CourtListener 10618931•Jamgotchian v. Wagenseller CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/27/25 Jamgotchian v. Wagenseller CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JERRY JAMGOTCHIAN et al., B333376
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV29607
v.
LAINE T. WAGENSELLER et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.
Klinedinst, Robert G. Harrison and Robert M. Shaughnessy
for Defendants and Appellants.
Jeff Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis and Kayla R. Dayton for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
_________________________
Jerry Jamgotchian and two of his companies—El Segundo
Plaza Associates L.P. and Theta Holding IV, Inc. (collectively,
Jamgotchian)—filed a lawsuit against their former attorneys,
Laine T. Wagenseller and Wagenseller Law Firm (together,
Wagenseller). Jamgotchian alleged, among other things, that
Wagenseller violated his professional and fiduciary duties
by withdrawing as counsel without good cause, disclosing
confidential information, and interfering with Jamgotchian’s
efforts to retain new counsel.
Wagenseller filed a motion under California’s anti-strategic
lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) statute (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16).1 Wagenseller asked the court to strike
Jamgotchian’s claims to the extent they arose from motions
and an ex parte application to withdraw as counsel, which he
filed in the prior action. The trial court agreed that the claims
arose from protected activity to the extent they were based
on the motions and application. However, the court denied
Wagenseller’s motion after finding Jamgotchian met his burden
to show a probability of prevailing. On appeal, Wagenseller
argues the court erred because Jamgotchian failed to establish
the causation elements of his claims. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The prior action
In January 2022, Jamgotchian retained Wagenseller
to defend him in another action (the Prior Action). Trial was
originally set for April 2022, but Wagenseller successfully filed
a motion to continue the trial to October 3, 2022.
1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise designated.
2
Jamgotchian signed a fee agreement requiring him to
maintain a “replenishing deposit” trust account for fees and costs
incurred during the representation. The agreement required
Jamgotchian to replenish the funds each month to maintain
the initial deposit amount.
Darren Salvin performed the day-to-day legal work on
Jamgotchian’s case. Salvin was not a partner or associate of
Wagenseller’s firm. Instead, he provided legal services to the
firm as an independent contractor.
Jamgotchian and Wagenseller’s relationship deteriorated
over time. Jamgotchian questioned Wagenseller’s work and
billing practices. Wagenseller, in turn, ordered work stopped
on Jamgotchian’s case at least twice for late payments, and
he threatened to withdraw from the case if Jamgotchian did
not make timely payments. Jamgotchian ultimately paid the
amounts due, and Wagenseller did not withdraw from the case.
In the summer of 2022, Wagenseller informed Jamgotchian
he was raising the deposit amount to $50,000. Wagenseller
mentioned that Jamgotchian had been “slow” paying the monthly
retainer and would do so only after “a lengthy email dialogue.”
Jamgotchian responded that a $50,000 deposit was
excessive. Jamgotchian noted that Wagenseller had been out
of the office for extended periods of time and had essentially
turned the case over to Salvin. Jamgotchian also noted
Wagenseller was billing him at a rate significantly higher
than what he paid Salvin. Jamgotchian suggested Salvin
could formally take over the representation, with Wagenseller
helping as needed. Salvin, however, told Jamgotchian he
would not take over the case from Wagenseller.
3
On July 19, 2022, Wagenseller informed Jamgotchian
he owed a little more than $5,000 in unpaid frees and $20,000
to replenish the deposit account. Jamgotchian replied he did not
know what fees Wagenseller was referring to, but his “intentions
are and will always be to pay all fees that are approved and due.”
On July 22, 2022, Wagenseller sent an email responding to
Jamgotchian’s earlier suggestion that Salvin take over the case.
Wagenseller wrote, “I agree that it is time to sever our
relationship and I agree with your proposal to move this case
away from Wagenseller Law Firm. The attorney-client
relationship has broken down irretrievably. Moreover,
you are in breach of the attorney-client retainer agreement.”
Wagenseller said he would file motions to withdraw “to ensure
that the transition [to new counsel] is done promptly.” He
advised Jamgotchian to retain new counsel and have counsel
provide a substitution of attorney form.
Jamgotchian asked Wagenseller not to file the motions to
withdraw and instead, to allow Salvin to substitute in as counsel.
