Torres v. Saied CA2/5

CourtListener 10623706Calctapp07.07.2025

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Filed 7/7/25 Torres v. Saied CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

SANDRA TORRES, B336857

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 21STCV22824)

SEAN SAIED,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Theresa M. Traber, Judge. Affirmed.

Burgee & Abramoff and John G. Burgee for Defendant and
Appellant.

Berokim Law and Kousha Berokim, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
******
A family relative agreed to help his cousin and the cousin’s
common law wife pay off an overdue business loan using the
couple’s funds, but the transfer of funds was to occur through a
series of transactions involving limited liability companies (LLCs)
to avoid attracting the attention of the couple’s other creditors.
After the loan was purchased and resold to a third party, the
relative refused to return the remaining proceeds to the couple.
The wife sued the relative for breach of fiduciary duty and
conversion, and the trial court ruled in her favor on both claims.
The relative challenges this ruling on appeal. We conclude his
challenges have no merit, and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts1
Sandra Torres (plaintiff) and Farzad Khalili (Khalili) are
not married civilly, but have been married “in the Jewish
religion,” have children together, and consider themselves
husband and wife. Sean Saied (Saied) is Khalili’s second cousin.
In 2017, Khalili told Saied that he and plaintiff were
having financial difficulties. More specifically, Khalili explained
that a commercial property he and plaintiff owned in downtown

1 These facts are drawn from the settled statement corrected
and approved by the trial court. Because the parties elected not
to have a court reporter, the statement’s recitation of facts cannot
be contradicted. (Cross v. Tustin (1951) 37 Cal.2d 821, 826
[“[W]hen the litigant fails to convince the trial judge that his
proposed [settled] statement accurately reflects the proceedings
in question, the action of the judge who heard and tried the case
must be regarded as final”].) We have accordingly disregarded
any statements in the parties’ briefs that dispute the facts set
forth in the settled statement.

2
Los Angeles was in foreclosure on a $1.25 million loan and
lamented that, although he had the funds to refinance that loan
and avert foreclosure, he did not want to use his personal funds
to do so because it might bring those funds to the attention of
Khalili’s other, personal creditors. Saied offered to do what he
could to help without remuneration.
Khalili, plaintiff and Saied agreed to the following plan.
Khalili would form two LLCs—namely, (1) Fox Plaza Hotel LLC
(Fox Plaza), in plaintiff’s name, and (2) Financial Group Funding
LLC (Financial Group), in Saied’s name. The three would avert
the foreclosure through a series of transactions using the LLCs—
namely, (1) Khalili “gifted” $1.25 million to plaintiff,2 (2) Khalili
transferred that money to Fox Plaza, (3) Fox Plaza transferred
that money to Financial Group, and (4) Financial Group used
that money to purchase the outstanding loan on the downtown
property that was in foreclosure. Next, the three would arrange
for plaintiff and Khalili to re-acquire plaintiff’s money used to
pay off the debt—namely, (1) Khalili arranged for a third party to
buy the loan from Financial Group for $1,145,000, (2) the
proceeds from that sale were placed into Saied’s “business bank
account,” and (3) Saied acted as the steward of the funds in that
account. This agreed-upon plan was executed in early 2017.
Over the subsequent several years, Khalili directed Saied
when and how to disburse plaintiff’s funds from Saied’s business
account, including the use of $342,313 to purchase four
investment properties as part of a joint venture between Khalili

2 The record is conflicting over whether the $1.25 million
came from “family savings held by [Khalili] and [plaintiff]
jointly,” or from a company called Model Investment Group LLC,
in which Khalili but not plaintiff held an ownership interest.

