CourtListener 10620259•People v. Taylor CA1/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Taylor CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A170633
v. (Alameda County
JESSIE JAMES TAYLOR, Super. Ct. No. 173702)
Defendant and
Appellant.
Jessie James Taylor appeals from the trial court’s denial of
his petition under Penal Code,1 section 1172.6 to vacate his
voluntary manslaughter conviction. He contends the trial court
erred by admitting certain evidence and that the record, with or
without that evidence, is insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that he is ineligible for resentencing relief. We find no
error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
According to testimony by Oakland police officer Mario
Martinez at the preliminary hearing, one day in February 2014
Danielle W. flagged down Martinez as he was driving by and
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
1
asked him for help retrieving her belongings from a house on 31st
Street in Oakland. When Martinez arrived, he saw Taylor
arguing with three men at the top of the stairs to the house.
Martinez spoke to the men, and Taylor told him that the dispute
was about rent money he owed the men for living at the house.
The dispute was heated, and Martinez believed it would have
soon escalated to a fist fight if he had not arrived and intervened.
Taylor kept trying to instigate a fight after Martinez had
separated him from the others. Martinez eventually left the
location.
Louise D. testified at the preliminary hearing that about a
half hour after this incident, she was standing in the street
talking to friends next door to the house on 31st Street. She
heard two people talking loudly inside the house and saw Taylor.
This was the second or third time Louise D. had seen Taylor.
When asked whether she knew him before the incident, Louise D.
testified, “No, I didn’t. I don’t want to know him, either.”
Taylor brought a bike out of the house and slammed it on
the porch outside the front door, which was at the top of a few
exterior stairs. Taylor next brought someone out the door by the
collar. Taylor stabbed the man in the chest about three times
with a knife with a wide blade. Louise D. gave two different
versions of Taylor’s statement after stabbing the victim. At one
point, Louise D. testified that Taylor said, “Now you see not to
mess with me. Now, die, die.” Louise D. later testified that
Taylor said, “I’ll show you not to mess with me. Now, die, die.”
Louise D.’s statement to the police said that Taylor had also said,
2
“I ain’t no joke.” After stabbing the man, Taylor went inside. A
few minutes later he came out, stepped over the victim, and
walked down the street.
At the time of the incident, Louise D. was using a walker
and wearing glasses. She needed the glasses to drive but did not
drive anymore because of her vision. She needed to get new
glasses at the time of the incident after having cataract surgery.
She sometimes got dizzy from high blood pressure and took
medication for it. But Louise D. recalled that the man who did
the stabbing was wearing a dark blue shirt with white horizontal
striping, with a couple buttons at the collar, and a dark blue
baseball cap. She did not know Taylor’s name at the time of the
incident and only learned it later from the newspaper and from a
police detective.
Martinez returned to the house. One of the individuals
who had been at the house earlier was now lying on his back at
the top of the stairs to the house. When he arrived, Danielle W.
approached him and said something like, “Jessie did it. Jessie
did it.” Martinez clarified with Danielle W. that she meant that
Taylor had stabbed the victim, whose name was Francis Nwagbo.
In April 2014, Taylor was charged by information with
murder, with an enhancement for personal use of a deadly
weapon and several allegations regarding prior prison terms and
strike convictions. In May 2016, Taylor pled no contest to
voluntary manslaughter and admitted one prior conviction as a
prior prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (b) and as a
strike, but not as a serious felony. Taylor also admitted to
3
serving prior prison terms on two other convictions but did not
admit those convictions as strikes or serious felonies. His counsel
stipulated that there was a factual basis for his plea. In August
2016, the trial court sentenced Taylor to the negotiated term of
25 years in prison.
In January 2023, Taylor filed a petition for resentencing
under what is now section 1172.6, alleging the information had
allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of felony murder,
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
another theory under which malice was imputed based on his
participation in a crime. He further alleged he had accepted a
plea offer in lieu of a trial and could not presently be convicted of
murder because of intervening changes to the law of murder. The
trial court appointed counsel, and the People conceded that a
hearing was necessary to determine Taylor’s eligibility for relief.2
In advance of the evidentiary hearing, the People
submitted the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The parties
stipulated to the admission of a statement Scott V. had made to
the police in February 2014 as well as his responses to a photo
line-up the police had showed him. The parties also stipulated
2 Taylor noted in response to the People’s briefs that if his
section 1172.6 resentencing petition were denied, he would
request a full resentencing under section 1172.75 because the
prior prison term enhancements he admitted were no longer
valid. After further proceedings on that request, the trial court
resentenced Taylor to a term of 17 years. Taylor separately
appealed from that resentencing, contending the trial court
should have reduced his sentence even further. We address that
appeal in a concurrently filed opinion.
