CourtListener 10601163•People v. Menchaca CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/9/25 P. v. Menchaca CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B334392
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA113040)
v.
DANIEL MENCHACA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Conditionally affirmed
and remanded with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Daniel Menchaca appeals from an order denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 at the
prima facie stage.1 The preliminary hearing transcript
established Menchaca was the sole shooter and, when pleading to
the charges, Menchaca admitted that, during the course of the
attempted murders, he personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm. However, because of an unusual wrinkle in this case—
that Menchaca’s brother also pleaded to the crimes (apparently
as an aider and abettor)—we grant Menchaca’s request that we
remand the matter to the trial court so Menchaca can, if he
wishes, supplement the bare bones petition he filed under section
1172.6. Accordingly, we conditionally affirm the order denying
Menchaca’s resentencing petition and remand the matter to the
superior court with directions to consider any “additional facts”
should Menchaca, within 30 days of that remand, seek to
supplement his petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The charges, plea agreement, and sentence
In 2010, the People charged Menchaca with attempting to
murder Wilson Guzman and Samuel Rivera. (§§ 664, 187, subd.
(a).) The second amended information added a second
defendant—Jonathan Leonis Moore. According to the record,
Moore is Menchaca’s brother. The second amended information
alleged that a principal personally used and intentionally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (e)(1)) and that
1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered to section
1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2
Menchaca personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury to Rivera (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c),
(d)).2
At Menchaca’s preliminary hearing,3 Guzman and Rivera
testified they were walking down a street in Bellflower one night
in October 2009. Menchaca and two other men pulled up in a car.
One man got out of the car and walked up to Guzman, announced
he was from the Swan Bloods gang, and began “popping his
collar” and making gestures.4 He challenged Guzman to a fight
and Guzman accepted. Guzman soon noticed the man “kept
backing away and looking across the street.” Guzman grabbed
Rivera’s hand and began to walk away. The man asked Guzman
if he was walking away from the fight, and Guzman turned
around and started to say he was not retreating.
Before Guzman could finish what he was saying, Menchaca
emerged with a gun and fired four or five rounds. Guzman and
Rivera ran. Menchaca shot Rivera in the stomach and the back
of his knee. Nobody else was hit.
On May 31, 2011, Menchaca pleaded no contest to
attempting to murder Rivera and admitted he personally used a
firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (c).) He stipulated there was a
2 The second amended information also included assault
charges, gang allegations, and additional firearm allegations that
are not relevant to this appeal.
3 Menchaca’s preliminary hearing took place before Moore
was added to the case. The record on appeal does not reflect
whether Moore had a preliminary hearing nor does it contain any
reporter’s transcript of any such hearing.
4 It is likely this man was Menchaca’s brother, Moore.
3
factual basis for his plea and admission. In accordance with the
plea agreement, the court sentenced Menchaca to a determinate
term of 25 years, consisting of five years for attempted murder
plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement.5
2. Postjudgment proceedings under section 1172.6
In 2022, Menchaca filed a pro per petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The petition alleged Menchaca had been
convicted of attempted murder and he could not be convicted of
that crime today because of the changes to sections 188 and 189.
The trial court appointed counsel for Menchaca.
The People’s opposition to the petition argued Menchaca
was ineligible for resentencing because he was prosecuted as the
actual shooter and not under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
Menchaca filed a reply arguing the trial court could not
determine he was ineligible for resentencing without engaging in
improper factfinding. The reply did not allege Moore or anyone
else was the shooter or otherwise explain how Menchaca might
have been convicted under any now-abrogated theory.
The People filed an additional brief arguing Menchaca was
ineligible for relief because the preliminary hearing transcript
showed he was the actual shooter. The People submitted
5 On that same date, Moore pleaded no contest to the
attempted murders of Guzman and Rivera in exchange for a
stipulated sentence of seven years in the state prison. He was
not asked to admit, and he did not admit, the “principal” firearm
enhancement.
