CourtListener 10616995•L.T. v. B.P. CA1/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/25/25 L.T. v. B.P. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
L.T.,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A170977
v. (San Mateo County
B.P., Super. Ct. No. 24-FAM-
00157)
Defendant and
Appellant.
B.P. appeals from a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA;
Fam. Code,1 § 6200 et seq.) prohibiting him from contacting or
abusing his separated wife L.T., their children, and L.T.’s mother.
He concedes that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
findings but contends those findings do not justify the issuance of
a three-year DVRO. We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Because B.P. does not challenge the evidentiary basis for
the court’s findings or the credibility determinations on which the
1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Family Code.
1
trial court based its findings, we need not describe the conflicting
testimony in detail here. It suffices to summarize the incidents
that the court cited as justifying the DVRO.
L.T. met B.P. in July 2015. B.P. told her that he had a
mental health condition and was taking anti-psychotic
medication. In March 2017, after his doctor took him off his
medication, B.P. experienced psychosis again. One of B.P.’s
symptoms was a belief that L.T. was a Russian spy. To see
whether she was a spy, B.P. pressed on the site of an old injury in
L.T.’s neck to see if he could get it to hurt. L.T. told him he was
hurting her. B.P. said he did not believe her and left. He was
hospitalized and resumed taking his medication.
B.P. and L.T. married in May 2017. They have two
children, N.P. and E.P. After N.P. was born in September 2020,
B.P. began directing tirades of extreme aggression and
uncontrollable outbursts at L.T. These episodes would last for
hours. B.P. frequently called L.T. “fucking bitch” and “selfish
bitch,” as well as, less frequently, “lying bitch,” “whore,” and
“cunt.” The children were usually present during B.P.’s rants
when he would call L.T. these names. B.P. claimed the children
did not react, but L.T. testified that N.P. would cry hysterically.
B.P. engaged in the same tirades towards L.T.’s mother. In
July 2023, B.P. and L.T. went to visit L.T.’s mother, whose
husband had died. B.P. told L.T’s mother that he was glad her
husband had died and that her husband deserved what he got.
B.P. also called L.T.’s mother a bitch and a hag and said he would
be glad if she was gone. L.T. said the children would cry when he
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did this. B.P. admitted that he told L.T.’s mother that he hated
her in front of the children, but he claimed the children did not
react, just like when he would call L.T. names.
On New Year’s Eve in 2023, L.T. and her mother bought a
confetti popper at Walmart to celebrate. N.P. and E.P. stayed by
the front porch while L.T. went out in the front yard. L.T.
twisted the popper and it threw out confetti. B.P. rushed up and
took N.P. away, telling L.T. she was endangering N.P. with a
bomb. B.P. accused L.T. that same evening of indoctrinating N.P.
into drinking culture by letting him toast with sparkling water.
L.T. believed B.P. was slipping into an alternate reality, like he
had during his psychotic episode in 2017. She was afraid that
anything she might do or say would set him off on a rant. She
was also afraid for her safety and that of the children if B.P. were
to hallucinate that L.T. intended to harm him or the children.
In January 2024, L.T. asked B.P. to make a smoothie with
bananas and kiwis for three-year-old N.P. B.P. said they did not
have any kiwis, but L.T. said they did. B.P. told N.P., “Mommy’s
lying to you,” and, “Mommy’s trying to manipulate you.” N.P.
insisted on checking the fridge and showed B.P. kiwis in the
fridge. B.P. told N.P. the kiwis were rotten and yucky and said,
“Mommy’s trying to make you sick.” N.P. screamed at B.P. that
the kiwis were not rotten and showed him they were still good.
L.T. came and told B.P. he could use the kiwis, which were still
good and were where L.T. had said they were. B.P. then went off
on a two-hour rant, accusing L.T. of trying to manipulate him
and calling her a “whore,” a “lying bitch,” and a “manipulative
3
bitch.” B.P. told N.P., “[I] can’t wait for us to be rid of mommy so
she isn’t in our lives any more, and she can’t do this to us any
more.” He also said that he was going to buy a place at Lake
Tahoe for just him and N.P., where they could spend time
together alone.
