CourtListener 10617816•People v. Palacios CA4/3
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Filed 6/26/25 P. v. Palacios CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063294
v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF1301484)
ABRAM DANIEL PALACIOS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, John M. Monterosso, and Frederick Paul Dickerson III, Judges.
Affirmed.
Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Evan Stele, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
A lying-in-wait special circumstance murder occurs when a
defendant intentionally kills a victim by concealing his or her presence or
purpose, by watching and waiting for an opportunity to act, and then by
making a surprise attack from a position of advantage. (People v. Stevens
1
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 201–202 (Stevens); Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15).)
Defendant Abram Daniel Palacios was a passenger in a car that
his brother Juan Mejia was driving. They were looking for Ivan Carrillo, who
was driving an SUV. Palacios suspected Carrillo of having been involved in a
home invasion robbery of his home months earlier. As Carrillo was
approaching an intersection, Mejia suddenly pulled in front of Carrillo’s SUV
and blocked it from moving forward. Palacios and Mejia got out of their car
armed with guns. As Carrillo sat in his SUV with his hands up, Palacios and
Mejia fired multiple shots at the SUV. Carrillo died at the scene.
A jury found Palacios guilty of first degree murder with a
firearm, and found true a lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation. The
trial court imposed a term of life without parole (LWOP), plus 20 years.
In this appeal, Palacios claims: there is insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s true finding as to the lying-in-wait special circumstance;
the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense; the court abused its discretion by
allowing the People to impeach a defense witness (Mejia) with some of his
prior felony convictions; the court erred by not conducting an in camera
review of an officer’s personnel records (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11
Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)); and there was cumulative prejudice.
We find no errors and affirm the judgment.
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 6, 2013, in the late afternoon, Carrillo was visiting his
girlfriend at her home, which was located on Las Rosas Drive, in a residential
area of San Jacinto. Carrillo had parked his large Ford Excursion SUV on the
street. Carrillo’s last name was displayed on the back window of the SUV.
Palacios and his girlfriend, Jane Doe, lived together in San
Jacinto. Doe had earlier spotted Carrillo’s SUV. Someone called Doe and told
her that the SUV was now parked on nearby Las Rosas Drive. Doe then
called Palacios because she was scared. Doe and Palacios both suspected
Carrillo “had something to do with a [prior] home invasion” robbery of
another home they lived in, which occurred on October 31, 2012. In less than
an hour, Palacios arrived at home, went to the bedroom, and retrieved a
black handgun. Doe later went to the home of Palacios’s sister, and his
brother-in-law Emmanuel C. (Emmanuel).
Palacios was later outside of his home with his friend, Alfonso R.
(Alfonso), and Emmanuel. Palacios and Emmanuel were discussing Carrillo’s
SUV. All three men left in Doe’s car, a Honda Accord, to look for Carrillo. The
men saw the distinctive SUV parked on Las Rosas, but they did not see
Carrillo. Palacios asked someone working in a yard (perhaps a gardener) if
that person had seen who was driving the SUV, but the person said he did
not know. Palacios then dropped off Emmanuel at his home, and then
returned to his own home with Alfonso.
When Palacios and Alfonso arrived back at Palacios’s home,
Palacios’s brother Mejia was in the driveway. Palacios and Mejia spoke to
each other. Alfonso left because the brothers “were upset and rowdy.” The
brothers then got into the Honda Accord and drove around the neighborhood.
3
Mejia was driving, and Palacios was in the passenger seat.
A woman was driving a vehicle on Las Rosas Drive approaching
Osprey Street. At the intersection, there were two stop signs, which
controlled traffic turning from Osprey Street onto Las Rosas Drive. As the
woman drove with the right-of-way and approached the intersection, she saw
an SUV driving towards her on Las Rosas Drive; the SUV was being driven
by a man (Carrillo).
As the woman entered the intersection, she saw a Honda Accord
darting out to her left from Osprey Street. The woman slammed on her
brakes to avoid a collision. The Honda Accord came to a stop in front of
Carrillo’s SUV, which prevented him from moving forward. The woman saw
two men (Mejia and Palacios) get out of the Honda Accord with guns in their
hands. Both men fired their guns at the SUV after Carrillo put up his hands
while sitting in the driver’s seat. After making eye contact with the car’s
passenger (Palacios), the woman drove into a cul de sac and called 911.
The Investigation
Deputy sheriffs arrived on the scene within three minutes. One
deputy saw bullet holes in the SUV and saw Carrillo’s bloody body slumped
over in the driver’s seat. The deputy detected a faint pulse and shallow
breathing, so he pulled Carrillo out of the SUV and onto the ground in order
to facilitate first aid. Another deputy noticed the SUV’s reverse lights were
on, and there was music playing. After Carrillo was out of the SUV, the
deputy placed it in park, and turned off the power. Carrillo was pronounced
dead at the scene. An autopsy later revealed that Carrillo had died from
multiple gunshot wounds.
Investigators retrieved 15 shell casings, and a later analysis
4
determined that 13 had been fired from one weapon, and two were fired from
another. Investigators canvassed the neighborhood, finding videos showing
the Honda Accord riding slowly around the neighborhood just prior to the
shooting. The woman who had witnessed the shooting later identified
Palacios from a photo lineup as the passenger in the Honda Accord. Police
searched for Palacios and Mejia, but they fled to Mexico after the shooting.
About two years later, Mejia was arrested and brought back to
the United States. A jury convicted Mejia of murder with a firearm
enhancement. The jury also found true a lying-in-wait special circumstance.
Court Proceedings
About 10 years after the shooting, Palacios was arrested and
brought back to the United States. The People filed an information charging
him with first degree murder. The People further alleged a personal use of a
firearm enhancement and a lying-in-wait special circumstance enhancement.
