. Harris
v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th [984] held that it is permiss[i]ble and expected that
new laws and reforms modify the terms of an existing plea agreement.”
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends his counsel at resentencing was ineffective for: failing to
request vacatur of the restitution order associated with his vacated manslaughter
conviction; request vacatur of the gang enhancements based on Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) and its amendments to section 186.22; and request a full
resentencing hearing at which the applicability of other ameliorative legislation could be
considered. Based on possible tactical explanations for counsel’s choices on this record,
we reject defendant’s contention.
To establish ineffectiveness of counsel in violation of a defendant’s right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the defendant
must show both deficiency in counsel’s performance and prejudice from the deficiency.
(People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216–217.) Deficient performance is rarely
shown if there was a tactical reason for counsel’s conduct. (See People v. Cruz (1980)
26 Cal.3d 233, 255–256 [“except in rare cases, an appellate court should not attempt to
second-guess trial counsel as to tactics”]; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 317
[affirming conviction where alleged failure to object “may well have been ‘an informed
tactical choice within the range of reasonable competence’ ”].)
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The record reflects defense counsel may have intentionally refrained from
requesting the full resentencing hearing defendant now requests, likely to preclude
resentencing to more than 54 years. After the prosecutor suggested to the court that it
could impose a consecutive sentence in case No. SS110022A following vacatur of the
manslaughter conviction in case No. SS110099B, defendant’s counsel advocated that
defendant should in that event be afforded a full resentencing hearing to allow other
changes to the aggregate sentence to be considered. Both parties then confirmed their
agreement to the stipulated sentence of 54 years. Had counsel formally requested full
resentencing in an attempt to further reduce defendant’s sentence, that strategy may have
resulted in a consecutive term in case No. SS110022A and a sentence longer than 54
years.
Defendant suggests that a full resentencing hearing would have resulted in vacatur
of the gang enhancements in case No. SS130495A and case No. SS110022A. He bases
that argument on Assembly Bill No. 333, which amended section 186.22 to modify the
elemental definitions of “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” and “ ‘criminal street
gang’ ” (§ 186.22, subds. (e), (f)), and to clarify what it means to “benefit, promote,
further, or assist” a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (g)). (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §§ 3,
4.) The amended statute also now prescribes the permissible age of predicate offenses
used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity relative to one another and to the
currently charged offense; the predicate offenses must have commonly benefited a
criminal street gang; the common benefit of the predicate and currently charged offenses
must have been more than reputational; the currently charged offense may not be used to
establish a pattern of gang activity; and the gang’s members must have collectively
engaged in the pattern of gang activity. (§ 186.22, subds. (e)–(g).) The substantive
amendments to section 186.22 are ameliorative and thus apply retroactively in nonfinal
cases, including those where resentencing proceedings render a judgment nonfinal.
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(People v. Trent (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 251, 263; People v. Keel (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 546, 565.)
In exchange for the dismissal of other charges and allegations in the three cases
before us, defendant admitted that he committed manslaughter and possessed a loaded
firearm for the benefit of a criminal street gang. At the time of his initial sentencing,
defendant also pleaded no contest in a fourth case to active participation in a criminal
street gang and defense counsel stipulated that “police reports and other discovery”
provided a factual basis for that plea. As defendant notes, because the charges against
him were resolved through a negotiated disposition, the appellate record contains little
evidence specifically establishing his gang affiliation or the gang-related nature of the
offenses. But the limited record does not establish ineffective assistance. The mere
absence of evidence from the record does not foreclose the possibility that it exists and
defense counsel was aware of its existence. Counsel may have assessed that the
prosecution would likely be able to satisfy the requirements of amended section 186.22
and that raising the issue would thus be unlikely to benefit defendant, especially if it
would invite the court to consider other permissible sentence modifications. In other
words, as the Attorney General observes, counsel may have “believed that attempting to
interfere with other parts of the stipulated sentence could ultimately lead to a less
favorable outcome.”
A similar explanation may exist for defense counsel’s asserted failure to request
vacatur of restitution associated with the vacated manslaughter conviction. At the time of
his plea, defendant entered a Harvey waiver by which he agreed to assume responsibility
for restitution associated with any dismissed charges (including the murder and gang
participation charges in case No. SS110099B, which arose from the same shooting
incident as the vacated manslaughter conviction). The original sentencing court imposed
a restitution fine of $1,800 in case No. SS110022A, well below the maximum permissible
fine of $10,000. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) It imposed the maximum $10,000 fine in case
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No. SS110099B, but defendant was also convicted in that case of soliciting murder.
(And vacatur of the manslaughter conviction did not affect the statutory maximum of the
restitution fine. (Ibid.)) With respect to direct victim restitution, the court ordered that
defendant pay $9,500 to the California Victim Compensation Board in case
No. SS110099B. That amount appears to have included $7,500 in burial expenses for the
shooting victim and $2,000 in relocation expenses for the victim’s family. The court also
ordered undetermined amounts of direct victim restitution in all three cases, and the
record indicates those amounts remained undetermined at the time of resentencing.
Under the circumstances, counsel may have concluded that raising the issue of restitution
in the resentencing context would be unlikely to result in any practical benefit to
defendant and could actually cause additional restitution to be ordered. (Cf. People v.
Lamoureux (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 136, 151–152.)
On this record, we cannot say that defense counsel lacked a reasonable tactical
basis for not requesting vacatur of the restitution order or gang enhancements. (See
People v. Kendrick (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 769, 778 [“If, as here, the record on appeal
sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an
appellate court must reject the claim of ineffective assistance unless there can be no
satisfactory explanation for counsel’s conduct.”].) Although defendant asserts that
counsel also failed to seek the benefit of other ameliorative legislation, he does not
identify the particular legislation or discuss its applicability to these cases. We therefore
treat the assertion as forfeited and do not consider it further. (See Tellez v. Rich Voss
Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 [“When an appellant asserts a point
but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point
as forfeited.”].) Nor do we consider defendant’s allegations in his request for a certificate
of probable cause attached to the notice of appeal, as those allegations would be more
appropriately addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding. (See People v. Mendoza Tello
8
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–267.)1 Defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel
performed deficiently.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
1
As the Attorney General notes, were we to consider defendant’s allegations that
he discussed the gang enhancements and restitution order with defense counsel before the
resentencing hearing, those allegations would suggest that counsel’s actions at the
hearing were the product of a conscious tactical choice rather than an inadvertent
mistake. The allegations provide no additional insight as to why counsel elected not to
make the arguments suggested by defendant.
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____________________________________
Grover, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________
Lie, J.
H051251
The People v. Rogers
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