In re A.I.P. CA2/4

CourtListener 10615465Calctapp23.06.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/23/25 In re A.I.P. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.I.P. et al., Persons B335574
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03635A-E)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Dismissed.
David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________________
Mother, N.P., challenges the jurisdictional finding that the
juvenile court made under Welfare and Institutions Code section
300, subdivision (a),1 based on allegations that mother physically
abused one of her children. The court also found jurisdiction was
proper based on other allegations against mother, including
identical allegations of physical abuse under subdivisions (b) and
(j) of section 300, as well as additional allegations against father,
E.P. Mother does not challenge those jurisdictional findings. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of justiciability.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother is the parent of five children: A.I.P (born 2006),
B.P. (born 2009), Ar.P. (born 2012), J.P. (born 2012), and R.P.
(born 2022). Father, E.P., is the father of Ar.P., J.P., and R.P.
A.I.P. and B.P. have different biological fathers. None of the
fathers are parties to this appeal. We therefore focus on the facts
relevant to the issue raised by mother.
In September 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
that J.P. disclosed mother recently slapped J.P. while J.P. was
sleeping. Mother previously told the reporting party she would
slap J.P. “because the child tends to talk back to her.” J.P. also
disclosed that about three weeks before, father was upset with
J.P. and threw a water bottle at her that hit her in the eye.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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A social worker met with the family the following week.
J.P. told the social worker mother disciplined her by pulling her
hair, hitting her “on the face with an open hand,” and hitting her
with a belt. J.P. said the last time mother hit her was about a
week ago. Further, J.P. stated father hit her and threw things at
the children when he was upset at them.
Ar.P. told the social worker that mother disciplined the
children by turning off the Wi-Fi and taking away their
electronics. Ar.P. also said mother had hit the children with a
broom or shoes and had thrown things at them. A.I.P. said she
only saw mother slap J.P. once about a month ago. B.P. denied
ever seeing mother slap the children.
Mother said she slapped J.P. the week before because J.P.
“was talking back to [her].” Mother denied hitting the children
any other time. Toward the end of mother’s interview, father
took R.P. into his van, which was “parked in the middle of the
street,” and drove off with the child on his lap to a “next-door
laundromat parking lot.”
Father denied he or mother hit the children. However,
father admitted he threw a water bottle at Ar.P. and J.P., though
he did not intend to hurt them. Father further said mother was
“very upset with the children and [him] because the children are
telling people at the school and the social workers everything.”
Approximately two weeks after the interview, father tested
positive for methamphetamine. DCFS requested and was
granted a removal order removing the children from father. The
request was denied as to mother, and the children remained in
her care.
DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). The petition alleged the children

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were at risk due to mother’s physical abuse of J.P. (counts a-1, b-
1, and j-1), father’s physical abuse of J.P. and Ar.P. (counts a-2, a-
3, b-2, b-3, j-2, j-3), father’s substance abuse of methamphetamine
and marijuana (count b-4), mother’s failure to protect the
children from father’s physical abuse and substance abuse
(counts b-2, b-4, and j-2), and father driving R.P. in a vehicle
without a safety restraint seat (b-5 and j-4). The allegations
concerning mother’s physical abuse of J.P. in counts a-1, b-1, and
j-1 were identical.
A dependency investigator interviewed the family in
December 2023. As to the allegations of mother’s physical abuse
of J.P., A.I.P told the investigator, “‘[Mother] doesn’t hit them,
she yells at them. Well, she doesn’t hit them bad, once in a while;
she throws them a chankla (shoe), just to get them scared.’” (Sic.)
B.P. stated mother did not hit the children but only “‘slaps their
butt, or pulls their hair and screams at them.’” Ar.P. said mother
did not slap her or pull her hair. J.P. reported mother did not
slap her “on purpose” and only screamed at the children.
However, J.P. later said that “mother hit [J.P.] with her hand to
[J.P.’s] face” and that mother pulled the children’s hair “but only
once in [a] while.”
Mother acknowledged slapping J.P.’s face but said it was
“not hard.” Mother stated, “[J.P.] was screaming and would not
stop screaming, so I slapped her and told her to stop screaming.
Now she talks to me better.” Mother denied hitting the children
with a belt or pulling their hair. Father told the investigator, “I
have never seen [mother] slap J.P.’s face. Pull hair yes, I have
seen it. I have never seen her hit them with a belt. She has
asked me for the belt.” (Sic.)