Jamgotchian accused Wagenseller of threatening Salvin and
preventing him from taking over the case. Jamgotchian also
asserted Wagenseller was acting in bad faith by moving to
withdraw immediately after Jamgotchian pointed out his
“unfair billing scheme.”
On July 25, 2022, Wagenseller filed three motions to be
relieved as counsel, one for each defendant in the Prior Action.
The hearings on the motions were set on different days. As
grounds for the motions, Wagenseller asserted the client’s
conduct “renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry
out the representation effectively” and the client “breached a
4
material term of an agreement . . . (Client Retainer Agreement;
payment of fees).”
The same day—July 25, 2022—Wagenseller filed an
ex parte application asking the court either to (1) grant all three
motions to be relieved as counsel, or (2) shorten the time for
hearing the motions and hear them the same day. He attached
to the application a declaration from Salvin and asserted
Wagenseller was seeking to withdraw from the case because
the “client breached a material term of an agreement with,
or obligation, to the lawyer relating to the representation
(Client Retainer Agreement; payment of fees).”
The court granted the ex parte application on July 28,
2022. The minute order states, on the “Court’s own motion,”
the court advanced the hearings on each motion to be relieved
as counsel, heard the motions, and granted them.
Although the timing is not entirely clear, it appears
Jamgotchian filed an opposition to the ex parte application a
few minutes after the court issued its order. Jamgotchian argued
he had paid all the fees due under the fee agreement and had
not taken any actions that would make it unreasonably difficult
for Wagenseller to continue to represent him. According to
Jamgotchian, he had already paid Wagenseller more than
$196,000 in legal fees and costs. Jamgotchian asked the court
to require Wagenseller to prepare for the October 3, 2022
trial date and litigate the case to completion.2
2 Jamgotchian later filed an ex parte application to
reconsider the order granting Wagenseller’s application, noting
the minute order does not reference his opposition. The court
summarily denied Jamgotchian’s application.
5
2. Jamgotchian’s complaint against Wagenseller
In September 2022, Jamgotchian filed a complaint against
Wagenseller asserting causes of action for legal malpractice
and breach of fiduciary duty. The gist of the complaint is that
Wagenseller improperly ended the parties’ attorney-client
relationship, revealed confidential information in the process,
and interfered with Jamgotchian’s efforts to retain new counsel
and defend himself in the Prior Action.
The complaint lists seven instances in which Wagenseller’s
provision of legal services both fell below the duty of care and
constituted a breach of his fiduciary duties: (1) using pretextual
grounds to terminate the relationship; (2) filing an application
to withdraw without a basis for doing so; (3) seeking to withdraw
on an ex parte basis; (4) disclosing confidential information
without consent; (5) failing to take reasonable steps to avoid
foreseeable prejudice; (6) interfering with Jamgotchian’s efforts
to obtain new counsel; and (7) failing to deliver the complete
client file. Jamgotchian alleged he suffered damages exceeding
$500,000.
3. Wagenseller’s anti-SLAPP motion
Wagenseller filed an anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds
that Jamgotchian’s claims arise from protected activity and
Jamgotchian cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing.
Wagenseller’s motion sought to strike all the causes of action
in the complaint. However, at oral argument, Wagenseller
clarified that he sought to strike only the allegations in the
complaint related to the motions and ex parte application to
withdraw.
According to Wagenseller’s motion, the “gravamen” of
Jamgotchian’s causes of action concern Wagenseller’s “right
6
to petition the court to be relieved as counsel of record” in the
Prior Action. Wagenseller argued the “act of filing a motion
to withdraw as counsel, as well as the ex parte [application],
are classic examples of exercising the constitutional right
to petition.” Wagenseller asserted Jamgotchian could not
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claims because
he cannot prove causation or damages. He pointed to evidence
showing the Prior Action was ongoing, Jamgotchian retained
new counsel within days after Wagenseller withdrew,
Jamgotchian continued to be represented by Salvin, and
the trial in the Prior Action had been continued.
Jamgotchian opposed the motion, arguing his causes of
action do not arise from protected activity within the meaning
of the anti-SLAPP law. According to Jamgotchian, under well-
established California law, the anti-SLAPP statute does not
apply to malpractice causes of action brought by a former client.
