CourtListener 10620146•People v. Leyva CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Leyva CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084625
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. Nos. SCD297274,
SCS326714)
ANGEL ALBERTO LEYVA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter F. Murray, Judge. Affirmed.
Joshua Peter Visco, under appointment of the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Angel Alberto Leyva appeals the trial court’s decision to revoke his
probation and commit him to state prison for three years for a “significant”
probation violation. Leyva claims the trial court (1) abused its discretion by
failing to give “meaningful consideration” to his previous performance on
probation and (2) revoked probation in a “reflexive action” in violation of due
process. We find this matter appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion
(see People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851-854), and affirm.
I.
In mid-2023, Leyva pled guilty to transportation of a controlled
substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and, in a separate case, to
unlawful driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). Leyva was
placed on formal probation for two years with execution of his three-year
prison sentence suspended. One condition of Leyva’s probation prohibited
him from knowingly possessing any controlled substances without a valid
prescription.
In April 2024, while still on probation, Leyva was arrested on multiple
drug charges, including possession of a controlled substance for sale. (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11375(b).)
The court granted Leyva’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained
during the April arrest. While there was sufficient evidence of possession of
narcotics for sale, the court excluded the narcotics evidence because it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the court
dismissed the new charges against Leyva.
Even so, the court considered the illegally seized evidence of narcotics
for purposes of revoking probation, as permitted by People v. Lazlo (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1070. The court then formally revoked Leyva’s
probation.
At the sentencing hearing, the court informed counsel it was “not
inclined to follow the probation officer’s recommendation” to reinstate
probation. Defense counsel asked the court to reinstate probation based on
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Leyva’s employment, participation in treatment, family situation, and
substantial compliance leading up to his re-arrest. The court found Leyva’s
possession of narcotics for the purposes of sale was a “significant violation,”
so it declined to reinstate probation and imposed the previously executed but
suspended prison term of three years.
II.
Leyva contends the trial court abused its discretion in not reinstating
probation by focusing on the nature of his probation violation without
weighing his probation performance before his re-arrest. He claims the court
instead automatically imposed prison time in violation of his due process
rights. We disagree.
A court may revoke probation “if the interests of justice so require and
the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe” the probationer “has
violated any of the conditions of their supervision.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.2(a).)
Once a probation violation occurs, the trial court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to continue or revoke probation. (People v. Angus (1980)
114 Cal.App.3d 973, 987-988.) The trial court may consider performance on
supervision and the nature of the violation. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.435(a).) The trial court may reinstate probation on the same or
modified terms or terminate probation and commit the probationer to prison.
(People v. Pennington (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 173, 176.)
We review a trial court’s decision to reinstate probation or sentence a
defendant to prison for abuse of discretion. (People v. Downey (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909.) We will not interfere with the trial court’s exercise
of discretion “when it has considered all facts bearing on the offense and the
defendant to be sentenced.” (People v. Vargas (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 516, 533.)
“[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the
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discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying or revoking probation.”
(People v. Lippner (1933) 219 Cal. 395, 400.)
Leyva asserts the court did not give “meaningful consideration” to
factors specific to his performance on probation, namely that (1) this was his
first violation in eight months of probation, (2) he was working full-time and
supporting his minor children, (3) he was attending drug counseling and
individual therapy, (4) he has a strong support system, and (5) he has not had
additional negative law enforcement contact.
Yet the trial court balanced all relevant evidence in deciding to revoke
probation. Although Leyva faults the court for “not stat[ing] it had
specifically considered and weighed [Leyva’s] performance on probation,” he
cites no authority requiring the court to do so. And to the contrary, we
presume a court has considered all relevant evidence unless the record
affirmatively suggests otherwise. (People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
757, 765.) Here, the court stated it “read and reviewed” all of Leyva’s case
files and the probation officer’s recommendation. At the sentencing hearing,
defense counsel argued for reinstatement based on the same factors it claims
the court did not consider. That the court disagreed with defense counsel on
the weight of those factors against the gravity of Leyva’s probation violation
does not render its decision arbitrary or capricious so as to constitute an
abuse of discretion. And although Leyva contends the court’s analysis “does
not fit into the parameters” of California Rules of Court rule 4.410’s general
sentencing objectives, it arguably satisfies the objectives of punishing Leyva,
deterring him and others from criminal conduct by showing its consequences,
and preventing Leyva from committing new crimes by isolating him during
his incarceration. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410(a)(2)-(5).)
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Nor did the court revoke his probation as an “‘automatic
consequence[ ]’” in violation of his due process rights, as Leyva argues. Leyva
focuses on how the court stated it “mean[s] what [it] say[s]” about executed
suspended sentences and there is no “free pass” because the new charges
were dismissed. Yet the court clarified it meant it in the context of “a
significant enough violation” and explained, “so I’m clear, I don’t find one
dirty [drug] test to be bad—to be sufficient” to impose the previously
suspended executed sentence. Leyva acknowledges his “conduct” is “a
violation of his probation,” but downplays it as “consistent with a drug addict
in recovery.” After considering all facts of the offense and Leyva’s
background, the trial court found Leyva’s conduct—possession for sale of
approximately 240 grams of methamphetamine and roughly 14 grams of
fentanyl—a “very significant violation of his probation” and thus revoked
probation and imposed prison time. Under these circumstances, Leyva has
not established a viable due process claim.
For the first time in his reply brief, Leyva argues his due process rights
were violated when the court considered allegations about drug tests
referenced in the probation report that were not proven up at the revocation
hearing. But the claim is forfeited, as “arguments made for the first time in a
reply brief will not be entertained because of the unfairness to the other
party.” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075.) In any event, the
court’s decision to revoke Leyva’s probation and impose a prison term relied
on his possession of narcotics for the purposes of sale. Indeed, the court did
not rely on or even address the missed and positive drug tests alleged in the
supplemental probation report except to note it would not revoke probation
based only on a positive drug test.
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In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Leyva’s
probation and imposing the previously executed but suspended prison term.
III.
We affirm.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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