People v. Murray CA2/8

CourtListener 10601791Calctapp10.06.2025

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Filed 6/10/25 P. v. Murray CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B334698

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA152697)
v.

DEONTE LEE MURRAY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Jason Tran and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Deonte Lee Murray appeals from his judgment of
conviction of multiple counts of attempted murder and other
crimes arising out of his commission of three separate shootings.
The victims of the shootings were an acquaintance of Murray, a
man whom Murray mistakenly believed was an undercover law
enforcement officer, and two sheriff’s deputies who were sitting in
their patrol vehicle. On appeal, Murray argues: (1) this court
should conduct an independent review of sealed transcripts for
discoverable material under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974)
11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess); (2) the trial court erred in admitting the
preliminary hearing testimony of one of the victims; (3) the
prosecution failed to timely disclose certain discovery to the
defense; (4) the prosecution committed prejudicial misconduct;
(5) there were two instances of prejudicial juror misconduct;
(6) Murray was improperly convicted of four separate counts of
possession of a firearm by a felon; (7) the sentence imposed on
each count of possession of a firearm by a felon should be stayed
under Penal Code1 section 654; and (8) assessments that were
not orally pronounced by the trial court must be stricken.
We conclude that two of the four convictions for possession
of a firearm by a felon must be reversed because the evidence
showed that Murray continuously possessed only two firearms
during the period of time covering the crimes in this case.
We also conclude that the trial court must impose certain
mandatory assessments on remand. We reject all of Murray’s
remaining arguments on appeal. We accordingly reverse the

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

2
convictions in counts 9 and 11 and remand for resentencing.
In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Charges
In an information, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office charged Murray with one count of carjacking
(§ 215, subd. (a); count 1), one count of second degree robbery
(§ 211; count 2), one count of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 3), three counts of attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 6, 7 & 10), and four counts
of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts
5, 8, 9, & 11). The information alleged that the attempted
murder offenses in counts 6 and 7 were willful, deliberate, and
premeditated, and committed against peace officers engaged in
their performance of their duties (§ 664, subds. (e)–(f)).
The information also alleged multiple firearm enhancements
(§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)), a great-bodily-
injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), a prior conviction for a
serious or violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d), 1170.12,
subd. (b)), and numerous aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)–(b)).
2. Prosecution evidence
2.1. Carjacking, robbery, and shooting of Andrew
Harris (counts 1–3, 5)
On September 1, 2020, Andrew Harris drove his black
Mercedes to Bradford Avenue in the city of Compton, and parked
it on the street. After Harris got out of his car, he was
approached by a group of men that included Murray, whom
Harris had known for years. The men exchanged “fighting
words,” and Murray threatened to shoot Harris. As Harris

3
started to leave, Murray walked up a driveway and returned with
a rifle. Murray told Harris, “Give me what you got.” Harris
threw his money and keys on the ground. Murray then shot
Harris in the leg. After shooting Harris, Murray took his
belongings from the ground, got into the Mercedes, and drove
away.
During a search of the scene, the police recovered one live
round and one expended shell casing from the street. The police
also obtained a video recording of the street taken by someone at
a nearby residence. The video showed Murray pointing the rifle
at Harris, and Harris with a wounded leg after the shooting.
2.2. Deputy-involved shooting of Murray’s friend
Samuel Herrera was Murray’s close friend. On the
morning of September 10, 2020, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department served a search warrant at Herrera’s residence on
Bradfield Avenue. During the service of that warrant, deputies
fatally shot Herrera outside the garage of his house.
2.3. Shooting of Alvaro Rios (counts 10–11)
On the afternoon of September 10, 2020, Alvaro Rios, an
employee of a private investigator company, drove a silver Ford
Explorer to the Compton courthouse and parked it on a nearby
street. After returning from the courthouse, Rios set up a laptop
computer inside the car to attend a virtual meeting for his work.
While Rios was sitting in the driver’s seat, a black Mercedes with
chrome trim around the window drove down the street and
stopped beside Rios’s vehicle. A Black man who was driving the
Mercedes pointed a rifle at Rios, fired several shots, and then
sped away. Rios was shot in the arm, hand, chest, and abdomen,
and suffered serious injuries. Shortly after the shooting, the

4
police found four expended shell casings on the street near Rios’s
car.
2.4. Shooting of deputy sheriffs Claudia Apolinar
and Emmanuel Perez-Perez (counts 6–9)
On September 12, 2020, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
deputies Claudia Apolinar and Emmanuel Perez-Perez sat in
their patrol car at the Compton train station. A Black man
walked up to the patrol car, pulled out a gun, and fired multiple
shots at the deputies through the passenger side window of the
car. The shooter then ran to a black Mercedes in a parking lot,
threw the gun into the car, and drove away. Both deputies were
seriously wounded in the shooting. Deputy Apolinar was shot in
the face and both arms. Deputy Perez-Perez was shot five times,
including in the forehead, arm, and hand.
The police found one fired bullet and five fired cartridge
cases at the scene of the shooting. A bullet also was recovered
from Deputy Perez-Perez’s forearm during surgery. As part of
the shooting investigation, the police obtained various
surveillance videos of the Compton train station and surrounding
areas. In addition to capturing the shooting of the deputies in
their patrol car, the video footage showed a black Mercedes with
chrome trim pulling into a nearby parking lot shortly before the
incident, and then driving away right after the shooting occurred.
A witness who saw the Mercedes leaving the scene of the
shooting obtained a partial license plate number for the vehicle.
That number partially matched the license plate number of a
black Mercedes owned by Cindy Sarmiento. On the morning of
September 13, 2020, Sarmiento saw that the rear license plate
was missing from her vehicle, and reported the theft to the police.
A neighbor’s security camera showed an unidentified person

5
taking the license plate from the Mercedes. Sheriff’s sergeant
Sam Dang, who was conducting surveillance of the Mercedes at
that time, observed a Black man remove the rear license plate
from the vehicle and then leave the area.
2.5. Investigation and arrest of Murray
On September 15, 2020, Murray led multiple officers from
the sheriff’s department on a high-speed chase while driving a
blue Toyota Solara. At some point, Murray abandoned the car in
the city of Lynwood and fled on foot. After several hours, the
officers found Murray hiding in a chicken coop. He refused to
come out until a police dog was released and began to attack him.
Murray was then caught and arrested.
During the pursuit of Murray, the police recovered a loaded
semiautomatic handgun from a parking lot in Compton. That
same day, the police also located Harris’s Mercedes, which was
parked near an elementary school. Several fired cartridge cases
were found in both the Mercedes and the Toyota abandoned by
Murray.
A forensic analysis of the spent casings that were found at
the scene of each shooting showed that casings recovered from
the Harris and Rios shootings were fired from the same firearm
as casings recovered from the Mercedes. Additionally, casings
recovered from the shooting of the deputies, as well as casings
recovered from both the Mercedes and the Toyota, were all fired
from the semiautomatic handgun that was found in the Compton
parking lot. Murray’s DNA was found inside the Mercedes, and
on the handgun and its live cartridges.
During the investigation, the police interviewed several
people who knew Murray. According to Herrera’s brother,
Murray admitted to him that he shot the sheriff’s deputies for