4
that Nwagbo had only a single stab wound to his chest, that
Taylor was 55 years old on the day of the stabbing, and to the
admission of two pictures of Taylor on the day of the incident
showing Taylor before and after the stabbing. The photo of
Taylor from before the stabbing showed him wearing a shirt with
blue and white horizontal stripes over the top of another dark
blue shirt with a collar and a dark baseball cap. The second
photo from after the stabbing showed him wearing a dark blue
polo shirt with white and light blue stripes across the chest.
In his February 2014 statement, Scott V. told the police
that he had lived on 31st Street across the street from the scene
of the stabbing since November 2013. On the day of the stabbing,
he first heard a commotion and saw a group of high school-aged
kids with bikes, with one person knocking on the door and trying
to open it. The police came, and Scott V. stopped paying
attention. About a half hour later, he heard a male voice yelling,
but there was no one outside. A minute passed, and he heard the
front door slam. One man had laid down another man on the
porch, with a bike halfway outside the door in an awkward
position. The first man repeatedly picked up the second man by
the front of his clothing and punched him in the face. The second
man looked like he was knocked out. The first man pulled out
what looked like a switchblade. He made horizontal slashing
motions a few times near the second man’s throat and chest, and
then put it away. The aggressor went back into the house.
When asked to describe the aggressor’s race, Scott V. said,
“Uh, I – I wasn’t looking, like, uh, I don’t – I couldn’t say it was –
5
I probably, just mixed race, I don’t know. I don’t . . . .” But when
prompted, Scott V. said the aggressor was male, darker, in his
30s, wearing a blueish “wife beater” and baggy jeans. Scott V.
also said the aggressor was five feet, eight inches tall, weighed
about 165 pounds, and was not very muscular. When asked
about his hair, Scott V. said “I don’t think it was long, but . . . but
I didn’t pay a lot of attention . . . to – to him unfortunately.” He
also said he did not pay much attention to the aggressor’s face.
Scott V. had never seen either of the people involved in the
incident before.
When first shown Taylor’s photo in a photo line-up, Scott V.
said, “That is not him.” He identified a different person’s photo
as having a similar complexion and shape of the head and
shoulders to the aggressor, but Scott V. did not conclusively
identify that person as the aggressor.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal background
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to change the state’s laws relating to
murder. (People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 835.) “ ‘Senate
Bill 1437 “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘Senate Bill 1437
also created a procedural mechanism for those convicted of
6
murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief.’ ” (Id. at p.
836.)
After several amendments, this mechanism is located in
section 1172.6 and allows “[a] person convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter” to file a petition “to have the petitioner’s murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts” if certain conditions are
met. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Those conditions are: “(1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner
could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3)
The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (Ibid.)
“A petition that includes ‘[a] declaration by petitioner that
the petitioner is eligible for relief . . . , based on all the
7
requirements of subdivision (a),’ the case number and year of the
petitioner’s conviction, and whether the petitioner seeks counsel
is facially sufficient and entitles the petitioner to counsel.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b); [citation].) A facially sufficient petition also
triggers the People’s duty to submit a response and the
petitioner’s right to submit a reply on the question of whether a
prima facie case for relief exists. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) ‘After the
parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court
shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief.’ (Ibid.) If the ‘petitioner
makes a prima facie showing,’ then the trial court issues an order
to show cause and holds ‘a hearing to determine whether to
vacate the . . . conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner.’ (Id., subds. (c), (d)(1).)” (People v.
Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558–559.)
The parties may present evidence at an evidentiary hearing
on a section 1172.6 petition, and “the burden of proof shall be on
the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under”
current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “The admission of evidence
in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except
that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any
prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,
including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed. The court may also consider the procedural
history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.
However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary
8
hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be
excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is
admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule.”
(Ibid.) “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the
prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached
to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.)