Prior to trial, Palacios filed a Pitchess motion, seeking to discover
an investigating officer’s personnel records. The court denied the motion (the
ruling will be covered in detail in the discussion section of this opinion).
During the trial, Palacios’s girlfriend Jane Doe testified under a
grant of immunity. Doe said that when the shooting occurred, she heard
gunshots in the distance. On a cell phone, Palacios spoke to Doe and said, “I
got him. I got him.” Palacios later told Doe that he had looked for Carrillo’s
SUV and “they found it, but Ivan wasn’t there, and came back home. And
then, they left again to go look for the Excursion.” Palacios told Doe that
when they found Carrillo, he and Mejia both got out of the car at the same
time, and that he started shooting first. For several days after the shooting,
Doe and Palacios stayed away from San Jacinto. Doe assisted Palacios and
5
Mejia by helping to hide her Honda Accord, which was eventually located by
the police at her mother’s home in Los Angeles.
Palacios called Mejia as a defense witness. Prior to his testimony,
the trial court ruled that some of Mejia’s prior felony convictions could be
used for impeachment (the evidentiary ruling will be covered in detail in the
discussion section of this opinion).
Mejia testified that he and Palacios were driving slowly through
the neighborhood looking for Carrillo before the shooting. Mejia said Palacios
was driving. Mejia testified that when they spotted Carrillo, Palacios did not
block his SUV. Mejia testified that he got out of the car first, waited five
seconds, and then fired his weapon at Carrillo until he ran out of bullets.
Mejia said that “before I shot him the first time, he kept saying, ‘I’m sorry,
I’m sorry.’” Mejia testified that after Carrillo made a gang sign, he went back
to the car, got a second weapon, and again fired at Carrillo “to stop the
monster he was.” Mejia said he did not tell Palacios in advance what he was
going to do, and that Palacios stood by the door and looked surprised during
the shooting. Mejia testified there were no other cars nearby.
The jury found Palacios guilty of the charged crimes, and found
true the sentencing enhancements. The trial court imposed a sentence of
LWOP, plus a determinate term of 20 years.
II.
DISCUSSION
Palacios claims: A) there is insufficient evidence to support the
lying-in-wait special circumstance enhancement; B) the court erred by not
instructing the jury on a lesser offense; C) the court erred by allowing Mejia
to be impeached with his prior convictions; D) the court erred by denying a
6
Pitchess motion; and E) cumulative prejudice.
A. Lying-In-Wait Special Circumstance
Palacios claims the jury’s true finding on the lying-in-wait special
circumstance enhancement is not supported by substantial evidence and
therefore “must be reversed.” We disagree. We find that there is evidence to
support each element of the lying-in-wait special circumstance.
In this part of the discussion, we will: 1) consider the standard of
review; 2) discuss the elements of the lying-in-wait special circumstance; and
3) analyze the elements of the rule as applied to the facts.
1. Standard of Review
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
. . . , we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment
to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27, italics added.)
“In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court
resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.]
Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive
province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
“The reviewing court presumes in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence.”
(People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208.) “Evidence of a defendant’s
state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence
is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction.” (Ibid.)
7
2. The Elements of Lying in Wait
The elements of lying in wait are: 1) “a physical concealment or
concealment of purpose”; 2) “a substantial period of watching and waiting for
an opportune time to act”; and 3) “immediately thereafter, a surprise attack
on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.” (Stevens, supra, 41
Cal.4th at pp. 201–202; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 630.)
The three lying-in-wait elements can support a lying-in-wait
special circumstance allegation as well as a lying-in-wait theory of first
degree murder (distinct from premeditation and deliberation). (§§ 189, subd.
(a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The only difference is that the special circumstance
finding “requires the specific intent to kill, whereas first degree murder by
lying in wait does not.” 2 (People v. Superior Court (Bradway) (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 297, 309–310.)
The first element is “a physical concealment or concealment of
purpose.” (Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 201.) “The concealment required
for lying in wait ‘is that which puts the defendant in a position of advantage,
from which the factfinder can infer that lying-in-wait was part of the
defendant’s plan to take the victim by surprise. [Citation.] It is sufficient that
a defendant’s true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or
conduct. It is not required that he be literally concealed from view before he
attacks the victim.’” (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448.) “‘The
concealment can be accomplished by ambush or some other secret plan.’”
(People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1264.)
The second element requires “a substantial period of watching
2
Palacios does not dispute there was substantial evidence he
intended to kill Carrillo, so the intent element is not at issue.
8
and waiting for an opportune time to act.” (Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p.
201.) The California Supreme Court has “never placed a fixed time limit” on
the required “substantial” period of watching and waiting. (People v. Moon
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 23.) “Indeed, the opposite is true, for we have previously
explained that ‘[t]he precise period of time is . . . not critical.’” (Ibid.) “Even
accepting defendant’s testimony that he waited only a few scant minutes
before killing [the murder victim], a few minutes can suffice.” (Ibid.) The
purpose of the “‘substantial’ period” requirement “‘is to distinguish those
cases in which a defendant acts insidiously from those in which he acts out of
rash impulse.’” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1073.)
The third element requires that after the period of watching and
waiting, there must be a surprise attack from a position of advantage that
occurs “‘immediately thereafter.’” (People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486,
516 [effective March 8, 2000, the electorate “passed an initiative measure
that . . . amended [section 190.2,] subdivision (a)(15) by changing ‘while’ lying
in wait to ‘by means of’ lying in wait”].) The requirement of a surprise attack
immediately after the period of watching and waiting ensures that the
murder was committed under the current “‘by means of’ lying in wait” rule,
rather than the former “‘while lying in wait’” rule.3 (Id. at pp. 516–517.) The
California Supreme Court has explained that so “long as the murder is
immediately preceded by lying in wait, the defendant need not strike at the
3
The trial court appears to have mistakenly instructed the jury
using the language of the former “while lying in wait” instruction (CALCRIM
No. 727), rather than the current “by means of lying in wait” instruction
(CALCRIM No. 728). The Attorney General argues that “this Court need only
find that substantial evidence in the record supports a true finding based on
the current standard, i.e. ‘by means of’ lying in wait.” We agree. Palacios does
not appear to dispute this point, and he has not challenged the trial court’s
lying-in-wait jury instruction in this appeal.