Jamgotchian argued Wagenseller’s actions constituting
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty were not protected
speech or petitioning activity, and, even if they were, he easily
could establish all the elements of his causes of action.
Jamgotchian submitted a declaration in opposition
to the anti-SLAPP motion. Jamgotchian asserted he was not
in material breach of the fee agreement but, even if he were,
he did not receive adequate notice of the breach or an opportunity
to cure it. Jamgotchian also asserted he did not consent to
Wagenseller’s disclosure of the fee dispute in the ex parte
application. According to Jamgotchian, the opposing parties
in the Prior Action used the existence of the fee dispute
successfully to oppose his request to continue the trial.
7
Jamgotchian asserted that, after the court granted the
ex parte application, Wagenseller interfered with his efforts
to retain new counsel and prepare for trial. According to
Jamgotchian, Wagenseller failed to return his entire case file
—including three boxes with documents related to his case—
which hampered his ability to prepare for trial and forced him
to purchase new copies of deposition transcripts. Jamgotchian
also asserted his new counsel charged him a “very significant
premium” to prepare for trial. Jamgotchian said he ultimately
suffered an adverse judgment in the Prior Action that will likely
exceed $10 million.
Jamgotchian also submitted a declaration from Salvin.
According to Salvin, after the court granted the ex parte
application, Wagenseller instructed him not to talk to
Jamgotchian “in any way, on any topic, including the location
or whereabouts of Wagenseller’s complete case file or the
complete turnover of the client file.” Salvin followed
Wagenseller’s direction in fear of losing his employment with
Wagenseller’s firm. Salvin listed the materials that were part
of the case file that Wagenseller never returned to Jamgotchian.
4. The court’s order
The court denied Wagenseller’s anti-SLAPP motion and
declined to impose sanctions on either party. The court explained
that, in “evaluating anti-SLAPP motions directed to an entire
cause of action or complaint, each allegation of protected activity
must be evaluated separately, with the moving defendant bearing
the burden of showing that each allegation supporting a claim
of recovery is one that rests on protected activity.”
The court determined Wagenseller had met his initial
burden with respect to claims related to his motions and ex parte
8
application to be relieved as counsel, which constitute protected
petitioning activity. However, Jamgotchian’s other claims—
including claims asserting Wagenseller interfered with his efforts
to obtain new counsel and withheld the case file—do not arise
from protected activity.
The court then turned to the second step of the analysis
and determined Jamgotchian had demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on his claims. With respect to the malpractice claims,
the court concluded Jamgotchian provided “sufficient evidence
of a negligent act or omission, including evidence that Defendant
made unauthorized disclosures, interfered with Plaintiffs’ efforts
to obtain new counsel, and failed to deliver the complete client
file.” The court also found Jamgotchian presented sufficient
evidence of causation and non-speculative damages, including
evidence that he had to purchase new transcripts before trial
and pay a significant premium to retain new counsel. The court
determined the breach of fiduciary duty claims arose out of the
same allegations and had sufficient merit for the same reasons.
Wagenseller timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Wagenseller contends the trial court erred by denying
his motion to strike Jamgotchian’s claims under the anti-SLAPP
statute. He asserts the court properly determined at the first
step of the analysis that Jamgotchian’s claims arise from
protected activity to the extent they concern his motions and
ex parte application to withdraw. However, Wagenseller argues
the court erred at the second step of the analysis when it found
Jamgotchian showed a probability of prevailing. According to
Wagenseller, Jamgotchian failed to meet his burden because
he did not present sufficient evidence of causation.
9
1. The anti-SLAPP analysis and standard of review
The anti-SLAPP statute, section 425.16, establishes a
procedure for expeditiously resolving “nonmeritorious litigation
meant to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition in connection with a public issue.”
(Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th
226, 235.) “When served with a SLAPP suit, the defendant may
immediately move to strike the complaint under section 425.16.
To determine whether this motion should be granted, the trial
court must engage in a two-step process.” (Hansen v. Department
of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537,
1543; Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002)
29 Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon).)
The first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires the court
to decide “whether the defendant has made a threshold showing
that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected
activity.” (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67; § 425.16, subd.
(b)(1).) Section 425.16, subdivision (e), describes four categories
of conduct that constitute protected activity. Wagenseller moved
to strike Jamgotchian’s claims under section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(1), which defines protected activity to include “any written
or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive,
or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized
by law.”
