CourtListener 10599149•People v. Jarmon CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/5/25 P. v. Jarmon CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098895
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22FE000455)
v.
TYRELL JARMON et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
B.T. and M.L.1 sold drugs out of their apartment in a gated apartment complex.
The victim, B.T.’s brother, was staying with them in the apartment. On December 7,
2021, the victim met defendants Tyrell Jarmon and Devonti Long at the entrance gate of
the apartment complex, believing he was going to consummate a drug sale. Defendants
confronted the victim at the gate and marched him back into the apartment complex with
his hands raised. A third defendant, Kishawn Johnson, who is not a party to this appeal,
1 To protect their privacy, we refer to the witnesses by their initials. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.90(b)(11).)
1
followed them. As they neared the apartment, one of the defendants fatally shot the
victim in the torso.
A jury found Jarmon and Long guilty of first degree felony murder and found true
the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed while defendants were
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery. The jury found all
three defendants guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted robbery. The trial
court sentenced Jarmon and Long to life without the possibility of parole for felony
murder and imposed and stayed sentences on the attempted robbery count.
On appeal, defendants argue the murder convictions and special circumstance true
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. They also contend there was an
instructional error with regard to the trial court’s felony-murder instructions and that the
prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the law of felony murder. Lastly,
defendants both argue that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on second degree
murder as a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder.
We will direct the abstracts of judgment corrected and affirm in all respects.
BACKGROUND
Second Amended Information
The second amended information charged Jarmon and Long in count one with
murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)2 The information alleged the special circumstance
that, in the commission of the murder, defendants were engaged in the commission of
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and the sentence enhancement that, in the commission of
the murder, defendants were armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The
information charged Jarmon and Long in count two with robbery in the second degree
(§ 211), and alleged that, in the commission of the robbery, defendants were armed with a
2 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2
firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In count three, the information charged Jarmon, Long,
and Johnson with attempted robbery in the second degree (§§ 664, 211), and further
alleged that in the commission of the attempted robbery, defendants were armed with a
firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The information alleged circumstances in aggravation as
to both Jarmon (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8)) and Long (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(8), (b)(2), (b)(3)). The information alleged Long had been convicted of three
prior serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)), and that he came
within the provisions of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12).
Trial
The Shooting
M.L. and B.T. lived in an apartment complex on Van Alstine Avenue in
Carmichael. They sold drugs out of the apartment.3 B.T. estimated that their operation
had 500 to 600 customers. In July 2021, the victim, B.T.’s brother, came to live in the
apartment. The victim would sometimes deliver drugs for M.L.
B.T. did not know Long or Jarmon. However, he knew codefendant Johnson, who
had been to the apartment more than 10 times to buy drugs. B.T. and M.L. would talk
about their business in front of Johnson. Johnson had also seen them counting a large
sum of money, nine to ten days before the homicide.
On December 7, 2021, (unless otherwise indicated, all events described occurred
on this date), B.T. and M.L. drove home from Las Vegas. Upon their return, before
leaving the apartment to go to his girlfriend’s house, B.T. observed that the victim was
having a disagreement over text messages with someone who was late to make a drug
purchase.
3 M.L. was granted use immunity. However, he refused to testify at trial, and the
trial court found him in contempt of court.
3
As B.T. was leaving the apartment complex, he saw S.R. and J.R., who frequently
visited the apartment, pull up in S.R.’s vehicle. In a surveillance video, S.R.’s white
Toyota RAV4 can be seen arriving at the apartment complex at approximately 9:50 p.m.
S.R. and J.R. came to the apartment complex to buy marijuana. When they arrived at the
apartment, M.L. and the victim were there. They all smoked marijuana and hung out for
15 to 20 minutes before the victim left the apartment. S.R. believed the victim was going
downstairs to deliver drugs to someone.
After a couple of minutes, S.R. heard a gunshot nearby. S.R. and J.R. wheeled
M.L., who was in a wheelchair, to his room, and then they ran to the bathroom and
locked the door. After several minutes, S.R. heard knocking at the front door, and heard
the victim yelling, “Help. Help. They shot me.” According to S.R., he and J.R. helped
the victim inside. S.R. and J.R. propped the victim up against a couch. Within five to ten
minutes, the victim was completely unresponsive. S.R. and J.R. acknowledged they did
not call 911. Nor did M.L.
M.L. suggested they leave as soon as possible because the assailants could return.
M.L. took the elevator down, and S.R. and J.R. followed. M.L. told S.R. to return to the
apartment to retrieve a shoebox, which he did. They all entered S.R.’s vehicle. Two or
three minutes later, S.R. heard sirens, and law enforcement arrived. S.R. admitted he did
not report to law enforcement that there was a gunshot victim upstairs in the apartment.
Deputies Austin Schraeder and Sean Woodward of the Sacramento County
Sheriff’s Office responded at 10:22 p.m. to the Van Alstine apartment complex following
a report of shots fired. Deputy Schraeder saw a white Toyota RAV4 with M.L., J.R., and
S.R. inside. Bystanders pointed at the vehicle and indicated that the occupants “were
related to the incident.” Deputies Schraeder and Woodward searched the occupants, but
found no firearm. Officers also conducted a brief search of the vehicle, but, again, found
no weapon. In a later, more comprehensive search of the RAV4, officers found $31,000
in cash and a large bag containing what appeared to be cocaine.
4
Meanwhile, while at his girlfriend’s house, B.T. received a call from M.L. telling
him that his brother had been shot. B.T. drove to the apartment complex and ran in.
Responding to the apartment complex based on a report of shots fired, Deputy Andrew
Durham encountered B.T., who was running towards the entrance. B.T. asked,
frantically, “Is he dead?” B.T. gave Deputy Durham his key fob so he could access the
stairwell and elevator.
Deputy Durham and two other deputies went to the second floor and approached
the apartment. Inside, Deputy Durham observed the victim on the living room floor,
propped up against a couch. He had sustained a gunshot wound to the lower abdomen.
The victim was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. The parties
stipulated that the pathologist’s autopsy findings indicated that the victim’s cause of death
was a gunshot wound to the torso.
In the apartment, law enforcement found a large amount of what appeared to be
drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, Xanax, and psilocybin mushrooms, as well as a
digital scale and $1,100 in cash. Deputy Durham testified that he could “assume that
sometimes drug dealers are armed.” Detective Brandon Wright testified that it would not
be uncommon to find a firearm in such a drug operation, but none was found. S.R. and
J.R. both testified that they had never seen a gun in the apartment.