6
Herrera. Murray told Herrera’s brother, “I smoked those
motherfuckers. Those fucking pigs.” Murray’s friend, Kristy
Gamble, disclosed that after Herrera was killed, Murray said he
was going to “take them . . . motherfuckers out,” and made clear
that he was going to kill a sheriff’s deputy. Murray later told
Gamble that he shot the two deputies, and that he “did it for
Sam.” Both Gamble and Herrera’s brother reported that when
they saw a video of the shooting on the news, they recognized
Murray as the shooter.
In her interview with the police, Jessica Luna stated that
she was friends with both Murray and Harris, and that Murray
admitted to her that he shot Harris and took his car during an
altercation. Luna also stated that Murray was angry at the
sheriff’s deputies who killed Herrera, and that he believed they
lied when they claimed Herrera was armed with a gun and being
aggressive. Following Herrera’s death, Murray was drinking,
using drugs, and not sleeping, and he said he was going to “blow
off a cop’s head.” Murray later told Luna that he “blasted” a
detective who was parked outside the Compton courthouse, and
he was angry the shooting did not make the news. The day after
the shooting of the deputies, Murray showed Luna a video of the
incident. Murray bragged about shooting both deputies in their
car at close range, but was upset that “those mother[fuckers]
didn’t die.”
Following his arrest, Murray was recorded making
statements on the bus that transported him to and from the
courthouse. In one recording, Murray repeatedly said, “Fuck the
police.” He also said, “I hope both them bitches die on the table.”
In another recording, Murray asserted, “I knew they were coming
for me for the carjacking shit,” and “I shoulda killed cuz.”

7
Murray further stated: “He told me in the morning Sam got
killed. I bust on the police right there. On Alondra and
Bradfield. Pop, pop, pop, pop, pop, pop. [Unintelligible]. That
was the first one. Then I caught that one over by the courthouse.
That was the second one. Then the train station in Compton.
(Laughing). Check the scoreboard, I’m up nigga. On Crip. I
don’t give a fuck. And y’all can’t prove it.”
3. Defense evidence
Murray testified on his own behalf. According to Murray’s
testimony, Harris lost his car to Murray in a dice game, and then
spread false rumors about him. Murray “put word . . . out on the
street” that Harris needed to come see him. When Harris showed
up, he argued with Murray and exposed a gun that he was
carrying under his shirt. After Harris handed over his car keys,
Murray told him to get any belongings he may have left in the
car. Murray then grabbed a gun because he felt threatened.
Murray admitted he shot Harris in the leg because he “got
spooked a little bit,” but denied he demanded Harris’s car or
other property.
Murray considered Herrera to be a “true friend,” and he
was devastated when he found out that Herrera died. Murray
saw a video that Herrera’s girlfriend took at the time Herrera
was shot by the sheriff’s deputies, and Herrera could be heard
saying his hands were up and asking why a gun was pointed at
his face. Murray admitted he shot Rios on the day that Herrera
was killed. About an hour after learning of Herrera’s death,
Murray drove to the courthouse and shot at Rios’s car because he
thought it was an undercover sheriff’s vehicle. Following that
shooting, Murray changed the license plate on the Mercedes by
taking the one from Sarmiento’s car.

8
Murray also admitted to shooting the deputies two days
after Herrera’s death. According to Murray, he had not slept for
several days because he was using drugs and drinking. Murray
was driving around and grieving for Herrera when he shot the
deputies. Murray believed that all sheriff’s deputies were
responsible for Herrera’s death, stating, “[T]hey might not have
been the one [that] pulled the trigger but they helped cover it up.”
Murray testified that when he committed the shooting, “I think it
was more on impulse. . . . Just reacted from everything that was
going on in my mind. . . . No plan, no nothing. Just everything
just overwhelmed me.”
On cross-examination, Murray admitted that when he shot
Rios, he was trying to kill him. He also admitted that when he
shot the two deputies, he was trying to take their lives. Murray
testified that he believed every sheriff’s deputy in the Compton
area “was guilty,” and that the shooting was “about making them
pay.”
4. Jury verdict and sentencing
The jury found Murray guilty as charged of the carjacking,
second degree robbery, and assault with a semiautomatic firearm
of Harris (counts 1, 2, & 3), the attempted murder of Rios (count
10), the attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murders
of Deputies Apolinar and Perez-Perez (counts 6 & 7), and four
counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (counts 5, 8, 9, & 11).
The jury made true findings on the firearm enhancements under
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), and section 12022.53,
subdivision (b), (c), and (d), and on the great-bodily-injury
enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (a). The jury
also found true the allegations that the attempted murders of the
deputies were committed against peace officers in the

9
performance of their duties under section 664, subdivisions (e)
and (f). In a bifurcated proceeding, Murray admitted that he
suffered a prior serious felony conviction under sections 667,
subdivision (a)(1), and 1170.12, subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced Murray to a term of 166 years
and eight months to life in state prison. The sentence consisted
of three years and four months plus 25 years to life on count 1 for
carjacking, consecutive terms of 16 months on counts 5, 8, 9, and
11 for possession of a firearm by a felon, consecutive terms of
55 years to life on counts 6 and 7 for the attempted murders of
Deputies Apolinar and Perez-Perez, and a consecutive term of
23 years on count 10 for the attempted murder of Rios. The court
stayed the sentences imposed on count 2 for robbery and count 3
for assault with a semiautomatic firearm under section 654.
Murray filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. Pitchess review
Prior to trial, Murray filed a motion for discovery under
Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 and Brady v. Maryland (1963)
373 U.S. 83, seeking evidence of misconduct by 13 sheriff’s
deputies who were involved in this case. The trial court ordered
an in camera hearing on the motion. After conducting an in
camera review of the requested materials, the trial court ruled
that there were 17 discoverable items to be disclosed to the
defense.
On appeal, Murray has requested that we conduct an
independent review of the sealed record to determine whether
any discoverable material was withheld. We reviewed the sealed
record of the proceedings, and conclude the trial court properly