“[T]he statutory phrase ‘cause of action . . . arising from’
means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s
cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the
right of petition or free speech. [Citation.] In the anti-SLAPP
context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action
itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right
10
of petition or free speech.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002)
29 Cal.4th 69, 78.) The court must consider the elements of a
claim and determine what actions supply those elements and
consequently form the basis for the defendant’s alleged liability.
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017)
2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 (Park).) Allegations of protected activity
that are “ ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ ” or that “merely
provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery,
cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 394 (Baral).) “In deciding whether
the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating
the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ”
(City of Cotati, at p. 79, quoting § 425.16, subd. (b).)
In Baral, our Supreme Court resolved a split in authority
regarding mixed causes of action—i.e., causes of action alleging
protected and unprotected activity—and held an anti-SLAPP
motion may be used to strike discrete allegations of protected
activity without defeating an entire cause of action. (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 392–393.) Under Baral, “[w]hen relief
is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected
activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded” in conducting
the first prong analysis, and the trial court then must determine
whether “relief is sought based on allegations arising from
activity protected by the statute.” (Id. at p. 396.) If the targeted
allegations “amount to a ‘cause of action’ in the sense that [they
are] alleged to justify a remedy,” those allegations are properly
subject to a special motion to strike, even though they may
be mixed with allegations of unprotected activity in a single
cause of action. (Id. at p. 395.) The critical question is whether
11
“allegations of protected activity . . . are asserted as grounds
for relief.” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
If the court finds the defendant has made the threshold
showing, the analysis proceeds to the second step, under which
the court “determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated
a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon, supra, 29
Cal.4th at p. 67; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To establish the requisite
probability of prevailing, the plaintiff need only have “ ‘stated
and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ” (Briggs v. Eden
Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123.)
We independently review the trial court’s ruling on an anti-
SLAPP motion under the de novo standard. (ComputerXpress,
Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 999.) “Only a cause
of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—
i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks
even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken
under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82,
89 (Navellier).)
2. Wagenseller met his burden to show Jamgotchian’s
claims arise from protected activity
Wagenseller contends Jamgotchian’s claims arise from
protected activity to the extent they are premised on his motions
and ex parte application to withdraw. The motions and
application plainly qualify under the anti-SLAPP statute’s
definition of protected activity, which includes “any written or
oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding.”
(§ 425.16(e)(1).) Therefore, the only question is whether
Jamgotchian’s claims arise from those motions and application
for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.
12
To decide that issue, we first consider the elements of
Jamgotchian’s claims. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.)
“In a legal malpractice action arising from a civil proceeding,
the elements are (1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill,
prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession
commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty;
(3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and
the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting
from the attorney’s negligence.” (Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1199 (Coscia).) The elements of breach
of fiduciary duty are: “(1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach
of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by
the breach.” (Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070,
1086 (Stanley).)
As we understand Jamgotchian’s claims, he alleges
Wagenseller violated his professional and fiduciary duties
by seeking to withdraw without good cause, using the wrong
procedure to do so (an ex parte application), and revealing
confidential information in the process. These claims rely
on Wagenseller’s act of filing the motions and application
to withdraw—as well as the information he chose to include
in them—to establish the “breach of duty” elements of his
legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action.
The claims rely on the motions and application to establish
Wagenseller’s liability. Therefore, they arise from the motions
and application for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. Because
the motions and application constitute protected activity under
the statute’s plain language (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)), Wagenseller
has met his initial burden.
13
Jamgotchian contends his claims do not arise from
protected activity because they involve claims against an
attorney by a former client.3 As Jamgotchian notes, courts
have repeatedly held “garden-variety attorney malpractice”
claims are not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute, even if they
arise out of the attorney’s statements and writings made before
a judicial proceeding. (See, e.g., Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 632; Thayer v. Kabateck Brown
Kellner LLP (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 141, 158 (Thayer);
Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 303, 313
(Wittenberg); Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton
(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1540 (Kolar); Loanvest I, LLC v.
Utrecht (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 496, 504; PrediWave Corp. v.