L.T. was particularly concerned about B.P.’s inappropriate
attachment to and interactions with N.P. During a September
2023 video call with B.P. and N.P. while L.T. was away on a trip,
N.P. was naked from the waist down as part of a toilet training
regimen. During the 20-minute call, N.P. pushed his genitals
against B.P.’s face and mouth about one hundred times, while
both he and B.P. laughed. L.T. was concerned because B.P. did
not stop the behavior and just sat there laughing and grinning.
L.T. was not alleging in the DVRO proceedings that B.P. sexually
abused N.P. or E.P. because she had no proof, but she
nonetheless was afraid for N.P.’s safety after the call.
L.T. was also concerned about other ways in which B.P.
interacted with N.P. more intimately and intensively than she
believed a father should. B.P. would lie on top of N.P. in N.P.’s
bed to brush N.P.’s teeth. B.P. would spoon N.P. in bed for hours
until L.T. woke up B.P. and told him to sleep in a separate bed.
And just before L.T. filed her petition for a restraining order, B.P.
had started holding N.P. on his lap during dinner and kissing
him up and down the sides of his neck. To L.T., it looked very
intimate, the way someone would kiss a partner, and B.P. refused
to stop when she asked.
4
In January 2024, L.T. filed a request for a DVRO protecting
herself, the children, and her mother from B.P. She filed for
divorce at the same time. The trial court granted a temporary
restraining order the next day. B.P. filed his own request for a
DVRO against L.T. in March 2024. B.P. alleged that L.T.
engaged in aggressive and degrading verbal and emotional abuse
of him in the presence of the children. He claimed that L.T. had
called him a “ ‘fucking asshole,’ ” “ ‘piece of shit,’ ” “ ‘worthless,’ ”
and “ ‘psychotic.’ ” He also alleged that she told the children their
marital problems were because B.P. was mentally ill.
The court heard testimony on four different dates in March
and May 2024. L.T. asked the court to make the temporary
restraining order permanent because of her experiences over the
course of eight years of increasing hostility and volatility from
B.P. and his hallucinations. She believed B.P was teetering on
the edge of reality, and she feared for her safety and that of her
children. She provided copies of text messages with B.P.’s
mother in which L.T. raised her concerns about B.P.’s behavior,
including B.P.’s treatment of L.T.’s mother, but B.P.’s mother did
not meaningfully respond to L.T.’s concerns.
B.P. and L.T. both testified at the hearings, as did L.T.’s
mother, B.P.’s mother, B.P.’s psychiatrist, and B.P.’s supervisor
at the law firm where he was a partner. Regarding B.P.’s
petition, B.P. testified that L.T. called him names frequently,
perhaps daily. B.P. provided chat and text records in which she
called him and other people names. L.T. acknowledged calling
B.P. names in the chats and texts. She explained that during
5
B.P.’s tirades, he would interrupt and talk over her, so she would
retreat to texts and chats where she could be braver. She
testified that she did not call him names in front of the children.
The trial court granted L.T.’s request and denied B.P.’s.
The court found L.T.’s mother to be credible, particularly about
B.P.’s comments after her husband died. The court also credited
L.T.’s testimony about the same event, which the court found
would disturb L.T.’s peace.
The court found B.P.’s mother was biased in favor of B.P.
and was advocating for him during the proceedings.
The court found B.P.’s testimony to be evasive and not
credible overall. The court said it was curious that B.P. would
claim the children had no reaction when B.P. told L.T. that he
hated her. The court noted that California public policy
recognizes that conflict between parents in front of children
impacts the children.
L.T. was credible in the court’s opinion, especially about the
New Year’s Eve confetti popper and sparkling water incidents
and the smoothie incident. B.P.’s behavior during those incidents
disturbed L.T.’s peace, was abusive, and caused her fear. L.T.
also credibly described earlier abuse in the Russian spy incident,
where B.P. pushed on L.T.’s neck to cause her pain. The court
credited L.T.’s testimony about the video call in which N.P.
pushed his genitals into B.P.’s face and found B.P.’s behavior
disturbed L.T.’s peace. The court also found B.P. disturbed L.T.’s
peace when he lay down on top of N.P. to brush his teeth and
kissed N.P.’s neck in inappropriate ways.
