CourtListener 10625168•People v. Vargas CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/8/25 P. v. Vargas CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087848
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. DF012197A)
v.
JOEL VARGAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. David E. Wolf,
Judge.
Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Kari Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, a jury convicted defendant Joel Vargas of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b); count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), carrying a loaded firearm while an active participant in a
criminal street gang (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3); count 3), and active participation in a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 4). (Undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.) The jury also found true a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and
an allegation defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of each count
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The court found true allegations defendant suffered a prior strike
conviction, and allegations defendant had suffered two prison priors within the meaning
of section 667.5, former subdivision (b). The court sentenced defendant on count 1 to 28
years in prison, including two years for the two prior prison terms. The court imposed
and stayed sentences on the remaining counts. Our court later struck the section 667.5,
former subdivision (b) enhancements on appeal following resentencing proceedings.
On March 19, 2024, defendant filed a request for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.75, which the court summarily denied. On appeal, he argues the court erred in
summarily denying his request for resentencing because his judgment included a prison
prior, even though the prison prior enhancements were stricken prior to the enactment of
section 1172.75. He asserts, to the extent the statute renders him ineligible for relief, it
violates equal protection because he is “similarly situated to individuals who are eligible
for resentencing relief due to the fact that their enhancement has not yet been stricken,
and there is no rational basis upon which to deprive him of the benefits of the statute.”
For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Convictions and Original Sentence
In 2016, a jury convicted defendant of assault with a semiautomatic firearm
(§ 245, subd. (b); count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
count 2), carrying a loaded firearm while an active participant in a criminal street gang
(§ 25850, subd. (c)(3); count 3), and active participation in a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 4). The jury also found true a gang enhancement (§ 186.22,
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subd. (b)(1)) as to count 1 and that defendant personally used a firearm during the
commission of that count (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The court found true allegations
defendant suffered a prior strike conviction,1 a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)), and allegations as to each count that defendant had suffered two prison priors
within the meaning of section 667.5, former subdivision (b). The court sentenced
defendant on count 1 to 18 years in prison, plus four years for the gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), four years for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)),
and two years for the two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
The court imposed and stayed sentences on the remaining counts pursuant to section 654.
Defendant appealed the judgment and our court concluded, and the parties agreed,
the court erred in applying the prior prison term enhancements as to each count rather
than to the aggregate sentence. (See People v. Vargas, supra, F073682.) Accordingly,
our court ordered the court to strike the prior prison term enhancements as to counts 2, 3,
and 4 and impose the two enhancements without reference to any particular count. (See
ibid.) Our court also directed the court on remand to consider its newfound discretion to
strike the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) firearm enhancement considering the passage
of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). (Vargas, F073682.)
On August 15, 2018, the trial court received a letter from the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (sometimes CDCR) that provided “the
court with authority to resentence [defendant] pursuant to Penal Code [former] section
1170, subdivision (d).” The letter noted defendant was convicted of assault with a
semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), and two enhancements attached to that offense
1The court initially found true allegations defendant suffered two prior strike convictions,
but it later determined one of these convictions did not qualify as a strike prior because defendant
had pled guilty to assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury rather than assault
with a deadly weapon. Accordingly, the court vacated its true finding as to that strike prior
allegation and granted the prosecutor’s motion to strike the allegation. (See People v. Vargas
(Apr. 27, 2018, F073682) [nonpub. opn.].)
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were imposed: a section 12022.5 firearm enhancement and a gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)). In recommending defendant’s sentence be recalled and that
he be resentenced, the Secretary asked the court to consider People v. Le (2015) 61
Cal.4th 416, which held “a trial court is precluded from imposing both an enhancement
for personal use of a firearm under Section 12022.5(a)(1) and a serious felony gang
enhancement under Section 186.22(b)(1)(B) when the offense qualifies as a serious
felony solely because it involved firearm use.”
On August 16, 2018, the court held further proceedings after receiving and
considering the remittitur from our court. The court then proceeded with resentencing.
The court stated, “The two one-year prior prison term enhancements imposed on Counts
1 and 4 are stricken. And the two enhancements are imposed without—well, they were
imposed without any reference to a particular count. [¶] So those two prison priors have
been stricken.” The court declined to strike the firearm enhancement, reiterated its
decision that “[t]he two prison priors … are stricken,” and it otherwise imposed the same
sentence for a total term of 26 years’ imprisonment—the upper term of 18 years on count
1 enhanced by four years for the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)) and
another four years for the section 12022.5 firearm enhancement. The court imposed and
stayed sentences as to the remaining counts pursuant to section 654. Defendant again
appealed from the judgment.
