CourtListener 10595763•People v. Cabrera
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/9/25; certified for publication 5/30/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B339998
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA080714)
v.
BRYAN CABRERA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Bess Stiffelman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Blake Armstrong, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, defendant Bryan Cabrera was convicted of first
degree murder for an offense he committed when he was 15 years
old. He was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. In 2023,
defendant filed a petition for recall and resentencing under Penal
Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A)1 (section 1170(d)(1)(A)),
which permits juvenile offenders sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) to petition for recall and
resentencing under certain circumstances. Defendant argued
that because his sentence was the functional equivalent of
LWOP, he was entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A). The
trial court denied the petition on the grounds that a sentence of
50 years to life is not the functional equivalent of LWOP and
defendant’s eligibility for a youthful offender parole hearing
under section 3051 rendered the issue moot. On appeal,
defendant contends the court erred in ruling his sentence of 50
years to life was not the functional equivalent of LWOP and his
eligibility for a youthful offender parole hearing under section
3051 did not preclude him from seeking relief under section
1170(d)(1)(A). The Attorney General agrees, as do we.
Accordingly, we reverse the court’s denial of defendant’s petition
and remand the case for the court to consider whether defendant
meets the other requirements for relief under section 1170,
subdivision (d).
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In 2006, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegations that a principal
personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm
causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d) & (e)(1)) and the offense
was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to
promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang
members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). The trial court sentenced
defendant to 50 years to life in state prison.
A prior panel of this division affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Cabrera (Jan. 18, 2008, B194832) [nonpub. opn.].)
On August 22, 2023, defendant filed a petition for recall
and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1)(A) and People v. Heard
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard). Defendant argued that
because his sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, he
was entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A). On
September 25, 2023, then represented by counsel, defendant filed
a second section 1170(d)(1)(A) petition that made the same
argument. That petition was followed by supplemental briefing
by counsel on the issue of whether a sentence of 50 years to life is
the functional equivalent of LWOP.
The trial court denied defendant’s petition. It ruled a
sentence of 50 years to life is not the functional equivalent of
LWOP. Further, defendant’s eligibility for a youthful offender
parole hearing under section 3051 rendered the issue moot.
2 We omit a recitation of the facts underlying defendant’s
conviction as they are not relevant to this appeal.
3
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides: “When a defendant who
was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment
for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for
at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing
court a petition for recall and resentencing.” Although section
1170(d)(1)(A) thus applies, by its own terms, to those juvenile
offenders sentenced to “imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole,” the Attorney General concedes that under
Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 698, juvenile offenders who have
been sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP are also
entitled to relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). The
Attorney General further states, “The California Supreme Court
has held that a 50-year-to-life sentence is the functional
equivalent of an LWOP term (People v. Contreras (2018) 4
Cal.5th 349, 369), and thus [defendant], who received the same
sentence, should be entitled to seek resentencing relief under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).” We agree.
Further, citing Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pages 628
through 629, the Attorney General concedes the trial court erred
in ruling that defendant’s eligibility for a youthful offender parole
hearing under section 3051 precluded defendant from seeking
relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A). We agree with Heard’s holding
that section 3051 eligibility does not defeat a defendant’s section
1170(d)(1)(A) petition. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 628–
629; People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 440 [“offenders
sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms . . . are entitled
to section 1170[, subdivision] (d) relief under the constitutional
4
guarantee of equal protection” and “parole eligibility under
section 3051 does not render those offenders ineligible for relief
under section 1170[, subdivision] (d)”].)
IV. DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1170(d)(1)(A)
petition is reversed and the matter is remanded. On remand, the
trial court is to consider whether defendant meets the other
requirements for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d).
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
BAKER, J.
5
People v. Cabrera, B339998
HOFFSTADT, P. J., concurring:
Were the slate clean, I would defer to our Legislature’s
decision as to where to draw the line between entitlement and
non-entitlement to relief under Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A)—at least in a case, like this one, where the
question presented is whether there is a rational basis to
distinguish a sentence of 50 years to life from an LWOP sentence.
However, our Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Contreras
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369 that “a sentence of 50 years to life is
functionally equivalent to LWOP” is, in my view, inescapable and
indistinguishable. (Cf. People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
499, 510-512 [distinguishing this language because it arose in the
context of an Eighth Amendment violation rather than an equal
protection violation].) I accordingly join the majority opinion.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
Filed 5/30/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B339998
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA080714)
v.
ORDER CERTIFYING
BRYAN CABRERA, OPINION FOR
PUBLICATION
Defendant and Appellant.
[NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
Non-party Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing Clinic has
requested that our opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed
May 9, 2025, be certified for publication. It appears that our
opinion meets the standards set forth in California Rules of
Court, rule 8.1105(c).
The majority and concurring opinions are ordered
published in the Official Reports.
HOFFSTADT, P. J. BAKER, J. KIM (D.), J.
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