6
The court disregarded as irrelevant the testimony of B.P.’s
psychiatrist and work supervisor.
Regarding B.P.’s DVRO request, the court found credible
L.T.’s explanation that she only used foul language over text
communications. The court found there was not a preponderance
of the evidence that L.T. disturbed B.P.’s peace. But to the extent
that she did, the court found the parties’ separation enabled B.P.
to seek resolution of the causes of the abuse. The trial court
therefore granted L.T.’s request for a restraining order but
reduced the length of the order from five years to three. The
restraining order, among other things, awarded L.T. sole custody
of the children and required B.P. to complete a batterer
intervention program.
DISCUSSION
“Under the DVPA, a court is authorized to issue a
protective order ‘ “ ‘to restrain any person for the purpose of
preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a
period of separation of the persons involved’ upon ‘reasonable
proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’ ” ’ [Citations.] Abuse includes
‘intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause
bodily injury’; ‘[s]exual assault’; ‘plac[ing] a person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or
to another’; and ‘engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or
could be enjoined’ under section 6320. (§ 6203, subd. (a).)
Behavior that may be enjoined under section 6320 relevant to
this appeal includes ‘disturbing the peace of the other party’
(§ 6320, subd. (a)), which ‘may be properly understood as conduct
7
that destroys [another’s] mental or emotional calm.’ [Citation.]
‘Thus, section 6320 provides that “the requisite abuse need not be
actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” ’ [Citation.]
“The DVPA vests the court with discretion to issue a
restraining order ‘simply on the basis of an affidavit showing past
abuse.’ [Citation.] The burden of proof is by a preponderance of
the evidence. [Citations.] The DVPA ‘confer[s] a discretion
designed to be exercised liberally, at least more liberally than a
trial court’s discretion to restrain civil harassment generally.’
[Citation.]
“We review the grant of a DVPA restraining order for abuse
of discretion, and, to the extent we are called upon to review the
court’s factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence
standard of review. [Citation.] In reviewing the evidence, we
examine the entire record to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support
the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We must accept as true all
evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, resolving every
conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We do not
determine credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If
substantial evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not
warranted even if facts exist that would support a contrary
finding.” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 11–12.) “An
abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling exceeds the bounds of
reason.” (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.)
B.P. recognizes that the trial court’s factual findings are
based on its credibility determinations, which are subject to
8
extremely deferential review. He therefore accepts the trial
court’s factual findings and argues mostly that those findings do
not support the trial court’s order.2 B.P. characterizes most of the
incidents and behaviors the trial court highlighted as mere
marital disagreements or differences in parenting styles and
contends that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the
DVRO based on them. We are not convinced.
The trial court found that B.P. committed abuse in the
Russian spy incident when he pushed on L.T.’s neck to
intentionally cause her pain, to determine whether she might be
a Russian spy. B.P. concedes that this incident would qualify as
abuse had it occurred recently, but he points out that it occurred
in 2017, before the parties’ marriage and seven years before the
DVRO proceeding.
In his opening brief, B.P. argued that section 3044,
subdivision (a) limits allegations of physical abuse to five years.
2 Despite generally arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion, B.P. suggests at one point that the trial court
committed legal error by issuing the DVRO based on non-abusive
behavior. He cites In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 106, 117, which held that a trial court’s “categorical
refusal to consider postfiling evidence . . . was legal error and
therefore constituted an abuse of the court’s discretion.” The trial
court here did not refuse to consider any evidence, so this
principle does not apply. B.P. also quotes from Eneaji v. Ubboe,
supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at page 1463 the familiar principle that
the question of whether a trial court understood the correct legal
standard and applied the proper criteria and legal assumptions is
subject to de novo review. B.P. does not argue that the trial court
erred in its statement of the legal standard and criteria, only that
it incorrectly concluded that the facts met the legal standard of
abuse.