II. Admissibility of evidence from preliminary hearing
Taylor first attacks the evidence the trial court admitted at
the hearing. He contends that the trial court should have
excluded the transcript of the preliminary hearing in its entirety
or, at a minimum, excluded Martinez’s testimony about what
people told him about the cause of Taylor’s disagreement with the
men at 31st Street and Danielle W.’s statement to him upon his
return to 31st Street that “Jessie did it.” Taylor failed to object to
the admission of any evidence in the trial court, so he has
forfeited these arguments. (People v. Vance (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 706, 714 [applying forfeiture rule to § 1172.6
evidentiary hearing].)
Recognizing the forfeiture problem, Taylor argues that his
counsel’s failure to object in the trial court constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. To prevail on such a claim in this appeal,
Taylor “ ‘must show that [his] counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’ ”
(People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165.) Prejudice for
these purposes means “ ‘ “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
9
would have been different.” ’ ” (In re Hernandez (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 530, 546.) Taylor fails to show one or both elements
as to the evidence he challenges.
Regarding the preliminary hearing transcript as a whole,
we held in People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158,
that a transcript of a preliminary hearing is admissible at a later
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing in the same case. Because
any objection would therefore have been futile, Taylor’s counsel
was not deficient for failing to object. (People v. Anderson (2001)
25 Cal.4th 543, 587 [“Counsel is not required to proffer futile
objections”].)
Nor was Taylor’s counsel deficient for failing to object to
Martinez’s hearsay testimony about the cause of Taylor’s
disagreement with Nwagbo and the other men at 31st Street.
Taylor points out that while section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3)
makes prior hearing testimony generally admissible, it excepts
and excludes “hearsay evidence that was admitted in a
preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872.”
Section 872, subdivision (b) allows a court to base a probable
cause determination at a preliminary hearing on hearsay
testimony by certain law enforcement officers. Counsel at a
resentencing hearing therefore may object to any hearsay
testimony by a law enforcement officer in a preliminary hearing
transcript that was admissible at the hearing only by virtue of
section 872, subdivision (b). However, the only hearsay that
Taylor points to about the cause of the disagreement at 31st
10
Street came from what Taylor himself told Martinez.3 As the
People point out in their brief and Taylor does not dispute in his
reply, Taylor’s statements to Martinez were admissible as
statements by a party. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) Because this
testimony was admissible independent of section 872, subdivision
(b), Taylor’s counsel was not deficient in failing to object to it.
Finally, Danielle W.’s statement to Martinez upon his
return to the 31st Street that “Jessie did it” may have been
admissible independent of section 872, subdivision (b) as a
spontaneous declaration, since she made the statement fairly
close in time to the stabbing. (Evid. Code, § 1240; e.g., People v.
Jones (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 653, 662 [affirming admission of
spontaneous declaration made 30 to 40 minutes after incident].)
But even if we assume for the sake of argument that Taylor’s
counsel was deficient for failing to object to Danielle W.’s
statement, Taylor has not shown that this deficiency was
prejudicial. The trial court did not mention Danielle W.’s
statement at all when it set out the reasons for its finding that
Taylor was Nwagbo’s actual killer. And as we discuss post, the
other evidence that the trial court did cite provides substantial
evidentiary support for that finding. There is not a reasonable
3 In response to questioning by Taylor’s counsel, Martinez
also related the statements of the other men at 31st Street about
the causes of the disagreement. To the extent that Taylor
contends his counsel at the resentencing hearing should have
objected to the testimony that his own counsel elicited at the
preliminary hearing, we conclude any such deficiency was not
prejudicial because Taylor’s own admissions provided the same
information.
11
probability that exclusion of Danielle W.’s hearsay statement
would have led to a different result in this resentencing
proceeding.
III. Evidence of guilt
Taylor next contends that even if the trial court made no
other error, its ruling must be reversed because its finding that
he was the actual killer lacks substantial evidentiary support.
“We review the trial judge’s factfinding for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] We ‘ “examine the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of
fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ [Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial
judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must
review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve
contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all
under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond
a reasonable doubt.”4 (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298.) “ ‘Even when there is a significant amount of
countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness that
satisfies the standard is sufficient to uphold the finding.’ ”
4 We reject Taylor’s suggestion that we review the trial
court’s factual determinations independently. (People v.
Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 232–233.)
12
(People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 711.) “ ‘ “[U]nless the
testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable,
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
conviction.” ’ ” (People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245,
271.)
The trial court cited Martinez’s description of Taylor as the
aggressor in the quarrel that preceded the stabbing and Louise
D.’s identification of Taylor as the person who stabbed Nwagbo.
Because these witnesses identified Taylor as the killer and
explained a possible motive, and the testimony of a single witness
is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of Taylor’s
petition.
Taylor resists this conclusion by first highlighting flaws or
problems with Louise D.’s testimony. He notes that Louise D.
learned Taylor’s name from the police and news reports, was
wearing glasses with an outdated prescription, had stopped
driving because of her poor vision, and required medication for
high blood pressure that could cause dizzy spells. He also
emphasizes that she gave different versions of Taylor’s statement
after stabbing Nwagbo and she saw three stabbing motions but
Nwagbo had only a single stab wound. He finally notes that he
alleged in his petition that Louise D. had a motive to testify
falsely because of an undisclosed plea deal, but he admits he did
not develop this allegation at the hearing.
None of these points, either individually or taken together,
makes Louise D.’s account “ ‘ “physically impossible or inherently
13
improbable” ’ ” (People v. Montanez, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p.
271), so they are insufficient to show the trial court’s finding
lacked substantial evidentiary support. Besides, the trial court
addressed many of these arguments and reasonably rejected
them. Louise D. said she had seen Taylor twice before the
stabbing. She admitted that she had only learned his name from
the police or media and did not know him, but she also said, “I
don’t want to know him, either.” The trial court reasonably
construed this as suggesting that Louise D. was familiar enough
with Taylor to know who he was. Nothing in the record
demonstrated that Louise D.’s eyesight problems or medication
would have caused her to misidentify Taylor. To the contrary,
Louise D. described Taylor as wearing a blue and white striped
shirt with a couple of buttons at the collar and a dark cap, which
matched a photo of Taylor’s clothing. The difference between
Louise D.’s one account of Taylor saying, “Now you see not to
mess with me. Now, die, die,” and her other version that he said,
“I’ll show you not to mess with me. Now, die, die,” is not
significant. The gist of the statements is similar, and both of the
statements are consistent with Martinez’s testimony that Taylor
had a quarrel with Nwagbo before the stabbing. Nothing in
Taylor’s petition or brief on appeal gives any details about Louise
D.’s alleged plea deal that gave her a motive or bias. Although,
as the trial court pointed out, Louise D.’s testimony that
defendant made multiple stabbing motions did not match
Nwagbo’s single stab wound, neither did Scott V.’s statement that
the killer made multiple slashing motions with the knife. The
14
discrepancy between the witnesses’ accounts and Nwagbo’s injury
is not material.
Taylor also emphasizes Scott V.’s statement to the police.
Taylor points out that Scott V.’s description of the killer and the
killer’s clothing did not match Taylor, with Scott V. saying the
killer was in his 30s, mixed race and about 165 pounds, while
Taylor was a dark-skinned African American who was solidly
built and 55 years old. Taylor also notes that Scott V. ruled out
Taylor in the photo line-up.
The trial court was entitled to resolve the conflict in the
evidence between Louise D.’s testimony and Scott V.’s statement.
The trial court did so by discounting Scott V.’s statement, both
because he saw the stabbing from across the street, while Louise
D. was next door, and because Scott V.’s testimony was
equivocating and not certain. Taylor disputes the latter point.
But when Scott V. was asked to describe the killer, he said, “Uh, I
– I wasn’t looking, like uh, I don’t – I couldn’t say it was – I
probably, just mixed race, I don’t know. I don’t . . . .” And later,
when asked about the killer’s hair, Scott V. said, “I don’t think it
was long, but . . . but I didn’t pay a lot of attention . . . to him
unfortunately.” Scott V. was more confident in his description of
the killer as wearing baggy jeans and a blueish “wife beater,” but
given Scott V.’s distance from the event and his admittedly
imprecise memory of the killer’s appearance, the trial court could
reasonably discount Scott V.’s description and failure to identify
Taylor as the killer.
15
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
CLAY, J.
People v. Taylor (A170633)
Judge of the Superior Court of Alameda County, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
16
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.