9
first available opportunity, but may wait to maximize his position of
advantage before taking the victim by surprise.’” (Id. at p. 517.)
3. Application and Analysis
As far as the first element, the jury could have reasonably
determined there was a concealment of purpose or presence. Palacios and his
brother Mejia were looking for Carrillo prior to the shooting, and there was
no evidence that Carrillo was aware of this fact. According to testimonial
evidence, Palacios did not tell his friend Alfonso or his girlfriend Doe that his
purpose in looking for Carrillo was to shoot and kill him. Additionally, there
is evidence that Palacios and Mejia may have concealed their presence from
Carrillo by waiting at the stop sign in the Honda Accord, and then darting
onto Las Rosas Road just as Carrillo entered the intersection. (See People v.
Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1264 [“‘The concealment can be
accomplished by ambush’”].)
As far as the second element, the jury could have reasonably
determined that Palacios waited and watched for Carrillo for a substantial
period of time prior to the shooting. The evidence showed that Palacios
suspected that Carrillo had previously robbed him, Palacios and Mejia
became aware that Carrillo’s SUV was nearby, and the video evidence
showed that the two brothers then drove slowly around the neighborhood in
the Honda Accord looking for Carrillo. (People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 23 [under this element, even “a few scant minutes” of watching and
waiting “can suffice” to establish a substantial period of time].)
As far as the third element, the jury could have reasonably
determined that immediately after they watched and waited for Carrillo at
the intersection, Palacios and Mejia then launched a surprise attack on him
10
from a position of advantage. That is, by darting out in front of Carrillo’s SUV
and stopping directly in front of Carrillo, he could not move forward. Then, as
described by the eyewitness, Palacios and Mejia almost immediately got out
of Doe’s Honda Accord and started firing multiple times at Carrillo as he held
up his hands while he was behind the steering wheel of the SUV. In other
words, this crime appears to be a classic ambush by fire.
In short, we find that the three challenged elements of lying in
wait are amply supported by substantial evidence. Thus, we affirm the jury’s
4
true finding on the lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation.
Palacios argues “there was no evidence of a concealed purpose;
there was no secret that Palacios and Mejia were out in their Honda looking
for Carrillo. At one point, they saw a gardener in the neighborhood, and
Palacios stopped the car and asked the gardener if he knew who was driving
the Excursion; the gardener said he did not know. [Citation.] The two
brothers continued to drive around the neighborhood searching for Carrillo;
there was no evidence presented to show they attempted to hide or conceal
themselves. Indeed, the evidence showed the opposite – they were openly
searching for Carrillo.”
But Palacios’s argument misses the mark. While it may be true
that Palacios and Mejia “were openly searching for Carrillo,” Palacios did not
disclose to the gardener (or his friend Alfonso) that his true intention and
purpose was evidently to shoot and kill Carrillo. (See People v. Webster,
4
The trial court also instructed the jury on the lying-in-wait
elements as an alternative theory of first degree murder (distinct from
premeditation and deliberation). (§ 189, subd. (a).) However, in this appeal,
Palacios only challenges the lying-in-wait elements as they relate to the
jury’s special circumstance finding.
11
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 448 [“‘It is sufficient that a defendant’s true intent and
purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct’”].) Indeed, had Palacios not
concealed his apparent true intention and purpose, then perhaps someone
may have alerted Carrillo (or perhaps law enforcement) to the danger, and
the resulting special circumstances murder may have been averted.
Palacios cites several cases concerning the concealment element
in which the defendant actively used false pretenses, or some kind of ruse, to
lure a murder victim into a position of vulnerability. (See, e.g., People v.
Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 119 [male defendant lured female murder
victim into car, which provided opportunity for ambush]; see also People v.
Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 433 [defendant lured pizza delivery driver into
hotel room prior to strangling him].) Palacios then argues that the facts of
this case are distinguishable from those cited cases.
But the problem with Palacios’s argument is that the cited cases
do not stand for the proposition that the prosecution was required to prove
that he used false pretenses, or some kind of ruse, in order to establish the
concealment element of a lying-in-wait special circumstance murder. Indeed,
case law holds otherwise. (See People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 333
[the prosecution satisfies the concealment element by proving that the
defendant concealed his purpose or his presence]; see also People v.
Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1264 [“‘The concealment can be
accomplished by ambush or some other secret plan’”], italics added.)
Palacios also argues “there was no substantial evidence that
there was a period of watching and waiting before the brothers acted.”
Palacios asserts “there was no evidence that the Honda stopped at any
intersection waiting for Carrillo to pass; indeed, the evidence contradicted
any finding of watching and waiting.”
12
We disagree. Based on the videos obtained by the investigating
officers, there was evidence that Palacios and Mejia were slowly driving
through the neighborhood immediately prior to the shooting. (People v. Moon,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 23 [there is no “fixed time limit” on the required
“substantial” period of “watching and waiting”]. And based on the eyewitness’
testimony, the Honda Accord darted out in front of Carrillo’s SUV and
blocked his escape immediately after he entered the intersection. Indeed, the
eyewitness testified that she had to slam on her brakes to avoid colliding with
the Honda Accord. Based on this evidence, it would have been reasonable for
the jury to infer that Palacios and Mejia had stopped their car at the stop
sign on Osprey Street, and then watched and waited for Carrillo to pass on
the intersecting Las Rosas Drive, before they darted forward, forcing Carrillo
to stop in the intersection. (See People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323,
330 [“‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence’”].)
