CourtListener 10632521•People v. Brinson
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/14/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171744
v.
JOHNNY LAWRENCE BRINSON, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR-28923-1)
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2000, Johnny Lawrence Brinson was sentenced to an aggregate term
of 39 years to life in prison after a jury found him guilty of two felonies.
In 2024, Brinson filed requests for recall and resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.1. 1 The trial court declined to take any action on the
requests pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (c). Brinson seeks to appeal
from one of the court orders declining to take action on his request, which is
not an appealable order. Accordingly, we dismiss.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
General Background
In 2000, a jury found Brinson guilty of attempted willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), with a related allegation
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Section 1172.1
was previously codified in section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and section
1170.03, subdivision (a). (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 992
(Hodge).) We cite to section 1172.1 throughout this opinion for ease of
reference.
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that he had personally used and discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b),
(c)), and of being a felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021,
subd. (a)(1)). The trial court found Brinson had a prior serious felony
conviction and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a), 1170.12).
The trial court sentenced Brinson to an aggregate term of 39 years to
life in prison. This court affirmed on direct appeal. (People v. Brinson (June
26, 2001, A091236) [nonpub. opn.].)
Section 1172.1 Requests
All subsequent dates refer to 2024.
In January, Brinson filed his first request for recall of sentence and
resentencing pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 600) and section 1172.1. The court denied that request and
took no action on his case pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (c).
On July 31, Brinson filed a second request for recall of sentence and
resentencing based on amendments to the Penal Code. On August 22,
Brinson filed a third request for recall of sentence and resentencing, again
citing section 1172.1 and Assembly Bill 600.
On August 23, the trial court issued an order2 stating it was in receipt
of Brinson’s request for recall and resentencing under Assembly Bill 600 and
section 1172.1 and, pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (c), “the court
takes no action on your request.” On September 13, a virtually identical
order was issued.
Brinson filed a notice of appeal from the August 23 order. The
Attorney General indicates the August 23 order responded to the second
2 Although the parties refer to the court’s orders as “letter[s],” a court’s
written decision denying a defendant’s request for recall and resentencing
under section 1172.1 “meets the definition of a judicial ‘order’ ” (Hodge, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 994), and we therefore refer to them as such.
2
request filed on July 31, and the September 13 order responded to the third
request filed on August 22. Brinson indicates the August 23 order responded
to the August 22 request. We need not settle this discrepancy because,
regardless of whether Brinson’s appeal from the August 23 order
corresponded to his second or third request, the notice of appeal makes clear
that he is seeking to appeal the court’s “tak[ing] no actions on [his] request
[to] recall his sentence under Assembly Bill 600.” (Some capitalization
omitted.) Accordingly, we, like the parties, limit the scope of this appeal to
the court’s decision to take no action under section 1172.1, subdivision (c).
DISCUSSION
Brinson attempts to appeal from the trial court’s order declining to take
any action on his section 1172.1 request for recall and resentencing. We
conclude the trial court’s decision is not an appealable order and dismiss.
We begin with the fundamental principle that “[t]he right to appeal is
statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or
ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.)
Brinson asserts the trial court’s order is appealable under section 1237,
subdivision (b), which provides that a defendant may appeal from any
postjudgment order that affects the substantial rights of the party. However,
we agree with the growing body of caselaw concluding a trial court’s decision
not to take any action on a section 1172.1 request initiated by a defendant
does not affect his or her substantial rights. (E.g., People v. Roy (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 991, 1001, petn. for review pending, petn. filed May 30, 2025,
S291146 (Roy); People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 696
(Faustinos); Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 999.)