10
exercised its discretion in deciding the material to be disclosed.
(People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229.)
2. Admission of Harris’s prior testimony at trial
Murray argues the trial court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him when it
admitted Harris’s preliminary hearing testimony because the
prosecution failed to take reasonable steps to secure Harris’s
presence at trial. We conclude the trial court did not err in
admitting Harris’s preliminary hearing testimony.
2.1. Relevant background
The trial began on July 24, 2023, with several days of jury
voir dire. On August 3, 2023, the prosecution requested a due
diligence hearing regarding Harris’s availability for trial, noting
that multiple teams were looking for Harris but were unable to
find him. The trial court set the due diligence hearing for
August 8, 2023.
At the hearing, Deputy District Attorney Maria Ghobada
testified that she attempted to serve Harris with a subpoena to
appear as a witness in this case on June 22, 2023. On that date,
Harris had a scheduled court appearance at the Norwalk
courthouse in another case. Ghobada waited in court to serve
Harris with the subpoena, but he did not appear and a bench
warrant was issued for him.
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s detective Steve Blagg
testified that he previously served Harris with a subpoena for the
preliminary hearing in this case “[a]fter a lot of effort.” To find
Harris for that hearing, Blagg obtained a current phone number
for him, secured a search warrant to “ping” his cell phone, and
then located Harris in his truck in Compton. Although Harris

11
repeatedly told Blagg at the time that he feared for his safety, he
appeared and testified at the preliminary hearing.
In June 2023, shortly after the bench warrant was issued
for him, Harris called Blagg and told him that he was afraid of
being in custody because of his prior testimony. After several
conversations with Blagg where Harris refused to surrender, the
phone number that Harris used to contact Blagg was
disconnected. Between mid-June and mid-July 2023, Blagg
looked for Harris on four to five occasions to serve him with a
subpoena for trial, but was unable to find him. Blagg drove by
several locations in Compton that Harris was known to frequent,
including the home and workplace of Harris’s girlfriend. Blagg
also created a wanted flyer with Harris’s photo, which he
distributed to deputies at the Compton and Lakewood sheriff’s
stations. In addition, Blagg contacted investigators with the
district attorney’s surveillance team to seek their assistance in
locating Harris.
On July 26, 2023, Harris called Blagg from a blocked phone
number, and again expressed fear of being in custody due to his
prior testimony in this case. Blagg explained that there was an
outstanding warrant for his arrest, and that Harris could be
placed in protective custody to ensure his safety. After Harris
indicated that Blagg was the only person to whom he felt
comfortable surrendering, they agreed to meet at the Compton
sheriff’s station on August 1, 2023, but Harris did not appear.
Blagg then called and texted Harris’s girlfriend, but received no
reply.
As part of the effort to find Harris, Blagg contacted the
county morgue and medical examiner’s office, but they did not
have any record of him. Blagg further confirmed that Harris was

12
not a patient at any hospital within Los Angeles County.
In addition, Blagg sought information on possible locations for
Harris from the former sheriff’s detective who last arrested
Harris in another case. Blagg then shared that information with
the district attorney’s investigators who were assisting in the
search. Blagg also asked Compton patrol deputies and gang
detectives to keep a watch out for Harris. Blagg did not write a
report documenting these efforts to locate Harris, and instead
testified based solely on his memory.
The district attorney investigator Oscar Fernandez testified
that he was part of a team of six to seven investigators tasked
with locating Harris. On July 26, 2023, the team conducted
surveillance of Harris’s last known address at a residence in
Compton. At that location, the team met with Sandra Garcia,
who identified herself as Harris’s former girlfriend. Garcia stated
that Harris occasionally stayed overnight at that address, but she
had not spoken to him for a few weeks and did not have a current
phone number for him. She also stated that Harris drove a white
Chevy truck. For about two hours, the team monitored the
residence and a nearby laundry mat where Garcia worked, but
did not find Harris.
On August 2, 2023, a team of six investigators followed
Garcia for about an hour to see if she would lead them to Harris,
but she did not. When Garcia arrived at the laundry mat, the
team again met with her. Garcia stated that Harris called her
from a blocked phone number the last time they spoke. She
denied knowing where Harris was staying, but identified some
streets in the Compton area that he tended to frequent. Based on
that information, each team member was assigned a geographic
area “to systematically search up and down the streets.” They

13
spent about six hours that day looking for Harris, but did not
locate him.
On August 7, 2023, Blagg provided the district attorney’s
investigation team with additional information about Harris’s
possible location. A team of six investigators then spent about
three hours that day searching the area in unmarked vehicles,
but they were unable to find Harris. Later that day, Harris
called one of the investigators from an untraceable internet
number. Harris stated that he had been receiving death threats
and that his truck had been stolen.
The trial court found that the prosecution exercised due
diligence in attempting to locate Harris, and that Harris was
unavailable as a witness. Based on that ruling, the trial court
allowed the prosecution to read Harris’s preliminary hearing
testimony to the jury.
2.2. Governing law
A criminal defendant has a right under both the federal
and state Constitutions to confront witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) “Although the constitutional
right of confrontation is important, it is not absolute. [Citation.]
If a witness is unavailable but had previously testified against
the defendant and was subject to cross-examination at that time,
that prior testimony may be admitted.” (People v. Wilson (2021)
11 Cal.5th 259, 290.) In Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S.
36, the United States Supreme Court recognized that, under the
Sixth Amendment, the “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses
absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant
is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine.” (Crawford v. Washington, at
p. 59.)

14
In California, Evidence Code section 1291 codifies this
traditional exception to the right of confrontation. (People v.
Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 290.) It provides, in relevant part,
that “[e]vidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by
the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness,” and
“[t]he party against whom the former testimony is offered was a
party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was
given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he
has at the hearing.” (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a).) As our
Supreme Court has recognized, “when the requirements of
[Evidence Code] section 1291 are met, the admission of former
testimony in evidence does not violate [the] constitutional right of
confrontation.” (People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 621.)
Under Evidence Code section 240, a declarant is
“unavailable as a witness” if he or she is “[a]bsent from the
hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exercised
reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her
attendance by the court’s process.” (Id., subd. (a)(5).) “The term
‘[r]easonable diligence, often called “due diligence” in case law,
“ ‘connotes persevering application, untiring efforts in good
earnest, efforts of a substantial character.’ ” ’ [Citation.]
Considerations relevant to the due diligence inquiry ‘include the
timeliness of the search, the importance of the proffered
testimony, and whether leads of the witness’s possible location
were competently explored.’ ” (People v. Herrera, supra,
49 Cal.4th at p. 622.) Where the relevant facts are undisputed,
we independently review a trial court’s determination of due
diligence. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 675.)