9
This is incorrect. Section 3044, subdivision (a) states only that
there is a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to a
child’s best interest to award custody of the child to a party that
has perpetrated domestic violence against the other person
seeking custody within the previous five years. (See also id.,
subd. (c) [defining perpetration of domestic violence for these
purposes as including causing bodily injury and disturbing a
party’s peace].) This does not place a time limitation on acts of
abuse that can support a DVRO. To the contrary, as L.T. points
out, section 6301, subdivision (d) states that “[t]he length of time
since the most recent act of abuse is not, by itself, determinative”
and a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances
when considering a request for a DVRO. There is no bright line
cutoff for how recent an act of abuse must be to support a DVRO.3
In his reply brief, B.P. pivots and argues instead that it
cannot be the law that an isolated, premarital act of abuse seven
years earlier, which is explainable as a result of B.P.’s
psychiatrist tapering his anti-psychotic medication, can support a
DVRO in the context of a marital dissolution. But the incident
relates to L.T.’s current fear for her safety and that of the
children because B.P.’s more recent behavior made L.T.
concerned that B.P. was again experiencing psychosis. The trial
3 When the trial court ruled, this requirement was in
section 6301, subdivision (c). (Former § 6301, subd. (c), as
amended by Stats. 2015, ch. 303, § 150.) The Legislature
amended this statute effective January 1, 2025, and placed the
principle in subdivision (d), without substantive change. (See
Stats. 2024, ch. 652, § 2.)
10
court’s findings regarding B.P.’s behavior on New Year’s Eve
2023, when he accused L.T. of having a bomb by using a store-
bought confetti popper and placing the children at risk of
alcoholism by serving them sparkling water, buttress its finding
that L.T.’s fear was credible. So, too, does the smoothie incident,
in which B.P. denied that kiwis existed or were suitable for a
smoothie for N.P., and then launched into a lengthy tirade and
accused L.T. of manipulating him and the children when three-
year-old N.P. showed him the unspoiled kiwis and L.T. insisted
that he could make a smoothie with them. Taken together, the
totality of the circumstances surrounding these incidents
supports the trial court’s conclusion that L.T. was in fear for her
safety and her children’s safety based on her concern that B.P.
was slipping into an alternate reality.
B.P. asserts that his medical or mental health issues were
not the reason that L.T. sought a DVRO. Her counsel did say as
much in her closing argument. But her counsel was also clear
moments later that L.T. had genuine concerns about B.P.’s
perceptions of reality that caused her fear about his behavior. In
other words, the issue was not whether B.P. had been diagnosed
with a mental health condition, but whether his recent behavior,
however it might be characterized by a medical professional, was
placing L.T. in fear.
The trial court’s findings that B.P. disturbed L.T.’s peace
also support the DVRO. “[T]he plain meaning of the phrase
‘disturbing the peace of the other party’ in section 6320 may be
properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental or
11
emotional calm of the other party.” (In re Marriage of Nadkarni
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.) L.T., whose testimony the
trial court found credible, described B.P.’s record of increasingly
frequent, hours-long tirades against L.T. These outbursts would
last for hours and involved B.P. calling L.T. crude names,
including “fucking bitch,” “whore,” and “cunt” in front of the
children. N.P. would cry hysterically during B.P.’s rants. By any
reasonable definition, such behavior destroyed L.T.’s emotional
and mental calm.
B.P. compares this case to Curcio v. Pels, supra, 47
Cal.App.5th at page 13, which held a single private Facebook
post could not support a DVRO. He also cites K.L. v. R.H. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 965, 974, 981, which remarked that written
comments in a court-mandated, online coparenting
communication tool did not rise to the level of disturbing
someone’s peace. These comparisons are inapt. B.P.’s conduct
was much more extensive than a few stray comments, and B.P.
directed his behavior at L.T. and her mother in person and in
front of the children.