On September 26, 2018, the trial court held a status conference regarding the letter
received from the CDCR. The court issued an order stating it was to prepare and mail a
letter in response to CDCR’s letter indicating the court’s lack of inclination to take
action.
In the second appeal, the parties argued and we agreed the trial court erred when it
imposed both the four-year gang enhancement and the four-year firearm enhancement
(§ 1170.1, subd. (f)), relying on People v. Le, supra, 61 Cal.4th 416 and People v.
Francis (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 876. (People v. Vargas (May 6, 2020, F077982) [nonpub.
4.
opn.].) Our court concluded the trial court was required to impose the greater of the two
enhancements, which was a 10-year sentence under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C).
(Vargas, supra, F077982.) The People also argued that, in our prior opinion, we imposed
the two 1-year prior prison term enhancements on the aggregate sentence but, on remand,
the trial court struck them in the absence of jurisdiction to do so. Our court reasoned we
did not need to reach this jurisdictional argument because the parties agreed the prior
prison term enhancements had to be stricken under Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.), which became effective January 1, 2020 (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) (Vargas,
supra, F077982.) We ordered the judgment on count 1 to be modified to reflect (1)
imposition of the 10-year gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (B)(1)(C),
and (2) the firearm enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) is stayed under
section 1170.1, subdivision (f). We also ordered the judgment to be modified to reflect
the prior prison term enhancements are stricken in light of the amendment to section
667.5, subdivision (b), under Senate Bill No. 136. Except as modified, we affirmed the
judgment. (Vargas, supra, F077982.)
On January 12, 2021, the court held resentencing proceedings after receiving and
considering our court’s remittitur. The court struck the section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
firearm enhancement attached to count 1. The court also struck the section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1)(B) enhancements attached to count 1 but replaced it with a violation of
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). The court then resentenced defendant to a term of
10 years for the amended gang enhancement plus the upper term of 18 years for count 1
for a total term of 28 years.
On March 19, 2024, the court received defendant’s petition for resentencing
pursuant to sections 1170, 1171, and 1172. Defendant noted the passage of Assembly
Bills Nos. 1540 and 124 and Senate Bill No. 567. which “collectively amended, and
added to the California Penal Code § 1170.” He also noted the passage of Senate Bill
No. 483 and the fact that section 1171.1 was renumbered to section 1172.75. He asserted
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the court should recall and resentence him, appoint him counsel, and apply the changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. He
asserted, if he is eligible, the court should apply Assembly Bill No. 333, Senate Bill
No. 73, and Assembly Bill No. 567 at resentencing. The court summarily denied the
petition the next day.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the court erred in failing to recall his sentence and hold
resentencing proceedings pursuant to section 1172.75. We conclude the court lacked
jurisdiction pursuant to section 1172.75 to consider defendant’s motion and, to the extent
it had jurisdiction to recall and resentence defendant under section 1172.1, its order
declining to act on its own motion is not appealable. Defendant alternatively asks us to
construe his appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We decline to do so.
I. Standard of Review
“The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) “The court’s role in construing a statute is
to ‘ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’
[Citations.] In determining the Legislature’s intent, a court looks first to the words of the
statute. [Citation.] ‘[I]t is the language of the statute itself that has successfully braved
the legislative gauntlet.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215.)
“‘We must look to the statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning.’”
(People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126.) “If there is no ambiguity in the
language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the
statute governs.” (Snook, at p. 1215.)
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II. Passage of Senate Bill No. 483 and Enactment of Section 1172.75
In October of 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 483), effective on January 1, 2022, which added section 1171.1 to the
Penal Code, subsequently renumbered as section 1172.75. Section 1172.75 establishes a
mechanism to provide certain affected defendants an avenue for relief from now invalid
prison prior enhancements.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) declares: “Any sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for
any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense … is
legally invalid.” Subdivision (b) directs the Secretary of the CDCR and the correctional
administrator of each county to “identify those persons in their custody currently serving
a term for a judgment” that includes a now legally invalid prior prison enhancement, and
to provide the names of such persons, their dates of birth, and the relevant case numbers
or docket numbers to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b), italics added.) After the court receives from the CDCR and the county
correctional administrator the information included in subdivision (b) of section 1172.75,
“the court shall review the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a
sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), italics
added; see Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 [“it is the intent of the Legislature to retroactively
apply … Senate Bill 136 (which amended section 667.5, subdivision (b)) … to all
persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed
sentence enhancements” (italics added)].) “If the court determines that the current
judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), italics added.)