15
2.3. The trial court did not err in admitting Harris’s
preliminary hearing testimony
Murray contends Harris was not an unavailable witness
because the prosecution failed to establish that it made timely
and reasonable efforts to locate him prior to trial. He specifically
claims the prosecution failed to exercise due diligence because it
did not begin searching for Harris until July 26, 2023, the third
day of trial. The record however, does not support Murray’s
claim. Rather, the record shows that, on June 22, 2023, about
one month before trial began, the prosecution attempted to serve
Harris with a subpoena for trial during a scheduled court hearing
in another case, but Harris did not appear. Furthermore, at the
due diligence hearing, Detective Blagg testified about the
repeated efforts that he made to find Harris between mid-June
and mid-July 2023. These efforts included driving by several
locations that Harris was known to frequent, distributing a flyer
with Harris’s photograph to deputies at two local sheriff’s
stations, asking patrol deputies and gang detectives at the
Compton station to look out for Harris, and contacting the
detective who last arrested Harris for information on his possible
whereabouts. Detective Blagg also looked for Harris in the
records of the county morgue, medical examiner’s office, and local
hospitals, but did not locate him.
The record further reflects Detective Blagg sought the
assistance of the district attorney’s investigators in searching for
Harris. A team of six to seven investigators conducted
surveillance of Harris’s last known address, contacted and
followed Harris’s girlfriend, and systematically searched the
areas that Harris tended to frequent based on the information
provided by his girlfriend and Detective Blagg. The team

16
engaged in these search efforts for two hours on July 26, 2023, for
six hours on August 2, 2023, and for three hours on August 7,
2023, but none proved to be fruitful. On this record, the
prosecution’s efforts to find Harris, while not exhaustive, showed
reasonable diligence.
Murray asserts the prosecution should have begun
searching for Harris earlier in the case given that he was a
reluctant witness who repeatedly expressed fear about testifying.
Murray also argues the prosecution should have conducted a
more extensive search by contacting Harris’s other friends and
family members, checking additional addresses that he might
have frequented, and attempting to locate him through his cell
phone. However, as the trial court observed, it appeared that
Harris was actively avoiding service because he did not want to
testify. In June 2023, after a bench warrant was issued for his
arrest, Harris called Detective Blagg to discuss his fear of being
harmed in custody based on his prior testimony. He then shut
down the service on his cell phone. Although Harris later called
Detective Blagg from a blocked phone number and agreed to
surrender himself at a designated time and location, he failed to
show up for the scheduled meeting. Under these circumstances,
it appears unlikely that additional efforts to locate Harris would
have been successful, even if such efforts had begun earlier.
Moreover, where, as here, the record shows the prosecution
exercised reasonable diligence to secure a witness’s presence at
trial, “the circumstance that ‘additional efforts might have been
made or other lines of inquiry pursued does not affect this
conclusion. [Citation.] It is enough that the People used
reasonable efforts to locate the witness.’ ” (People v. Fuiava,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 677.) Because the prosecution exercised

17
reasonable diligence in attempting to find Harris, the trial court
did not err in determining that he was an unavailable witness
and admitting his preliminary hearing testimony.
3. The prosecution’s compliance with discovery
Murray asserts the prosecution violated its discovery
obligations by failing to timely disclose information about certain
witnesses that it intended to call at trial. We conclude the trial
court properly addressed the prosecution’s alleged discovery
violations, and even if there was error, it was harmless.
3.1. Relevant background
At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from Cindy
Sarmiento that the license plate on her black Mercedes was
missing, along with her neighbor’s surveillance video showing
that a Black man removed the license plate on the morning of
September 13, 2020. Following the presentation of this evidence,
the prosecution sought to call the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
sergeant Sam Dang to testify that he was conducting surveillance
of Sarmiento’s Mercedes that morning, and that he saw an
unidentified Black man remove the license plate from the vehicle.
Defense counsel objected to Sergeant Dang’s testimony
because his name was not listed in any police reports. The
prosecutor responded that he recently discovered that Sergeant
Dang was the unnamed officer referenced in the police report who
observed the removal of Sarmiento’s license plate, and that his
testimony would be limited to matters contained in the report.
Defense counsel then argued that this was not the first
time the prosecution violated its discovery obligations. Defense
counsel noted that she was not provided with a rap sheet for
Kristy Gamble who previously testified, and that she had to find
Gamble’s criminal record herself. The prosecutor explained that

18
he offered to delay calling Gamble as a witness when he learned
of the failure to provide the rap sheet, but defense counsel
declined that offer. Defense counsel clarified that she was still
requesting that the prosecutor provide the rap sheet and agree to
a stipulation regarding Gamble’s criminal record if any new
information was discovered. The prosecutor confirmed that he
would comply with defense counsel’s request.
After questioning the prosecutor about the late disclosure
of Sergeant Dang’s name to the defense, the trial court ruled that
it would allow Sergeant Dang to testify about the specific matters
described in the report. The court also stated that it would
instruct the jury on the untimely disclosure and asked defense
counsel to draft a proposed instruction.
The trial court later gave the jury an instruction entitled
“Untimely Disclosure of Evidence.” The instruction provided:
“Both the People and the defense must disclose their evidence to
the other side before trial, within the time limits set by law.
Failure to follow this rule may deny the other side the chance to
produce all relevant evidence, to counter opposing evidence, or to
receive a fair trial. [¶] An attorney for the People failed to
disclose: [¶] 1. Name of witnesses Sergeant Dang and Kaniewski
disclosed during trial. [¶] 2. Report of witness Detective Magana
(disclosed August 9, 2023). [¶] 3. Felony convictions/crimes of
moral turpitude (Impeachment evidence) for witness Kristy
Gamble [¶] [p]rior to trial. [¶] In evaluating the weight and
significance of that evidence, you may consider the effect, if any,
of that late disclosure.”
3.2. Governing law
Section 1054.1 requires the prosecution to disclose to the
defense certain categories of evidence, including the “names and

19
addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses
at trial,” the “existence of a felony conviction of any material
witness,” and the “[r]elevant written or recorded statements of
witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses.” (Id.,
subds. (a), (d) & (f).) “ ‘Absent good cause, such evidence must be
disclosed at least 30 days before trial, or immediately if
discovered . . . within 30 days of trial. (§ 1054.7.)’ ” (People v.
Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 280.) “Upon a showing both that
the defense complied with the informal discovery procedures
provided by the statute, and that the prosecutor has not complied
with section 1054.1, a trial court ‘may make any order necessary
to enforce the provisions’ of the statute, ‘including, but not
limited to, immediate disclosure, . . . continuance of the matter,
or any other lawful order.’ (§ 1054.5, subd. (b).) The court may
also ‘advise the jury of any failure or refusal to disclose and of
any untimely disclosure.’ ” (Ibid.) The court may prohibit the
testimony of a witness only if all other sanctions have been
exhausted. (§ 1054.5, subd. (c).)
We review the trial court’s ruling on whether a discovery
violation occurred for abuse of discretion. (People v. Thompson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1105; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th
225, 299.) Even where the prosecution fails to comply with its
discovery obligations, “[a] violation of section 1054.1 is subject to
the harmless-error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [].” (People v. Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
p. 280.) To demonstrate reversible error, the defendant “ ‘must
establish that “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 960.) “To the extent the denial of