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1204,
1227 (PrediWave); see also Benasra v. Mitchell Silberberg &
3 We reject Wagenseller’s contention that Jamgotchian
cannot raise this issue because he did not file an appeal or cross-
appeal. Although the court rejected Jamgotchian’s arguments
at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, it ultimately ruled
in his favor. Therefore, there were no grounds for Jamgotchian
to appeal. (See Nevada County Office of Education v. Riles (1983)
149 Cal.App.3d 767, 779 [“if the judgment or order is in favor of
a party he is not aggrieved and cannot appeal”].) Moreover, “[n]o
rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority,
nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety,
than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be
disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason.”
(Davey v. Southern Pac. Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329.)
Accordingly, Jamgotchian is free to argue alternative grounds
on which we may affirm the order, including arguments
concerning the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (See § 906.)
14
Knupp LLP (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1181 [the anti-SLAPP
statute does not apply to claims alleging an attorney’s breach of
the duty of loyalty].)
Although courts have given various reasons for excluding
malpractice claims from the anti-SLAPP statue, one of the
primary justifications is that those claims do “not have the
chilling effect on advocacy found in malicious prosecution, libel,
and other claims typically covered by the anti-SLAPP statute.
In a malpractice suit, the client is not suing because the attorney
petitioned on his or her behalf, but because the attorney did
not competently represent the client’s interests while doing so.
Instead of chilling the petitioning activity, the threat of
malpractice encourages the attorney to petition competently
and zealously. This is vastly different from a third party suing
an attorney for petitioning activity, which clearly could have
a chilling effect.” (Kolar, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1540.)
As one court put it, “[a]lthough a broad interpretation of
the anti-SLAPP statute is statutorily mandated (see § 425.16,
subd. (a)), an overly broad interpretation of section 425.16,
subdivision (b), that includes such client lawsuits unreasonably
expands the language beyond the clear legislative purpose and
leads to absurd results.” (PrediWave, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1228.)
However, not all claims against attorneys brought by
former clients fall outside the anti-SLAPP statute. In PrediWave,
the court identified three general categories of claims against
attorneys: “(1) clients’ causes of action against attorneys based
upon the attorneys’ acts on behalf of those clients, (2) clients’
causes of action against attorneys based upon statements or
conduct solely on behalf of different clients, and (3) nonclients’
15
causes of action against attorneys.” (PrediWave, supra, 179
Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.) “[O]nly the ‘first class’ of claims—
those brought by former clients against their former attorneys
based on the attorneys’ acts on behalf of those clients—may
not be within the ambit of SLAPP. The other kinds of actions
—‘(2) clients’ causes of action against attorneys based upon
statements or conduct solely on behalf of different clients,
and (3) nonclients’ causes of action against attorneys’—are.”
(Thayer, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 158; see Wittenberg, supra,
50 Cal.App.5th at p. 313 [“only the first category of cases may
be outside the ambit of the anti-SLAPP law”].)
Here, Jamgotchian does not bring the sort of “garden-
variety” malpractice claims that courts have excluded from
the anti-SLAPP statute. In a garden-variety malpractice
claim, the attorney’s liability arises out of actions taken on
the plaintiff’s behalf. (See PrediWave, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1227.) However, where an attorney moves to withdraw
without the client’s consent—as Wagenseller allegedly did here—
the attorney effectively is acting on his own behalf, not on behalf
of the client. (See Kirsch v. Duryea (1978) 21 Cal.3d 303, 311
(Kirsch) [when an “attorney seeks to withdraw without consent
of [the] client, there is an obvious inference his withdrawal is
not for the client’s purpose but for the attorney’s purpose”].)
Jamgotchian’s claims instead more closely resemble
those falling under the second PrediWave category, which arise
out of an attorney’s actions taken on behalf of another client.
(PrediWave, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.) Here,
Wagenseller was acting on his own behalf, not on behalf of
another client. Nevertheless, we do not find this distinction
to be meaningful. What differentiates claims falling under
16
the second PrediWave category from the first—and what justifies
applying the anti-SLAPP statute to the former but not the latter
—is the fact that the attorney is acting on behalf of someone
other than the plaintiff. (Ibid.) Whether that someone is another
client or the attorney himself, the threat of a lawsuit has the
same sort of “ ‘chilling effect on advocacy found in malicious
prosecution, libel, and other claims typically covered by the
anti-SLAPP statute.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1221–1222.)
