CourtListener 10606793•People v. Ignacio CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/17/25 P. v. Ignacio CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B329097
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA040038)
v.
ERIC RUBIO IGNACIO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Eric Rubio Ignacio appeals from an order denying his
petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6
(former section 1170.95).1 This is Ignacio’s second appeal from a
denial of his resentencing petition after an evidentiary hearing.
In his first appeal, Ignacio argued substantial evidence did not
support the superior court’s finding that the prosecution met its
burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner
is guilty of murder . . . under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 and 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Although this Court determined the evidence at the
evidentiary hearing was sufficient to support the superior court’s
order, we reversed due to then-recent legislative amendments
which, among other things, limited a court’s consideration of a
prior appellate opinion to “the procedural history of the case
recited.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292.) Because the court relied on the factual
statement in the prior appellate opinion, we remanded for a new
evidentiary hearing to conform to the amendment. On remand,
the court held another evidentiary hearing and denied Ignacio’s
petition. In his second appeal, Ignacio again argues the evidence
was insufficient to support the superior court’s finding he was not
entitled for relief under section 1172.6. He alternately requests
we remand for a third evidentiary hearing for the court to
consider the impact of his youth on his mental state at the time of
the offense. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1997, Anthony Boissiere was shot and killed at a house
party in the City of Azusa. At the time, Ignacio was a member of
a street gang called Azusa 13 along with Paul Ortiz, Gabriel
Centeno, and Victor Blas. Boissiere was not a member of any
gang. Ignacio, Ortiz, Centeno, and Blas (collectively, defendants)
were charged with Boissiere’s murder. Ortiz later admitted he
was the shooter.
A. Underlying Crime
On July 18, 1997, Blas drove the defendants to a house
party in a tan Buick Regal. Boissiere also attended the party
with his friend Moses Alcala, Angelica Ramirez (Alcala’s
girlfriend), and another friend. Alcala had known each of the
defendants for a year or more. When Alcala saw the defendants
arrive, he told Boissiere and gave him a baseball hat to help him
avoid being seen by the defendants. Alcala did this because he
knew Boissiere fought with an Azusa 13 member named Nick
Jaramillo two weeks before the party. Additionally, Jaramillo
and Ignacio chased Boissiere down the street near Alcala’s home
a few hours after that fight. Alcala believed the defendants
would retaliate against Boissiere.
Towards the end of the night, a fight broke out in a
treehouse in the backyard. Alcala saw someone jump from the
treehouse onto the roof of the house. Everyone headed to the
front yard, including Alcala and Ramirez. As they stood in the
front yard, Alcala and Ramirez observed Boissiere walking and
speaking with Blas. Suddenly, Blas and Boissiere began to fight.
Alcala saw Ignacio and either Ortiz or Centeno go to the tan
3
Buick Regal, open the passenger door, look for something, and
retrieve it. He then watched Ignacio, Ortiz, and Centeno
approach Boissiere and Blas, who were still fighting, and they all
“jump[ed]” and “ganged up” on Boissiere. Alcala saw Boissiere
fall to the ground and heard approximately five gunshots. Alcala
saw the defendants drive off in the Buick. When he and his
girlfriend returned to where Boissiere lay, someone was
performing CPR on him.
Ramirez corroborated Alcala’s testimony. At trial, she
stated she observed two of the defendants go to the Buick and
appear to retrieve something. She could not identify which of the
defendants went to the Buick but testified both defendants had
their hands in their pockets when they joined the fight. Ramirez
heard at least three gunshots shortly thereafter. Patrick Glen
Nordin, the organizer of the house party, testified at trial he
heard four to five gunshots shortly after he heard the Buick’s
door slam. Nordin saw the Buick drive away but could not
identify anyone in the car.
Boissiere died from his gunshot wounds. The police
retrieved two expended bullets and six .25-caliber semiautomatic
expended cartridges from the scene of the crime.
B. Trial and Sentencing
The defendants were each charged with Boissiere’s murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)). The information alleged that a principal was
armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(l)) and that the offense
was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in
association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(l)).
The information also alleged one count of dissuading a witness
(§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)) against Ortiz with an attendant gang
4
enhancement allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The defendants
were tried together.
The People presented testimony and evidence as described
above. At trial, Alcala also testified that Ortiz approached him
after he testified at the preliminary hearing. Ortiz asked Alcala
if he was going to be a witness and whether Alcala knew who
pulled the trigger. When Alcala confirmed he would testify but
that he did not know who the shooter was, Ortiz responded,
“Good. Keep it that way and don’t go back to court anymore.”
The prosecution proceeded on the theory that a principal
armed with a gun committed the murder. The prosecution
argued each of the defendants was liable for Boissiere’s murder
either because each defendant directly aided and abetted the
principal in committing the murder, or each defendant aided and
abetted in committing the assault and the murder was the
natural and probable consequence of that assault.