Outside the apartment, Deputy Durham found a .40-caliber cartridge casing about
10 feet from the apartment door. He also observed a broken silver necklace on the floor
in front of the elevator. B.T. testified it was the victim’s chain.
Deputy Woodward took a statement from J.R. at the scene. J.R. said that he, S.R.,
and M.L. arrived at the apartment complex in S.R.’s car right before hearing a gunshot.
He told Deputy Woodward they “were just chilling in the car” at the time. Deputy
Woodward also interviewed S.R., whose statement was largely consistent with his trial
testimony.
5
Evidence from Cell Phone Records
Reviewing the records of a cell phone associated with Jarmon, Detective Richard
Hamilton found a text message exchange between Jarmon’s cell phone and the victim’s
cell phone that occurred between 8:56 and 9:33 p.m. At 8:56 p.m., a text message from
Jarmon’s cell phone to the victim’s cell phone said, “[y]ou online,” which, according to
Detective Hamilton, was a way of asking, “if you’re available to sell.” At 8:57 p.m.,
Jarmon’s cell phone texted, “VVS gave me yo [sic] number”; VVS was a moniker
associated with M.L. At 8:57 p.m., the victim’s cell phone responded, “Yeah, what do
you need?” and Jarmon’s cell phone replied, “2 grams can you come to me?” At 9:04
p.m., the victim’s cell phone supplied an address, and Jarmon’s cell phone responded that
he would be there in 15 minutes. At 9:15 p.m., the victim’s cell phone texted that the
price would be “80 a g,” meaning $80 per gram. At 9:23 p.m., Jarmon’s cell phone texted
asking, “Can u meet me a little closer,” and the victim’s cell phone replied, “I’m not
mobile till tomorrow g [sic] I’ve been drinking.” At 9:25 p.m., Jarmon’s cell phone
responded that he would be there in five minutes. At 9:33 p.m., the victim’s cell phone
texted Jarmon’s cell phone, “Wya,” meaning “[W]here you at.”
Having reviewed surveillance video from the Van Alstine apartment complex,
discussed post, Detective Hamilton testified that, at the time this text exchange was
taking place, some “parties of interest” were already at the apartment complex.
Consistently, Detective Wright testified that two of the individuals who were present at
the homicide could be seen on surveillance video at the apartment complex earlier in the
night. The records of a cell phone associated with Long indicated that, at 9:13 p.m., one
hour before the shooting, his cell phone received a call from codefendant Johnson’s cell
phone, and, at that time, Long’s cell phone connected with a cell tower in or near the Van
Alstine apartment complex. The same was true for another incoming call to Long’s cell
phone at 9:22 p.m.
6
Reviewing cell phone records associated with the victim’s cell phone, Detective
Hamilton saw that, at 10:10 p.m., approximately three minutes before the shooting, the
victim’s cell phone connected with Jarmon’s cell phone for a call lasting 12 seconds. At
that time, the victim can be seen on surveillance video at the apartment complex walking
towards the entrance gate to meet defendants.
Surveillance Video Evidence
At approximately 5:45 p.m. on the day of the shooting, Long and Jarmon
patronized a liquor store in Oakland, arriving in a Chevy Impala rental car. By 8:06 p.m.,
the Chevy Impala can be seen in surveillance video recorded at Johnson’s apartment
complex on Fair Oaks Boulevard in Sacramento. At 8:07 p.m., Long and Jarmon can
both be seen walking in the parking lot of that apartment complex.
Next, at approximately 8:53 p.m., the Chevy Impala can be seen parking in a
parking area at the Van Alstine apartment complex. No one emerges from the vehicle for
more than 10 minutes, until Long and Jarmon get out at approximately 9:06 p.m., walk
out of the frame, return to the vehicle approximately 10 minutes later, and drive away at
9:16 p.m. As stated, the text messages exchanged between Jarmon’s cell phone and the
victim’s cell phone about the purported drug buy occurred between 8:56 and 9:33 p.m.,
and thus, during much of this time, Long and Jarmon were at the apartment complex.
The Chevy Impala is next seen on video at approximately 9:42 p.m., back at
Johnson’s apartment complex. At 9:46 p.m., Johnson’s Lexus SUV can be seen driving
in the parking lot, and the Chevy Impala turns to follow it. At 9:49 p.m., Johnson’s Lexus
SUV can be seen driving in the parking lot with the Chevy Impala following directly
behind it. Surveillance video from a traffic camera at approximately 10:00 p.m. showed
the Chevy Impala and Johnson’s Lexus SUV driving, in tandem, in the direction of the
Van Alstine apartment complex.
Detective Alex Zakrzewski obtained surveillance video from a liquor store near
the Van Alstine apartment complex. At approximately 10:04 p.m., the Chevy Impala and
7
Johnson’s Lexus SUV can be seen pulling into the parking lot. After the cars park,
Johnson can be seen getting into the rear passenger seat of the Chevy Impala. At 10:07
p.m., the Chevy Impala leaves the parking lot and turns in the direction of the apartment
complex.
Detective Wright described what appeared in the surveillance video clips recorded
before, during, and after the shooting from a property adjacent to the apartment complex.
The shooting itself occurred out of the frame. The video shows part of one apartment
complex building, the driveway, a parking structure, and parked cars, the apartment
complex’s entrance gate, the street, and the opaque fence between the apartment complex
and the adjacent property. The digital time on the surveillance recording was accurate.
The parties do not dispute the identities of Jarmon, Long, Johnson, or the victim on the
recording.
Just before 10:11 p.m., Johnson can be seen, walking or running outside of the
apartment complex’s entrance gate. He stops after passing where the entrance gate
intersects with the opaque wooden fence separating the apartment complex and the
adjacent property. As seen in exhibit 1-24, a still photograph, that opaque wooden fence
extends toward the street, well beyond where it meets with the apartment complex
entrance gate, so someone could hide behind that portion of the fence, unseen by persons
inside the apartment complex’s driveway.
As the recording continues, the victim appears on the lower right corner of the
screen, coming from within the apartment complex, and walking towards the entrance
gate. As he approaches the entrance gate, Johnson, on the other side of the wooden fence,
appears to crouch down slightly. In the next clip, the victim continues walking toward
the entrance gate while two individuals outside the complex, Jarmon and Long, approach
the gate, where they meet the victim. Johnson remains behind the fence. The victim,
Jarmon, and Long interact near the entrance gate for about 15 seconds. Then the victim,
Jarmon, and Long walk together from the entrance gate towards the apartment from
8
where the victim came. Accompanied closely by Jarmon and Long, the victim can be
seen walking with his hands raised in the air. The three continue towards the apartment
building, the victim lowers his hands, and the three proceed out of the frame. Almost 40
seconds after Long and Jarmon began to lead the victim away, and after they exited the
frame, Johnson, dressed all in red, comes around from behind the wooden fence, climbs
over the entrance gate, and follows the other three.
