CourtListener 10599235•People v. Martinez CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/5/25 P. v. Martinez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051286
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 179119)
v.
BRANDON GENE MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Brandon Gene Martinez of first degree murder in
1997. He petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court
denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing after it determined defendant was
ineligible for relief under the statute as a matter of law. Finding no prejudicial error, we
will affirm the order denying the resentencing petition.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Defendant and a codefendant, Hayward Simon, Jr., were each charged with
murder and tried together for a homicide that occurred in 1993. We have taken judicial
notice of the record from the direct appeal. (People v. Simon et al. (case No. H017616).)
The jury instructions quoted here are from the reporter’s transcript in that record.
Relevant to defendant’s arguments in this appeal, the jury was instructed on aiding
and abetting liability with CALJIC No. 3.01: “ ‘A person aids and abets the commission
of a crime when he: [⁋] ‘One, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator;
and, [⁋] ‘Two, with the specific intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime; and [⁋] ‘Three, by act or advice aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.’ ”
The jury was instructed on murder with CALJIC No. 8.10 as follows: “ ‘In order
to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved: [⁋] ‘One, a human
being was killed; [⁋] ‘Two, the killing was unlawful; and [⁋] ‘Three, the killing was done
with malice aforethought.’ ” Malice was defined using CALJIC No. 8.11: “ ‘Malice may
be either express or implied. [⁋] ‘Malice is express when there is manifested an intention
unlawfully to kill a human being. [⁋] ‘Malice is implied when: [⁋] ‘One, the killing
resulted from an intentional act; [⁋] ‘Two, the natural consequences of the act are
dangerous to human life; and, [⁋] ‘Three, the act was deliberately performed with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.”
The jury was instructed on a single theory of first degree murder: premeditation.
As relevant here, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.20: “All murder which is
perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with express
malice aforethought is murder of the first degree.” “If you find that the killing was
preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to
kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been
formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other
condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.” “To
constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the
question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the
consequences, he decides to and does kill.” The jury was not instructed on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or felony murder.
The jury found both defendant and his codefendant guilty of first degree murder.
The judgments were affirmed in a single unpublished opinion in 1999. (People v. Simon
et al. (Nov. 18, 1999, H017616) [nonpub. opn.].)
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Defendant petitioned pro se for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 in
2023, and the court appointed counsel to represent him. The district attorney’s office
opposed the petition, arguing that the record of conviction precluded relief as a matter of
law. Filed along with the opposition was a request for judicial notice of: the jury
instructions given in defendant’s trial; this court’s opinion affirming the judgment in case
No. H017616; the information; and the completed verdict form from defendant’s trial.
Defense counsel filed a reply, arguing that defendant had made the necessary prima facie
showing and that the trial court “may not rely on any prior appellate opinions in this case
to find petitioner to be ineligible based on the facts of the underlying case.”
The trial court denied defendant’s petition by written order without issuing an
order to show cause. The court determined that the “record of conviction shows that
[defendant] is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.” The court also quoted from
the 1999 direct appeal opinion, in which the appellate court found sufficient evidence
supported defendant’s conviction: “ ‘there [was] no evidence that [defendant] intended to
aid and abet [his codefendant] in the commission of a different specifically contemplated
target offense.’ ”
II. DISCUSSION
A person convicted of “felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime” may petition under Penal Code
section 1172.6 to have those convictions vacated when certain conditions are satisfied.
(Pen. Code, § 1172.6, subd. (a).) An order to show cause must issue if a petitioner makes
a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The “parties can, and should, use the
record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has
made a prima facie case.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972.) The court must
take the petitioner’s factual allegations as true and make a preliminary assessment about
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
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proved. (Id. at p. 971.) But if the record contains information refuting the allegations in
the petition, the court must deny the petition. (Ibid.) Our review is de novo. (People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
The only theory of first degree murder the jury here was instructed about was
premeditation, requiring “a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill.”