The jury found Ignacio guilty of second degree murder and
found true the firearm and gang enhancement allegations. The
trial court sentenced Ignacio to a term of 15 years to life plus one
year for the firearm enhancement. This Court affirmed the
judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Ignacio (Feb. 7,
2000, B125562) [nonpub. opn.].)
C. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
On February 6, 2019, Ignacio filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95. The superior
court concluded that because the jury was instructed on the
natural and probable consequences theory of murder and the
direct aider and abettor theory, and because the record did not
disclose which theory the jury relied upon in reaching its verdict,
5
Ignacio had shown a prima facie case for relief. The court
appointed counsel and issued an order to show cause.
In addition to the trial transcripts and the record of
conviction, the parties offered new testimony from Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department Detective Tommy Harris and also
from Ortiz. Detective Harris testified regarding Alcala’s
statements in a police interview shortly after the shooting.
Alcala told Harris’s partner that Ignacio, whom Alcala knew and
recognized, and another defendant ran to the Buick, obtained
something, and ran to the fight. Alcala then heard three or four
gunshots.
Ortiz had not testified at trial. But at the evidentiary
hearing Ortiz confessed he shot Boissiere on impulse. He
explained he was under the influence of methamphetamine and
alcohol on the night of the murder and had not slept in three
weeks. Ortiz testified he obtained the gun from another Azusa 13
gang member before going to the party with the defendants. He
kept it in his pocket and did not show the gun to Ignacio or any
other defendant.
Ortiz testified that while on his way to buy beer, he heard
someone yelling in the treehouse and believed the person was
disrespecting him and Azusa 13. Ortiz climbed into the
treehouse and punched the person, who jumped out of the
treehouse. When Ortiz climbed down, he encountered a “loud
talker” and pulled out the gun. He put the gun away when he
was informed the loud talker was the cousin of another Azusa 13
member. Initially, Ortiz testified “Chino” told him this
information. Ortiz confirmed Ignacio’s gang moniker is Chino.
Upon further questioning by defense counsel, Ortiz stated it was
Centeno who told him the identity of the “loud talker.”
6
Ortiz testified he decided to leave when he heard someone
say, “call the cops” because he had just punched someone and had
a gun. He went to the Buick to wait for the other defendants.
Only Ignacio came back. Ortiz and Ignacio left the car to look for
the others. When he encountered Blas fighting, Ortiz shot the
person fighting with Blas because his “training in a gang fight
[was] . . . you protect [a fellow gang member].” He only later
discovered he shot Boissiere. Ortiz believed Ignacio was behind
him when they approached the combatants. After the shooting,
the defendants all ran to the Buick and left the party.
After considering the evidence from the trial, the new
testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and counsel’s arguments,
the superior court denied Ignacio’s petition. It found Ortiz was
truthful in certain parts of his testimony but “absolutely
untruthful in other parts.” The court found Alcala’s testimony
that the four defendants participated in beating Boissiere more
credible than Ortiz’s account. The court concluded, “the clear
evidence [is] that Mr. Ignacio participated in the assault of the
incident; that during the course of the assault, he and Mr. Ortiz
went to the car, returned to the fight, shot the decedent.” Ignacio
timely appealed.
This Court determined the evidence at the evidentiary
hearing was sufficient to support the superior court’s order
denying the petition, but reversed due to then-recent legislative
amendments to the resentencing statute. This Court concluded
the Legislature amended section 1172.6 to render inadmissible
“the factual summary and the factual conclusion found in an
appellate opinion.” (People v. Ignacio (May 16, 2022, B311152)
[nonpub. opn.].) Instead, consideration of a prior appellate
opinion at the evidentiary stage was limited to the procedural
7
history of the case. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The record
disclosed the superior court “relied heavily, if not exclusively” on
the facts stated in the appellate opinion addressing Ignacio’s
direct appeal. (People v. Ignacio, supra, B311152, *39.) The
Court concluded the amendment to section 1172.6 applied
retroactively to Ignacio’s case and remanded the matter for a new
evidentiary hearing to comply with the amended statute. (See
ibid.)
On remand, the superior court conducted a second
evidentiary hearing on December 6, 2022. The parties did not
present any new evidence and submitted on the record of
conviction, as well as the testimony presented at the previous
evidentiary hearing. After taking the matter under submission,
the court issued a two-page written opinion. The court stated it
relied on the trial testimony and Ortiz’s testimony. It further
stated it did not consider Detective Harris’s testimony or the
Court of Appeal opinion. The superior court found Ignacio was
not entitled to relief because the prosecution proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ignacio was guilty of second degree murder
as an aider and abettor under California law as amended by
Senate Bill No. 1437. It concluded Ignacio was thus ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6. Beyond these determinations, it did
not otherwise explain its ruling as it did after the previous
evidentiary hearing.