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and Saied, and to make a variety of payments to others
(including $270,000 to plaintiff’s sister, $44,500 to Khalili, and
$50,000 to Khalili’s brother).
In 2019, Khalili and plaintiff asked Saied to disburse to
them $500,000 of the remaining funds in Saied’s business
account so they could avoid foreclosure of their home, and Saied
refused. That creditor ultimately foreclosed on the house.
II. Procedural Background
A. Pleadings
In June 2021, plaintiff sued Saied for his refusal to return
the balance of funds in Saied’s business account. In the operative
first amended complaint, plaintiff asserted claims for (1) breach
of fiduciary duty, on the theory that she and Khalili “entered into
an oral agreement with Saied, in which Saied acquired the duties
of an agent, proxy and fiduciary on behalf of [p]laintiff,” and (2)
conversion. In October 2021, Saied filed a cross-complaint
against plaintiff, Khalili, Khalili’s brother, the joint venture, and
three other LLCs for (1) common counts, (2) breach of contract,
(3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) promissory fraud, and (5)
declaratory relief.
B. Trial and ruling
The matter proceeded to a two-day bench trial in June
2023. At the trial, Khalili, plaintiff, and Saied testified.
In October 2023, the trial court issued a final statement of
decision.
The court ruled in plaintiff’s favor on both of her claims.
The court ruled that Saied had breached his fiduciary duty to
plaintiff. Specifically, the court found that (1) Saied had become
an “agent” of the “principals” plaintiff and Khalili to “assist” them
“in protecting their ownership” of the downtown property by

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moving plaintiff’s money through “several LLCs” to “avert the
impending foreclosure” of that property, (2) Saied accordingly
“owed” plaintiff a “fiduciary duty to act in [plaintiff’s] best
interest and to handle the transaction[s] with due care,” and (3)
Saied breached that duty by withholding some of plaintiff’s funds
used to effectuate those transactions. The court calculated the
amount of money wrongfully withheld as $521,520.3 The court
also ruled that Saied had converted plaintiff’s money, and
calculated the same amount of damages. The court declined to
award punitive damages (because plaintiff had not introduced
evidence of Saied’s net worth), and rejected all of Saied’s cross-
claims.4
The court rejected Saied’s arguments that plaintiff lacked
standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty, which Saied
grounded in the assertions that (1) the $1.25 million used in the
transaction had originally been owned by Khalili and (2) Fox
Group—rather than plaintiff—had transferred that money to
Financial Group (which was the LLC in Saied’s name). The court
explained that “unrebutted testimony from [Khalili] and
[plaintiff]” established that Khalili had given the $1.25 million to

3 The amount consists of $1,145,000 received for the sale of
the loan to the third party, plus $75,000 and $8,333 in funds
owned by plaintiff and that were deposited into Saeid’s account,
less the $342,313 disbursed to purchase properties for the joint
venture and the amounts Saied disbursed from the account at
Khalili’s direction (that is, the $270,000 to plaintiff’s sister,
$44,500 to Khalili and $50,000 to Khalili’s brother). Saied does
not challenge this calculation on appeal.

4 Saied has not appealed from the trial court’s ruling on his
cross-claims.

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plaintiff “so it was her money”5 and further explained that the
principal-agency relationship ran between plaintiff and Khalili on
the one hand, and Saied on the other, such that “[t]he LLCs were
not parties to the agency agreement but rather tools used to
effectuate it.” The court also rejected Saeid’s arguments that he
was entitled to keep the funds as an offset for what he was owed
as part of the joint venture with Khalili, explaining that “even if
Saied had a valid claim for a share of [those funds] . . . , there was
no showing that” the plaintiff’s money Saied refused to disburse
“held any funds that could be conceived of as including Saied’s
share,” such that “Saied [was] effectively [holding plaintiff’s]
remaining funds hostage to coerce a payment for his alleged
share of a separate share of properties” under the joint venture.
The court also rejected Saied’s argument that plaintiff should be
barred from recovery due to her unclean hands. Although
plaintiff’s and Khalili’s “conduct may have been wrongful as to
their creditors,” the court reasoned, “this does not mean it would
be inequitable to grant relief to them against Saied, who was
‘fully aware’ that [plaintiff and Khalali] were using the money
transfer scheme to obtain maximum advantage on the [downtown
property’s loan] transaction without creating a target for
[Khalili’s] creditors.”
C. New trial motion
After judgment was entered, Saied moved for a new trial.
Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court denied the

5 The court also noted Khalili’s and plaintiff’s “jointly held
view that all their property and assets belong[] equally to them
both,” but ultimately rested its ruling on the finding that Khalili
had gifted the $1.25 million to plaintiff. Thus, Saied’s arguments
on appeal that the trial court erred in viewing that money as
quasi-community property are of no moment.