20
discovery implicated defendant’s federal due process rights
[citation], the applicable test is whether the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18 [].)” (Id., at p. 961.)
3.3. The trial court properly addressed the
prosecution’s alleged discovery violations
Murray contends the prosecution’s discovery violations
necessitate a reversal for a new trial because they unduly
prejudiced the defense. We disagree. Regarding the late
disclosure of Sergeant Dang’s name, the trial court properly
addressed the discovery violation by limiting the witness’s
testimony to the observations that were described in the police
report, and then instructing the jury on the untimely disclosure.
Moreover, the prosecution’s failure to discover Sergeant Dang’s
identity earlier in the case did not prejudice the defense. Given
the uncontroverted video evidence showing an unidentified Black
man removing a license plate from Sarmiento’s vehicle, Sergeant
Dang’s testimony that he witnessed the removal of the license
plate was cumulative and not critical to any disputed issue. With
respect to the prosecution’s failure to provide Gamble’s rap sheet
to the defense, this discovery violation was likewise harmless.
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from
Gamble that she had a number of “theft and drug-related
convictions.” Additionally, as requested by defense counsel, the
parties later stipulated to all of Gamble’s prior convictions for
crimes of moral turpitude.
While the jury instruction on the untimely disclosure of
evidence also referenced the prosecution’s late disclosure of
Sergeant Kaniewski’s name and Detective Magana’s report, the
record does not include any discussion in the trial court about

21
these alleged discovery violations. Even assuming that the
prosecution violated its discovery obligations with respect to
these two witnesses, Murray has not shown that he suffered any
prejudice. Both Sergeant Kaniewski and Detective Magana
testified that they participated in the pursuit of a blue Toyota
Solara, but neither officer was present at Murray’s subsequent
capture or arrest. Because it was undisputed that Murray led
the police on a high-speed chase, any discovery violations related
to these witnesses were harmless.
Although Jessica Luna was not included in the instruction
on the untimely disclosure of evidence, Murray argues he was
prejudiced by the prosecution’s delay in providing transcripts of
some of Luna’s interviews with the police. The record, however,
shows that the prosecutor provided defense counsel with audio
recordings of each of Luna’s police interviews, including one that
took place shortly before the start of trial. Although defense
counsel had the recordings of those interviews transcribed
herself, the trial court instructed the prosecutor to provide copies
of any transcripts in his possession to ensure that they were
consistent with one another. There is no indication that the
prosecutor failed to do so, or that defense counsel raised any
further concerns with the trial court about the timeliness of those
transcripts. On this record, Murray has failed to demonstrate
that the prosecution’s alleged discovery violations resulted in
prejudicial error.
4. Prosecutorial misconduct
Murray contends the prosecution committed prejudicial
misconduct by harassing him during the trial and improperly
injecting sympathy for the victims during closing argument.
We conclude this claim lacks merit.

22
4.1. Governing law
“ ‘ “ ‘A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution when it “infects
the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial
of due process.” [Citations.] . . . A prosecutor’s misconduct that
does not render a trial fundamentally unfair nevertheless
violates California law if it involves “the use of deceptive or
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or
the jury.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 943.) “ ‘A
defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial
misconduct . . . unless it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the
misconduct.’ ” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 403.)
In addition, “[t]o preserve a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct on appeal, ‘ “[the] defendant must make a timely and
specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to
disregard the impropriety. [Citations.]” [Citation.] The failure to
timely object and request an admonition will be excused if doing
either would have been futile, or if an admonition would not have
cured the harm.’ ” (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 204.)
4.2. The prosecution did not commit misconduct
Murray raises two claims of prosecutorial misconduct on
appeal. First, he argues the prosecution’s investigating officer,
Detective Blagg, committed misconduct by winking at him during
trial. The record reflects that, early in the trial, Murray told the
trial court that Detective Blagg was “taunting” him in the
courtroom because he winked at Murray during a lunch break
after the jurors left. The court did not ask Detective Blagg
whether Murray’s allegation was true. Instead, the court simply
ordered Detective Blagg to not have any eye contact with Murray.

23
Murray did not raise any further complaints about Detective
Blagg’s behavior at trial.
Murray’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on
Detective Blagg’s conduct fails. Even assuming Detective Blagg
winked at Murray during a lunch break, the conduct occurred on
single occasion when the jury was not present. Murray has not
shown that Detective’s Blagg’s act of winking at him rendered the
trial fundamentally unfair or constituted an improper attempt to
persuade the court or the jury. Indeed, because the jury had no
knowledge of the incident, it could not have affected the verdict.
Second, Murray asserts the prosecutor committed
misconduct during closing argument when he commented to the
jury: “And we’ve been talking about this from the very beginning
about you’re not here to decide whether or not you like
Mr. Murray. You’re not. And I’m not going to ask you to like him
or dislike him. It’s not my place. That’s not what we’re here
about. We’re not here about whether you have sympathy for the
deputies, sympathy for Alvaro Rios, sympathy for Andrew Harris.
It’s not about that. This is about did he commit these crimes.
Does two plus two equal four. And, of course, it does. Of course,
it does. From all of [the] things that we’ve seen, all of the things
that we’ve heard, of course, it does.”
Murray’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on these
comments before the jury likewise fails. Because Murray did not
raise any objection to the prosecutor’s remarks in the trial court,
he forfeited this claim on appeal. Even if not forfeited, however,
the claim lacks merit. “ ‘As a general rule, a prosecutor may not
invite the jury to view the case through the victim’s eyes, because
to do so appeals to the jury’s sympathy for the victim.’ ” (People
v. Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 205.) In this case, however, the

24
prosecutor did not improperly appeal to the jury’s sympathy for
the victims. Rather, the prosecutor told the jury that sympathy
for the victims was not relevant because the jury’s role was solely
to determine whether Murray committed the charged crimes.
Where, as here, “ ‘a claim of misconduct is based on the
prosecutor’s comments before the jury, “ ‘the question is whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied
any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.” ’ ” ’
(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 334.) When considered in
context, the prosecutor’s isolated remark about sympathy for the
victims was not reasonably likely to inflame the jury. Moreover,
the trial court instructed the jury that in “closing arguments, the
attorneys will discuss the case, but their remarks are not
evidence,” and that the jury “must not let bias, sympathy,
prejudice, or public opinion influence [its] assessment of the
evidence or [its] decision.” “ ‘We presume that jurors treat the
court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the
prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an
attempt to persuade.’ ” (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166,
260.) On this record, no prejudicial misconduct occurred.
5. Juror misconduct
Murray argues reversal is required based on two instances
of alleged juror misconduct. He specifically asserts that Juror
No. 1 was unduly pressured by other jurors during deliberations
to reach a verdict, and that Juror No. 8 was biased against him
based on a fear for her safety. We conclude Murray has failed to
demonstrate that there was juror misconduct in this case.