The next clip begins with no one visible in the frame. Just over 30 seconds into
the clip, at 10:13:52 p.m., there is a loud noise which, according to Detective Wright,
sounded like a gunshot. Seconds later, Johnson can be seen fleeing out of the apartment
complex. Jarmon can then be seen running across the parking lot toward the entrance
gate. Meanwhile, after the gunshot, the victim’s voice can be heard screaming. Some of
the screams are unintelligible, but at one point, the victim yells out, “I’m hurt!” As the
next clip begins, Jarmon and Long can be seen fleeing, one after the other, out of the
apartment complex.
Almost two minutes elapsed between when defendants and the victim met at the
entrance gate and when the lone gunshot can be heard. The last defendant fleeing the
scene, Long, exits the frame at 10:14:14 p.m., approximately two minutes and 20 seconds
after the encounter began at the entrance gate.
On another surveillance video, Long and Jarmon can be seen walking the victim
up steps, around what appears to be S.R.’s vehicle, and toward the apartment. Detective
Wright testified that, later in the video, he observed two individuals running from the area
of the victim’s apartment towards a staircase leading to the lower level. Long can be seen
dropping something, stopping to pick it up, and then continuing to run down the stairs.
This occurred at approximately 10:13 p.m.
At 10:15 p.m., back at the nearby liquor store, Johnson can be seen walking into
the parking lot from the direction of the Van Alstine apartment complex. Within
approximately one minute, the Lexus SUV can be seen exiting the parking lot.
9
Detective Wright emphasized that, although the victim was shot at 10:13 p.m. and
he remained at the apartment complex until medical personnel transported him to the
hospital, at 10:20 p.m., his cell phone began moving. Detective Wright believed the cell
phone “moved from the crime scene and traveled to the area of Fair Oaks Boulevard and
Eastern Avenue.” A traffic camera video showed the Chevy Impala at the intersection of
Watt Avenue and Fair Oaks Boulevard at 10:20 p.m. Detective Wright testified that if a
car traveled along Fair Oaks Boulevard from Van Alstine Avenue, past Eastern Avenue,
the car could end up at the intersection of Watt Avenue and Fair Oaks Boulevard. Law
enforcement never found the victim’s cell phone.
Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found defendants guilty of first degree felony murder, and found true the
allegation that a principal in the commission of the offense was armed with a firearm.
The jury also found true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation. The jury
found defendants and Johnson not guilty of robbery on count two, but found them guilty
of the lesser included offense of attempted robbery. The jury also found true all
circumstances in aggravation alleged
The trial court sentenced Jarmon to life without the possibility of parole on count
one and one year for the firearm enhancement, and to the middle term of two years on
count two plus one year for the firearm enhancement, with the sentences imposed on
count two stayed. (§ 654.) The court sentenced Long to life without the possibility of
parole on count one and one year for the firearm enhancement, and to 25 years to life on
count two plus one year for the firearm enhancement, with the sentences on count two
stayed. (§ 654.)
10
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence of Felony Murder and the Special Circumstance
A. Defendants’ Contentions
Long argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s determination on the
felony-murder count and the special circumstance true finding. He argues that the
evidence demonstrated that he only participated in an armed attempted robbery, which is
legally insufficient to support a finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human
life. Jarmon joins in Long’s arguments. We will conclude that the jury’s verdicts and
special circumstance true findings are supported by substantial evidence.
B. Standard of Review
“The law governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges is well established and
applies both to convictions and special circumstance findings. [Citations.] In reviewing
a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment
below to determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—supporting the decision, and not whether the
evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We neither reweigh the
evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We presume in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the
evidence.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639.) “ ‘A reversal for
insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever
is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v.
Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)
11
C. Felony Murder
Murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain
enumerated felonies, including robbery, constitutes first degree felony murder. (§ 189,
subd. (a).) A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of one of the
enumerated felonies “in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not
the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in
the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life . . . .” (§ 189, subd. (e).) The felony-
murder special circumstance statute includes the same culpability requirements as those
found in section 189, subdivision (e). (See § 190.2, subds. (b)-(d).)
Both Long and Jarmon argue that substantial evidence does not support their
guilty verdicts and special circumstance true findings on the theories that they each were
the actual killer or that they each aided the actual killer with the intent to kill. Like the
People in their briefing, we focus on the theory pursued at trial, that defendants both were
major participants in the attempted armed robbery who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.
D. Major Participant in the Underlying Felony
The People correctly observe that neither Long nor Jarmon challenges the premise
that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that they were “major participants” in
the underlying felony. Long acknowledges “he was directly involved in the attempted
robbery,” and proceeds directly to a discussion of reckless indifference. Jarmon states the
culpability requirements to support a felony-murder guilty verdict and also focuses on
reckless indifference.
Substantial evidence shows that Long and Jarmon spent hours together before the
crime. They arrived at the apartment complex together. They confronted the victim
12
together at the entrance gate. They compelled the victim to walk into the apartment
complex together. And, after one of them shot the victim, they fled together.
E. Reckless Indifference to Human Life
“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective element.
[Citation.] As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly
involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and he or
she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’
[Citations.] As to the objective element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.” ’
[Citations.] ‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any
[violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish reckless indifference to human life; ‘only
knowingly creating a “grave risk of death” ’ satisfies the statutory requirement.
[Citation.] Notably, ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could
anticipate lethal force might be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to
human life.” (In re Scroggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677; accord, People v. Banks (2015)
61 Cal.4th 788, 808 (Banks).)
To determine whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life, a
reviewing court analyzes the totality of the circumstances. (In re Scroggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) “Relevant factors include: Did the defendant use or know that a gun
would be used during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the
defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain
the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the
perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or
her confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts
did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony? [Citation.]
