In re D.E. CA2/6

CourtListener 10596640Calctapp02.06.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/2/25 In re D.E. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re D.E., a Person Coming 2d. Juv. No. B337199
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. FJ57993)
Law. (Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.E.,

Defendant and Appellant.

D.E. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a
wardship petition alleging possession of a handgun by a minor
and placing him on probation. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 602; Pen.
Code, § 29610, subd. (a).) He contends insufficient evidence

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code, unless otherwise stated.
supports the petition and the court erroneously included a
maximum term of confinement. We strike the maximum term of
confinement but otherwise affirm.2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 2022, Officers Giron and Gutierrez from the
South Pasadena Police Department pulled over a car for speeding
and failing to signal when turning. Seventeen-year-old D.E. was
the driver and only occupant in the car. Officer Giron
approached D.E. and asked him for his driver’s license. D.E. did
not produce a license. At Officer Giron’s request, D.E. exited the
car. Officer Giron conducted a patdown search of D.E.’s person
and found a marker. D.E. told Officer Giron that he had clothes
in the car and gave him permission to search the car.
Officer Giron searched the inside of the car and located a
loaded .38 Special revolver inside an unzipped purse located
behind the front passenger seat. The purse was “within arm’s
reach” of the driver. The stock or handle of the firearm faced the
driver’s seat and the barrel pointed away. There were no objects
obstructing access to the firearm from the driver’s seat.
Near the purse in the rear passenger side area of the car
were “feminine items” including perfume and a woman’s bra.
Inside the car was a pouch with used makeup items. In the
trunk of the car was men’s clothing. Officer Gutierrez also
searched in the center console of the car and found live rounds of
ammunition, including .38 Special rounds, and several markers.
The center console lid was closed and the contents were not
visible to the “naked eye.”

2 We grant appellant’s unopposed motion to augment filed
April 17, 2025.

2
There were no fingerprints linking D.E. to the firearm or
ammunition. Nor was there evidence the car was registered to
D.E.
The District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition
against D.E. alleging he was a minor in possession of a handgun
(Pen. Code, § 29610, subd. (a); count 1) and live ammunition
(Pen. Code, §29650; count 2). The juvenile court heard testimony
from Officers Giron and Gutierrez, and reviewed their body
camera footage. The court sustained the section 602 petition only
as to count 1, finding that the “gun was in view of” D.E. because
it was a small car and one would see it “if one looked over their
shoulder even to turn around to drive carefully.” It declared
count 1 a misdemeanor, declared D.E. a ward of the court, and
placed him on home probation. It also set a maximum term of
confinement of six months.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the evidence
D.E. contends he was denied due process of law under the
federal and California constitutions because insufficient evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding that he possessed a
handgun. We are not persuaded.
Our review is limited to reviewing the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment and determining whether
substantial evidence supports it. (In re M.V. (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 1495, 1518.) To be substantial, evidence must be
reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re
Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.) We do not reweigh
credibility nor resolve evidentiary conflicts (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403), and we accept logical inferences from

3
circumstantial evidence. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th
327, 357.) A reasonable inference must be based on evidence
rather than speculation. (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353,
360.)
Penal Code section 29610, subdivision (a), prohibits a minor
from possessing a firearm. Possession may be actual or
constructive. (In re Charles G. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945, 951
(Charles G.).) An individual “has actual possession when the
weapon is in [their] immediate possession or control,” i.e., when
they are holding or touching it. (People v. Blakely (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 1042, 1052 (Blakely).) “ ‘To establish constructive
possession, the prosecution must prove a [person] knowingly
exercised a right to control the prohibited item, either directly or
through another person.’ ” (People v. Bay (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
126, 132 (Bay).)
The accused “does not avoid conviction if [their] right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where the
contraband was located is shared with others.” (People v.
Rushing (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 618, 622.) While possession may
be shared with others, mere proximity or opportunity to access a
firearm is not sufficient to infer possession. (Bay, supra, 40
Cal.App.5th at p. 132.) “Nor is knowledge of a gun’s presence.”
(In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 779 (I.A.).)
In Charles G., our colleagues in the First District noted
that “possession is far broader than carrying” and need not be
carried on an accused’s person. (Charles G., supra, 14
Cal.App.5th at p. 951.) Possession may encompass having the
firearm in a location under one’s control. (Ibid.) Possession is
also committed when the accused “ ‘in any way’ ” has a firearm
within their control; they need not be armed with it or have it

4
readily available to deploy. (Blakely, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p.
1052.)
The issue here is whether substantial evidence supports
the juvenile court’s finding that D.E. constructively possessed the
firearm.
We conclude it does. D.E. was the driver and only occupant
in the car, supporting the “inference that he had the right to
exercise . . . control” over the vehicle. (People v. Valerio (1970) 13
Cal.App.3d 912, 923.) The stock of the handgun was also in open
view, unobstructed, and within D.E.’s reach. Unlike the
ammunition located inside the closed center console, which was
not visible to the “naked eye,” the handgun was in plain view.
The juvenile court found that any driver, including D.E., would
have seen the handgun because the car was small and one would
see it “if one looked over their shoulder even to turn around to
drive carefully.” D.E. also told Officer Giron that there were
clothes inside the trunk of the car, supporting the inference that
he knew what was inside the car. Based on this evidence, it was
reasonable for the court to conclude that D.E. had knowledge of
the handgun. (See People v. Gant (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 420,
424-425 [car occupant’s knowledge inferred from proximity to
firearm].) Substantial evidence supports the finding that D.E.
constructively possessed the handgun.
Because there were no fingerprints tying D.E. to the
handgun nor evidence showing that D.E. owned the car, D.E.
contends that one could infer that the handgun belonged to the
owner of the car or the owner of the purse in which the handgun
was located. But that does not compel a contrary result. D.E.
had constructive possession of the firearm even though “his right
to exercise dominion and control over the place where the

5
contraband was located is shared with others.” (People v.
Rushing, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 622.) And possession of a
weapon “for even a limited time and purpose” may support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Daniel G.
(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 831.) The weighing of evidence and
resolution of evidentiary conflicts falls within the exclusive
province of the trier of fact. (In re M.S. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
1177, 1185.) “[R]eversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled
with a contrary finding.” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47,
60.)
D.E.’s reliance on I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th 767 is not
persuasive. There, we reversed a conviction for possessing a
concealable firearm because there was insufficient evidence the
juvenile “exercised dominion and control over the gun” that was
used to commit a murder. (Id. at p. 779.) But unlike I.A., D.E.
was the sole occupant inside the car where the handgun was
visible and it was within his reach. Substantial evidence
supports the charge here.
Maximum term of confinement
D.E. contends, and the Attorney General concedes, the
juvenile court erred when it set a maximum term of confinement.
We agree. Because D.E. was placed on probation, setting a
maximum term of confinement was improper because the
juvenile court did not remove D.E. from his parent’s physical
custody. (§ 726, subd. (d)(1); In re Matthew A. (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 537, 541.)
“[W]here a juvenile court’s order includes
a maximum confinement term for a minor who is not removed
from parental custody, the remedy is to strike the term.” (In re

6
A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 592.) Accordingly, we direct the
juvenile court to strike the reference to a maximum term of
confinement.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court is directed to amend the April 30, 2024,
minute order to delete references to a maximum term of
confinement. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.

7
Christina L. Hill, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Dee A. Hayashi and Keilana Truong, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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