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motion. In response to Saied’s renewed objection that plaintiff
lacked standing because the funds at issue had passed through
the LLCs, the court explained that its rulings “recognize[] the
financial reality of a situation in which three individuals devised
a plan involving the transfer of funds to Saied for a specific
purpose but created and employed corporate entities to
implement the deal. This is not a question of disregarding the
corporate entities but rather of recognizing them as the tools they
were for the parties—vessels for accepting and transferring funds
that were at the core of the parties’ agency contract.”
D. Appeal
Saied filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Saied argues that the trial court erred in ruling for plaintiff
on her breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims. Where, as
here, a trial court awards the same damages on multiple claims,
we may affirm the judgment as long as any of those claims
supports the judgment. (Crogan v. Metz (1956) 47 Cal.2d 398,
403; Barragan v. Banco BCH (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 283, 304; El
Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 1337, 1352-1353.) As discussed below, the trial
court’s ruling on the breach of fiduciary duty claim supports the
judgment.6
To prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff
must prove (1) “the existence of a fiduciary relationship,” (2)
“breach of fiduciary duty,” and (3) “damages.” (Oasis West Realty,
LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) A fiduciary
relationship exists when a person “‘knowingly undertake[s] to act

6 We accordingly have no occasion to separately evaluate the
court’s ruling on the conversion claim.

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on behalf and for the benefit of another’” or “‘enter[s] into a
relationship which imposes that undertaking as a matter of law.’”
(City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008)
43 Cal.4th 375, 386.) A person who agrees to be the agent
becomes a fiduciary to his principal. (Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 977.) That fiduciary
relationship extends to “all dealings between [the principal and
agent] relating to the subject-matter of the agency” (De Rubidoex
v. Parks (1874) 48 Cal. 215, 219; Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 400, 410-411), and, as to those dealings,
obligates the agent to act with “the utmost good faith and
fairness” and to “giv[e] priority to the best interest” of the
principal at all times (De Rubidoux, at p. 219; Committee on
Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35
Cal.3d 197, 222, superseded by statute on other grounds, as
stated in Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s LLC
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227).
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that
Saied owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and thereafter breached it.
(E.g., Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) Saied
offered to help plaintiff and Khalili, and subsequently agreed to
their plan to shepherd plaintiff’s money through a series of LLCs
and back to plaintiff; this principal-agency relationship was a
fiduciary relationship that imposed upon Saied a duty to act
forthrightly toward plaintiff and Khalili. Saied breached that
duty by refusing to give plaintiff the remainder of the money that
he held for her, which was within the scope of the agency
relationship. And Saied damaged plaintiff by the amount of her
money he withheld.

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Saied challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. He asserts
that plaintiff was never a principal in any principal-agent
relationship because plaintiff testified in her deposition to not
knowing the details of the transactions or about the business of
Fox Plaza and because plaintiff dealt with Saied only through
Khalili, such that plaintiff was “not a party to the [principal-
agent] transaction at all but was acting as [Khalili’s] strawman.”
However, the trial court found that plaintiff’s lack of active,
personal involvement did not negate the existence of a principal-
agent relationship between plaintiff and Saied because Khalili
was acting “for himself and on behalf of [plaintiff] [in]
negotiat[ing] an arrangement with Saied to effectuate [the]
transaction[s] to save [the] property” (italics added), and the
evidence at trial supported this finding because the funds had
been gifted to plaintiff, because plaintiff was aware of “the plan”
for moving her money around to pay off the loan in the aggregate,
and because Khalili’s specific transactions were part of that plan.
(Accord, Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 581, 589 [“‘much less evidence is required to
establish a principal and agent relationship between’” spouses].)
To the extent Saied asks us to re-evaluate the evidence, we may
not do so while engaging in substantial evidence review.
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 996.) Saied also
argues that the evidence shows he is entitled to an offset for the
money Khalili and/or plaintiff owed him. The trial court rejected
this argument, largely on the basis of Saied’s “overall lack of
credibility in his testimony at trial,” and we may not gainsay that
credibility finding. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.)
Saied raises two further challenges to the breach of
fiduciary duty ruling.