Ignacio timely appealed.
8
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6 and Standard of Review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
significantly limited the scope of the felony murder rule by
amending sections 188 and 189. (See People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 984 (Reyes); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing
malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). (See People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448
(Curiel); People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869.) Felony
murder is not at issue in this case.
“‘[N]otwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of
natural and probable consequences liability for second degree
murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to
aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the
person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of
another and acts with conscious disregard for life.’” (Reyes,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 990; accord, People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 850.) “‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on
the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and
abettor’s own mens rea. [Citation.] In the context of implied
malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the
commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and
abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding
9
the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for
an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by
words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act,
not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be
personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge
that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the
perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act
is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for
human life.’”2 (Reyes, at pp. 990-991; accord, Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 463; People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689,
712-713 (Powell).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 provides a procedure in section 1172.6
for an individual convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences theory to petition the
sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on
any remaining counts if the individual could not have been
convicted of murder under the changes to sections 188 and 189.
(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) Where, as here, the
petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing he is entitled
to relief under section 1172.6, the superior court must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the
2 In contrast, “‘the natural and probable consequences
doctrine did not require that the aider and abettor intend to aid
the perpetrator in committing a life-endangering act . . . . What
was natural and probable was judged by an objective standard
and it was enough that murder was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the crime aided and abetted.’” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 991.)
10
petitioner on any remaining counts. (See § 1172.6, subds. (c),
(d)(1).)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), provides that at the
evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of evidence in the
hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the
court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
noticed. . . . The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new
or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
We review the superior court’s decision to deny the petition
after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence, provided
the court understood the elements of the offense and applied the
proper standard and burden of proof. (See Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 988; People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943,
951.) “In conducting our review, we consider the whole record in
the light most favorable to the superior court’s findings [citation],
and we presume ‘“‘every fact in support of the judgment the trier
of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence.’”’”
(People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066; accord,
People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270.) “‘The same
standard governs in cases where the prosecution relies primarily
on circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] We must ‘presume, in
support of the judgment, the existence of every fact the trier of
fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence, whether direct or
11
circumstantial.’” (Montanez, at p. 271.) In conducting this
review, we resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary
conflicts. (See ibid.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
Finding Ignacio Aided and Abetted Second Degree Murder
Ignacio contends there is insufficient evidence in the record
to support the superior court’s denial of his petition. According to
Ignacio, the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt he
harbored express or implied malice, a finding necessary for
murder under the changes to sections 188 and 189. (See Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448.) As to express malice, he contends
there is no evidence he knew Ortiz had the intent to kill or that
he shared that intent. As to implied malice, Ignacio argues the
evidence did not demonstrate he knew of or intended to aid Ortiz
in a shooting, knowing the shooting was dangerous to human life,
and that he acted in conscious disregard for human life. We
conclude substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
implied finding Ignacio committed the acts required and
harbored the requisite mental state for aiding and abetting
implied malice murder.3 We therefore need not address whether
he also harbored express malice.
3 Although the superior court made no express findings
regarding the credibility of witnesses or disputed facts as it did
after the first evidentiary hearing, “‘[w]e imply all findings
necessary to support the judgment, and our review is limited to
whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support
these implied findings.’” (People v. Francis (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th
873, 878.)
12
To aid and abet an implied malice murder, the defendant
must by words or conduct aid the perpetrator’s commission of the
life-endangering act and must know and intend to aid in that act.
(See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990-991; Powell, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 713-714.) “For implied malice murder, that
intent is that the perpetrator ‘“knows that his conduct endangers
the life of another and . . . acts with conscious disregard for life.”’”
(People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1058.)
People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 443 is
instructive. There, the defendant was one of eight gang members
who beat the victim to death because they believed the victim had
complained to law enforcement about them. One hit the victim
with a baseball bat, another with a shovel, and a third stabbed
him. The court found the defendant participated in the attack
with his fists and feet. (See id. at p. 440.) The superior court
denied the defendant’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. (See id. at p. 442.) Schell affirmed and concluded
that the defendant’s “presence at the scene, his participation in
the attack on the victim, his companionship with other
perpetrators, his conduct before and after the crimes, and his
motive of retaliation for disrespect all support the finding that he
aided and abetted an implied malice murder.” (Id. at p. 443.)
Schell reasoned, “‘It suffices that he knew he was aiding in a
violent attack, knew dangerous weapons were being used against
[the victim], and intended to stop [the victim] from escaping or
defending himself by helping the perpetrators to surround and
hit him.’” (Ibid.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
finding that Ignacio aided and abetted an implied malice murder.