4
Menchaca’s felony advisement of rights, waiver, and plea form,
and excerpts of the preliminary hearing transcript.6
At the hearing, the trial court stated it had reviewed the
preliminary hearing transcript, which established Menchaca
“was identified as the actual shooter.” Menchaca argued the
court should not engage in factfinding at the prima facie stage,
but he did not object to the court’s reliance on or characterization
of the preliminary hearing transcript. The People submitted on
the briefing. The court reiterated that the preliminary hearing
evidence showed Menchaca was the actual shooter, concluded he
had failed to make a prima facie showing, and denied the
petition.
DISCUSSION
1. Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder and limited the scope of the felony
murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
Effective January 2022, the Legislature extended resentencing
eligibility by eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a means of finding a defendant guilty of attempted
murder. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, § 2(a).)
Taken together, Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 created a
procedure allowing a person convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter under the former law to seek
resentencing if the person could no longer be convicted under the
6 We granted Menchaca’s motion to augment the appellate
record with the complete preliminary hearing transcript and a
transcript of his plea hearing.
5
amended law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; § 1172.6.) A
defendant convicted of attempted murder starts this procedure by
filing a petition and declaring (1) “the charging document allowed
the prosecution to ‘proceed under a theory of . . . attempted
murder under a natural and probable consequences doctrine,’ ”
(2) the defendant “was convicted of the attempted murder charge
or accepted a plea offer in lieu of trial on such a charge,” and
(3) the defendant “could not be presently convicted” under the
current law. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558
(Patton), citing § 1172.6, subd. (a).) Lewis held that “petitioners
who file a complying petition requesting counsel are to receive
counsel upon the filing of a compliant petition.” (Lewis, at p.
963.) “After the parties have had an opportunity to submit
briefings,” the trial court must “hold a hearing to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If
the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
The prima facie inquiry is limited. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) “It is not, however, simply duplicative of the
facial inquiry.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 562.) In
assessing whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing
for relief under section 1172.6, the trial court is entitled to review
the record of conviction, which will “necessarily inform the trial
court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at pp. 971–972; see Patton, at p.
563 [“after the appointment of counsel, a court looks beyond the
face of the petition”]; People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1244, 1251.) At the prima facie stage, a reviewing court may
6
“rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a
preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox
allegations” in a petition. (Patton, at p. 564.)
“We independently review the trial court’s determination
that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing for
relief.” (People v. Ramos (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 460, 465.)
2. The record of conviction rebuts Menchaca’s
conclusory allegations of eligibility for resentencing
Because Menchaca was charged with and pleaded no
contest to attempted murder, he is eligible for relief only if he
could have been convicted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 548; § 1172.6, subd. (a).) This doctrine applies only to
accomplices prosecuted under an aiding and abetting theory.
(People v. Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029 (Fisher) [direct
perpetrator “could not have been convicted under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine”].)
At the preliminary hearing, two witnesses identified
Menchaca as the only shooter. Both witnesses testified under
oath and were subject to cross-examination, which supports a
conclusion that their testimony is reliable. The preliminary
hearing transcript thus demonstrates Menchaca “was the sole
and direct perpetrator of the shooting such that his conviction
was not based on the natural and probable consequences theory.”
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563; Fisher, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at p. 1029 [natural and probable consequences
doctrine does not apply to direct perpetrators].) Menchaca’s “plea
to the section 12022.53, subdivision (c) enhancement for
intentional discharge of a firearm in the commission of the
7
attempted murder tended to corroborate this view.”7 (Patton, at
p. 563.) The record of conviction therefore refutes Menchaca’s
allegations of eligibility and confirms he did not make a prima
facie showing.