25
5.1. Juror No. 1
5.1.1. Relevant background
On the last day of jury deliberations, the trial court
informed the parties that Juror No. 1 called the court’s judicial
assistant at the end of the previous day and expressed that she
felt “threatened” and “harassed” in the jury room. On the call,
the juror said she was frustrated because she was a special
education teacher, and after getting home late each day from jury
duty, she had to prepare lesson plans for her class while not
being paid for that work. She also said the jury “could have been
done yesterday . . . but there is one juror that insists on having a
verdict, either a not guilty or a guilty.” Juror No. 1 wanted the
court to instruct the jury that “it’s okay to be hung.”
Later that morning, Juror No. 1 was brought into the
courtroom for questioning. When the trial court asked how she
was doing, Juror No. 1 replied, “Better. I think we finally came
to an agreement so it’s good.” She reiterated how jury duty was
negatively impacting her work and students. With respect to the
deliberations, however, she stated, “I’m better. It’s over. So we
finally came to an agreement with everybody and I think . . .
we’ve grown close with some people and stuff and I feel like we
were able to sort it out together . . . .” When asked whether she
was feeling harassed in the jury room and whether it impacted
her ability to be fair, Juror No. 1 responded, “No.” She then
explained, “Honestly, it’s personality . . . you bring twelve people
from different paths of life and a lot of times the way you talk to
people in your immediate circle is not the way you would talk to
people you don’t know. And I think that that’s what’s happened
where people think they can just talk to you the way they talk to
their immediate circle and it’s not . . . and we have been together

26
so long.” She added, “[W]e’re parents, we’re employees, and I
think it’s getting on us, honestly. [¶] So we are just so glad we are
on the other end.”
After Juror No. 1 left the courtroom, the trial court stated,
“I feel comfortable that she was able to effectively deliberate with
the jurors and she did not reiterate any of the concerns that she
had from yesterday.” Defense counsel did not object or raise any
concerns about juror misconduct. Shortly after, the jury returned
its verdict.
5.1.2. Governing law
“ ‘A defendant accused of a crime has a constitutional right
to a trial by unbiased, impartial jurors.’ ” (People v. Miles (2020)
9 Cal.5th 513, 601.) Where a verdict is attacked based on juror
misconduct, “ ‘the focus is on whether there is any overt event or
circumstance . . . which suggests a likelihood that one or more
members of the jury were influenced by improper bias.’ ” (People
v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 776, italics omitted.) “Although
juror misconduct generally raises a presumption of prejudice, any
such presumption is rebutted if a review of the entire record fails
to show a ‘substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were
actually biased against the defendant.’ ” (People v. Nadey (2024)
16 Cal.5th 102, 174–175, italics omitted.) “ ‘ “In determining
whether juror misconduct occurred, ‘[w]e accept the trial court’s
credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical
fact if supported by substantial evidence.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Whether
any such misconduct was prejudicial, however, ‘ “is a mixed
question of law and fact subject to an appellate court’s
independent determination.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 172.)

27
5.1.3. The trial court did not err in finding there
was no misconduct involving Juror No. 1
Murray contends prejudicial juror misconduct occurred in
this case because other jurors harassed and pressured Juror
No. 1 to reach a unanimous verdict. A defendant forfeits a claim
of juror misconduct, however, “when defense counsel does not
‘propose additional questions [be asked of jurors], object to any
juror’s continued service, or request a mistrial on the ground of
juror misconduct.’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116,
1169–1170.) Here, defense counsel did not request that the court
ask additional questions of Juror No. 1 or any other members of
the jury, nor did counsel raise any objection regarding alleged
juror misconduct. Murray thus forfeited this claim on appeal.
Even if not forfeited, the claim fails on the merits.
Although Juror No. 1 initially stated in a telephone call to
the trial court’s judicial assistant that she felt “harassed” and
“threatened” during jury deliberations, she did not identify any
specific conduct by other jurors that caused her to feel that way.
Then, when questioned by the court about these comments, Juror
No. 1 explained that “[h]onestly, it’s personality . . . you bring
twelve people from different paths of life and a lot of times the
way you talk to people in your immediate circle is not the way
you would talk to people you don’t know.” While Juror No. 1
acknowledged being frustrated with how her fellow jurors
communicated during deliberations, she denied that it impacted
her ability to be fair. As our Supreme Court observed, “ ‘jurors
can be expected to disagree, even vehemently, and to attempt to
persuade disagreeing fellow jurors by strenuous and sometimes
heated means.’ ” (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 141.)

28
Such disagreement, even if heated, does not establish juror
misconduct. (Ibid.)
Murray claims there was misconduct because Juror No. 1
was unduly pressured by the other jurors to reach a unanimous
verdict rather than have a hung jury. The record, however, does
not support this claim. When Juror No. 1 spoke with the court’s
judicial assistant, she conveyed that one of the other jurors
wanted to continue deliberating until they reached a verdict of
guilty or not guilty. Juror No. 1 did not suggest that she herself
was a holdout juror, or that she felt pressured by her fellow
jurors to vote a certain way. Additionally, when questioned by
the court the following day, Juror No. 1 explained that the jury
“finally came to an agreement with everybody” that morning, and
that they “were able to sort it out together.” There is no
indication that Juror No. 1, or any other juror, was improperly
coerced to change their vote. On this record, no misconduct
related to Juror No. 1 occurred.
5.2. Juror No. 8
5.2.1. Relevant background
During trial, at the end of a Friday session, the trial court
indicated that Juror No. 8 sent a note to the judicial assistant
expressing that she felt uncomfortable because Murray’s mother
“gives aggressive energy.” The court noted that it never observed
any inappropriate behavior by Murray’s mother, who often sat in
the audience. Defense counsel expressed concern that Juror
No. 8’s comment about aggressive energy was “code for I don’t
like Black people,” and asked that the juror be removed for bias.
The following Monday, Juror No. 8 was brought into the
courtroom for questioning. In response to the court’s inquiry,
Juror No. 8 recounted that she was in the hallway outside the