Given the potential chilling effect of Jamgotchian’s claims,
we reject his contention that they fall outside the scope of the
anti-SLAPP statute. Wagenseller’s motions and ex parte
application constitute protected activity under the statute’s
plain language, which expressly applies to “any written or oral
statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1).) Because Jamgotchian’s claims arise
from that activity, Wagenseller has met his burden at the
first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
3. Jamgotchian met his burden to show a probability
of prevailing
Because Wagenseller met his burden to show the claims
arise from protected activity, the burden shifts to Jamgotchian
to show a probability of prevailing. To satisfy that burden,
Jamgotchian must show only that his claims have “minimal
merit.” (See Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89.) That is,
he must make a prima facie showing as to each element of his
claims. (See Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane
Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.) In general terms, the
elements of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty are
the same: (1) the existence of a duty, (2) a breach of that duty,
17
and (3) damages caused by the breach. (See Coscia, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 1199; Stanley, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086.)
As to the first element, the parties do not dispute
that Wagenseller owed professional and fiduciary duties to
Jamgotchian when he moved to withdraw as counsel. It is a
“long-accepted standard of professional conduct” that an attorney
may not withdraw from representation “ ‘until he has taken
reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of
his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time
for employment of other counsel, delivering to [the] client all
papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying
with applicable laws and rules.’ ” (Kirsch, supra, 21 Cal.3d at
p. 310.) These duties are codified in the Rules of Professional
Conduct, which state a lawyer may not terminate representation
“until the lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably
foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, such as giving
the client sufficient notice to permit the client to retain other
counsel.” (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(d).)
The Rules of Professional Conduct also list the
circumstances under which an attorney may withdraw from
representation. As relevant here, the rules permit a lawyer
to withdraw if the client “renders it unreasonably difficult
for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively,” or
the client breaches a “material term” of an agreement. (Rules
Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(b)(4), (5).) By stating the circumstances
under which an attorney may withdraw, the rules imply an
attorney may not withdraw for other reasons. (See In re J.W.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209 [“the expression of one thing in
a statute ordinarily implies the exclusion of other things”].)
Moreover, during the process of withdrawing, the California
18
Rules of Court preclude a lawyer from revealing information
“compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client
relationship.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(c).)
Jamgotchian presented sufficient evidence showing
Wagenseller breached these duties when he filed the motions
and application to withdraw. Wagenseller’s motions and
application stated—or at least implied—that he was
withdrawing, in part, because Jamgotchian had breached
the parties’ fee agreement. According to Jamgotchian, he
did not consent to Wagenseller disclosing the existence of
their fee dispute. Therefore, a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude Wagenseller’s reference to the dispute in public filings
constituted a breach of his duty not to disclose confidential
information compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-
client relationship. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(c).)
A reasonable trier of fact also could conclude Wagenseller
moved to withdraw without good cause. The record shows
Jamgotchian maintained a good working relationship with Salvin
—who was the primary attorney working on his case—up until
Wagenseller withdrew from the case. There also is evidence
that the amount of unpaid fees was relatively small, Jamgotchian
intended to pay them, and Wagenseller had accepted late
payment in the past. On this record, a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude Wagenseller’s purported reasons for terminating
the relationship—Jamgotchian’s breach of the fee agreement
and a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship—were either
pretextual or insufficient to warrant withdrawal. In either case,
a trier of fact could conclude Wagenseller violated his duty
not to withdraw without good cause. (See Rules Prof. Conduct,
rule 1.16(b).)
19
There also is evidence that Wagenseller withdrew from
the case under circumstances prejudicial to Jamgotchian. The
record shows Wagenseller moved to withdraw fewer than three
months before the trial date and only a few days after informing
Jamgotchian of his intentions. Wagenseller then filed an
ex parte application seeking expedited rulings on his motions.
On this record, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
Wagenseller provided insufficient notice to permit Jamgotchian
to retain other counsel and prepare for trial, in violation of
his duty to take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice
to his client. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(d); Kirsch,
supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 310.)
Wagenseller does not meaningfully contest that
Jamgotchian presented sufficient evidence showing he breached
his professional and fiduciary duties.4 Nevertheless, he contends
Jamgotchian failed to present evidence that those breaches
caused him to suffer damages. Wagenseller points specifically
to the lack of evidence that Jamgotchian would have obtained
a more favorable judgment in the Prior Action had Wagenseller
not withdrawn as counsel. According to Wagenseller, absent
such evidence, Jamgotchian cannot make out a malpractice
claim.