Palacios argues that the case of People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th
513 (Nelson), compels a different result. We disagree.
In Nelson, “[t]he evidence showed, directly or by reasonable
inference, that Nelson rode his bicycle to the area near the Target parking
lot, where he had reason to believe the victims would be waiting to go to
work. He concealed his bicycle and came up behind his victims on foot to take
them by surprise. He shot the two victims in quick succession. After ensuring
his victims were dead by shooting a second time, he retrieved his bicycle and
left.” (Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 551.) The Supreme Court found there
was insufficient evidence to prove the lying-in-wait special circumstance
because there was no evidence “that Nelson arrived before the victims or
waited in ambush for their arrival. In the absence of such evidence, there is
13
no factual basis for an inference that before approaching the victims, he had
concealed his bicycle and waited for a time when they would be vulnerable to
surprise attack.” (Ibid.)
In this case, the evidence reasonably showed that Palacios was
told by Doe that Carrillo was in his neighborhood, so he returned home to get
his gun in order to kill him. After driving around with Emmanuel and
Alfonso, and determining that Carrillo’s SUV was parked on a nearby street,
Palacios then met up with his brother Mejia, and they slowly drove around
the neighborhood in Doe’s Honda Accord, intending to find Carrillo in his
SUV. And unlike Nelson, there is a reasonable inference—based on all of the
preceding evidence—that Palacios and Mejia then arrived at the intersection
before waiting and watching for the opportunity to ambush Carrillo. 5
To reiterate and conclude, we find there is substantial evidence
Palacios intentionally killed Carrillo, he concealed his presence or purpose,
he watched and waited for an opportunity to act, and then he and Mejia made
a surprise attack from a position of advantage.
B. Voluntary Manslaughter
Palacios claims the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. We disagree. There
is not substantial evidence to support the instruction.
We review instructional error claims under an independent or de
5
The only other explanation would appear to be that Mejia and
Palacios fortuitously came upon Carrillo at precisely the same time Carrillo
was entering the intersection. But this was ultimately a decision for the jury
to make. (See People v. Meneses (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 71 [“‘the jury may
reject impossible or unreasonable interpretations of the evidence’”].)
14
novo standard of review. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review general
principles of law regarding voluntary manslaughter; 2) summarize the trial
court’s ruling; and 3) apply the law to the facts.
1. General Legal Principles
The voluntary manslaughter statute refers to a killing “upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (§ 192, subd. (a).) Another type of
voluntary manslaughter occurs when a defendant kills in imperfect
(unreasonable) self-defense. (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199.)
Under the heat of passion theory, the victim must provoke the
defendant to such a degree that the provocation “would cause an emotion so
intense that an ordinary person would simply react, without reflection. . . .
[T]he anger or other passion must be so strong that the defendant’s reaction
bypassed his thought process to such an extent that judgment could not and
did not intervene.” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 949.)
The heat of passion theory has both subjective and objective
elements: the defendant actually killed in the heat of passion (the subjective
element); and the provocation by the victim would arouse passion in the mind
of an ordinarily reasonable person in similar circumstances (the objective
element). (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1253.) Under the objective
element of the heat of passion theory, the “‘defendant is not permitted to set
up his own standard of conduct.’” (Id. at p. 1254.)
“To satisfy this test, the victim must taunt the defendant or
otherwise initiate the provocation.” (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263,
1306.) Further, the killing must have occurred suddenly in direct response to
the provocation from the victim and not belatedly as revenge or punishment.
15
(People v. Hach (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1458.) That is, if sufficient time
elapsed for the passions of a reasonable person to cool, then the intentional
killing was murder, not manslaughter. (Ibid.)
“Thus, to warrant instructions on provocation and heat of
passion, there must be substantial evidence in the trial record to support a
finding that, at the time of the killing, defendant’s reason was (1) actually
obscured as a result of a strong passion; (2) the passion was provoked by the
victim’s conduct; and (3) the provocation was sufficient to cause an ordinary
person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection, and from this passion rather than from due deliberation or
reflection.” (People v. Wright (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1481.)
A trial court has a duty to instruct on a lesser included offense
where there is substantial evidence to support the instruction. (People v.
Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, 643.) However, “the existence of ‘any
evidence, no matter how weak’ will not justify instructions on a lesser
included offense.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [“such
instructions are [only] required whenever [the] evidence . . . is ‘substantial
enough to merit consideration’ by the jury”].)
2. The Trial Court’s Ruling
Prior to closing arguments, the trial court conducted a hearing to
finalize the jury instructions. At the close of the hearing, Palacios’s counsel
said, “I would request, just for the record, voluntary manslaughter as well.”
When the court asked counsel for the basis of the request, he responded,
“Based on the anger that was possessed pretty quickly -- just based on the
evidence that we heard at the trial. I’ll just submit based on that. I think the
Court has already kind of ruled on it, but I'll ask for it just in case.”
16
The prosecutor responded, “I don’t think that there was any
evidence that this was done in a heat of passion situation or imperfect self-
defense situation. All the evidence -- we didn’t get, I believe, any evidence to
say that the defendant was acting in the heat of passion, or whether he was --
believed that he had should some right to imperfect self-defense. It seems,
from all the evidence, that they knew Ivan Carrillo’s car was in the area, they
went looking for him, and found him, and shot him.”
The court ruled, as follows:
“I agree. There was no evidence presented at the trial that he was
acting under the heat of passion, or that it was imperfect self-defense. Mr.
