CourtListener 10620260•People v. Taylor CA1/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Taylor CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A170177
v. (Alameda County
JESSIE JAMES TAYLOR, Super. Ct. No. 173702)
Defendant and
Appellant.
Jessie James Taylor appeals from the sentence the trial
court imposed in response to his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code,1 section 1172.75. He contends, and the People agree,
that the trial court erred by imposing an enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a) (section 667(a)) that he never
admitted in his plea and by failing to update his days of credits
for time served. He also points out a clerical error in the abstract
of judgment. We agree with Taylor’s arguments and remand the
case for resentencing to address them.
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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BACKGROUND
The facts concerning Taylor’s offense, which are set forth in
more detail in our opinion in Taylor’s companion appeal, are
irrelevant here. It suffices here to note that on May 10, 2016,
Taylor pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (a)) and admitted one prior conviction for attempted second
degree robbery (§ 211) as a prior prison term under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) (section 667.5(b)) and as a strike under sections
667, subdivision (e)(2) and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2), but not as
a serious felony. Taylor also admitted to serving prior prison
terms under section 667(b) on two other convictions for attempted
grand theft (§ 487, subd. (c)) and attempted second degree
robbery but did not admit those two convictions as strikes or
serious felonies. In August 2016, the trial court sentenced Taylor
to the negotiated term of 25 years in prison, which consisted of
the upper term of 11 years for voluntary manslaughter (§ 193,
subd. (a)), doubled because of the one admitted strike, with one
year for each of the admitted prior prison terms under section
667.5(b). The court awarded 928 days of actual custody credits
and 139 days of conduct credits for a total of 1,067 days.
During proceedings on a petition Taylor filed for
resentencing under section 1172.6 (discussed in more detail in
our opinion in the companion appeal), Taylor also requested a full
resentencing under section 1172.75 because the prior prison term
enhancements he admitted were no longer valid after recent
legislation. While opposing Taylor’s section 1172.6 petition, the
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People agreed that resentencing under section 1172.75 was
appropriate.
The trial court held a section 1172.75 resentencing hearing
on March 12, 2024, at which it agreed that Taylor’s three prior
prison term enhancements were now invalid. The trial court also
agreed that Taylor was entitled to a full resentencing that would
give Taylor the benefit of any law that had been passed since
Taylor’s original sentencing that would reduce his sentence.
Taylor’s counsel asserted that the trial court could no longer
impose the upper term for manslaughter because of an
amendment to section 1170, subdivision (d) and also asked the
trial court to dismiss the prior strike. The trial court declined to
dismiss the strike and imposed the middle term of six years for
voluntary manslaughter, doubled because of the strike to 12
years. It also ordered that in place of the prior prison term
enhancements under section 667.5(b) there would be a five-year
term imposed under section 667(a). The court therefore imposed
a total term of 17 years. The court recognized that Taylor had at
that point served “a little over 10 years” but did not calculate a
precise amount of custody credits. The amended abstract of
judgment stated Taylor’s date of conviction as May 16, 2016.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 667(a) Enhancement
“Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill [No. 136 (2019–2020
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1)] amended section 667.5 by
limiting imposition of the prior prison term enhancement to prior
terms for sexually violent offenses. Then, in Senate Bill [No. 483
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(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3)], effective
January 1, 2022, the Legislature made the change retroactive,
enacting section 1172.75, which provides in subdivision (a) that
‘[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January
1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for
any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually
violent offense . . . is legally invalid.’ The statute expressly
provides for resentencing; once a trial court has determined that
a defendant’s current judgment includes a now-invalid prior
prison term enhancement, ‘the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), italics added;
[citation].)
“Among other things, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1)
and (2) provides that ‘[r]esentencing pursuant to this section
shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed
as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement,
unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety,’ and
that ‘[t]he court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.’
(Id., subd. (d)(3).)” (People v. Terwilligar (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
585, 595.)
Taylor contends that after properly striking the now-
invalid section 667.5(b) prior prison term enhancements that he
had admitted as part of his original plea and reducing the upper
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term for voluntary manslaughter to the middle term, the trial
court erred by imposing an enhancement under section 667(a)
that he never admitted. The People agree, as do we.
Section 1170.1, subdivision (e) states, “All enhancements
shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either admitted
by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of
fact.” The prosecution cannot substitute one pleaded and
admitted enhancement for a different, unpleaded and unadmitted
enhancement, even when both enhancements are based on the
same conviction. (People v. Haskin (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1434,
1439–1440.) The trial court therefore erred by replacing the
invalid section 667.5(b) enhancements that Taylor admitted with
a section 667(a) enhancement for a prior conviction of a serious
felony that he did not.2
While they agree on the trial court’s error, Taylor and the
People disagree over the proper remedy. The People contend we
should remand for resentencing, while Taylor argues we should
modify the sentence ourselves by simply striking the section
667(a) enhancement because no other legal sentence is possible.
We need not discuss the issue in detail, however, because, as
discussed post, the trial court erred by failing to update the
calculation of Taylor’s actual custody credits. Because we must
2 Taylor did not object to the trial court’s sentence on this
ground in the trial court. However, because the sentence was
unauthorized, Taylor’s failure to object did not forfeit the issue.
(In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129 [“ ‘The “unauthorized
sentence” rule generally permits . . . defendant[s] to “challenge an
unauthorized sentence on appeal even if they failed to object
below” ’ ”]; accord, People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 635.)
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remand the matter in any event for the trial court to correct that
error, we will also direct the trial court to address the section
667(a) error by conducting a full resentencing of Taylor. The
parties are free to raise their arguments concerning the allowable
and appropriate sentence to the trial court in the first instance.
II. Custody Credits
Taylor contends the trial court erred by failing to update
the calculation of his custody credits at the time of resentencing.
The People agree, as do we. “[W]hen a prison term already in
progress is modified as the result of an appellate sentence
remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against
the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already
served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he
was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.”
(People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29, italics omitted; see
People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 396–397 [at
resentencing, trial court should update calculation of actual
custody credits but not conduct credits].)
Taylor contends he was entitled to 3,690 days of actual
custody credits and 139 conduct credits from before his original
sentencing, for a total of 3,829. The People offer no calculation of
their own and request remand for calculation of the credits.
Taylor does not oppose a remand for recalculation of his credits.
Because the parties are not in accord about the amount of
custody credits but do agree on the propriety of remand, we will
remand for recalculation of credits.
III. Abstract of Judgment
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On remand, the trial court should also address a third
error. As Taylor points out and the People concede, the amended
abstract of judgment after the trial court resentenced Taylor
incorrectly states the date of his conviction as May 16, 2016. The
record shows Taylor entered his plea on May 10, 2016. The
abstract of judgment after the trial court resentences Taylor on
remand and recalculates his credits shall reflect the correct date
of conviction.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is reversed. The matter is remanded
for resentencing.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
CLAY, J.
People v. Taylor (A170177)
Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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