We agree that Jamgotchian failed to present sufficient
evidence showing Wagenseller’s actions caused him to suffer
4 In passing, Wagenseller contends there was nothing
procedurally improper about the ex parte application or
the court’s ruling on it. While that may be true generally,
a reasonable trier of fact could conclude Wagenseller’s decision
to file an ex parte application seeking to expedite the withdrawal
was improper under the particular circumstances of this case.
20
a worse judgment. However, contrary to Wagenseller’s
suggestions, Jamgotchian is not limited to recovering that
type of damages. Our Supreme Court has explained the
“determination of actual injury [in an attorney malpractice
case] does not necessarily depend upon or require some form
of final adjudication, as by judgment or settlement.” (Adams v.
Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 591.) Instead, “[a]ny appreciable
and actual harm flowing from the attorney’s negligent conduct
establishes a cause of action upon which the client may sue.”
(Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 201.) Moreover, “attorney
fees incurred as a direct result of another’s tort are recoverable
damages.” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger &
Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 751.) Therefore, in an attorney
malpractice action, a plaintiff may recover fees paid to “his
second attorney[ ] to the extent that such fees compensated that
attorney for his efforts to extricate plaintiff from the effect of
defendant’s negligence.” (Budd, at p. 202; see Orrick Herrington
& Sutcliffe v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1060
[“fees paid to a second attorney to correct errors committed by
the first attorney represent damages”].)
Here, Jamgotchian presented evidence that he incurred
expenses to extricate himself from the effects of Wagenseller’s
alleged torts. (See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart
& Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 180–181 [legal malpractice
gives rise to an action in tort]; Stanley, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1086 [“breach of fiduciary duty is a species of tort”].)
Specifically, Jamgotchian asserted in his declaration that,
because Wagenseller withdrew from the case only a few months
before the trial date, he had to pay a “very significant premium”
to retain new counsel to represent him. Jamgotchian also
21
asserted he had to purchase new copies of transcripts that
Wagenseller failed to return when he withdrew from the case.
Jamgotchian would not have had to incur those expenses had
Wagenseller not withdrawn from the case. Therefore, if a trier
of fact concludes the withdrawal was wrongful, Jamgotchian
would be entitled to recover those expenses.
Jamgotchian also presented evidence that he suffered
damages caused by Wagenseller’s disclosure of confidential
information. According to Jamgotchian’s declaration, the
opposing parties in the Prior Action used the existence of the
fee dispute successfully to oppose his application to continue
the trial date. After retaining new counsel, Jamgotchian then
had to expend attorney fees to file a motion to continue. A trier
of fact reasonably could conclude that, but for Wagenseller’s
disclosure of the fee dispute in his ex parte application, the court
would have granted Jamgotchian’s initial application. If so,
Jamgotchian would not have had to incur attorney fees to file
the subsequent motion.
We reject Wagenseller’s contention that Jamgotchian
alone is responsible for any damages caused by the disclosure
of confidential information. According to Wagenseller,
Jamgotchian’s injuries were “self-inflicted” because the ex parte
application revealed the existence of the fee dispute in the
most general terms, while Jamgotchian’s opposition revealed
detailed information about the nature of the parties’ dispute.
To determine whose disclosure ultimately caused the damages
would require us to weigh the evidence and resolve factual
disputes, which we decline to do in connection with an
22
anti-SLAPP motion. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)
It is enough that Jamgotchian presented sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find in his favor.
We also reject Wagenseller’s contention that Jamgotchian
cannot show damages because it is undisputed he retained
new counsel, new counsel successfully moved to continue the
trial, and Salvin substituted into the case for trial. Wagenseller
overlooks evidence showing Jamgotchian had to pay new counsel
a premium and incurred attorney fees in connection with the
motion to continue trial. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that, but for Wagenseller’s alleged breaches, Jamgotchian
would not have had to incur those expenses. While far from
overwhelming, Jamgotchian presented sufficient evidence
to establish the minimal merit required to survive an
anti-SLAPP motion to strike.
23
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Wagenseller’s anti-SLAPP
motion. Jamgotchian shall recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
24
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