When resentencing a defendant under section 1172.75, the court must “apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
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promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “The court may consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk
for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the
original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
III. This Appeal Arises From a Nonappealable Order
Defendant contends the court erred in denying him resentencing relief because
section 1172.75 “requires trial courts to resentence defendants in all cases where the
judgment includes the imposition of an invalid prison prior, irrespective of whether the
punishment for the prison prior was later stricken prior to the enactment of section
1172.75.” He argues “resentencing relief under section 1172.75 broadly applies to any
‘judgment’ that includes a prison prior,” irrespective of whether the punishment for the
prison prior was later stricken prior to the enactment of section 1172.75; so, he was
entitled to resentencing under the provisions of section 1172.75. He also asserts, to the
extent the statute renders him ineligible for relief, it violates equal protection because he
is “similarly situated to individuals who are eligible for resentencing relief due to the fact
that their enhancement has not yet been stricken, and there is no rational basis upon
which to deprive him of the benefits of the statute.” Defendant notes section 1172.75
requires the CDCR to have identified those persons in their custody currently serving a
term for a judgment that includes a now invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison
prior by July 1, 2022, and that review and resentencing pursuant to that section be
completed by December 31, 2023. (See § 1172.75, subds. (b) & (c).) He acknowledges
he was not identified by the CDCR within that time frame but contends the case law
suggesting a trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear a stand-alone motion for relief pursuant
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to section 1172.75 should not apply because the circumstances here are distinct.
Alternatively, he asks us to construe his appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The People contend defendant is not eligible for relief under section 1172.75 because he
is not “currently serving” a judgment with a now invalid prison prior, and such a
conclusion does not violate equal protection principles. They also argue the appeal must
be dismissed because defendant’s invitation to the court to recall and resentence him does
not affect his substantial rights.
A. The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Recall and Resentence
Defendant Pursuant to Section 1172.75
First, we conclude the court lacked authority to recall and resentence defendant
pursuant to section 1172.75.
1. Applicable Law
“In general, ‘“once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has
begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.”’”
(People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 319, 329; accord, People v. King (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 629, 634; People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1089.) “And, ‘[i]f the
trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate or modify a sentence,
an order denying such a motion is nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order
must be dismissed.’” (People v. King, supra, at p. 634.)
Section 1172.75 provides a process for recall of certain sentences rendered invalid
by Senate Bill 483 and for the resentencing of eligible individuals. (See People v. Cota,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 330.) “The resentencing process begins with corrections
officials: ‘The Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the
county correctional administrator of each county shall identify those persons in their
custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described
in subdivision (a) and shall provide the name of each person along with the person’s date
of birth and the relevant case number or docket number, to the sentencing court that
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imposed the enhancement.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).)” (Id. at p. 330.) Section 1172.75
requires such information to be provided to the sentencing court as follows: “(1) By
March 1, 2022, for individuals who have served their base term and any other
enhancements and are currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement. For
purposes of this paragraph, all other enhancements shall be considered to have been
served first. [¶] (2) By July 1, 2022, for all other individuals.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b)(1),
(2).) “Receipt of information from corrections officials regarding a defendant’s
resentencing eligibility triggers review by the trial court: ‘Upon receiving the
information described in subdivision (b), the court shall review the judgment and verify
that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).
If the court determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.’
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)” (People v. Cota, supra, at p. 330.) The statute provides that
“review and resentencing shall be completed as follows: [¶] (1) By October 1, 2022, for
individuals who have served their base term and any other enhancement and are currently
serving a sentence based on the enhancement. [¶] (2) By December 31, 2023, for all
other individuals.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1), (2).)
2. Analysis
Here, defendant does not argue the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
identified him as an individual eligible for recall and resentencing pursuant to section
1172.75. Rather, he appears to concede he was not identified as an eligible individual,
but nonetheless should be eligible for relief under the statute because “the prescribed
deadlines under section 1172.75, subdivision (c) had passed at the time [he] filed his
request for resentencing.” He argues, “[o]utside of the prescribed deadlines, the language
of section 1172.75 reasonably supports the conclusion that the trial court maintains
ongoing jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of individual claims of entitlement to
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resentencing under section 1172.75 and must continue to resentence eligible defendants
upon being presented with that information.”