Menchaca argues a trial court’s reliance on evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing effectively requires a
petitioner to rebut that evidence. He claims this is improper at
the prima facie stage. As our high court has explained, however,
“requiring nonconclusory allegations” does not “improperly shift a
burden of proof to petitioners. Instead, it reflects that, even if the
prima facie ‘burden’ [citations] is a ‘ “bar” ’ that is set ‘ “very low” ’
[citation], a ‘petitioner’ must nonetheless ‘make[ ] a prima facie
showing’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) to frame a disputed issue that
entitles that petitioner to an evidentiary hearing.” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 566.) Indeed, a petitioner has “multiple
opportunities to proffer specific facts” in support of otherwise
conclusory allegations, including in the petition itself (which may
be accompanied by a substantive brief), in a reply brief, and at
the hearing. (Id. at p. 567.) At each opportunity, Menchaca could
have alleged “specific facts that identify someone else as the
direct perpetrator,” if any such facts exist, but he failed to do so.
(Ibid.) Without specific facts, a prima facie showing cannot be
based on “mere latent, speculative possibilities; that is, a
hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be conjured from
thin air or a legal conclusion.” (Ibid.)
7 Menchaca argues his admission to personally using a
firearm does not itself establish he was “the actual perpetrator.”
However, our conclusion is not based solely on that admission—it
is based also on the uncontroverted evidence from the
preliminary hearing showing he was the one and only shooter.
8
Menchaca also contends the trial court necessarily engaged
in improper factfinding by relying on the preliminary hearing
transcript to determine he was the sole shooter. Not so. “Where
facts from the record of conviction are undisputed, accepting
them over contrary legal allegations that are merely conclusory is
not ‘ “factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.” ’ ” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 565–
566.) “Rather than resolving a contested factual dispute,” the
uncontested testimony of two percipient witnesses at Menchaca’s
preliminary hearing “contributed specific factual assertions about
his conviction — namely, that it was premised on him being the
sole shooter.” (Id. at p. 569.)
In addition, Menchaca notes he did not plead no contest
under any specific theory of liability, and he contends the
prosecutor could have pursued a conviction at trial under the
now-abrogated natural and probable consequences doctrine.
However, “a defendant convicted by plea cannot show eligibility
for relief by asserting the People could have prosecuted him
based on invalid theories when the record conclusively
establishes that at the time of the plea, the People were operating
under only one theory of the defendant’s guilt, and that theory is
still valid under current law.” (People v. Muhammad (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 268, 277, review granted Feb. 19, 2025, S288860.)
As we have discussed, the preliminary hearing transcript
establishes the People were proceeding under the still-valid
theory that Menchaca was the only shooter. The “speculative
possibilit[y]” that the prosecutor could have later relied on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, despite
uncontradicted testimony that Menchaca was the sole shooter, is
9
insufficient at the prima facie stage. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 567.)8
In short, on this record Menchaca is ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. On May 8,
2025, however, Menchaca submitted a citation of new authority,
citing People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922. In that case,
the court conditionally affirmed the denial of the appellant’s
resentencing petition but remanded the matter to the superior
court to allow the petitioner to plead additional facts in support of
an amended petition.
Neither in the trial court nor here on appeal has Menchaca
suggested that his brother—or anyone else—was the person who
fired the shots at the victims. Nevertheless, in light of the
unusual circumstances in this case, in which the People alleged
the attempted murder charges against two defendants, we will
follow the same course as did the Glass court.
8 In the final paragraph of Menchaca’s opening brief, he
asserts the trial court’s denial of his petition violated his due
process rights. Menchaca recites several legal standards but his
briefing fails to apply those standards to this case. We therefore
reject this contention as forfeited. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10
Cal.4th 764, 793 [appellate court may reject a claim as forfeited
“when an appellant makes a general assertion, unsupported by
specific argument”].)
10
DISPOSITION
We remand this matter to the superior court with
directions to consider any “additional facts” should Menchaca,
within 30 days of that remand, seek to supplement his petition.
We otherwise conditionally affirm the order denying his
resentencing petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
11
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