13
‘ “[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, defendants attempted an armed robbery against a drug seller. More than
that, however, they confronted the victim at the apartment complex’s closed entrance gate
and forced him into the apartment complex and up to the second floor, where M.L.’s and
B.T.’s apartment was located. Johnson, defendants’ codefendant at trial, was a patron of
the drug operation who had visited the apartment more than 10 times to buy drugs. B.T.
and M.L. had talked about their business in front of him, and days before the shooting,
Johnson had seen them counting a large amount of money. The victim was shot within
feet of the apartment door, near which law enforcement found the victim’s necklace and a
cartridge casing. The jury could reasonably infer that the defendants intended not merely
to rob the victim, but to steal from the apartment and rob any occupants. Otherwise,
there would be no reason to force the victim toward the second-floor apartment. In fact,
both defendants in their briefing concede that the evidence supports an inference that they
intended to rob the drug dealers in the apartment.
Turning to the factual considerations highlighted by the Supreme Court (see In re
Scroggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677), we first address whether defendants used or knew
that a gun would be used during the felony. Long repeatedly argues that he was unarmed,
and that it was Jarmon who had the firearm. There is no evidence establishing that Long
was unarmed. In any event, under the relevant analysis, we need not decide whether it
was Jarmon who brandished the firearm, as Long argues, or address his arguments
concerning whether surveillance video establishes who was armed. One of the
defendants used a gun. The victim died from a gunshot wound to the torso, and a .40-
caliber cartridge casing was found at the scene. Furthermore, even if one of the
defendants was unarmed, the jury reasonably could have inferred that that particular
defendant knew that a gun would be used during the intended robbery. Again, defendants
intended to rob a drug seller, and they intended to steal from the apartment and rob
14
anyone in it, including the drug dealers themselves. The jury could reasonably infer that,
even if one of the defendants was unarmed, he knew his companion would bring a
firearm under these circumstances. It strains credulity to suggest that, not only was one
of the defendants unarmed, but that he did not know that a gun would be used in the
attempt to rob the victim, force him up to the apartment, and rob whoever happened to be
present in the drug dealers’ apartment.
With regard to how many weapons were used, it may be that both defendants were
armed. But we may not speculate since “[s]peculation is not substantial evidence.”
(People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851.) Substantial evidence, however,
supports the conclusion that at least one firearm was used in the attempted robbery.
Both defendants were physically present at the crime. The surveillance videos
demonstrate that, at all relevant times, both defendants were in the immediate presence of
each other and the victim. Both defendants thus would have had the opportunity to
“restrain the crime.” (In re Scroggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) Either defendant could
have encouraged flight rather than resort to gunfire. And if one of the defendants was
unarmed, that defendant could have attempted to restrain the shooter. We recognize that
the reality of the situation may have included the victim suddenly resisting and matters
escalating quickly. However, given the roughly two minutes between when defendants
met the victim at the entrance gate and when one of them shot the victim, we conclude
each defendant had the opportunity to restrain the crime by, for example, urging his
codefendant to abandon the undertaking.
Following the shooting, neither defendant exercised the opportunity to aid the
victim by summoning medical assistance. (See In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450,
465 [after hearing a gunshot fired by his confederate, the petitioner did nothing to aid the
victim].) Although a defendant’s actions after a shooting may not always be probative of
their mental state (see In re Scroggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 679-680; In re Taylor
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 559-560), defendants’ flight and failure to render aid were
15
factors the jury could consider (see Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 141; People v.
Bradley (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1034).
Defendants also heightened the risks inherent in the crime. Approximately two
minutes elapsed between when defendants and the victim met at the entrance gate and
when the gunshot could be heard. This was substantially longer than the interaction
could have been had defendants chosen merely to rob the victim at the gate. Instead, they
forced him towards the apartment, apparently with the intent to rob anyone inside.
Escorting the victim from the entrance gate took time, time defendants deemed
worthwhile to gain the bounty of what was in the apartment. This plainly heightened the
risk.
There is little evidence in the record to establish either defendant’s knowledge of
his confederate’s propensity for violence or the likelihood of using lethal force.
Defendants spent hours together before the shooting, including time at the apartment
complex, presumably planning their crime. It seems reasonable to infer, based on this
time together and its purpose, that defendants would each be aware of the other’s
background, propensity for violence, and the likelihood that lethal force might be used.
However, on this record, we conclude that this would be speculation.
There is no evidence that either defendant took any steps to minimize the risks of
violence during the felony.
In addition to the factual circumstances outlined by the Supreme Court, we
emphasize additional factors here. First, as stated, it would have been reasonable for the
jury to infer that defendants intended not merely to rob the victim, but to steal from the
apartment and rob its occupants. Defendants had knowingly set up a drug buy from the
victim, presumably as a pretext. And, based on their affiliation with Johnson, defendants
knew M.L. and B.T. were dealers with a significant drug trade operating out of the
apartment. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that defendants knew they
could face armed resistance. Jarmon argues that there was no evidence he or his
16
confederates knew the extent of the drug operation and that there was no evidence
codefendant Johnson had seen guns at the apartment. However, case law, and common
sense, support the premise that defendants, intending to rob one or more drug dealers,
would have known they could face armed resistance. (See People v. Bland (1995)
10 Cal.4th 991, 1005 [“Drug dealers are known to keep guns to protect not only
themselves, but also their drugs and drug proceeds”]; People v. Gallegos (2002)
96 Cal.App.4th 612, 629 [same]; see also People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 367
[firearms are “ ‘ “tools of the trade” ’ ” in narcotics business]; People v. Bradford (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 1733, 1739 [“it is common knowledge that perpetrators of narcotics
offenses keep weapons available to guard their contraband”].) Defendants’ knowing
choice to target and attempt to rob individuals reasonably likely to be armed substantially
heightened the risk of danger, escalating it from a “garden variety” armed robbery to one
involving a grave risk of deadly violence.
Jarmon suggests that, if the circumstances in Banks were not sufficient to establish
reckless indifference to human life, then they were not here either. Jarmon emphasizes
that, in Banks, the defendants attempted to rob a medical marijuana dispensary which had
a sally port, security cameras, and a security guard, and argues that the Supreme Court in
Banks “did not draw any inferences favorable to a finding of reckless indifference from
those facts.” Jarmon elides from his consideration of Banks the following: The security
guard’s “coworkers testified they believed he was an unarmed guard, and there was no
evidence [the defendant] believed otherwise, or even that he knew a guard would be
present. Because nothing in the record reflects that [the defendant] knew there would be
a likelihood of resistance and the need to meet that resistance with lethal force, the
evidence failed to show [the defendant] ‘knowingly engag[ed] in criminal activities
known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 811.) Conversely,
here, we have concluded it could properly be inferred that both defendants knew they
were going to attempt to rob drug dealers who might be armed. Moreover, the defendant
17
in Banks merely served as the getaway driver for the armed robbery, contributing to the
Supreme Court’s conclusion that he was no more culpable than the getaway driver in
Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, who defined the contours at the least culpable
end of the Enmund-Tison continuum (Banks, at p. 794). Here, both defendants were
directly, physically involved in the attempted robbery.