But defendant cites no authority to support his argument “the language of section
1172.75” supports a conclusion “the trial court maintains ongoing jurisdiction to
adjudicate the merits of individual claims of entitlement to resentencing under section
1172.75” outside of the prescribed deadlines provided for in the statute. And this is not
what the statute says. Rather, the plain language of section 1172.75 is clear. As our
court discussed in People v. Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 318, the statute provides that,
when the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation provides an identification to the
trial court, it places the “matter within a statutorily authorized exception to the general
rule that a trial court has no jurisdiction to modify a final judgment.” (Id. at p. 332.) The
recall and resentencing “process is triggered by the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation identifying a defendant as a person serving a sentence that includes a prior
prison term enhancement.” (Ibid.) Said differently, the identification of the defendant as
an individual potentially eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 is a statutory
prerequisite to the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider recall and resentencing under the
language of that statute. Without such an identification, the trial court lacks authority to
recall and resentence the defendant under the plain language of section 1172.75. To the
extent defendant invites us to interpret the language of section 1172.75 in such a way that
it would validate his right to seek modification of the judgment through his own petition
when the CDCR has not identified him as an eligible individual, we decline to do so.
Rather, the plain language of the statute does not confer upon a defendant such a right
and we cannot conclude the court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 1172.75 to entertain
defendant’s freestanding motion. (See People v. King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 640
[“a defendant who wishes to challenge a sentence as unlawful after the defendant’s
conviction is final and after the defendant has begun serving the sentence must do more
than simply file a motion in the trial court making an allegation that the sentence is
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legally infirm”].) And we decline to read language into the statute that is not there. (See
People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587 [“‘insert[ing]’ additional language into a
statute ‘violate[s] the cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must not add
provisions to statutes’”].)
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over defendant’s stand-alone request for
relief under section 1172.75, we cannot conclude its denial of such relief is appealable.
B. The Court’s Order Is Also Not Appealable Pursuant to Section 1172.1
On reply, defendant contends the order denying him resentencing relief is
appealable under section 1172.1. Initially, “we do not consider arguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 197.) Irrespective,
defendant’s contention fails on its merits.
Section 1172.1 (former § 1170, subd. (d)) provides an exception to the general rule
that a trial court loses jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun by authorizing a
recall and resentencing procedure that may be invoked when, for example, the Secretary
of the CDCR recommends resentencing. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1); see People v. E.M.
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082.) Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)
amended section 1172.1 to allow a court to now resentence a defendant “on its own
motion” when “applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are
subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1), as
amended by Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2.) Accordingly, effective January 1, 2024, section
1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides the court may, “on its own motion, … at any time if
the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently
changed by new statutory authority or case law, … recall the sentence and commitment
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided
the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (Italics added.) And
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section 1172.1, subdivision (c) expressly states, “A defendant is not entitled to file a
petition seeking relief from the court under this section.” (Ibid.) Additionally: “If a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required to
respond.” (Ibid.)
Section 1172.1 does not address whether a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s
request for recall and resentencing under the statute is appealable. Section 1237,
subdivision (b) “provides that a defendant may appeal from ‘any order made after
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.’” (Teal v. Superior Court (2014)
60 Cal.4th 595, 598.)
But under the circumstances, we cannot conclude the court’s order denying
defendant’s request for recall and resentencing proceedings affected defendant’s
substantial rights such that it constitutes an appealable order. Section 1172.1, subdivision
(c) expressly provides that the trial court may choose not to respond to a defendant’s
invitation for the court to initiate recall and resentencing proceedings on its own motion
pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (a) as amended by Assembly Bill No. 600.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) By stating a court may decline to respond to a defendant’s request
for relief under the statute, the language of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) establishes
there is no affirmative obligation on a trial court to consider a defendant’s request for
relief or initiate recall and resentencing proceedings in response thereto. And, if a court
has no duty to respond to—let alone grant—a defendant’s request for relief, it follows
that a defendant has no right to the initiation of recall and resentencing proceedings.
Thus, where, as here, the court issues an order denying such relief, it cannot be said to
affect the defendant’s substantial rights as would be required for such a postjudgment
order to be appealable. (§ 1237, subd. (b).) Consequently, we will order the appeal be
dismissed.
While defendant urges us to construe his appeal as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, we decline to do so. If defendant wishes to pursue habeas corpus relief, he must
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do so in accordance with the procedures governing such petitions. In this respect,
appellate counsel’s application to expand appointment to include filing a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in this appeal, filed on April 16, 2025, is denied.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
MEEHAN, J.
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