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I. A Trial Court’s Decision To Take No Action Pursuant to 1172.1,
Subdivision (c) Does Not Affect a Defendant’s Substantial Rights
Section 1172.1 serves as a statutory exception to the general rule that a
trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a sentence after judgment is rendered
and execution of the sentence has begun. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
p. 992.) In particular, section 1172.1 authorizes a trial court to “recall a
sentence and resentence a defendant ‘at any time’ upon the recommendation
of various designated correctional or law enforcement authorities. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).) The trial court may also do so ‘on its own motion’ within 120
days of the date of commitment. (Ibid.)” (Hodge, at p. 992.)
Effective January 1, 2024, Assembly Bill 600 amended section 1172.1 to
expand a trial court’s authority to recall and resentence on its own motion.
(Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2; Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 694.) Now,
a court may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own motion
“at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original
sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case
law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1); see Assem. Bill 600, Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2.)
Crucially for our purposes, section 1172.1 “expressly denies defendants
the right to file a petition for resentencing under that section, and expressly
excuses the trial court from acting on any such request that a defendant
might nevertheless file.” (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.)
Specifically, subdivision (c) of section 1172.1 states: “A defendant is not
entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not
required to respond.”
Courts have interpreted the second sentence of section 1172.1,
subdivision (c) to mean that defendants do not have a substantial right at
4
stake when they request recall and resentencing. (Hodge, supra, 107
Cal.App.5th at p. 996; accord, Roy, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 998–999,
petn. for review pending; Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 696.) As
Hodge explained: “That sentence excuses the trial court from any
responsibility to rule on such a request, or even to respond. It follows that a
defendant who chooses to file an unauthorized request for resentencing has
no right to a ruling. The defendants may have a liberty interest at stake in
any decision as to whether they should remain incarcerated. But a defendant
has no right to demand that the trial court actually make such a decision. If
the defendant has no right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to make
one does not deprive the defendant of any right, much less a substantial one.”
(Hodge, at p. 996.)
Hodge further explained that a contrary conclusion would result in an
arbitrary rule where, if a trial court does not respond to a defendant’s request
for recall and resentencing, there would be no order to appeal, but if the court
informs a defendant that it will take no action on the request (as was the case
here), the defendant would be able to appeal that decision. (Hodge, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) The court in Hodge found “such an irrational and
arbitrary result” seemed unlikely to have been intended by the Legislature.
(Ibid.)
We agree with Hodge’s reasoning and conclude a trial court’s decision
not to act on a defendant’s section 1172.1 request for recall and resentencing
does not affect his or her substantial rights and is therefore not appealable
under section 1237, subdivision (b). (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
5
p. 996; accord, Roy, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 998–999, 1001, petn. for
review pending; Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 696.) 3
II. Section 1171 Does Not Override Section 1172.1, Subdivision (c)
Brinson contends the reasoning of Hodge no longer applies after
Assembly Bill No. 2483 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2483) added
section 1171 to the Penal Code, which he asserts overrides the plain language
of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) that excuses a trial court from ruling on, or
responding to, a defendant-initiated request for recall. Reviewing this issue
of statutory interpretation de novo (People v. Wilson (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
874, 878), we disagree.
“ ‘Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do
not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to
harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts
must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would
3 We do not address Brinson’s arguments in his reply brief based on an
opinion by the Fifth District Court of Appeal that has since been ordered
depublished following rehearing by that court and is no longer citable
authority. (See People v. Chatman (Feb. 4, 2025, F087868), opn. vacated
Mar. 3, 2025.) We also do not reach his arguments, raised for the first time
on reply, relying on People v. Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1155 and People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367. (See Rental Housing Owners Assn. of
Southern Alameda County, Inc. v. City of Hayward (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
81, 94, fn. 12 [we do not consider points raised for the first time in reply
brief].) Even if these arguments were properly raised, we would find
Brinson’s reliance on Loper and Carmony inapposite for the reasons stated in
Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at page 997, and Faustinos, supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at pages 698–699.
6
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.’ ” (People v.
Wilson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 878.)
Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly Bill 2483 enacted section 1171,
which sets forth various procedures under subdivision (c) that apply to all
postconviction proceedings to modify a sentence or conviction under
ameliorative statutes, including section 1172.1. (§ 1171, subds. (a) & (c);
Assem. Bill 2483, Stats. 2024, ch. 964, § 2.) Section 1171 explicitly states
that the procedures set forth in subdivision (c) do not apply where “there is a
conflict with a more specific rule established in statute, in which case the
more specific statute shall apply.” (§ 1171, subd. (c).)
As relevant for our purposes, section 1171 provides that, upon receiving
“a request to begin a postconviction proceeding that is authorized in law,” the
court shall consider appointment of counsel for the defendant. (§ 1171,
subd. (c)(1), italics added.) It also requires a court to “state on the record the
reasons for its decision to grant or deny the initial request to begin a
postconviction proceeding” and provide notice of that decision. (Id.,
subd. (c)(4).) And, “[a]fter ruling on a request, the court shall advise the
defendant of their right to appeal and the necessary steps and time for taking
an appeal.” (Id., subd. (c)(5).)
Brinson asserts that, because section 1171 expressly applies to
resentencing proceedings under section 1172.1, a trial court must now follow
the procedures set forth in section 1171, subdivision (c)—including issuing a
decision stating its reasons on the record—even when a request for recall and
resentencing under section 1172.1 is initiated by a defendant. He contends
that, as a result, Hodge’s concerns that there are no “statutory constraints on
a trial court’s decision to decline action on a defendant’s request for
resentencing under section 1172.1” nor “discernable criteria for an appellate
7
court to evaluate” are no longer applicable. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th
at p. 998.)
Contrary to Brinson’s contention, the plain language of section 1171,
subdivision (c) makes clear that it does not apply if it conflicts “with a more
specific rule established in statute, in which case the more specific statute
shall apply.” (§ 1171, subd. (c).) The language of section 1171, subdivision (c)
requiring a trial court to take any action in response to a request for recall
and resentencing clearly conflicts with the more specific rule established in
section 1172.1, which expressly states that “the court is not required to
respond” to a defendant-initiated request under that section. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (c).) Both cannot be true at the same time. Moreover, this language on
its face applies only to those requests that are “authorized in law” (§ 1171,
subd. (c)(1)), which a defendant-initiated section 1172.1 petition is not.
Indeed, as the court in Hodge noted, there are already numerous
procedural requirements codified within section 1172.1, but applying those
requirements “to a defendant’s request for resentencing would directly
contradict the clear statement in [section 1172.1,] subdivision (c) that, ‘[i]f a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not
required to respond.’ ” (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 998.) This would
also be the case were we to apply the procedural requirements of section
1171, subdivision (c) to a defendant’s request for recall and resentencing
under section 1172.1. Because section 1171, subdivision (c) clearly and
unambiguously states that in the case of a conflict “the more specific statute
shall apply,” we need go no further in our statutory analysis. (In re D.B.
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 945 [“ ‘If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous our inquiry ends.’ ”].)
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In sum, we conclude section 1172.1, subdivision (c), not section 1171,
subdivision (c), applies to defendant-initiated requests for recall and
resentencing. Accordingly, Brinson’s contention that the court’s response to
his request for recall and resentencing did not comply with section 1171, and
we must therefore remand for further proceedings under the guidelines in
that statute, is unavailing. Rather, for the reasons explained in section I,
ante, a defendant who requests recall and resentencing under section
1172.1—even after section 1171 became effective—does not have a
substantial right at stake, and the trial court’s decision on that request is not
appealable. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996; accord, Roy, supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at pp. 998–999, 1001, petn. for review pending; Faustinos, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 696.)
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed.
PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
TUCHER, P. J.
RODRIGUEZ, J.
9
A171744
People v. Brinson
Trial Court: Sonoma County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Mark Urioste
Counsel:
Johnny Lawrence Brinson, in pro. per.; and William P. Melcher, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
[Appointed.]
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Seth K. Schalit, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Jeffrey M.
Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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