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At the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained all
the allegations in the section 300 petition as pled. At the
disposition hearing, the court released the children to mother’s
care and removed them from father’s custody. Mother timely
appealed.
In July and August 2024, the juvenile court found the
conditions that justified the initial assumption of jurisdiction
under section 300 no longer existed and were not likely to exist if
supervision was withdrawn. The court terminated jurisdiction,
with mother retaining custody over the children.2

DISCUSSION
Mother argues substantial evidence did not support the
jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (a), based on
her physical abuse of J.P (count a-1). Mother does not challenge
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings against her made
under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), or the multiple
findings against father. DCFS contends mother does not raise a
justiciable issue, and the appeal should be dismissed. We
conclude mother’s contentions are not justiciable.
“Pursuant to the doctrine of justiciability, ‘“‘[a] judicial
tribunal ordinarily may consider and determine only an existing
controversy, and not a moot question or abstract proposition.’”’
[Citation.] Application of the doctrine of justiciability in the
dependency context leads to the conclusion that ‘[w]hen a
dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion
that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a
reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of

2 We grant mother’s request for judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s post-appeal orders terminating jurisdiction.

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jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for
jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by
substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need
not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory
grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’
[Citation.] This is true because no effective relief could be
granted in such a situation, as jurisdiction would be established
regardless of the appellate court’s conclusions with respect to any
such additional jurisdictional grounds.” (In re Madison S. (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328–329.)
Mother’s appeal is nonjusticiable because regardless of
whether we grant mother relief as to the count a-1 finding, the
juvenile court had jurisdiction over the children based on the
identical sustained findings under counts b-1 and j-1 (and the
findings as to father), which are not challenged on appeal. Thus,
even if mother were to prevail, we would not disturb the court’s
jurisdictional order. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283–284
(D.P.).) Furthermore, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction
and awarded mother custody of the children.
Mother asks us to exercise our discretion to consider the
merits of her challenge to the finding on count a-1. “Even when a
case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to
reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 282.) Our Supreme Court has provided a non-exhaustive list of
factors to be considered when deciding whether a court should
exercise discretionary review of a moot dependency appeal:
(1) “whether the challenged jurisdiction finding ‘could be
prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the
current or future dependency proceedings,’ or ‘“could have other
consequences for [the appellant] beyond jurisdiction”’” (Id. at

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p. 285); (2) “whether the jurisdictional finding is based on
particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct” (Id. at pp. 285–
286); and (3) “why the appeal became moot.” (Id. at p. 286.)
“[N]o single factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court
should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (Ibid.)
Mother contends discretionary review is appropriate
because she promptly complied with her case plan and the
outcome of her appeal “may impact [her] ability to obtain
employment” or “have far-reaching” effects in “future dependency
proceedings, if one were to be filed.” But mother does not identify
any specific consequences or prejudice she could suffer, nor does
she identify how the finding under count a-1 could impact her
ability to obtain employment. Any impact the challenged finding
may have in hypothetical future proceedings is too speculative for
us to exercise our discretion to consider the challenged finding.
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282; In re I.A. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494–1495, overruled in part on other grounds
by D.P., at p. 283.) This is particularly true because mother’s
conduct underlying the count a-1 finding was also the basis of the
count b-1 and j-1 findings she does not challenge. Consequently,
identical allegations concerning mother’s physical abuse of J.P.
would remain under counts b-1 and j-1, regardless of whether
mother successfully challenged the findings made as to count a-1.
Furthermore, mother has not demonstrated that the
challenged count is based on particularly stigmatizing conduct,
distinguishable from the findings she does not challenge, and she
does not offer any other reason to show discretionary review is
appropriate. While we commend mother for her compliance with
her case plan, this factor alone does not warrant reaching the

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merits of mother’s challenge. Accordingly, we decline to address
the merits of mother’s appeal.

DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as nonjusticiable.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, Acting P. J.

COLLINS, J.

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