29
courtroom when she overheard Murray’s mother speaking “very
aggressively” to the cleaning crew in the nearby restroom and
“screaming loudly” because she was not allowed to use the
restroom at that time. Juror No. 8 stated that the incident made
her feel “very uncomfortable” because she believed “that when
somebody is doing their duties as far as cleaning the restroom,
it’s not really their fault” and “nobody should be talked to in that
way.” She did not tell any other jurors what she heard, but one of
them approached her afterward and noted that she looked
stressed. Juror No. 8 also stated that, when she left the
courthouse that day, she was “more cautious of [her]
surroundings” and did not drive straight home because she was
“scared someone [might] follow” her.
The court asked Juror No. 8 if she could set that incident
aside and decide the case based on the evidence. She initially
replied, “I can try.” The court reminded Juror No. 8 of its
instruction to the jury at the start of trial “that anything that
happens in that hallway does not bear on this case.” When the
court again asked if she could set the incident aside, Juror No. 8
answered, “Yes.” In response to questioning from defense
counsel, Juror No. 8 denied that she was afraid of Murray’s
mother, that she would render a verdict based on fear, or that she
would hold the perceived behavior of his mother against Murray.
When asked whether she would be comfortable having someone
with her feelings sitting as a juror if she were on trial, Juror
No. 8 said, “[P]robably not.” But when asked whether she could
be fair if she remained on the jury, Juror No. 8 replied, “Based on
the facts, yes.” She then stated, “The only reason why I brought
it up is something I was feeling. I didn’t know if it was going to
keep going throughout the weekend. So I just wanted to make

30
sure that whatever I was feeling at the moment was that—
I didn’t want to come back today and talk about that. . . . [¶]
Kind of just wanted to forget about it.” In response to further
questioning, Juror No. 8 again stated, “[B]ased on the facts, I can
be fair.”
After hearing from counsel, the court denied the request to
discharge Juror No. 8. The court reasoned: Juror No. 8
“indicated that she could be fair. [¶] Counsel asked her if
knowing what she knows about her, would she feel comfortable
with her as a juror. She said, ‘Probably not.’ That’s all she said.
But when asked directly if she could be fair in this case, she said
she could based on the facts. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I think she was doing
her duty as reporting anything that happens out in the hallway
to the court. She’s explained what happened . . . . Nothing
directed at her, nothing directed at the jurors.” The court also
noted that Juror No. 8 “came back today wanting to forget about
what happened on Friday,” and that she “said she could be fair
today.”
5.2.2. Governing law
“Under section 1089, a trial court may discharge a juror
any time during trial, . . . if the court concludes the juror in
question is ‘unable to perform his or her duty.’ ” (People v.
McGhee (2025) 17 Cal.5th 612, 627.) “ ‘A juror who is actually
biased is unable to perform the duty to fairly deliberate’ and is
subject to discharge.” (Id. at p. 636.) “ ‘Actual bias’ is ‘the
existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to
the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror
from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of any party.’ ” (Ibid.) The trial court’s
decision on whether to discharge a juror under section 1089 is

31
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th
339, 365.) “ ‘ “Before an appellate court will find error in failing
to excuse a seated juror, the juror’s inability to perform a juror’s
functions must be shown by the record to be a ‘demonstrable
reality.’ The court will not presume bias, and will uphold the
trial court’s exercise of discretion on whether a seated juror
should be discharged . . . if supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ”
(People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 943.)
5.2.3. The trial court did not err in denying the
defense request to discharge Juror No. 8
Murray asserts the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request to remove Juror No. 8 for bias. He argues
the incident with his mother affected Juror No. 8’s ability to be
impartial because she admitted that she would not want herself
as a juror and that she was afraid to drive home afterward.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling.
As the trial court observed, the incident involving alleged
aggressive behavior by Murray’s mother was isolated in nature
and unrelated to the trial. As described by Juror No. 8, the
mother did not direct her behavior at the jurors or anyone else
involved in the trial, and her comments did not have anything to
do with the case. Although Juror No. 8 expressed that the
incident made her uncomfortable at the time, she agreed that she
could set it aside and decide the case based on the evidence. She
also stated that she did not feel afraid of Murray’s mother, and
that she would not hold any aggressive conduct by his mother
against Murray. Under questioning from defense counsel, Juror
No. 8 did state that she “probably” would not want herself as a
juror if she were on trial. But in response to further questioning,
she made clear that she believed she could be a fair juror if she

32
remained on the panel and render her verdict based solely on the
facts. On this record, Juror No. 8’s inability to perform her duty
as a juror was not shown to be a “ ‘demonstrable reality.’ ”
(People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 943.)
Murray contends Juror No. 8 should have been discharged
because she admitted that she was afraid to drive straight home
after the incident with his mother, fearing she might be followed.
Although Juror No. 8 indicated that she was scared that someone
would follow her when she left court that day, she clarified that
she was not afraid of anyone in particular, and that she drove
around for awhile “just to get it out of [her] head.” She also
stated that she felt uncomfortable “just at the moment,” and that
after reporting the incident to the court, she “kind of just wanted
to forget about it.” Juror No. 8 did not express that she continued
to feel uncomfortable or afraid after returning to court, and she
confirmed that she would not render a verdict based on fear.
Under these circumstances, the trial court reasonably could find
that Juror No. 8 was not biased against Murray. The court
accordingly did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to
discharge her.
6. Multiple convictions for possession of a firearm by a
felon in counts 9 and 11
Murray contends his convictions for possession of a firearm
by a felon in counts 9 and 11 must be reversed because the
prosecution did not prove that he continuously possessed more
than two firearms when he committed the shootings in this case.
The People concede that Murray’s convictions in counts 9 and 11
must be reversed. We agree.
“[P]ossession of a firearm by a felon is a continuing
offense.” (People v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 365,

33
citing Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 525, fn. 1,
and People v. Warren (1940) 16 Cal.2d 103, 112.) “ ‘In the case of
continuing offenses, only one violation occurs even though the
proscribed conduct may extend over [an] indefinite period.’ ”
(People v. Mason, at p. 365.) The crime of possession of a firearm
by a felon continues for as long as the possession of the firearm
continues, and is not completed until the possession has ceased.
(Id. at pp. 366–367.) Therefore, where there is no evidence that
the defendant relinquished his possession of a firearm, or that his
possession was interrupted for a given period of time, he can be
convicted of only one count of that offense. (Ibid.)
Here, Murray was convicted of four counts of possession of
a firearm by a felon based on his possession of a firearm when he
(1) shot Harris on September 1, 2020 (count 5), (2) shot Rios on
September 10, 2020 (count 11), (3) shot Deputies Apolinar and
Perez-Perez on September 12, 2020 (count 8), and (4) threw a
firearm out of his car as he was fleeing the police on
September 15, 2020 (count 9). The prosecution’s theory was that
Murray used the same .223-caliber rifle to commit the shootings
of Harris and Rios, and that the .40-caliber semiautomatic
handgun that he used in the shooting of Deputies Apolinar and
Perez-Perez was the same handgun that he threw out of his car
during the police chase. The prosecution did not present evidence
that Murray ceased his possession of the .223-caliber rifle
between the Harris and Rios shootings. Nor did the prosecution
present evidence that Murray ceased his possession of the .40-
caliber handgun between his shooting of the deputies and his
disposal of that firearm as he was fleeing the police.
Because the evidence showed that Murray continuously
possessed only two firearms—the .223-caliber rifle and the .40-