Mejia testified, in fact, that he was the one actually that shot the victim. And
that the defendant, Mr. Palacios, . . . did nothing, other than was getting out
of the car and standing up. And I think -- in fact, I’m certain the testimony
was that [Mejia] fired all the bullets and that the defendant looked surprised
while he did it, not angry at all. It was just very surprised that it happened.
“Other than that, they pursued . . . the victim, not the other way
around. And whatever had happened, there was no evidence to substantiate
there was ever any kind of home invasion robbery or when it happened. So
there was a lag between the occurrence of the alleged home invasion robbery
and when this occurred. [¶] The victim[’s car] was at someone’s house. They
drive by the car, and they lie in wait. And the testimony, I believe, they
executed him. Unless they believe, now, Mr. Mejia, and that maybe he was
acting under heat of passion. Although, yeah, it didn’t come out what he was
convicted of -- but that wouldn’t have anything to do with the defendant. That
[Mejia] said I was angry, I got out, I shot him. He threw up gang signs, so I
shot him some more. But that has nothing to do with Mr. Palacios.
“So, in the opinion of the Court, there is no evidence to support
17
giving any lessers here -- manslaughter, whether it’s heat of passion, or
imperfect self-defense. All the evidence was the victim was in the car,
defenseless, and they shot in the windshield of his car. So I agree with the
People here. That should not be given.”
3. Application and Analysis
In short, we agree with the analysis of the trial court. We find
there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the giving of a
voluntary manslaughter instruction as a lesser included offense to the
charged crime of first degree murder.
As far as the imperfect self-defense theory of voluntary
manslaughter, there was no evidence that Palacios was in imminent danger
of being killed. As the trial court observed, the most favorable view of the
evidence was that Carrillo was shot in his SUV by Mejia as he held up his
hands, and possibly said, “I’m sorry, I’m sorry.” (See People v. Lopez (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306 [“the defendant must have believed ‘the
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against’ the danger”].)
As far as the heat of passion theory, there was no evidence
Carrillo had any interaction with Palacios or Mejia immediately prior to the
killing other than perhaps saying he was sorry. That is, there was no
evidence of any of provocation by Carrillo. (People v. Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th
at p. 1306 [“the victim must taunt the defendant or otherwise initiate the
provocation”].) Moreover, there was no evidence that Palacios was
intentionally seeking to kill Carrillo during a period of intense emotion as a
result of the provocation. (See People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 704,
708 [‘To establish voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory,
both provocation and heat of passion must be found”].)
18
Palacios claims that he was emotional because of Carrillo’s
alleged involvement in an armed robbery of his home. But according to Doe,
the alleged robbery occurred on October 31, 2012, so as the trial court
observed, there was a considerable lag time between the alleged fear and the
shooting that occurred on June 6, 2013. (See People v. Hach, supra, 176
Cal.App.4th at p. 1458 [if sufficient time elapsed for the passions of a
reasonable person to cool, then the killing was murder, not manslaughter].)
Palacios further argues the “evidence supports the possibility
that the killing occurred in a heat of passion, as this was the first possible
sighting by [Palacio and Mejia] of Carrillo after the terrifying home invasion
robbery.” But under well-established law, the defense of voluntary
manslaughter cannot be used as an excuse for revenge. (See People v. Hach,
supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458 [the killing must have occurred “‘“suddenly
as a response to the provocation, and not belatedly as revenge or
punishment”’”]; see also People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1254 [under
the objective element of the heat of passion theory, the “‘defendant is not
permitted to set up his own standard of conduct’”].)
To reiterate and conclude, we find that the trial court did not
commit an instructional error by failing to instruct the jury on the crime of
voluntary manslaughter (imperfect self-defense or heat of passion).
C. Prior Convictions for Impeachment
Palacios claims the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
the People to impeach Mejia with some of his prior convictions. We disagree.
Generally, witnesses may be impeached with prior felony convictions
involving moral turpitude conduct, and there is no indication that the court’s
ruling was somehow arbitrary or capricious.
19
In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review general
principles of law regarding the admission of prior convictions; 2) summarize
the trial court’s ruling; and 3) apply the law to the facts.
1. General Legal Principles
We review a trial court’s ruling to admit or excluded
impeachment evidence for abuse of discretion and will not disturb the ruling
“unless the trial court ‘exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’”
(People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 705.)
“A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) “Because the court’s discretion to
admit or exclude impeachment evidence ‘is as broad as necessary to deal with
the great variety of factual situations in which the issue arises’ [citation], a
reviewing court ordinarily will uphold the trial court’s exercise of discretion.”
(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 932.)
“For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may
be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment
that he has been convicted of a felony . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 788.) In a criminal
trial, ordinarily only felony convictions involving “moral turpitude” may be
used for impeachment. (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 174, 179.)
Moral turpitude offenses are “crimes in which dishonesty is an element (i.e.,
fraud, perjury, etc.).” (People v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 28.)
Generally, “all relevant evidence is admissible.” (Evid. Code,
§ 351.) Relevant evidence includes “evidence relevant to the credibility of a
witness.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) However, “[t]he court in its discretion may
20
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352, italics added.)
Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s “‘decision
will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its
judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”’” (People v. Superior Court
(Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978.)
2. Trial Court Proceedings
Prior to Mejia testifying, the trial court conducted a brief hearing
regarding the admissibility of his prior convictions. The prosecutor orally
reviewed the convictions from Mejia’s rap sheet. In 1998, there was a
conviction for false imprisonment. In 2002, there were two convictions for
rape by force, one conviction for assault with intent to commit rape, one
conviction for illegal sex with a minor, and one conviction for residential
burglary. In 2016, there was a conviction for murder with a firearm
enhancement, and with a lying-in-wait enhancement. The prosecutor said
that she did not want to bring in the 1998 conviction for false imprisonment,
or the 2002 conviction for statutory rape, but she did want to impeach Mejia
with the remainder of the crimes. The court clarified that the crimes were
felonies involving moral turpitude conduct.