Like the defendant in Schell, Ignacio attacked Boissiere as part of
13
a group of gang members who sought to retaliate against
Boissiere for disrespecting and fighting with another Azusa 13
member. When Ignacio and Ortiz came across Blas, their fellow
Azusa 13 member, fighting with Boissiere, Ignacio did not
immediately join in the fight but accompanied Ortiz to retrieve
something from the car. He then returned to the fight with Ortiz
and participated in beating Boissiere to the ground before Ortiz
shot him.
Substantial evidence also supports the superior court’s
implied finding that Ignacio and Ortiz retrieved a gun from the
car because the shooting occurred almost immediately after they
returned. The court could also have reasonably concluded
Ignacio knew Ortiz was bringing a gun to a fistfight because he
was there when Ortiz retrieved the gun. Because Ignacio
accompanied Ortiz back to the fight after Ortiz retrieved the gun,
the court could reasonably have found Ignacio demonstrated an
intent to aid Ortiz in the shooting.
Further, the superior court also had before it testimony
from Ortiz (from the evidentiary hearing) and the prosecution’s
gang expert (from the trial) regarding the obligation a gang
member has to protect a fellow gang member in a fight and to
retaliate against the other person. The expert testified such
retaliation may include “simple beatings and then all the way up
to murder.” Ortiz stated he shot Boissiere because his “training
in a gang fight” was to protect a fellow gang member. The high
court has held that shooting a gun at someone is dangerous to
life. (See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992 [life-endangering acts
include shooting at a victim].) As in Schell, it is sufficient that
Ignacio knew he was aiding in a violent attack, knew a firearm
would be used against Boissiere, and stopped Boissiere from
14
escaping or defending himself by helping the defendants to knock
him to the ground. (See Schell, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 443.)
Ignacio contends it is speculative to conclude he knew
about Ortiz’s gun or “that Ignacio knew and shared in Ortiz’s
rashly committed act.”4 “Because direct evidence of a defendant’s
intent rarely exists, intent may be inferred from the
circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s acts.” (People v.
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 457.) As stated, the evidence
before the superior court allowed it to reasonably conclude
Ignacio knew Ortiz retrieved a gun from the car and intended to
use it. By returning to the fight with Ortiz, Ignacio demonstrated
his intent to aid in Ortiz’s life-endangering act of shooting at
Boissiere.
Ignacio argues there was no evidence of his or of Ortiz’s
intent to kill. But, “[i]mplied malice does not require an intent to
kill.” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653, 142;
People v. Lee (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254, 263-264.) On this
record, substantial evidence supports the court’s denial of
Ignacio’s petition on the ground he could still be convicted of
aiding and abetting second degree implied malice murder.
4 Ignacio further contends the People’s remaining substantial
evidence arguments are speculative, such as the argument that
Ignacio aided the shooting by preventing anyone from interfering
when there was no evidence anyone interfered or tried to
interfere. We do not rely on the People’s substantial evidence
arguments.
15
C. Ignacio Forfeited His Argument the Superior Court Did Not
Consider Youth as a Factor in His Mental State
For the first time on appeal, Ignacio argues he is entitled to
have the court to consider his youth as a factor in determining
whether he harbored implied or express malice. Ignacio had just
turned 18 years old at the time of the offense. He relies on the
absence of any mention of his youth in the court’s order and on
cases holding that the “‘hallmark features’ of youth” may be
relevant to consideration of a defendant’s mental state. (People v.
Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 418 (Pittman); see People v.
Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 987; In re Moore (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454.) Ignacio did not raise this argument in
the superior court, and it is forfeited. (See Pittman, at p. 416.)
Further, Ignacio does not cite anything in the record before
us that would support his contention. (See People v. Dougherty
(1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282-283 [failure to cite record forfeits
issue on appeal].) Ignacio fails to provide any facts and record
citations that would support his argument that his youth affected
whether he harbored the requisite mental state for implied
malice murder. (See Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 418
[“The cases discussing the role of youth in relation to criminal
culpability ‘stress two areas’: youthful offenders’ ‘relative
impulsivity’ and ‘their vulnerability to peer pressure.’”]; ibid.
[concluding the “‘“hallmark features of youth’” may have been at
play” given specific circumstances of the crime]; but see People v.
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 595 [“Youth can distort risk
calculations. Yet every 18 year old understands bullet wounds
require attention. The fact of youth cannot overwhelm all other
factors.”].) “[O]ur review is limited to those issues that have been
adequately raised and supported in the appellant’s brief” and “it
16
is not the appellate court’s role to construct theories or
arguments” for an appellant. (Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
705, 721; see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellate
brief must “support each point by argument and, if possible, by
citation of authority”], and 8.360(a) [briefs in criminal appeals
must comply with rule 8.204].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Ignacio’s petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6 is affirmed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
FEUER, J.
17
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.