Additionally, we consider the setting for the crime. Defendants met the victim at
the entrance to a very large, four-building apartment complex, walked him across the
driveway and to one of the buildings, and upstairs, toward his apartment. These well-
populated surroundings further increased the risk of violence.
Considering the record and the totality of the circumstances in the light most
favorable to the judgment (People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 638), we conclude
substantial evidence supports the conclusion that defendants acted with reckless
indifference to human life by knowingly creating a grave risk of death in their
commission of the attempted robbery. We cannot say that “ ‘ “ ‘upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” ’ ” the jury’s verdicts and
special circumstance true findings. (People v. Penunuri, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 142.)
II
Instructional Error
A. Additional Background
The trial court instructed the jurors with the following instructions, reproduced
insofar as relevant to defendants’ contentions here.
CALCRIM No. 540A
“The defendants Tyrell Jarmon and Devonti Long are charged in Count 1 with
murder, under a theory of first degree felony murder. [¶] To prove that the defendant is
guilty of first degree murder under this theory, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant committed or attempted to commit a robbery; [¶] 2. The defendant intended
18
to commit a robbery [¶] AND [¶] 3. While committing or attempting to commit a
robbery, the defendant caused the death of another person.” (Italics added.)
CALCRIM No. 540B
“Defendants Tyrell Jarmon and Devonti Long are charged in Count One with
murder, under a theory of First Degree Felony Murder. [¶] A defendant may also be
guilty of murder, under a theory of felony murder, even if another person did the act that
resulted in the death. I will call the other person the perpetrator. [¶] To prove that a
defendant is guilty of first-degree murder under this theory, the People must prove that:
[¶] 1. The defendant committed or attempted to commit, or aided and abetted, a robbery
or attempted robbery; [¶] 2. The defendant intended to commit, or intended to aid and
abet the perpetrator in committing robbery [¶] 3. If the defendant did not personally
commit or attempt to commit robbery then a perpetrator, whom the defendant was aiding
and abetting, committed or attempted to commit robbery; [¶] 4. While committing or
attempting to commit a robbery the perpetrator caused the death of another person; [¶]
AND [¶] The defendant was a major participant in the robbery or attempted robbery;
AND [¶] When the defendant participated in the robbery or attempted robbery, he acted
with reckless indifference to human life. [¶] . . . [¶] You may not find the defendant
guilty of felony murder unless all of you agree that the defendant or a perpetrator caused
the death of another. You do not all need to agree, however, whether the defendant or a
perpetrator caused that death.” (Italics added.)
CALCRIM No. 703
“If you decide that a defendant is guilty of first degree murder but was not the
actual killer, then, when you consider the Special Circumstance of whether the murder
was committed during commission of a robbery or attempted robbery, you must also
decide whether the defendant acted either with intent to kill or with reckless
indifference to human life. [¶] In order to prove this Special Circumstance for a
defendant who is not the actual killer but who is guilty of first degree murder as an aider
19
and abettor, the People must prove either that the defendant intended to kill, or the People
must prove all of the following: [¶] 1. The defendant’s participation in the crime began
before or during the killing; [¶] 2. The defendant was a major participant in the crime;
[¶] AND [¶] 3. When the defendant participated in the crime, he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [¶] If the defendant was not the actual killer,
then the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with
either the intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life and was a major
participant in the crime for the Special Circumstance of murder during the commission of
a robbery or attempted robbery to be true.”
CALCRIM No. 730
“The defendants, Tyrell Jarmon and Devonti Long, are charged with the Special
Circumstance of murder committed while engaged in the commission of a robbery, or
attempted robbery. [¶] To prove that this Special Circumstance is true, the People must
prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant committed or attempted to commit, or aided and abetted
a robbery [¶] 2. The defendant intended to commit, or intended to aid and abet the
perpetrator in committing, a robbery [¶] 3. If the defendant did not personally commit or
attempt to commit a robbery, then a perpetrator, whom the defendant was aiding and
abetting before or during the killing, personally committed or attempted to commit a
robbery. [¶] AND [¶] Either Tyrell Jarmon or Devonti Long did an act that caused the
death of another person. [¶] . . . [¶] In addition, in order for this special circumstance
to be true, the People must prove that the defendant intended to commit a robbery
independent of the killing. If you find that the defendant only intended to commit murder
and the commission of a robbery was merely part of or incidental to the commission of
that murder, then the Special Circumstance has not been proved.” (Italics added.)
B. Defendants’ Contentions
Long argues that CALCRIM Nos. 540A, 540B, and 730 permitted the jurors to
find him guilty of felony murder and find true the robbery-murder special-circumstance
20
allegation based on a legally invalid theory. According to Long, the law requires a
finding that the perpetrator personally killed the victim or, in other words, was the actual
killer. The phrase in the instructions “ ‘caused the death of another,’ ” however,
described proximate cause, a standard that does not properly limit liability. Jarmon joins
Long, advancing the same arguments in his briefing. Following applicable case law, we
agree the instructions were erroneous. However, we conclude the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Forfeiture
“ ‘A trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate
statement of law without a request from counsel [citation], and failure to request
clarification of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of
appeal.’ [Citation.] ‘But that rule does not apply when . . . the trial court gives an
instruction that is an incorrect statement of the law.’ ” (People v. Garcia (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 123, 154 (Garcia).) Defendants’ primary argument is that the trial court
instructed the jury with a legally invalid theory. As such, they have not forfeited their
contention as the People claim. (Ibid. [same argument not forfeited because the
instruction was an incorrect statement of law].)
D. Analysis
“An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses
whether the instruction accurately states the law. [Citation.] In reviewing a claim of
instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the trial court’s instructions caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the
Constitution. [Citations.] The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the
instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
21
Several cases have addressed the claimed instructional error defendants raise here.
In Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 123, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 730
on the robbery murder special circumstance, including the requirement that the People
prove that the defendant “did an act that caused the death of another person.” (Garcia, at
pp. 149-150.) The defendant argued on appeal that CALCRIM No. 730 “failed to
properly limit the special circumstance liability to a defendant who actually killed,” and
the appellate court agreed. (Garcia, at p. 150.) The court found “the California Supreme
Court has used the term ‘personally killed’ when describing liability of an ‘actual killer’
for the felony-murder special circumstance,” and “ ‘[p]roximately causing and personally
inflicting harm are two different things.’ ” (Id. at p. 151.) The Court of Appeal
concluded that “the meaning of ‘actual killer’ under section 190.2[, subdivision] (b) is
literal. The actual killer is the person who personally kills the victim . . . .” (Id. at
p. 152.) The court concluded that the instruction’s language was based on a theory
contrary to law and constituted legal error. (Id. at p. 155.)
In People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, the jury found the defendant guilty of
first degree murder and found true a robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation.
(Id. at p. 10.) In relevant part, the court concluded that “the term ‘actual killer’ as used in
the revised felony-murder rule of section 189, subdivision (e)(1) refers to someone who
personally killed the victim and is not necessarily the same as a person who ‘caused’ the
victim’s death.” (Id. at p. 4.) Based on the jury instructions, “the jury necessarily found
that defendant ‘caused the death of another person’ and ‘did an act that caused the death
of another person,’ ” but “for defendant to be liable for felony murder under section
189[, subdivision ](e), based on the prosecution’s theory and the instructions given,
defendant would have to have been the ‘actual killer.’ ” (Id. at p. 16.) Like the court in
Garcia, the Lopez court found that “actual killer” means “personally killed.” (Id. at
pp. 16-17.)
22
The issue again arose in People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64. In Vang, a
different panel of this court concluded that, in “light of Senate Bill No. 1437’s intent to
impose punishment commensurate with the person’s culpability, . . . the term ‘actual
killer’ was intended to limit liability for felony murder—in cases where section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) or (3) do not apply—to the actual perpetrator of the killing, i.e., the
person (or persons) who personally committed the homicidal act.” (Id. at p. 88.) The
court further concluded: “The jury instructions here have the same flaw as those in
Garcia. They allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of felony murder, and to find the
special circumstance true, if it determined that defendant ‘caused’ [the victim’s] death
based on general causation principles, even if it did not find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that he personally committed the homicidal act. The instructions were inadequate
because jurors were not provided a proper definition of ‘actual killer.’ ” (Id. at p. 91.)
We see no reason to depart from the conclusions in Garcia, Lopez, and Vang. The
People have not offered any persuasive argument on this point. In fact, the People have
failed altogether to address this line of cases.
Here the instructions allowed the jury to find each defendant guilty of first degree
felony murder, and to find true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, upon
a finding that the defendant, or the perpetrator, “ ‘caused the death of another person’ ”
(CALCRIM Nos. 540A, 540B, 730) rather than requiring the jury to find that the
perpetrator personally killed the victim. This was legal error. (People v. Vang, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 91; Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.)
E. Prejudice
“Where, as here, the verdict was based on a legally invalid theory, reversal is
required unless we can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to
the verdict.” (People v. Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 91; see Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; see also People v. Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 671.) Here, we
can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
23
The victim died from a single gunshot wound to the torso. Only one gunshot can
be heard on the surveillance recording before defendants fled the scene. One expended
cartridge casing was discovered at the scene. The jury found true that a principal in the
commission of the murder—Long or Jarmon—was armed with a firearm. Johnson was
not present when defendants initially led the victim away, seemingly at gunpoint, was not
charged with the murder, and was not one of the defendants found to be armed under the
firearm enhancement attached to count one.
Defendants were tried only under the theory that they were each a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
The prosecution did not attempt to prove the identity of the actual killer or that either
defendant, with the intent to kill, aided the actual killer in the commission of murder.
Of course, one of the defendants was the actual killer. But the evidentiary
circumstances of this case made it difficult, if not impossible, to determinate which of
them personally killed the victim. However, “the jury need not decide unanimously
whether a defendant was a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor, so long as it is
unanimous that he was one or the other.” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 801.)
“ ‘Sometimes . . . the jury simply cannot decide beyond a reasonable doubt exactly who
did what. There may be a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the direct perpetrator,
and a similar doubt that he was the aider and abettor, but no such doubt that he was one
or the other.’ ” (People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 618.) The jury must
unanimously agree on the guilt of a murder. (Ibid.) “But additional unanimity is not
required. [Citation.] ‘Once the discrete event is identified, for example, the killing of a
particular human being, the theory each individual juror uses to conclude the defendant is
criminally responsible need not be the same and, indeed, may be contradictory.’
[Citation.] It suffices if the jury unanimously agrees that the prosecution has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt every element necessary to establish guilt of a discrete crime.”
(Ibid.)
24
The instructions here erroneously stated that, to find defendants guilty, the jurors
had to find that the defendant or a perpetrator “ ‘caused the death of another person.’ ”
(CALCRIM Nos. 540A, 540B.) Additionally, as argued by defendants, the prosecutor
expressly relied on this legally invalid theory in repeatedly emphasizing the language
invoking proximate causation. (See Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 156 [prosecutor
expressly relied on invalid legal theory].)
Nevertheless, under the facts of this case, the instructional error could not have
made any meaningful difference. There are no facts based on which the jury could have
concluded, as it did, that the perpetrator caused the death of the victim, that did not also
constitute the perpetrator personally killing the victim. Put another way, there would be
no way for the jury to conclude that, while the perpetrator caused the victim’s death by
the gunshot to the torso, the perpetrator did not also personally kill the victim with that
shot. And there was no evidence of a shooter other than Long or Jarmon.
Although the jury may not have been able to “ ‘decide beyond a reasonable doubt
exactly who did what,’ ” it was not required to do so. (People v. Smith, supra, 60 Cal.4th
618.) The jury’s verdict would not have differed if the trial court instructed the jury that
it must find that the defendant, or the perpetrator, “personally killed another person”
rather than “caused the death of another person.” This analysis applies with equal force
to the robbery murder special circumstance and CALCRIM No. 730.
There is no reasonable possibility that these instructional errors contributed to the
verdict. (See generally People v. Reese, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 671.)
F. Additional Claims of Instructional Error
Long makes additional instructional error claims under his primary argument. He
argues that CALCRIM No. 540B’s definition of “reckless indifference” was
“incomplete,” and that “ ‘reckless indifference’ requires further definition.” However, as
Long acknowledges, the definition of reckless indifference in CALCRIM No. 540B was
an accurate statement of law. (People v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County (2025)
25
107 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1279.) Long also argues, quoting language from Banks, that the
trial court should have instructed the jurors to assess the defendant’s personal role in the
crimes leading to the victim’s death. Banks was not a case addressing jury instructions.