The trial court asked Palacios’s counsel if he wished to be heard.
Counsel said, “I believe all the 2002 things are sex charges. I think they’re [a]
totally . . . different class of crime. I believe it would be highly prejudicial
because that just makes him out to be a bad guy. And I don’t think it’s
21
relevant for this. And it’s also remote in time. [¶] Admittedly, he was in
prison for a while, but he did discharge parole successfully. And he did not
commit those, you know, further. So I would think that these are only going
to be there to confuse the jury.” As far as the murder conviction, counsel said,
“I think it’s just too prejudicial, especially since I’m going to elicit that, yeah,
he fired guns and killed the guy. So I don’t know that that should come in,
the conviction part. The conduct is going to come in, obviously. I’m going to
ask about it.”
The trial court asked the prosecutor for a response. The
prosecutor argued that Mejia’s 2002 convictions were not remote in time. The
prosecutor said that Mejia “was released on parole in 2009, and was
discharged in 2012, and 9 months later, this murder happens.” The
prosecutor noted that as far as prejudice, the jury would be given a “limited
purpose instruction, and I think that would take care of any concern.” The
prosecutor argued that the purpose of impeachment is for the jury to
determine whether Mejia “is a credible person. So the fact that he is a
convicted murderer, that is moral turpitude, and I should be able to impeach
on that conviction. [¶] Additionally, I’m not asking to impeach on what we
call the stat rape offenses. I’m asking to impeach on the rape with force or
fear, which is a crime of violence. But I recognize that sex crimes are
prejudicial, but that doesn’t mean that . . . they’re more prejudicial than they
are probative when it comes to impeachment. [¶] And, obviously, this
witness’s testimony, his credibility is very important. And I think that the
jurors should have a full picture of who this individual is, as far as credibility
goes, and they can do with it what they wish.”
The trial court then ruled on the admission of Mejia’s prior
convictions for impeachment purposes:
22
“I agree with the People . . . . They’re not requesting the stat
rape. They’re requesting the rape being brought in. That is a crime of
violence. This is a crime of violence -- different kinds of crimes of violence, but
They’re violent in nature. So they’re not dissimilar in the sense they're
violent crimes. [¶] As far as being remote in time, they’re not. He was
convicted on April 30th of 2002. He’s in prison until 2009, then he’s
discharged in 2012 on parole. Then, literally nine months later, this is
committed. So he’s been in custody almost the entire time since 2002.
“The residential burglary . . . is a crime of moral turpitude. For
the Court to exclude [the 2002 convictions] is to provide an inaccurate picture
of [Mejia’s] criminal history. The jury has the right to decide whether or not
what he is saying is true. And without this information, it does provide an
incomplete picture. It’s probative because what he’s saying is going to have
some impact on the jury. They need to know what his history is so they can
decide for themselves what they believe. [¶] As far as the homicide goes, yes,
that’s a crime of moral turpitude. He was convicted of it, and they shouldn’t
be confused. He’s here. He’s in a jail suit. They’re going to wonder what
happened. And a jury is presumed to follow the instructions. The instructions
from the Court are going to be -- and I’ve already talked to them about this --
he’s presumed innocent, and the People have to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. That has nothing to do with the witness. That has to do
with your client. So it’s completely different.”
At the beginning of the People’s cross-examination of Mejia, the
prosecutor asked him to confirm the felony convictions that the trial court
had ruled were admissible for impeachment purposes.
23
3. Application and Analysis
“Any testifying witness can be impeached with evidence that he
or she suffered a prior conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude.”
(People v. Burton (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 129, 133.) In this case, there is no
dispute that Mejia’s prior felony convictions, which the court admitted into
evidence for impeachment purposes, all involved moral turpitude conduct.
“Exercises of discretion must be ‘“grounded in reasoned judgment
and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular
matter at issue.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1291.) Here, the
trial court was conversant with the appropriate legal principles regarding the
admission of prior felony convictions for purposes of impeachment. The court
appeared to listen attentively to the summary of Mejia’s prior felony
convictions. Indeed, the court asked questions to clarify that the convictions
were felonies that involved moral turpitude conduct.
The trial court further listened and considered the arguments of
both sides, and the court additionally responded to each of defense counsel’s
arguments regarding potential prejudice. The court then finally announced
its ruling regarding the probative value of Mejia’s prior convictions, which
appeared to be grounded in reasoned judgment. In other words, we find that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
On appeal, Palacios essentially repeats the same arguments he
made in the trial court. For instance, Palacios argues “the probative value of
Mejia’s prior convictions was slight.” He argues the admission of Mejia’s prior
convictions “completely and prejudicially undermine[d] his testimony to
Palacios’s detriment.” Finally, Palacios argues the admission of Mejia’s
murder conviction in particular “implicitly gave guidance to the Palacios’s
jury on how to convict him.”
24
But Palacios appears to misapprehend the role of this court. That
is, under an abuse of discretion standard of review, even if this court would
have ruled differently, and excluded all of Mejia’s prior felony convictions,
that does not establish a prejudicial evidentiary error by the trial court. (See
People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 978 [a trial court’s
“‘decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might
disagree’”].) We are simply not “‘“authorized nor warranted in substituting
[our] judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”’” (Ibid.)
To reiterate and conclude, Palacios does not argue in this appeal
that rape by force, assault with intent to commit rape, residential burglary,
and murder are not crimes involving moral turpitude. Thus, having found
that the trial court was not arbitrary or capricious (i.e., the court did not
abuse its discretion), we affirm the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.