34
caliber handgun—during the time period covering the crimes in
this case, he can only be convicted of two counts of possession of a
firearm by a felon. Therefore, the convictions in counts 9 and
count 11 must be reversed.
7. Multiple punishment for possession of a firearm by a
felon in counts 5 and 8
Murray argues the sentences imposed on counts 5, 8, 9, and
11 for possession of a firearm by a felon should have been stayed
under section 654. He specifically asserts that section 654 bars
multiple punishment for the offense of possession of a firearm by
a felon and the primary offense in which the firearm was used.
Because we are reversing the convictions in counts 9 and 11 for
the reasons addressed above, we limit our analysis of this claim
to the counts 5 and 8. We conclude the trial court did not err in
imposing separate sentences on each of these counts.
7.1. Governing law
Section 654 provides that “[a]n act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may
be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
(Id., subd. (a).) The statute “bars multiple punishment for
separate offenses arising out of a single occurrence when all of
the offenses were incident to one objective.” (People v. Cowan
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 498.) “ ‘Whether a course of criminal
conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act
within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and
objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one
objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such
offenses but not for more than one.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2009)
47 Cal.4th 501, 507, italics omitted.) A trial court’s express or

35
implied determination that two crimes are subject to multiple
punishment must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence. (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.)
As this court recently explained, “[w]hether being a felon in
possession of a firearm is a ‘ “ ‘divisible transaction from the
offense in which [the defendant] employs the weapon depends
upon the facts and evidence of each individual case. Thus where
the evidence shows a possession distinctly antecedent and
separate from the primary offense, punishment on both crimes
has been approved. On the other hand, where the evidence
shows a possession only in conjunction with the primary offense,
then punishment for the illegal possession of the firearm has
been held to be improper where it is the lesser offense.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1214.)
“Generally, section 654 bars multiple punishment where
‘the evidence “demonstrates at most that fortuitous
circumstances put the firearm in the defendant’s hand only at the
instant of committing another offense,” ’ such as when the
defendant obtains a firearm during a struggle that immediately
precedes his use of the weapon to assault the victim. [Citation.]
On the other hand, multiple punishment is permissible where
‘the evidence shows that the defendant possessed the firearm
before the crime, with an independent intent.’ ” (People v.
Richardson, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1214–1215.) Multiple
punishment also is allowed where the defendant’s possession of
the firearm “was not merely simultaneous” with the primary
offense, but “continued before, during and after” the commission
of that offense. (People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401,
1413.)

36
7.2. The trial court did not violate section 654 in
imposing consecutive sentences for possession
of a firearm by a felon in counts 5 and 8
Murray’s conviction in count 5 was for unlawful possession
of the .223-caliber rifle, which was the firearm that he used to
commit the carjacking, robbery, and assault of Harris on
September 1, 2020. While the trial court stayed the sentences for
the robbery (count 2) and assault (count 3), it imposed
consecutive terms for the carjacking (count 1) and possession of a
firearm by a felon (count 5). The court also imposed a
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement on the
carjacking count. This was permissible under section 654
because the evidence did not show that fortuitous circumstances
placed the rifle in Murray’s hands at the instant that he
carjacked Harris. Rather, Harris testified that after the two men
argued on the street, Murray walked up the driveway, retrieved
the rifle, and then returned and demanded Harris’s property.
After Harris dropped his money and car keys on the ground,
Murray shot him in the leg and drove off in his Mercedes.
Murray also retained possession of the rifle, and used that same
firearm to commit the shooting of Rios nine days later. Under
these circumstances, the trial court did not err in failing to stay
the sentence for the possession of a firearm by a felon in count 5.
Murray’s conviction in count 8 was for unlawful possession
of the .40-caliber handgun, which was the firearm that he used to
commit the shooting of Deputies Apolinar and Perez-Perez on
September 12, 2020. The trial court imposed consecutive terms
for the attempted murder of Deputy Apolinar (count 6), the
attempted murder of Deputy Perez-Perez (count 7), and
possession of a firearm by a felon (count 8). The court also

37
imposed a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement on each
attempted murder count. Section 654 did not preclude multiple
punishment for these offenses and enhancements because the
evidence showed that Murray was already in possession of the
handgun when he arrived at the Compton train station where the
deputies were parked. Indeed, Murray admitted that he was
driving around with the gun when he first spotted the deputies’
patrol car. After circling the area, Murray parked the Mercedes,
walked over to the patrol car, and then pulled out the gun and
repeatedly fired at the two deputies. Murray did not dispose of
the gun until a few days later as the police were chasing him. On
this record, the trial court did not violate section 654 in imposing
a separate sentence for the possession of a firearm by a felon in
count 8.
8. Imposition of mandatory court assessments
Last, Murray asks us to strike a $30 criminal conviction
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) and a $40 court operations
assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) from the clerk’s minute order
because the trial court did not orally impose them at sentencing.
The People acknowledge that these assessments were not orally
pronounced by the trial court or included in the abstract of
judgment, but argue that the abstract of judgment should be
modified to reflect the assessments because they are mandatory.
“The oral imposition of sentence constitutes the judgment
in an action, and the minutes cannot add anything substantive to
the oral pronouncement. [Citations.] Generally, the oral
pronouncement controls if there is a discrepancy, and the court
clerk lacks the authority to add fines or fees not imposed by the
trial court. [Citation.] . . . ‘[T]he clerk’s minutes must accurately
reflect what occurred at the [sentencing] hearing.’ [Citation.]

38
If the clerk includes fines in the court’s minutes or the abstract of
judgment that were not part of the oral pronouncement of
sentence, those fines must be stricken from the minutes and the
abstract of judgment.” (People v. Bongani El (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967.)
Here, the trial court was required to impose a $30 criminal
conviction assessment under Government Code section 70373,
and a $40 court operations assessment under Penal Code
section 1465.8, for each of Murray’s convictions. (See People v.
Bongani El, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 967; People v. Woods
(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 269, 272.) While the reporter’s transcript
reflects the trial court did not impose either of these assessments,
the clerk’s minute order for the sentencing hearing indicates the
assessments were imposed but “stayed.” Because the matter is
being remanded for resentencing, the trial court must impose
these assessments on remand. (People v. Bongani El, at pp. 967–
968.)

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DISPOSITION
The convictions in counts 9 and 11 are reversed and the
matter is remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court
shall resentence Murray on all remaining counts, and shall
impose a criminal conviction assessment under Government Code
section 70373, and a court operations assessment under Penal
Code section 1465.8, for each conviction. Upon resentencing, the
trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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