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788.) In any event, CALCRIM No. 540B included numerous
factors for the jury to consider in assessing reckless indifference that directly addressed
the defendant’s role and culpability. Long’s contention is without merit.
Long also claims that there was not substantial evidence supporting the
CALCRIM No. 540A felony-murder instruction that the jury could find him guilty as the
actual killer. Substantial evidence to support a jury instruction “ ‘is evidence sufficient to
“deserve consideration by the jury,” that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find
persuasive.’ ” (People v. Kanawyer (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1243.) One of the two
defendants shot and killed the victim. Long and Jarmon can both be seen compelling the
victim to go into the apartment complex seemingly at gunpoint, although it is not clear
who was armed. Immediately after the shooting, as he flees from the apartment, Long
can be seen stopping to pick something up that he dropped. We conclude that substantial
evidence supported the instruction.
Lastly, Long argues that CALCRIM No. 703 was unclear because it “did not
specify that the defendant must have aided and abetted murder, the jury could have
interpreted the instruction to mean he could be convicted of murder for aiding and
abetting attempted robbery.” We disagree. A true finding on the special circumstance
can be based on, among other things, a defendant, not the actual killer, with reckless
indifference to human life and as a major participant, aiding and abetting the commission
of an enumerated felony which results in death. (§ 190.2, subd. (d).) CALCRIM No.
703’s references to the “crime” correctly refer to the underlying felony. CALCRIM No.
703 distinguishes between the crime and the homicide, reciting, for example, that the
“defendant’s participation in the crime began before or during the killing.” (CALCRIM
No. 703, italics added.) The instruction also directs the jury to consider, in deciding
26
whether defendant was a major participant, the defendant’s “role in planning the crime
that led to the death.” (CALCRIM No. 703.) This is obviously a reference to the
underlying crime, not to the resulting homicide, which may not have been planned. Even
if there were any ambiguity, it would be resolved by reference to CALCRIM No. 730.
(See People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644, 655 [jury instruction not considered in
isolation but in the context of the instructions as a whole].) That instruction discusses the
robbery murder special circumstance and specifically addresses finding a defendant
committed, attempted, or aided and abetted “a robbery” as opposed to “the crime.”
(CALCRIM No. 730.)
III
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Jarmon argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the law of
felony murder. Specifically, Jarmon faults the prosecutor for (1) suggesting defendants
could be jointly liable for each other’s actions, (2) urging the jurors to find defendants
guilty based on a “domino” or proximate cause theory of felony murder, (3) stating the
jury could find defendants guilty if either of them “was aware of the risk of life,”(4)
judging the gravity of the risk from the victim’s perspective, and (5) suggesting that the
reckless indifference standard was satisfied by mere awareness of the possibility of death.
Long joins in these arguments.
“ ‘A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury
commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal Constitution
when they infect the trial with such “ ‘unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process.’ ” [Citations.] Under state law, a prosecutor who uses such
methods commits misconduct even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally
unfair trial.’ ” (People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 359.)
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a “defendant must generally
object ‘in a timely fashion—and on the same ground,’ and must ‘request[] that the jury be
27
admonished to disregard the impropriety.’ ” (People v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022)
14 Cal.5th 1, 29.) As Jarmon acknowledges, his attorney did not object to the alleged
instances of misconduct. Thus, he has forfeited his contentions.
Turning to defendant’s alternative contention, to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 691-692; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217.) To
demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the defendant
would have achieved a more favorable result had counsel’s performance not been
deficient. (Strickland, at pp. 693-694; Ledesma, at pp. 217-218.)
One of Jarmon’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct—the prosecutor’s repeated
statements that the jury could find defendants guilty based on a “domino” or proximate
cause theory of felony murder—essentially consists of the prosecutor’s emphasis and
recharacterization of the legally erroneous instruction discussed in part II, ante. Given
our conclusion that the erroneous instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it
is even clearer that the prosecutor’s remarks were harmless under the lesser standard for
prejudice applicable to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. There is not a
reasonable probability that defendants would have achieved a more favorable result had
defendants’ trial attorneys objected to the prosecutor emphasizing the same standard.
Jarmon’s remaining claims relate to the prosecutor’s purported misstatements of
the law. Jarmon offers no particularized analysis as to how he was prejudiced by each
instance of alleged misconduct, or by the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s arguments.
In any event, the prosecutor’s misstatements were minor and fleeting. And, crucially, the
trial court instructed the jurors that they “must follow the law as I explain it to you, even
if you disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict
with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.” (CALCRIM No. 200.) “The
28
jury is presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions in the absence of any
indication it was unwilling or unable to do so.” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010)
50 Cal.4th 99, 196.)
Jarmon relies on People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, but the circumstances
of that case are not at all like those here. In Centeno, the Supreme Court stated that the
prosecutor “repeatedly suggested that the jury could find defendant guilty based on a
‘reasonable’ account of the evidence. These remarks clearly diluted the People’s burden”
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 673.) Centeno is distinguishable on
numerous grounds. First, Centeno addressed the fundamental issue of the dilution of the
prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, in Centeno, the
prosecutor’s dilution of the burden of proof “came in rebuttal, [and] defense counsel had
no opportunity to counter it with argument of his own.” (Id. at p. 676.) Here, the
prosecutor’s challenged remarks were not “the last word on the subject” (id. at p. 677),
because he made the remarks in his initial closing argument. Lastly, Centeno “was a very
close case,” as the People conceded. (Ibid.) This case, on the other hand, is not.
Even if trial counsels’ performances were deficient, there is not a reasonable
probability that defendants would have achieved a more favorable result had their
attorneys objected to the prosecutor’s remarks.
IV
Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense
Jarmon argues, and Long joins in the argument, that the trial court’s failure to
instruct on the lesser-included offense of second degree murder requires reversal. We
disagree.
“ ‘ “It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial
court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those
principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are
29
necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” [Citation.] That obligation has been
held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a
question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation],
but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged.’ ”
(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, disapproved on another ground in
People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.) The trial court is required to
instruct on a lesser included offense “whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only
of the lesser offense is ‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the jury.”
(Breverman, at p. 162.)