D. Motion for In Camera Review of Officer’s Personnel Records
Palacios claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his Pitchess motion for an in camera review of an investigating
officer’s personnel records. We disagree. The motion did not present a
plausible factual basis for conducting an in camera review.
A trial court’s order on a Pitchess motion is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039 [a court has
broad discretion in ruling on a Pitchess motion, and its ruling will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion].)
In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review general
principles of law regarding Pitchess motions; 2) summarize the trial court
proceedings; and 3) analyze the law as applied to the facts.
25
1. General Legal Principles
A defendant’s motion to discover an officer’s personnel file that
purportedly contains information helpful to his or her defense, is commonly
called a Pitchess motion. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d. 531.) The Legislature
has largely codified Pitchess procedures. (Evid. Code, §§ 1043–1047.) If a
defendant establishes good cause, the trial court must screen the officer’s
personnel files for evidence that may be relevant to the defense. (People v.
Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1220.) “By providing that the trial court should
conduct an in camera review, the Legislature balanced the accused’s need for
disclosure of relevant information with the law enforcement officer’s
legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her personnel records.” (Ibid.)
A Pitchess motion “shall include all of the following: [¶] (1)
Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the
party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose
records are sought, the governmental agency that has custody and control of
the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or
disclosure shall be heard. [¶] (2) A description of the type of records or
information sought. [¶] (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or
disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter
involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the
governmental agency identified has the records or information from the
records.” (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b).)
“There is a ‘relatively low threshold’ for establishing the good
cause necessary to compel in camera review by the court.” (People v.
Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1316 (Thompson).) To establish good
cause, “defense counsel’s declaration in support of a Pitchess motion must
propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges” and articulate how the
26
discovery sought might be admissible or lead to relevant evidence. (Warrick v.
Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1024 (Warrick).)
The defense must present “a specific factual scenario of officer
misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents.”
(Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1025.) “A scenario sufficient to establish a
plausible factual foundation ‘is one that might or could have occurred. Such a
scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police
misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense
proposed to the charges.’” (Thompson, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316.)
2. Trial Court Proceedings
Prior to trial, Palacios filed a Pitchess motion requesting an in
camera review of: “Any investigations of misconduct or possible misconduct
of” Investigator Martin Alfaro. Palacios stated, in part: “This is a case where
the Investigator in question has intimidated witnesses to lie or ‘tell him what
he wants to hear,’ has lied on the witness stand in a previous trial, and has
threatened the defendant’ s family with arrest, with no legal basis to do so.
Declarations of a family member [Palacio’s sister] is attached, along with
court transcripts from the previous trial of the co-defendant in this case.”
The declaration of Palacios’s sister averred, in part, “I was
contacted by Investigator Alfaro several times during the course of this case.
He accused me of hiding the defendant and also accused me of knowing
where the defendant was hiding. He also threatened me with arrest for
simply refusing to talk to him.”
Attached to the motion were portions of various transcripts from
unidentified witnesses and undated proceedings. One such transcript appears
to be from a cross-examination of Investigator Alfaro. Apparently, Mejia’s
27
counsel asked Alfaro at his prior trial, “Okay. You at no time ever indicated
to [Palacios’s sister] anything about you wanting to arrest her?” Alfaro
responded, “I don’t recall. I left it open that this was still an active
investigation and that she might possibly be arrested. And if she did harbor
[Abram] Palacios, that she was going to get arrested.”
The sheriff’s department filed an opposition: “This motion . . . is
made against [Investigator Alfaro], for unfortunately an unknown situation
in what appears to be a 2013 Murder. However, like much of the Motion, this
is all guess work since no police reports and/or any case background was
provided.” The opposition argued that “there is nothing in Defendant’s motion
to indicate why it is valid as . . . the supporting declaration does not establish
the requisite good cause via a plausible factual foundation as to why it should
be heard and considered.” The opposition argued “there is no plausible
factual scenario set forth as to any of the claims and charges against [Alfaro].
The defendant is missing, omitting and . . . skipping many things.”
Palacios filed a reply, which included a supplemental 10-page
police report written by Investigator Alfaro. The report concerns the
investigation into Carrillo’s murder. The reply stated, in relevant part, “The
sheriff’s department can’t seem to figure out how the attached transcript is
related to this case. . . . And if it would have simply asked Investigator Alfaro
his involvement in the case, it could have easily determined that he was the
lead investigator on the case and interviewed many of the witnesses in this
case, including the fact that he re-interviewed some of the witnesses that his
fellow deputies had already interviewed. [¶] In addition, the sheriff’s counsel
complaint that there is no police reports [(sic)] attached to the motion can be
easily be clarified as the defendant is not alleging that the report is false per
se, but the Investigator in question left out some details that should have
28
been included. Just to be safe, the defendant attaches Alfaro’s supplemental
report that shows he had his hand in virtually every witness in this case.”
The trial court conducted a hearing. The court indicated it had
read the Pitchess motion, the opposition, and the reply. Sheriff's counsel
stated, “with all due respect to [Palacios’s] counsel, a lot of the things that he
says I can do, aren’t required of me.” Sheriff’s counsel argued that based on
“the four corners of the” motion, it was lacking details, the department was
not required to conduct an internal investigation based on the Pitchess
motion, and, “I don’t believe a plausible factual scenario of anything has been
established.”
After hearing further argument, the trial court ruled on the
motion. The court said that the threshold “is actually pretty low when it
comes to whether or not an in-camera review should be conducted.” The court
said that “the bottom line is the defense must . . . present a plausible factual
scenario as to why the potential records would be beneficial to the defense
case.” The court ruled: “This is one of those rare occasions where I would find
the defendant did not meet that threshold.”
The trial court further explained its ruling as follows:
“Number one the first scenario presented was that . . .