As to aiding and abetting liability, the jury was instructed that a “ ‘person aids and abets
the commission of a crime when he: [⁋] … with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of
the perpetrator; and, [⁋] … with the specific intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime; and, [⁋] … by act or advice aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.’ ” By finding both
defendant and his codefendant guilty of first degree murder based on those instructions,
the jury necessarily concluded that defendant harbored express malice—at a minimum in
aiding and abetting his codefendant’s commission of first degree murder.
That defendant and his codefendant were convicted of first degree murder in a
case where the only substantive offense about which the jury was instructed was murder
distinguishes this case from People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi). Langi
was convicted of second degree murder for participating in a fistfight where someone in
his group punched the victim who fell and hit his head, resulting in death. (Id. at p. 975.)
Langi’s jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, but
Langi argued that the pattern aiding and abetting and second degree murder instructions
“permitted the jury to find him guilty on a theory under which malice was imputed to him
based solely on his participation in the crime.” (Id. at p. 980.) The Langi court reasoned
that the “instructions permitted the jury to find [Langi] guilty of murder if it found that
(1) the killing resulted from the actual killer’s intentional act; (2) appellant aided and
abetted that intentional act; and (3) the killer ‘deliberately performed [the act] with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life’—whether or
not appellant knew of or consciously disregarded the danger to human life.” (Id. at
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p. 981.) The court concluded that “under the instructions that were given, the jury was
entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree murder,
appellant need only have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—[there],
punching [the victim]—whether or not [Langi] intended to aid or encourage [the
victim’s] killing, and whether or not he personally knew of and disregarded the risk of
such a killing.” (Id. at p. 983.) As a result, the Langi court concluded section 1172.6
relief was not precluded as a matter of law, and an order to show cause must issue.
Unlike in Langi, defendant and his codefendant were convicted of first degree
murder. That means the jury necessarily concluded the direct perpetrator acted with
express malice. It further means that the jury necessarily concluded the aider and abettor
knew about the direct perpetrator’s express malice, that the aider and abettor had the
specific intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the premediated murder, and
that the aider and abettor acted to aid, promote, encourage, or instigate the murder.
Defendant notes that the prosecutor at defendant’s trial requested a jury instruction
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. That request was made after closing
arguments, based on defense counsel’s argument to the jury that there was no evidence
defendant knew his codefendant was going to commit murder. Defendant also contends
the prosecutor’s closing argument at trial “supported the theory that [the codefendant]
alone needed to act with express malice for appellant to be convicted of first degree
murder as well.” The trial court denied the prosecutor’s requested instruction. The jury
was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the record of
conviction therefore does not support a prima facie showing of eligibility for
resentencing.
Defendant argues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting
to the trial court’s reliance on facts from this court’s 1999 opinion in the direct appeal.
But trial counsel did preserve that issue by arguing in papers on the current petition reply
that the trial court “may not rely on any prior appellate opinions in this case to find
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petitioner to be ineligible based on the facts of the underlying case.” Contrary to
defendant’s argument, the trial court properly looked to the record of conviction to
determine that the “only lawful path to convict [defendant] of first-degree murder under
the given instructions required a finding that [defendant] intended to aid and abet a
premeditated murder.” Because we agree with the trial court that the record of conviction
precludes relief as a matter of law, any arguable reliance by the trial court on facts from
the earlier appellate opinion was harmless. (People v. Hurtado (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893 [error in not appointing counsel was harmless where Pen. Code,
§ 1172.6 relief was precluded as a matter of law by the record of conviction]; People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 974 [when Pen. Code, § 1172.6 petition is denied without
an order to show cause, the petitioner has the burden to show error and a reasonable
probability of a more favorable result].)
Defendant’s argument about his youth at the time of the offense is not relevant to
the prima facie analysis. While youth may be considered at an evidentiary hearing on a
resentencing petition (see People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416), a hearing
is not called for here because the record of conviction precludes relief.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying resentencing is affirmed.
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____________________________________
Grover, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________
Lie, J.
H051286
The People v. Martinez
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