Our Supreme Court has not yet decided the question of whether second degree
murder is a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder. (People v. Westerfield
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 717; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 623.) Ultimately, we
need not analyze that issue here. We conclude that, even if second degree murder is a
lesser included offense, and even if an instruction on that offense was supported by
substantial evidence, the failure to give the instruction was harmless.
We assess prejudice based on a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a lesser
included offense supported by substantial evidence under the People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, state law standard for error. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186,
196, 198, 201.) Jarmon suggests that People v. Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th 237, changed
or called into question the applicable standard as stated in Gonzalez. However, Schuller
addressed the trial court’s error in denying the defendant’s request for an instruction on
imperfect self-defense and whether that error amounted to constitutional error. (Id. at
p. 243.) The Supreme Court in Schuller noted that, in Gonzalez, it did not address a
theory of federal constitutional error discussed by one of the dissenting Justices in
Breverman. (Id. at pp. 256-257; see People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 187,
189-191 [dis. opn. of Kennard, J.].) However, the Supreme Court further stated:
“Indeed, it does not appear that theory would have had any relevance to the type of error
30
at issue in Gonzalez because the omitted instructions in that case—lesser forms of
homicide—did not operate to negate or otherwise modify the elements of the charged
offense of felony murder, which does not require a showing of malice.” (Schuller, at
pp. 256-257.) “ ‘It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not
considered.’ ” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 566.) We follow Gonzalez and
apply the Watson standard for state law error. Under Watson, “ ‘a defendant must show it
is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the
error.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955.)
“ ‘Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, but
without the additional elements . . . that would support a conviction of first degree
murder. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Malice may be express or implied. [Citation.] Malice
will be implied ‘when the killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences
of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 623-624.)
Here, the evidence established that M.L. and B.T. sold drugs out of their apartment
and had hundreds of customers. Codefendant Johnson knew about this business, had
been to the apartment repeatedly to purchase drugs, B.T. and M.L. talked about their
business in front of him, and, nine to ten days before the homicide, Johnson saw them
counting a large amount of money. Both defendants concede that the evidence supports
an inference that they intended to rob the drug dealers in the apartment.
In the time before the shooting, Long and Jarmon went to Johnson’s apartment
complex, went to the Van Alstine apartment complex for approximately 20 minutes,
presumably to plan their robbery, returned to Johnson’s apartment complex, and then left,
following Johnson’s car to the liquor store near the Van Alstine apartment complex,
where Johnson exited his car and joined Long and Jarmon in the Chevy Impala.
31
Johnson, Long, and Jarmon approached the Van Alstine apartment complex on
foot. Long and Jarmon met the victim at the entrance gate, while Johnson remained
concealed. The victim, Jarmon, and Long interacted at the gate for about 15 seconds, and
then the victim, Jarmon, and Long walked together into the apartment complex, the
victim with his hands raised in the air. Johnson later emerged from hiding, climbed over
the entrance gate, and followed the others. Less than a minute later, one of the
defendants fatally shot the victim.
Outside of the apartment, law enforcement found a single cartridge casing and the
victim’s silver necklace on the ground. In the apartment, law enforcement found a large
amount of drugs, a digital scale, and $1,100 in cash. Additionally, the shoebox M.L. had
S.R. retrieve as they fled the apartment contained more than $31,000 in cash and a large
bag of cocaine.
Cell phone records established that, prior to these events, Jarmon exchanged a
number of text messages with the victim, purporting to set up a drug buy. During a
portion of the exchange, Jarmon and Long were actually in the apartment complex, but
did not disclose this to the victim.
As we have concluded, this constituted legally sufficient evidence to support
defendants’ convictions of first degree felony murder. The jury also found all three
defendants guilty of attempted robbery. We conclude that it is not reasonably probable
that, had the jury also been instructed on second degree murder, the jury would have
found defendants guilty of second degree murder rather than first degree felony murder.
In People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, disapproved on another ground in
People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th at pages 363 and 391, footnote 3, the Supreme Court
concluded that, although the trial court erred in failing to instruct on second degree
murder, the error was harmless. (Banks, at p. 1161.) There was “no reasonable
probability that the evidence of an argument between defendant and [the victim], minimal
as it was, would have led the jury, had it been properly instructed, to conclude that
32
defendant shot [the victim] at the ATM out of malice unrelated to any robbery.” (Ibid.)
Here, by the even greater force of reason, where there is a great deal of evidence
supporting the attempted robbery felony-murder theory, and no evidence supporting any
argument theory or other basis for malice, there is no reasonable probability the jury
would have concluded defendants shot the victim out of malice, unrelated to any
attempted robbery, and that they were therefore guilty of second degree murder rather
than first degree felony murder.
“To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported
by . . . citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Jarmon does not identify any evidence that would support
the conclusion that defendants could be convicted of second degree murder but not first
degree felony murder. Instead, he only notes that the “conscious disregard” standard
applicable to second degree murder is a lower one than the “reckless indifference”
standard. He argues, without any reference to facts in the record, that the “jury could
have concluded” that he only harbored “the less culpable mental state of conscious
disregard for human life.” He argues that a jury “faced with an all-or-nothing choice
between felony murder and acquittal will convict the defendant of murder, even though
the prosecution may have failed to prove this crime.” However, what he does not do is
guide us to evidence to support his claims.
Jarmon argues that, where no additional findings are required to reach a true
finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance beyond what is required for a guilty
verdict on the felony-murder count, that true finding does not render the error in failing to
instruct harmless. (See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 191, 206, fn. 6
[robbery-murder special-circumstance true finding rendered error in failing to instruct on
murder with malice aforethought or lesser included offenses harmless; however, “[w]e
express no opinion as to whether this conclusion would apply in cases where the special
circumstance finding does not require findings in addition to those necessary for a felony-
33
murder conviction . . . .”].) We would agree with Jarmon only insofar as stating that we
cannot find the error harmless based only on the special circumstance true finding.
However, we do not base our conclusion on that true finding.
Any error in not instructing the jury on second degree murder was harmless.
V
Abstracts of Judgment
Defendants’ abstracts of judgment erroneously state that the sentences imposed on
the attempted robbery counts, and the associated firearm enhancements, were imposed on
count three. However, count three was dismissed, and the jury found defendants guilty of
attempted robbery on count two as a lesser offense to the robbery charged in that count.
We shall order the abstracts corrected to reflect that defendants were convicted on count
two.
34
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare amended abstracts
of judgment reflecting that defendants were convicted of attempted robbery and
sentenced on count two, not count three, and to forward a certified copy of the amended
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Mauro, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Boulware Eurie, J.
35
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.