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First, he renews his objection that plaintiff lacks standing
to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. Standing is a legal question
we review de novo, although we review subsidiary factual
findings for substantial evidence. (E.g., Sirott v. Superior Court
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 371, 380; Kalta v. Fleets 101, Inc. (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 514, 517.) To begin, Saied contends that the court
may not disregard plaintiff’s use of Fox Plaza and that plaintiff—
as the party who used that LLC—is estopped from arguing that
Fox Plaza was merely her alter ego. This contention ignores that
the fiduciary relationship underlying plaintiff’s claim is the
principal-agent relationship between her and Khalili on the one
hand, and Saied on the other. That the parties to this agency
relationship agreed to transfer money through the LLCs does not
improperly disregard the LLCs’ independent existence in the eyes
of the law or, more to the point, supplant or otherwise negate the
agency relationship itself. Given that Fox Plaza has no fiduciary
relationship with Saied at all, accepting Saied’s argument that
plaintiff lacks standing would also mean that no entity has
standing to sue him and that he would get to keep the money
that he agreed to hold on plaintiff’s behalf. Saied also argues
that the there is “nothing to support th[e] claim” that the funds
moved through the LLCs was plaintiff’s money (gifted to her by
Khalili) beyond plaintiff’s and Khalili’s testimony, but that
testimony is sufficient. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d
604, 614 [“‘The testimony of a witness . . . may be sufficient’” to
constitute substantial evidence].)
Second, Saied renews his assertion that the doctrine of
unclean hands bars plaintiff from any recovery. “The doctrine of
unclean hands is a defense to an equitable action” that “rests on
the maxim that ‘“‘he who comes into equity must come with clean

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hands.’”’” (Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110.)
Although “[n]ot every wrongful act constitutes unclean hands,”
“conduct that violates conscience, or good faith, or other equitable
standards of conduct is sufficient cause to invoke the doctrine.”
(Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 970, 979.) To bar relief, however, “[t]he misconduct
that brings the unclean hands doctrine into play” must be
“connected with the controversy before the court” and “‘pertain to
the very subject matter involved’” such that the misconduct
“‘affect[s] the equitable relations between the litigants’” and
thereby warrants barring the requested relief. (Id. at pp. 979-
980; Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. East Bay Union of
Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 728.) A trial court’s
decision not to apply the doctrine is reviewed deferentially, either
for an abuse of discretion (e.g., Farahani v. San Diego
Community College Dist. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1495) or
for substantial evidence (Kendall-Jackson, at p. 978).
The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in declining
to apply the unclean hands doctrine to bar plaintiff’s relief
against Saied. That is because substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding that plaintiff and Khalili’s acts in seeking to pay
off the loan on the downtown property through a mechanism that
did not attract the attention of their personal creditors—even if
deemed, although never formally by the trial court here, to be
misconduct (e.g., Severance v. Knight Counihan Co. (1947) 29
Cal.2d 561, 567-568 [agreement “made to defraud creditors” or to
“impair[] the rights of future creditors” is wrongful])—was not
connected to the duties flowing from the principal-agent
relationship between plaintiff and Khalili on the one hand, and
Saied on the other. The agency relationship was designed to

11
repurchase and pay off the creditor holding the outstanding loan
on the downtown property; no misconduct was committed toward
Saied under that plan. (Brown v. Grimes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th
265, 283 [“‘If [the wrongdoer] is not guilty of inequitable conduct
toward the defendant in th[e] transaction, his hands are as clean
as the court can require,’” italics added]; accord, Martin v. Kehl
(1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 239, fn. 1 [a plaintiff’s conduct,
“although wrongful with respect to” a third party, does “not
render inequitable his obtaining relief against defendant” where
the defendant “was fully aware” of the plaintiff’s “device” and
“was not prejudiced by” that conduct].) What is more, given the
trial court’s findings that Saied wrongfully retained plaintiff’s
money despite his promise not to do so, and the absence of a
finding of misconduct by plaintiff, it would be inequitable to deny
plaintiff relief on the basis of unclean hands.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to her costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

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______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

_________________________, J.
WILLIAMS


Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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