B.P.’s comments to L.T. during the smoothie episode
confirm this. B.P. dismisses the incident as a trivial dispute over
whether a kiwi was spoiled. And it is true that, if the dispute
over the kiwis was not indicative of B.P. possibly slipping into an
alternate reality, it was a simple household quarrel. But that
merely highlights why B.P.’s reaction was excessive and
disproportionate. The trial court was within its discretion to
conclude that B.P.’s two-hour tirade, complete with accusations of
12
manipulation and lying, profanity, and insults, based on a
disagreement about a breakfast smoothie for a three-year-old
child, was evidence of recent abuse in the form of disturbing
L.T.’s peace.
The same is true of the evidence regarding L.T.’s mother.
The trial court found both L.T. and her mother credibly testified
that B.P. told L.T.’s mother that he was glad her husband died
and that her husband got what he deserved. B.P. minimizes his
comment as a one-off statement to a mother-in-law that he did
not like. But he also called L.T.’s mother a “bitch” and a “hag,”
told her he hated her in front of the children, and said he would
be glad if she was gone. The trial court apparently mistakenly
believed that B.P. said he hated L.T. in front of the children. In
actuality, he said he hated L.T.’s mother and insulted L.T. with
names. But regardless of which person he directed each comment
to, the trial court reasonably disbelieved B.P.’s additional
testimony that the children did not react at all to hearing B.P.’s
harsh remarks to L.T. and her mother.
B.P. notes that L.T. did not accuse of him of sexual abuse of
N.P. and thus dismisses the trial court’s finding about N.P.’s
behavior in pushing his genitals on B.P.’s face during a video call.
He also characterizes as a “parental choice” or “playful behavior”
his other actions with N.P. that the trial court found disturbed
L.T.’s peace, which were brushing N.P.’s teeth while lying on top
of him and kissing N.P.’s neck inappropriately. Here, again,
accepting the trial court’s credibility determinations and factual
findings regarding these incidents, the trial court was within its
13
discretion to find the incidents supported its order. The trial
court observed the witnesses’ demeanor and could assess their
credibility in their differing descriptions of these incidents. It is
conceivable that one parent could view the tooth brushing or neck
kisses as benign differences in parenting styles. But another
parent could view them as more than that and see B.P.’s refusal
to desist from the behaviors as disturbing to the parent’s peace.
It was the trial court’s role to weigh the different witnesses’
credibility and determine which account was accurate, and B.P.
offers no basis to overturn that determination. This is especially
true of the video call. Even if it does not rise to the level of sexual
abuse, the trial court reasonably found it to be inappropriate and
disturbing to L.T.’s peace.
Moreover, even if any one of B.P.’s behaviors with N.P. or
his actions with L.T. would not on its own justify issuance of a
three-year DVRO in the context of a divorce, it would not matter.
The trial court was required to look at the totality of the
circumstances. Taking all of the incidents together, between the
somewhat dated instance of physical abuse against L.T., more
recent behavior raising genuine fears in L.T. about a recurrence
of physical abuse, hours-long rants and inappropriate comments
over trivial incidents, and B.P.’s unusual behaviors with N.P. and
refusal to desist from them, we cannot say the trial court abused
its discretion in issuing the DVRO.
Finally, B.P. contends the trial court abused its discretion
in denying his request for a DVRO while granting L.T.’s. He
points out that the trial court found that to the extent that L.T.’s
14
verbal abuse of B.P. in text communications disturbed B.P.’s
peace, a DVRO was unnecessary because the parties’ separation
provided a period of calm sufficient to allow them to resolve the
problem. He contends this was the correct ruling and then
questions why the trial court did not treat L.T.’s DVRO petition
the same way. The two parties’ conduct was not equivalent. The
trial court credited L.T.’s testimony that she only used foul
language against B.P. in text communications in response to
B.P.’s tirades. B.P.’s abuse of L.T. took place in person, and in
front of their children. It was not absurd or irrational for the
court to conclude that L.T. was entitled to judicial relief while
B.P. was not.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.
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