Investigator Alfaro had committed perjury or lied or made misleading
statements during the course of a prior jury trial related to the same case.
And, to be frank, as I read the excerpts . . . from the transcript, I couldn’t
figure out, quite honestly, . . . what exactly you were getting at. [¶] I agree . . .
that [the Pitchess motion] was jumbled, out of context, and it was almost
impossible to decipher what exactly you were pointing to.”
“Secondly, . . . it was argued that comments made by Investigator
Alfaro to a witness, who I don’t believe was even a percipient witness to the
29
alleged offense, may have somehow been intimidating by alerting that
particular witness to the fact that if she or he were harboring a fugitive that
they could be subject to prosecution. Interestingly, that’s basically what
the investigator testified to in the transcripts that were provided and that’s
basically what the witness said in the declaration; so there’s no inconsistency
there. So there’s nothing about that, that even if there were records that
somehow pertain to this in the personnel file that would assist in any
material way in the defense of the case. [¶] So on those grounds alone, the
defense has failed to meet the prima facie level necessary to show a plausible
factual scenario for the in-camera review.”
3. Application and Analysis
A Pitchess motion is properly denied if “it is not internally
consistent or complete.” (Thompson, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317, italics
added.) In Thompson, defendant was arrested for selling illegal narcotics to
an undercover officer who was “part of the narcotics ‘buy team’ of the Los
Angeles Police Department.” (Id. at p. 1315.) Defendant filed a Pitchess
motion seeking an in camera review of the personnel records and other
documents of several “officers and detectives who were involved in the drug
transaction.” (Id. at pp. 1315–1316.) A declaration by defendant’s counsel
asserted: “The charges ‘are a fabrication manufactured by the officers . . . .’”
(Id. at 1317.) The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that “the trial court could reasonably conclude that
[defendant] failed to show good cause for the requested discovery because he
did not present a specific factual scenario that is plausible when read in light
of the pertinent documents and undisputed circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1316.)
The Thompson court held that defendant’s Pitchess motion was
30
“insufficient because it is not internally consistent or complete. We do not
reject [the declaration] because it lacked credibility, but because it does not
present a factual account of the scope of the alleged police misconduct, and
does not explain his own actions in a manner that adequately supports his
defense.” (Thompson, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317.) “Most importantly
for the instant case, the defendant must ‘“establish a plausible factual
foundation”’ for its defense.” (Id. at p. 1316.) “Counsel’s declaration simply
denied the elements of the offense charged.” (Id. at p. 1317.)
In this case, similar to Thompson, we find that the trial court
could reasonably conclude that Palacios failed to provide a plausible factual
foundation for the in camera review of Investigator Alfaro’s personnel
records. As the trial court pointed out, counsel’s declaration did not “suggest
a plausible factual scenario that would lead to any assistance to the defense
should records be disclosed if they exist.” In our independent review of the
Pitchess motion and the supporting documents, we agree with the trial court’s
assessment “that it was jumbled, out of context, and it was almost impossible
to decipher what exactly [it was] pointing to.” That is, Palacios’s Pitchess
motion is “not internally consistent or complete.” (Thompson, supra, 141
Cal.App.4th at p. 1317, italics added.)
Presumably, Palacios’s motion was contending that Investigator
Alfaro had lied on the stand when he testified at Mejia’s trial. But the
declaration by Palacios’s sister was essentially consistent with Alfaro’s trial
testimony. Most importantly, Palacios did not establish in the Pitchess
motion how any of this would support his defense. It appears that Palacios’s
sister may have been suspected of harboring Palacios in the days after the
shooting. But we fail to see how this is relevant to his defense: that he was an
innocent bystander when Mejia shot and killed Carrillo.
31
Palacios argues in this appeal that the declaration by his sister
“satisfied the low threshold for good cause as it illustrated how the detective
treated potential witnesses, threatening them to get the answers he wanted.”
Palacios goes on to argue: “These observations created good cause for the
court to investigate further any other potential mistreatment of witnesses by
investigator Alfaro, particularly as he was the person who conducted the
unrecorded photo lineup with the main witness in the trial . . . to identify the
driver and passenger of the Honda . . . .”
To begin with, we fail to see how the trial court had an obligation
to conduct any kind of investigation. Further, the problem with this factual
argument, and other factual arguments that Palacios raises in this appeal, is
that he did not state them within the four corners of the Pitchess motion. (See
People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 739 [“We review the correctness of the
trial court’s ruling at the time it was made . . . and not by reference to
evidence produced at a later date”]; People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
513, 557, fn. 16 [“this court may consider only the evidence presented to the
trial court when the motion was heard”]; People v. Hernandez (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 417, 425 [defendant “is too late. We may assess the trial court’s
ruling only on the facts made known to it at the time it made that ruling”].)
In sum, Palacios had an obligation within the Pitchess motion to
demonstrate a plausible factual scenario. (See Thompson, supra, 141
Cal.App.4th at p. 1316.) After our own review of the Pitchess motion, we
agree with the trial court that he failed to do so.
Thus, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion and affirm
the denial of Palacios’s motion for an in camera review of an officer’s
personnel records. (See Alford v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1039
[a court has broad discretion in ruling on a Pitchess motion].)
32
E. Cumulative Prejudice
Palacios contends the cumulative prejudice of the alleged
foregoing errors compels reversal of his murder conviction. We disagree.
“In theory, the aggregate prejudice from several different errors
occurring at trial could require reversal even if no single error was prejudicial
by itself.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483, superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 728.) However,
the rejection of each of a defendant’s individual claims “cannot logically be
used to support a cumulative error claim [where] we have already found
there was no error to cumulate.” (In re Reno, at p. 483.)
Here, we found that the alleged errors claimed by Palacios are
not meritorious. Thus, there is no prejudice to cumulate.
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
33
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