People v. Guevara CA2/6

CourtListener 10613057Calctapp18.06.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/18/25 P. v. Guevara CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B336331
(Super. Ct. No. TA100162)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

JOSE MANUEL GUEVARA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Jose Manuel Guevara appeals following a Penal Code
section 1172.751 resentencing. He contends: (1) the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero); and (2)
the clerk’s minutes and abstract of judgment must be corrected to
accurately reflect the court’s oral pronouncement. We will order
correction of the minute order and abstract of judgment. We will
otherwise affirm the judgment.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In our prior unpublished opinion modifying appellant’s
credits and affirming the judgment in all other respects (People v.
Guevara (Apr. 25, 2000, B130432) [nonpub. opn.]), we
summarized the trial evidence as follows:2
“During an afternoon in October 1998, [appellant] jumped
over a stucco wall surrounding the yard and house owned by the
Hendersons. No one was at home and all doors, sliding glass
windows and gates were locked. Once in the yard, [appellant]
broke into an enclosed patio through a sliding glass door.
[Appellant] took a set of keys from inside the patio and
unsuccessfully tried to open doors to the house with the keys.
Then, [appellant] obtained gardening shears and pliers from the
patio and tried to pry open doors to the house. Some of
[appellant’s] actions were witnessed by neighbors who called the
police. The police arrived promptly and arrested [appellant] at
the scene. Prior to the arrest, officers witnessed some of
[appellant’s] efforts to pry open doors. There was considerable
damage to the house and grounds, including a broken lock on a
gate and four damaged doors.”
On March 1, 1999, a jury convicted appellant of first degree
residential burglary (§ 459). In a bifurcated proceeding, the court
found true a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), a serious felony
prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and eight prior convictions within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)). The court sentenced appellant to 30 years to life
in prison: 25 years to life on the burglary charge pursuant to the

2 Respondent requested judicial notice of the reporter’s

transcript in appellant’s direct appeal from his trial and
conviction, case number B130432. Appellant did not oppose the
request, and we grant it. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)

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Three Strikes law, plus five years for the serious felony prior.
The court stayed the one-year term for the section 667.5,
subdivision (b) prison prior. The court imposed a restitution fine
of $10,000 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a stayed parole revocation
fine in the same amount (§ 1202.45).
On December 11, 2023, the trial court conducted a
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. The court denied
appellant’s Romero motion to strike the prior strikes. The court
struck the invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) prison prior, as
well as the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) five-year serious felony
prior. Accordingly, the court resentenced appellant to 25 years to
life. The court made no statements regarding fines.
DISCUSSION
Alleged Abuse of Discretion
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his Romero motion. We disagree.
Courts deciding Romero motions “‘must consider whether,
in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies
and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or
in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not
previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.’” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377
(Carmony).) We review Romero motion denials for abuse of
discretion. (Id. at p. 376.)
Such abuse of discretion occurs in limited circumstances—
for example, “where the trial court is not aware of its discretion
[to dismiss or strike under section 1385]; where [it] considers
impermissible factors; or where applying the Three Strikes law
would produce an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd result

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under the specific facts of a particular case.” (People v. Dryden
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029.) “The [trial] court is presumed
to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an
affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 305, 310.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Appellant
suffered eight strike prior convictions—two attempted residential
burglaries, two residential burglaries, and four residential
robberies. For one offense, appellant admitted personal use of a
knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)). Although appellant was 21 years old
when he committed the offenses in a short spree, these
circumstances do not place appellant outside the Three Strikes
scheme’s spirit, especially given his continuous criminal conduct.
Approximately seven months after receiving parole in his prior
case, a 29-year-old appellant committed the current case’s
burglary. Even considering appellant’s educational and
rehabilitative efforts, his is not the “extraordinary case” in which
failure to strike constitutes abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
Restitution and Parole Revocation Fines
Appellant contends the minute order and abstract of
judgment contain a $10,000 restitution fine and a $10,000
suspended parole revocation fine (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b); 1202.45)
that were not part of the court’s oral pronouncement. Appellant
argues those fines as “reflected on those documents must be
stricken.” Respondent agrees, as do we.
“When there is a discrepancy between the oral
pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract
of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Walz
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1367, fn. 3.) Here, the minute order
and abstract of judgment list $10,000 restitution and parole

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revocation fines (the latter stayed or suspended), but the court
was silent as to both fines at appellant’s resentencing. “Given
the prosecution’s lack of objection, any claim of error would be
forfeited.” (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 244; see
also People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027.)
Therefore, we will order the court to correct the minute order and
abstract of judgment by striking the fines.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is ordered to correct the minute order and
abstract of judgment for the December 11, 2023 resentencing by
striking the restitution and parole revocation fines (§§ 1202.4,
subd. (b); 1202.45). The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

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Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________

William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Scott A.
Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

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